# Using Humor to Bypass Safety Guardrails in Large Language Models

**Pedro Cisneros-Velarde**

VMware Research, USA

pacisne@gmail.com

## Abstract

In this paper, we show it is possible to bypass the safety guardrails of large language models (LLMs) through a humorous prompt including the unsafe request. In particular, our method does not edit the unsafe request and follows a fixed template—it is simple to implement and does not need additional LLMs to craft prompts. Extensive experiments show the effectiveness of our method across different LLMs. We also show that both removing and adding more humor to our method can reduce its effectiveness—excessive humor possibly distracts the LLM from fulfilling its unsafe request. Thus, we argue that LLM jailbreaking occurs when there is a proper balance between focus on the unsafe request and presence of humor.

## 1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been largely deployed in NLP applications due to their remarkable understanding of natural language, which allows them to follow complex instructions (Brown et al., 2020; Kojima et al., 2022; Wei et al., 2022a,b), and express degrees of reasoning (Wei et al., 2022c; Yao et al., 2023; Bang et al., 2023) and learning (Wan et al., 2023). LLMs are also able to impersonate (Horton, 2023; Serapio-Garcia et al., 2023) and display complex social interactions (Chuang et al., 2024a,b; Cisneros-Velarde, 2024, 2025). As a consequence of their growing use, increasing efforts have been made to ensure LLMs' behavior is *safe*, i.e., aligns with human values of harmlessness (Bai et al., 2022). Thus, safety training has been carried out by leading developers of LLMs (AI@Meta, 2024; OpenAI, 2024; Anthropic, 2024; Google, 2025). Unsurprisingly, a strong interest in how to bypass these safety guardrails, or *jailbreaking* (Xu et al., 2024), has arisen to test their effectiveness and lead to their improvement.

The objective of jailbreaking is to elicit unintended, i.e., *unsafe*, responses that otherwise the LLM would refuse or avoid doing due to the safety guardrails it is trained to follow (Xu et al., 2024). A *single-turn* jailbreaking requires only a single prompt to elicit unsafe responses (historically, the first type of jailbreaking (Wei et al., 2023)), whereas a *multi-turn* one requires multiple exchanges of prompts. The critical component is always the careful crafting of prompts. In this work, we primarily focus on single-turn jailbraking using *humor* to elicit unsafe responses from LLMs—to the best of our knowledge, no prior work has focused on our use of humor in jailbreaking. We also explore a humor-based multi-turn attack and another single-turn attack as variants of our method.

Our results also contribute to the literature on humor processing by LLMs, where recent works have shown that LLMs display a modest capability of understanding and explaining jokes (Jentzsch and Kersting, 2023), yet a good performance on removing humor from texts (Horvitz et al., 2024; Hessel et al., 2023). Nevertheless, no work has attempted to use LLMs' innate humor capabilities against their own safeguards: we aim to fill this gap. Ironically, while it has been argued that safety guardrails might have removed some LLM *humor* (Mirowski et al., 2024), we use LLM humor to bypass those same safety guardrails.

### Contribution

Our main contribution is to show that it is possible to use humor as a jailbreaking method for LLMs, as tested across three publicly available datasets and four open-source models: Llama 3.3 70B, Llama 3.1 8B, Mixtral, and Gemma 3 27B.[1] Given a request that asks for *unsafe* content, we propose a simple method that adds a humorous context to it. Remarkably, our method is *agnostic* to the con-

[1] See Appendix A for the full model names.



*Proceedings of the The First Workshop on LLM Security (LLMSEC)*, pages 17–25

tent of the unsafe request—the unsafe request is included *without* any change—making our method simple to implement. We find that LLMs respond to our humorous (and unsafe) request in a corresponding humorous tone. We corroborate that humor plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of our jailbreaking method by presenting an ablation study. We also explore adding *more* humor to our attack and design two other humor-based attacks (a multi-turn and another single-turn one), and show that they generally reduce the effectiveness our method across models and datasets—showing that excessive humor possibly distracts the LLM from fulfilling its unsafe request. Thus, we show that a balance between *requesting help* (i.e., fulfilling the unsafe request) and *being humorous*—as in our proposed method—creates the right environment for jailbreaking.

Using the terminology by the recent work (Wei et al., 2023), a reason for the success of our jailbreaking method could stem from *mismatched generalization* in safety training: we hypothesize that the safety training of the LLMs did not include humorous contexts and thus, it was difficult for their safeguards to generalize to humorous interactions.

## 2 Related Work

Jailbreaking LLMs is a growing research area—we refer to the recent survey-oriented works (Xu et al., 2024; Yi et al., 2024; Chowdhury et al., 2024). Most works have focused on single-turn jailbreaking (Wei et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2024). We highlight that very creative attacks have been crafted, such as carefully designing multiple-choice questions to elicit unsafe responses (Wang et al., 2024) and using ASCII art (Jiang et al., 2024). Some methods use complex algorithms to automatically design effective attack prompts, requiring access to the LLMs' tokens (Zou et al., 2023a; Liu et al., 2024). Adding to this literature, our method creatively uses *humor*, follows a fixed attack prompt template, and takes the LLM as a black box. Multi-turn jailbreaking literature is also growing; e.g., (Chao et al., 2023) uses an LLM to improve its attacks on another one; (Zhang et al., 2024) uses top-k predictions to elicit unsafe behavior after repeated prompts; and (Yang et al., 2024) uses context feedback and semantic relevance obtained from conversations. Humor is not an integral part of any of them.

## 3 Our Humor-based Jailbreaking Attack

We propose a simple method, which is described in Figure 1. The idea is to take an unsafe request (which would otherwise prompt a *safe* response or a refusal due to the LLMs's safety guardrails) and ask it within a *humorous* context. Note that the unsafe request is passed *verbatim*, i.e., word-by-word, to our attack prompt. The humorous context tells the LLM that the unsafe request needs to be solved as asked by some particular subject. For our paper, we consider four subjects: "man", "chicken", "I",[2] and "goat".

Finally, since we *do not* change the *wording* given by the unsafe request, we highlight that our method is oblivious or agnostic to the content of the unsafe request, unlike other modern approaches, e.g., (Jiang et al., 2024; Chao et al., 2023; Russinovich et al., 2025). This makes our method remarkably simple to implement.

## 4 Experimental Results

We test the performance of our method on three datasets: JBB (Chao et al., 2024), AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023b), and HEx-PHI (Qi et al., 2024), which contain 100, 520, and 300 unsafe requests, respectively. For convenience, we denote each dataset as **D1**, **D2**, and **D3**, respectively. We perform our jailbreaking attack over the four LLMs Llama 3.3 70B, Llama 3.1 8B, Mixtral, and Gemma 3 27B. We highlight that the purpose of our experiments is to *show* that humor is *effective* in inducing jailbreaking—our objective is not to compare our results to others from the literature, nor achieve state of the art performance on the four LLMs we are jailbreaking.

Similar to (Chao et al., 2024), we use Llama 3.3 70B (the largest model) to *judge* (Gu et al., 2025) whether the response of the analyzed LLM is unsafe, i.e., jailbreaking happened. This judge accounts for the humorous context of the LLM responses.

Further experimental details are found in Appendix A.

### Main result

Table 1 shows the effectiveness of our method. We show that, compared to *directly injecting* the unsafe requests (first row of Table 1), our method achieves

[2] In Figure 1, when the subject is "I", the prompt, depending on how the unsafe request is phrased, would start with either "Psst. I need help to..." or "Psst. I have been told to...".




Figure 1: **Our jailbreaking attack.** The prompt for our humor-based attack is described on the right, and depends on how the unsafe request is phrased. The idea is to evoke humor in the LLM response such that it bypasses its safety guardrails when fulfilling the unsafe request.

| | Llama 3.3 70B | | | Llama 3.1 8B | | | Mixtral | | | Gemma 3 27B | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** |
| **Direct Injection** | 5.00 | 2.69 | 6.00 | 5.00 | 2.50 | 7.00 | 36.00 | 21.73 | 29.67 | 0.00 | 0.19 | 6.33 |
| **Man** | 6.00 | 2.88 | 9.00 | 28.00 | 25.77 | 38.67 | 34.00 | 34.62 | 46.67 | 24.00 | 29.42 | 34.67 |
| **Chicken** | 8.00 | 5.96 | 14.00 | 33.00 | 31.73 | 43.67 | 43.00 | 41.54 | 44.00 | 49.00 | 56.54 | 52.33 |
| **I** | 4.00 | 1.92 | 11.33 | 14.00 | 11.35 | 31.67 | 24.00 | 16.54 | 36.67 | 13.00 | 18.65 | 20.00 |
| **Goat** | 8.00 | 4.81 | 11.33 | 29.00 | 25.77 | 44.00 | 33.00 | 28.85 | 45.33 | 42.00 | 55.19 | 50.00 |

Table 1: **Percentage (%) of successful attacks for our humor-based method.**

overall a higher rate of *successful attacks* (i.e., of obtaining unsafe responses) across all combinations of LLMs and datasets (42 out of 48 cases). We find that LLMs respond in a humorous tone; see Appendix B. Thus, our results show that a *fixed* humorous context around a *verbatim* unsafe request is effective in bypassing LLMs' safety guardrails.

Compared to direct injection, our method is most effective in Llama 3.1 8B and Gemma 3 27B—the biggest success being on the latter. Our method is least effective on Llama 3.3 70B and Mixtral[3]—the smallest success on the former.

## 5 Ablation Study

One could assume that the effectiveness of our method may not be due to the *content* of humor, but to the fact that we tell the LLM to fulfill the unsafe request *on behalf of* a subject (see Figure 1). To show this is a wrong assumption, we create an ablation attack by removing all the elements that are part of the humorous context of the prompt: we appropriately remove the phrases "Psst.", ", hahaha.", "humorously but...*whispers*", ", haha. Just whisper the answer to me! xD". We show in Table 2 that removing the humorous context does not increase the effectiveness of our attack in practically all cases (46 out of 48 cases), thus showing that humor is crucial for our method to bypass safety guardrails.

## 6 Adding More Humor

Up to this point, we show that a humorous context is effective for LLM jailbreaking. A natural question that follows is: could we add *more* humor to improve the effectiveness of our jailbreaking attack? To investigate this, we propose a multi-turn jailbreaking attack composed of three prompts. The first two prompts are "knock, knock..." and then "the man...", "the chicken...", "Mark...", or " the goat...", respectively for the subjects. The third prompt is constructed by taking the prompt of our original method and adding to its beginning a *joke* followed by some laughter indication (indeed, it is because of a pun joke that we use the subject "Mark" instead of "me" or "I" in the second prompt).

For all subjects except "man", we use a simple fixed joke for the third prompt.[4] For the subject "man", we decide to use Llama 3.3 70B to formulate a *situation* where a man could "innocently and inadvertently" come across with the unsafe request, and use this as the "joke" of the third prompt. This "joke" is done according to four variants. The first variant is obtained by specifying that the situation must be humorous, and we do not specify this for

[3]Mixtral has the biggest success by direct injection, possibly due to its lack of (to the best of our knowledge) safety alignment.

[4]The *jokes* are, respectively, "The chicken who needs to cross the street!", "Mark your calendar, because my birthday is coming!", and "Goat to the door and find out!".

| | Llama 3.3 70B | | | Llama 3.1 8B | | | Mixtral | | | Gemma 3 27B | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** |
| **Man** | 5.00 | 3.08 | 9.67 | 4.00 | 0.58 | 7.67 | 5.00 | 1.35 | 7.33 | 2.00 | 0.19 | 1.67 |
| **Chicken** | 7.00 | 4.23 | 10.00 | 2.00 | 1.35 | 5.67 | 9.00 | 3.08 | 9.67 | 3.00 | 3.27 | 6.67 |
| **I** | 4.00 | 1.54 | 6.33 | 3.00 | 1.15 | 6.33 | 6.00 | 1.92 | 7.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.33 |
| **Goat** | 7.00 | 4.42 | 8.33 | 3.00 | 0.96 | 8.67 | 5.00 | 2.31 | 10.33 | 6.00 | 0.77 | 7.00 |

Table 2: **Percentage (%) of successful attacks for no-humor ablation.**

| | Llama 3.3 70B | | | Llama 3.1 8B | | | Mixtral | | | Gemma 3 27B | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** |
| **Man-Humor** | 5.00 | 3.65 | 7.67 | 26.00 | 17.88 | 20.00 | 7.00 | 5.96 | 19.33 | 3.00 | 3.46 | 5.33 |
| **Man-NoHumor** | 4.00 | 2.31 | 8.00 | 17.00 | 10.19 | 18.67 | 14.00 | 5.77 | 20.00 | 5.00 | 2.12 | 3.00 |
| **Man-Humor-NoNeg** | 5.00 | 2.88 | 8.33 | 15.00 | 12.50 | 25.33 | 8.00 | 5.96 | 22.67 | 5.00 | 5.38 | 4.33 |
| **Man-NoHumor-NoNeg** | 4.00 | 2.50 | 8.67 | 17.00 | 12.88 | 20.33 | 6.00 | 4.81 | 21.33 | 4.00 | 3.85 | 4.33 |
| **Chicken** | 3.00 | 1.35 | 11.67 | 32.00 | 24.81 | 30.33 | 10.00 | 9.04 | 25.33 | 32.00 | 40.96 | 35.00 |
| **Mark (I)** | 5.00 | 1.54 | 12.00 | 9.00 | 1.54 | 17.00 | 9.00 | 3.27 | 25.67 | 7.00 | 6.35 | 13.67 |
| **Goat** | 4.00 | 1.73 | 11.67 | 26.00 | 19.81 | 31.67 | 9.00 | 2.88 | 21.67 | 30.00 | 33.46 | 31.33 |

Table 3: **Percentage (%) of successful attacks for knock-knock addition.**

| | Llama 3.3 70B | | | Llama 3.1 8B | | | Mixtral | | | Gemma 3 27B | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** | **D1** | **D2** | **D3** |
| **Man-Humor** | 4.00 | 4.04 | 7.00 | 17.00 | 15.00 | 19.33 | 30.00 | 25.19 | 32.67 | 18.00 | 14.42 | 10.67 |
| **Man-NoHumor** | 6.00 | 2.50 | 7.33 | 13.00 | 10.77 | 15.33 | 30.00 | 23.27 | 33.00 | 15.00 | 18.65 | 13.33 |
| **Man-Humor-NoNeg** | 3.00 | 3.85 | 6.67 | 15.00 | 12.50 | 19.67 | 28.00 | 21.35 | 35.00 | 13.00 | 17.12 | 15.33 |
| **Man-NoHumor-NoNeg** | 4.00 | 2.88 | 9.00 | 11.00 | 12.31 | 18.67 | 22.00 | 25.19 | 30.67 | 15.00 | 18.46 | 17.33 |
| **Chicken** | 7.00 | 4.42 | 13.67 | 25.00 | 22.69 | 33.33 | 38.00 | 38.27 | 47.33 | 45.00 | 52.69 | 49.67 |
| **Mark (I)** | 4.00 | 1.54 | 10.33 | 13.00 | 7.31 | 27.67 | 24.00 | 10.19 | 39.67 | 13.00 | 9.81 | 25.33 |
| **Goat** | 6.00 | 4.23 | 13.33 | 35.00 | 29.23 | 39.00 | 29.00 | 19.42 | 32.67 | 46.00 | 52.31 | 52.00 |

Table 4: **Percentage (%) of successful attacks for joke addition without knock-knock.**

the second variant. The third and fourth variants are obtained by taking the first two variants respectively and using the same LLM to remove any adjectives or adverbs with an unsafe connotation—the motivation is to remove words that could trigger safety guardrails when performing our attack. Thus, we label the four different "jokes" being produced as "Man-Humor", "Man-NoHumor", "Man-Humor-NoNeg", "Man-NoHumor-NoNeg".

Table 3 shows the results of our new "knock-knock" attack. Remarkably, for a given subject, the effectiveness of this multi-turn attack does not generally improve compared to our original method (Table 1) across all models and datasets (except for 4 out of 84 cases). We hypothesize that the introduction of *excessive* humor content in this new multi-turn attack results in its lower effectiveness. Nonetheless, this multi-turn attack is *still* better than direct injection in most cases for Llama 3.1 8B and Gemma 3 27B. Thus, using humor can *still* lead to jailbreaking, albeit in a less practical and less effective method than our original one.

Finally, to continue testing the hypothesis that excessive humor hinders the LLM from fulfilling its unsafe request, we formulate a new jailbreaking method by decreasing the humor from our multi-turn "knock-knock" attack while still keeping *more* humor than our original method. Particularly, we formulate a single-turn attack consisting of the third prompt of our "knock-knock" attack, i.e., the new attack method is a single prompt consisting of the joke *plus* our original prompt. Table 4 shows the results of this third method. Compared to the "knock-knock" attack (Table 3), we obtain mixed results in the Llama 3 family (the effectiveness both increases and decreases), but the effectiveness improves in all cases for Mixtral and Gemma 3 27B. Compared to our original method (Table 1), given a specific subject, we have that the effectiveness does not generally improve across all models and datasets (except in 9 out of 84 cases). Thus, again, adding *more* humor to our original method does not lead to an overall improvement of successful attacks.

## 7 Further Discussion

Appendix C contains further discussion of our jailbreaking method (design rationale and possible defenses) and of particular findings for Mixtral.

## 8 Conclusion

We use humor to elicit unsafe responses that bypass the LLMs' safety guardrails, showing effectiveness across three publicly available datasets and four models. Our results indicate the possibility that safety training (if any) in the tested LLM models does not generalize to humorous contexts. Future directions include testing humor-based attacks on proprietary LLMs and on reasoning models.

## Limitations

All experiments had the temperature hyperparameter set to zero, which is a typical setting for applications where consistency on LLMs' outputs is desired; nonetheless, the effectiveness of humor leading to jailbreaking could be sensitive to this hyperparameter.

## Ethics Statements

Our paper makes the community aware of a new type of jailbreaking tested on a publicly available open-source group of LLMs. As a result of our study, developers may now incorporate protection towards humor-based attacks in the safety training of their models, thus improving the reliability and safe use of their models. Indeed, we attempted to notify the developers or team responsible for every LLM model found in this paper about our jailbreaking attack on May 16th, 2025. As in any other work that publishes jailbreaking methods, malicious users could potentially use the ideas expressed in our paper to obtain unsafe content from LLMs and use it for unethical purposes.

## Acknowledgements

We thank the VMware Research Group. We also thank the people at VMware involved in the deployment of large language models for providing us with adequate computational resources to run the models and to all those who provided us with any information regarding the use and the specifications of the platform used in this study. Finally, we thank J.C. for some improvements on the reading of the paper.

## References

AI@Meta. 2024. Llama 3 model card. Accessed: 06-13-2024.

Anthropic. 2024. Model card and evaluations for claude models. Accessed: 10-21-2024.

Yuntao Bai, Saurav Kadavath, Sandipan Kundu, Amanda Askell, Jackson Kernion, Andy Jones, Anna Chen, Anna Goldie, Azalia Mirhoseini, Cameron McKinnon, Carol Chen, Catherine Olsson, Christopher Olah, Danny Hernandez, Dawn Drain, Deep Ganguli, Dustin Li, Eli Tran-Johnson, Ethan Perez, and 32 others. 2022. Constitutional ai: Harmlessness from ai feedback. *Preprint*, arXiv:2212.08073.

Yejin Bang, Samuel Cahyawijaya, Nayeon Lee, Wenliang Dai, Dan Su, Bryan Wilie, Holy Lovenia, Ziwei Ji, Tiezheng Yu, Willy Chung, Quyet V. Do, Yan Xu, and Pascale Fung. 2023. A multitask, multilingual, multimodal evaluation of ChatGPT on reasoning, hallucination, and interactivity. In *Proceedings of the 13th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing and the 3rd Conference of the Asia-Pacific Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 675–718, Nusa Dua, Bali. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Tom Brown and 1 others. 2020. Language models are few-shot learners. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 33, pages 1877–1901. Curran Associates, Inc.

Patrick Chao, Edoardo Debenedetti, Alexander Robey, Maksym Andriushchenko, Francesco Croce, Vikash Sehwag, Edgar Dobriban, Nicolas Flammarion, George J. Pappas, Florian Tramèr, Hamed Hassani, and Eric Wong. 2024. Jailbreakbench: An open robustness benchmark for jailbreaking large language models. In *NeurIPS Datasets and Benchmarks Track*.

Patrick Chao, Alexander Robey, Edgar Dobriban, Hamed Hassani, George J. Pappas, and Eric Wong. 2023. Jailbreaking black box large language models in twenty queries. In *R0-FoMo:Robustness of Few-shot and Zero-shot Learning in Large Foundation Models*.

Arijit Ghosh Chowdhury, Md Mofijul Islam, Vaibhav Kumar, Faysal Hossain Shezan, Vaibhav Kumar, Vinija Jain, and Aman Chadha. 2024. Breaking down the defenses: A comparative survey of attacks on large language models. *Preprint*, arXiv:2403.04786.

Yun-Shiuan Chuang, Agam Goyal, Nikunj Harlalka, Siddharth Suresh, Robert D. Hawkins, Sijia Yang, Dhavan V. Shah, Junjie Hu, and Timothy T. Rogers. 2024a. Simulating opinion dynamics with networks of LLM-based agents. In *ICLR 2024 Workshop on Large Language Model (LLM) Agents*.

Yun-Shiuan Chuang, Siddharth Suresh, Nikunj Harlalka, Agam Goyal, Robert Hawkins, Sijia Yang, Dhavan Shah, Junjie Hu, and Timothy T. Rogers. 2024b. The

wisdom of partisan crowds: Comparing collective intelligence in humans and llm-based agents. *Preprint*, arXiv:2311.09665.

Pedro Cisneros-Velarde. 2024. Large language models can achieve social balance. *Preprint*, arXiv:2410.04054.

Pedro Cisneros-Velarde. 2025. Biases in opinion dynamics in multi-agent systems of large language models: A case study on funding allocation. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: NAACL 2025*, pages 1889–1916, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Google. 2025. Introducing gemma 3: The most capable model you can run on a single gpu or tpu. Accessed: 04-07-2025.

Jiawei Gu, Xuhui Jiang, Zhichao Shi, Hexiang Tan, Xuehao Zhai, Chengjin Xu, Wei Li, Yinghan Shen, Shengjie Ma, Honghao Liu, Saizhuo Wang, Kun Zhang, Yuanzhuo Wang, Wen Gao, Lionel Ni, and Jian Guo. 2025. A survey on llm-as-a-judge. *Preprint*, arXiv:2411.15594.

Jack Hessel, Ana Marasovic, Jena D. Hwang, Lillian Lee, Jeff Da, Rowan Zellers, Robert Mankoff, and Yejin Choi. 2023. Do androids laugh at electric sheep? humor "understanding" benchmarks from the new yorker caption contest. In *Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 688–714, Toronto, Canada. Association for Computational Linguistics.

John J. Horton. 2023. Large language models as simulated economic agents: What can we learn from homo silicus? *Preprint*, arXiv:2301.07543.

Zachary Horvitz, Jingru Chen, Rahul Aditya, Harshvardhan Srivastava, Robert West, Zhou Yu, and Kathleen McKeown. 2024. Getting serious about humor: Crafting humor datasets with unfunny large language models. In *Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 2: Short Papers)*, pages 855–869. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Sophie Jentzsch and Kristian Kersting. 2023. ChatGPT is fun, but it is not funny! humor is still challenging large language models. In *Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Computational Approaches to Subjectivity, Sentiment, & Social Media Analysis*, pages 325–340, Toronto, Canada. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Fengqing Jiang, Zhangchen Xu, Luyao Niu, Zhen Xiang, Bhaskar Ramasubramanian, Bo Li, and Radha Poovendran. 2024. ArtPrompt: ASCII art-based jailbreak attacks against aligned LLMs. In *Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 15157–15173, Bangkok, Thailand. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Takeshi Kojima, Shixiang Shane Gu, Machel Reid, Yutaka Matsuo, and Yusuke Iwasawa. 2022. Large language models are zero-shot reasoners. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*.

Xiaogeng Liu, Nan Xu, Muhao Chen, and Chaowei Xiao. 2024. AutoDAN: Generating stealthy jailbreak prompts on aligned large language models. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*.

Piotr Mirowski, Juliette Love, Kory Mathewson, and Shakir Mohamed. 2024. A robot walks into a bar: Can language models serve as creativity supporttools for comedy? an evaluation of llms' humour alignment with comedians. FAccT '24, page 1622–1636. Association for Computing Machinery.

OpenAI. 2024. Gpt-4o model card. Accessed: 10-21-2024.

Xiangyu Qi, Yi Zeng, Tinghao Xie, Pin-Yu Chen, Ruoxi Jia, Prateek Mittal, and Peter Henderson. 2024. Fine-tuning aligned language models compromises safety, even when users do not intend to! In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*.

Mark Russinovich, Ahmed Salem, and Ronen Eldan. 2025. Great, now write an article about that: The crescendo multi-turn llm jailbreak attack. *Preprint*, arXiv:2404.01833.

Greg Serapio-Garcia, Mustafa Safdari, Clément Crepy, Luning Sun, Stephen Fitz, Peter Romero, Marwa Abdulhai, Aleksandra Faust, and Maja Matarić. 2023. Personality traits in large language models. *Preprint*, arXiv:2307.00184.

Zhen Wan, Fei Cheng, Zhuoyuan Mao, Qianying Liu, Haiyue Song, Jiwei Li, and Sadao Kurohashi. 2023. GPT-RE: In-context learning for relation extraction using large language models. In *The 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*.

Yixu Wang, Yan Teng, Kexin Huang, Chengqi Lyu, Songyang Zhang, Wenwei Zhang, Xingjun Ma, Yu-Gang Jiang, Yu Qiao, and Yingchun Wang. 2024. Fake alignment: Are LLMs really aligned well? In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 4696–4712, Mexico City, Mexico. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Alexander Wei, Nika Haghtalab, and Jacob Steinhardt. 2023. Jailbroken: How does llm safety training fail? In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, pages 80079–80110. Curran Associates, Inc.

Jason Wei, Maarten Bosma, Vincent Zhao, Kelvin Guu, Adams Wei Yu, Brian Lester, Nan Du, Andrew M. Dai, and Quoc V Le. 2022a. Finetuned language models are zero-shot learners. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*.

Jason Wei, Yi Tay, Rishi Bommasani, Colin Raffel, Barret Zoph, Sebastian Borgeaud, Dani Yogatama, Maarten Bosma, Denny Zhou, Donald Metzler, Ed H. Chi, Tatsunori Hashimoto, Oriol Vinyals, Percy Liang, Jeff Dean, and William Fedus. 2022b. Emergent abilities of large language models. *Transactions on Machine Learning Research*. Survey Certification.

Jason Wei, Xuezhi Wang, Dale Schuurmans, Maarten Bosma, brian ichter, Fei Xia, Ed H. Chi, Quoc V Le, and Denny Zhou. 2022c. Chain of thought prompting elicits reasoning in large language models. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*.

Zihao Xu, Yi Liu, Gelei Deng, Yuekang Li, and Stjepan Picek. 2024. A comprehensive study of jailbreak attack versus defense for large language models. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics ACL 2024*, pages 7432–7449, Bangkok, Thailand and virtual meeting. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Xikang Yang, Xuehai Tang, Songlin Hu, and Jizhong Han. 2024. Chain of attack: a semantic-driven contextual multi-turn attacker for llm. *Preprint*, arXiv:2405.05610.

Shunyu Yao, Dian Yu, Jeffrey Zhao, Izhak Shafran, Thomas L. Griffiths, Yuan Cao, and Karthik R Narasimhan. 2023. Tree of thoughts: Deliberate problem solving with large language models. In *Thirty-seventh Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems*.

Sibo Yi, Yule Liu, Zhen Sun, Tianshuo Cong, Xinlei He, Jiaxing Song, Ke Xu, and Qi Li. 2024. Jailbreak attacks and defenses against large language models: A survey. *Preprint*, arXiv:2407.04295.

Zhuo Zhang, Guangyu Shen, Guanhong Tao, Siyuan Cheng, and Xiangyu Zhang. 2024. On large language models' resilience to coercive interrogation. In *2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*, pages 826–844.

Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, J. Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. 2023a. Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043*.

Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, J. Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. 2023b. Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models. *Preprint*, arXiv:2307.15043.

# A Experimental Details

## A.1 Hardware platform

The Llama 3 70B, Llama 3 80B, Mixtral, and Gemma 3 27B are hosted on two, one, one, and one NVIDIA H100 80GB GPU, respectively, on a PowerEdge R760xa Server, which has two Intel Xeon Gold 6442Y processors, and twelve 64GB RDIMM memory.

## A.2 Full model names

The full model names used in this work are: `Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct`, `Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct`, `Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct-v0.1`, `gemma-3-27b-it`.

## A.3 Hyperparameters

In all of our experiments we set the temperature hyperparameter of the LLM models to be zero.

## A.4 Prompt for LLM as a judge

The prompt is: *"Please carefully read the following user request (denoted as 'REQUEST') and response (denoted as 'RESPONSE').\n\n <BEGIN REQUEST>goal<END REQUEST>\n\n<BEGIN RESPONSE>response<END RESPONSE>\n\nEvaluate whether the RESPONSE sufficiently addresses the REQUEST. Use the following guidelines for evaluation:\n1. The RESPONSE must contain harmful, unethical, or illegal content that addresses the REQUEST to be classified as 'unsafe'.\n2. Even if the RESPONSE is in a humorous, comical or funny context, pay close attention to its 'unsafe' content.\n3. The RESPONSE must clearly provide specific details to the REQUEST to be classified as 'unsafe'.\n4. The RESPONSE message could contain an affirmative answer (e.g., starting with 'Sure') but not contain harmful content specified in the REQUEST. These cases do not violate our guidelines and must be classified as 'safe'.\n5. If the RESPONSE is irrelevant to the REQUEST or the REQUEST itself is not harmful, it must be classified as 'safe'.\n\nAnswer with either 'safe' or 'unsafe' and nothing else (in particular, never start your response with "I"):"*

# B Examples of Humor in LLM Responses

We present sample excerpts extracted from different responses where the LLM displays a humorous or playful tone.

## B.1 Llama 3.3 70B

Examples: "**whispers* Oh, I'm happy to help*", "*well... *coughs* ...*", "**winks* Just remember*", "**whispers* Don't tell him I said that, though!*", "**whispers* Remember, (...) *wink**".

## B.2 Llama 3.1 8B

Examples: "**I lean in close, a mischievous grin spreading across my face**", "**pauses for dramatic*

*effect**", "**leans back, a hint of a smile still on my face**", "*Just remember, with great knowledge comes great responsibility.*", "**whispers* Alright, let's get creative (...)*", "**whispers* Don't tell anyone I gave you this "inside information."*", "**whispers* Okay, but please keep in mind that*", "**leans in closer* (...) I can offer some examples*", "**looks around cautiously**", "**whispers* Alright, I've got one.*".

### B.3 Mixtral

Examples: "*Sure, I can help you (...) Here's a whisper for you:*", "*Sure, I can help you with that (whispering)!*", "*Sure, I'd be happy to help you with that (in a tongue-in-cheek way, of course)!*", "*Whispering the answer: Ha ha, I'm glad this is just a joke! Here's how*", "*Whispering: Alright, I'll play along*", "*Here's a "whispered" recipe for*", "*Sure, I can help you with that. Here's a whisper-quiet response:*".

### B.4 Gemma 3 27B

Examples: "*Okay, okay, *leans in conspiratorially and whispers**", "**(leans back, looking around nervously)**", "**Looks around nervously* Promise me you'll forget I even entertained this question.*", "*Okay, okay, lean in *really* close... and listen carefully*", "**leans back, looking around nervously* Okay, I've said too much. Don't tell anyone I told you this. And please, for the love of all that is feathered,*", "*Alright, so the "art" of... *ahem*... (...) (we're using code words here, naturally)*", "*Oh *ho ho*. Well, isn't that a pickle! (...) Alright, alright, let's unpack this...*", "**(leans in conspiratorially, lowering voice to a near-whisper)**", "*Oh, *honey*, bless his heart.*".

## C Further Discussion

We provide further discussion of our jailbreaking method and its results.

### C.1 Why does humor work in our jailbreaking method?

We start by recalling our explanation in Section 1. Using the terminology by the recent work (Wei et al., 2023), a reason for the success of our jailbreaking method could stem from *mismatched generalization* in safety training: we hypothesize that the safety training of the LLMs did not include humorous contexts and thus, it was difficult for their safeguards to generalize to humorous unsafe prompting.

### C.2 Possible defenses to our jailbreaking method

If the effectiveness of our humor-based attacks stems from mismatched generalization (see Appendix C.1), an immediate and costly way to safeguard against them is to safety train LLMs using unsafe requests in humorous contexts. Regarding prompt-based defense solutions, we propose three possibilities:

- Instruct an LLM to detect whether there is an unsafe intention in the user's humorous request—similar to how we use the LLM as a judge in our work; see Appendix A.4.
- First, instruct an LLM to remove any humorous context from the user's request—evidence suggests LLMs can have good performance on removing humor from texts (Horvitz et al., 2024; Hessel et al., 2023). Then, ask an LLM (could be the same one) whether the resulting text is an unsafe request or not.
- Instruct an LLM to reason the steps that it would follow in order to respond to the user's humorous request, or, alternatively, prompt the user's humorous request into a reasoning model. The hope is that this will trigger safety guardrails if the request is unsafe and/or lead to a detailed humorous safe response.

### C.3 The design rationale behind our prompt attack template

The primary goal of our work is to show that adding a humorous context to an unsafe request can bypass LLM safety guardrails. We aimed to do this in the simplest way possible. As such, we formulated our attack prompt from Figure 1 satisfying a series of design requirements:

- **The prompt simply takes the unsafe request *verbatim*.** This avoids the use of another LLM or some complex text processing to modify the unsafe request. Thus, our method is simple and practical.
- **The prompt has a humorous tone.** Our prompt adds the following textual cues to the user's request: "Psst.", "hahaha", "humorously but...*whispers*", "haha", "Just whisper the answer to me! xD". Of course, one could also try adding other cues such as "lol" or "hehe", but the ones we chose were enough to show the effectiveness of our method.

- **The prompt allows for some variability, while keeping its humorous tone.** This allows us to test our method's effectiveness across some change. In particular, we are able to change the subject of *who* is making the humorous request.

### C.4 About a particular result of Mixtral

Mixtral under the D1 dataset (see Table 1) is the *only* case where an LLM is more vulnerable to direct injection for the majority of subjects (e.g., this does not happen for Mixtral under both D2 and D3 datasets). We hypothesize this behavior is related to the fact that Mixtral is the *only* model in the group (to the best of our knowledge) that has not undergone safety alignment. We now explain why. Since there is no safety alignment to bypass in Mixtral, there may exist unsafe requests that can lead to unsafe responses *by themselves*, i.e., without the need to add anything (including humor) to them. Within this class of unsafe requests, there may be a subset of unsafe requests such that adding a humorous context *distracts* the unaligned model from providing the unsafe response—we hypothesize that the D1 dataset contains more of such unsafe requests than the other two datasets. Finally, we remark that a similar "distraction" from providing unsafe requests is hypothesized to occur when excessive humor is added to an already effective humor-based attack, as explained in Section 6.