Deep learning-based Natural Language Processing (NLP) models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, where small perturbations can cause a model to misclassify. Adversarial Training (AT) is often used to increase model robustness. However, we have discovered an intriguing phenomenon: deliberately or accidentally miscalibrating models masks gradients in a way that interferes with adversarial attack search methods, giving rise to an apparent increase in robustness. We show that this observed gain in robustness is an illusion of robustness (IOR), and demonstrate how an adversary can perform various forms of test-time temperature calibration to nullify the aforementioned interference and allow the adversarial attack to find adversarial examples. Hence, we urge the NLP community to incorporate test-time temperature scaling into their robustness evaluations to ensure that any observed gains are genuine. Finally, we show how the temperature can be scaled during training to improve genuine robustness.

Adversarial attack research in natural language processing (NLP) has made significant progress in designing powerful attack methods and defence approaches. However, few efforts have sought to identify which source samples are the most attackable or robust, i.e. can we determine for an unseen target model, which samples are the most vulnerable to an adversarial attack. This work formally extends the definition of sample attackability/robustness for NLP attacks. Experiments on two popular NLP datasets, four state of the art models and four different NLP adversarial attack methods, demonstrate that sample uncertainty is insufficient for describing characteristics of attackable/robust samples and hence a deep learning based detector can perform much better at identifying the most attackable and robust samples for an unseen target model. Nevertheless, further analysis finds that there is little agreement in which samples are considered the most attackable/robust across different NLP attack methods, explaining a lack of portability of attackability detection methods across attack methods.

In this paper, we consider the challenge of summarizing patients medical progress notes in a limited data setting. For the Problem List Summarization (shared task 1A) at the BioNLP Workshop 2023, we demonstrate that ClinicalT5 fine-tuned to 765 medical clinic notes outperforms other extractive, abstractive and zero-shot baselines, yielding reasonable baseline systems for medical note summarization. Further, we introduce Hierarchical Ensemble of Summarization Models (HESM), consisting of token-level ensembles of diverse fine-tuned ClinicalT5 models, followed by Minimum Bayes Risk (MBR) decoding. Our HESM approach lead to a considerable summarization performance boost, and when evaluated on held-out challenge data achieved a ROUGE-L of 32.77, which was the best-performing system at the top of the shared task leaderboard.

Deep learning based systems are susceptible to adversarial attacks, where a small, imperceptible change at the input alters the model prediction. However, to date the majority of the approaches to detect these attacks have been designed for image processing systems. Many popular image adversarial detection approaches are able to identify adversarial examples from embedding feature spaces, whilst in the NLP domain existing state of the art detection approaches solely focus on input text features, without consideration of model embedding spaces. This work examines what differences result when porting these image designed strategies to Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks - these detectors are found to not port over well. This is expected as NLP systems have a very different form of input: discrete and sequential in nature, rather than the continuous and fixed size inputs for images. As an equivalent model-focused NLP detection approach, this work proposes a simple sentence-embedding “residue” based detector to identify adversarial examples. On many tasks, it out-performs ported image domain detectors and recent state of the art NLP specific detectors.

Grammatical error correction (GEC) systems are a useful tool for assessing a learner’s writing ability. These systems allow the grammatical proficiency of a candidate’s text to be assessed without requiring an examiner or teacher to read the text. A simple summary of a candidate’s ability can be measured by the total number of edits between the input text and the GEC system output: the fewer the edits the better the candidate. With advances in deep learning, GEC systems have become increasingly powerful and accurate. However, deep learning systems are susceptible to adversarial attacks, in which a small change at the input can cause large, undesired changes at the output. In the context of GEC for automated assessment, the aim of an attack can be to deceive the system into not correcting (concealing) grammatical errors to create the perception of higher language ability. An interesting aspect of adversarial attacks in this scenario is that the attack needs to be simple as it must be applied by, for example, a learner of English. The form of realistic attack examined in this work is appending the same phrase to each input sentence: a concatenative universal attack. The candidate only needs to learn a single attack phrase. State-of-the-art GEC systems are found to be susceptible to this form of simple attack, which transfers to different test sets as well as system architectures,

Machine learning systems have shown impressive performance across a range of natural language tasks. However, it has been hypothesized that these systems are prone to learning spurious correlations that may be present in the training data. Though these correlations will not impact in-domain performance, they are unlikely to generalize well to out-of-domain data, limiting the applicability of systems. This work examines this phenomenon on text classification tasks. Rather than artificially injecting features into the data, we demonstrate that real spurious correlations can be exploited by current state-of-the-art deep-learning systems. Specifically, we show that even when only ‘stop’ words are available at the input stage, it is possible to predict the class significantly better than random. Though it is shown that these stop words are not required for good in-domain performance, they can degrade the ability of the system to generalize well to out-of-domain data.