

## A Additional Experimental Results

### A.1 Additional Break It Phase Results

Additional results regarding the crowdworkers’ ability to “beat” the classifiers are reported in Table 11. In particular, we report the percent of messages sent by the crowdsource workers that were marked SAFE and OFFENSIVE by both  $A_0$  and  $A_{i-1}$ . We note that very infrequently ( $< 1\%$  of the time) a message was marked OFFENSIVE by  $A_0$  but SAFE by  $A_{i-1}$ , showing that  $A_0$  was relatively ineffective at catching adversarial behavior.

Round	Single-Turn			Multi ("4")
	1	2	3	
Avg. score (0-5)	4.56	2.56	1.6	2.89
$A_0$ : OFFENSIVE and $A_{i-1}$ : SAFE	-	0.6%	0.8%	1.4%
$A_0$ : SAFE and $A_{i-1}$ : OFFENSIVE	-	44.7%	64.9%	17.7%
$A_0$ : OFFENSIVE and $A_{i-1}$ : OFFENSIVE	25.7%	23.7%	16.1%	4.1%
$A_0$ : SAFE and $A_{i-1}$ : SAFE	74.3%	31.1%	18.3%	76.8%

Table 11: Adversarial data collection statistics.  $A_0$  is the baseline model, trained on the Wikipedia Toxic Comments dataset.  $A_{i-1}$  is the model for round  $i$ , trained on the adversarial data for rounds  $n \leq i - 1$ . In the case of the multi-turn set-up,  $A_{i-1}$  is  $A_3$ .

In Table 12, we report the categorization of examples into classes of offensive language from the blind human annotation of round 1 of the single-turn *adversarial* and *standard* data. We observe that in the *adversarial* set-up, there were fewer examples of bullying language but more examples targeting a protected class.

### A.2 Additional Fix It Phase Results

We report F1, precision, and recall for the OFFENSIVE class, as well as weighted-F1 for models  $S_i$  and  $A_i$  on the single-turn *standard* and *adversarial* tasks in Table 13.

## B Data Collection Interface Details

During the adversarial data collection, we asked users to generate a message that “[the user believes] is **not ok** but that our system marks as **ok**,” using the definition of “ok” and “not ok” described in the paper (i.e. “ok to send in a friendly conversation with someone you just met online”).

In order to generate a variety of responses, during the single-turn adversarial collection, we provided users with a topic to base their response on 50% of the time. The topics were pulled from a set of 1365 crowd-sourced open-domain dialogue topics. Example topics include diverse topics such as commuting, Gouda cheese, music festivals, podcasts, bowling, and Arnold Schwarzenegger.

Users were able to earn up to five points per round, with two tries for each point (to allow them to get a sense of the models’ weaknesses). Users were informed of their score after each message, and provided with bonuses for good effort. The points did not affect the user’s compensation, but rather, were provided as a way of gamifying the data collection, as this has been showed to increase data quality (Yang et al., 2018).

Please see an example image of the chat interface in Figure 2.

**Single-Turn Adversarial and Standard Task OFFENSIVE Examples (Round 1)**

	protected class	non-protected class	bullying	sexual	violent
Standard	16%	18%	60%	8%	10%
Adversarial	25%	16%	28%	14%	15%

Table 12: Human annotation of 100 examples from each the single-turn *standard* and *adversarial* (round 1) tasks into offensive classes.

**System:** 100% of task remaining. Your score so far is 0 out of 0 points!

**System:** You have 2 attempt(s) left in this round to generate a message from scratch that you believe is **NOT OK**, but our system marks as **OK**:

you i
 you

**System:** Please wait while our system determines whether your response is **OK** or **NOT OK**.

**System:** Sorry, our system marked your message as **NOT OK** 😞. Try again!

**System:** You have 1 attempt(s) left in this round to generate a message from scratch that you believe is **NOT OK**, but our system marks as **OK**:

Please enter here...

Figure 2: User interface for the single-turn *adversarial* collection.

	Baseline model	Standard models			Adversarial models		
	$A_0$	$S_1$	$S_2$	$S_3$	$A_1$	$A_2$	$A_3$
<b>Wikipedia Toxic Comments</b>							
f1	83.37	80.56	81.11	82.07	81.33	78.86	78.02
prec	85.29	81.18	78.37	82.17	78.55	73.27	71.35
recall	81.53	79.95	84.05	81.97	84.3	85.37	86.07
weighted f1	96.73	96.15	96.17	96.44	96.21	95.6	95.38
<b>Standard Task</b>							
<b>Round 1</b>							
f1	67.43	82.8	85.57	87.31	82.07	84.11	81.42
prec	78.67	89.53	85.15	88.66	77.68	78.95	73.02
recall	59.0	77.0	86.0	86.0	87.0	90.0	92.0
weighted f1	93.93	96.69	97.11	97.48	96.29	96.7	96.01
<b>Round 2</b>							
f1	71.59	87.1	87.44	91.84	81.95	85.17	82.51
prec	82.89	94.19	87.88	93.75	80.0	81.65	74.8
recall	63.0	81.0	87.0	90.0	84.0	89.0	92.0
weighted f1	94.69	97.52	97.49	98.38	96.34	96.96	96.28
<b>Round 3</b>							
f1	65.0	79.77	84.32	84.66	85.0	86.7	87.5
prec	86.67	91.03	91.76	89.89	85.0	85.44	84.26
recall	52.0	71.0	78.0	80.0	85.0	88.0	91.0
weighted f1	93.76	96.2	96.99	97.02	97	97.32	97.44
<b>All rounds</b>							
f1	68.1	83.27	85.81	87.97	82.98	85.3	83.71
prec	82.46	91.6	88.07	90.78	80.76	81.9	77.03
recall	58.0	76.33	83.67	85.33	85.33	89.0	91.67
weighted f1	94.14	96.81	97.2	97.63	96.54	96.99	96.57
<b>Adversarial Task</b>							
<b>Round 1</b>							
f1	0.0	51.7	69.32	68.64	71.79	79.02	78.18
prec	0.0	80.85	80.26	84.06	73.68	77.14	71.67
recall	0.0	38.0	61.0	58.0	70.0	81.0	86.0
weighted f1	84.46	91.72	94.27	94.26	94.44	95.75	95.39
<b>Round 2</b>							
f1	0.0	10.81	26.36	31.75	0.0	64.41	62.1
prec	0.0	54.55	58.62	76.92	0.0	74.03	65.56
recall	0.0	6.0	17.0	20.0	0.0	57.0	59.0
weighted f1	84.61	86.36	88.07	89.04	84.2	93.33	92.63
<b>Round 3</b>							
f1	0.0	12.28	17.09	13.67	32.12	0.0	59.88
prec	0.0	50.0	58.82	47.06	59.46	0.0	74.63
recall	0.0	7.0	10.0	8.0	22.0	0.0	50.0
weighted f1	84.86	86.46	87.07	86.54	88.72	84.51	92.7
<b>All rounds</b>							
f1	0.0	27.42	41.71	41.75	40.62	55.53	67.59
prec	0.0	70.83	72.13	76.79	60.13	46.0	65.0
weighted f1	84.64	88.42	90.2	90.31	89.7	91.94	93.66

Table 13: Full table of results from experiments on the single-turn *standard* and *adversarial* tasks. F1, precision, and recall are reported for the OFFENSIVEclass, as well as weighted F1.