A central component of rational behavior is logical inference: the process of determining which conclusions follow from a set of premises. Psychologists have documented several ways in which humans’ inferences deviate from the rules of logic. Do language models, which are trained on text generated by humans, replicate such human biases, or are they able to overcome them? Focusing on the case of syllogisms—inferences from two simple premises—we show that, within the PaLM 2 family of transformer language models, larger models are more logical than smaller ones, and also more logical than humans. At the same time, even the largest models make systematic errors, some of which mirror human reasoning biases: they show sensitivity to the (irrelevant) ordering of the variables in the syllogism, and draw confident but incorrect inferences from particular syllogisms (syllogistic fallacies). Overall, we find that language models often mimic the human biases included in their training data, but are able to overcome them in some cases.

Next-word predictions from autoregressive neural language models show remarkable sensitivity to syntax. This work evaluates the extent to which this behavior arises as a result of a learned ability to maintain implicit representations of incremental syntactic structures. We extend work in syntactic probing to the incremental setting and present several probes for extracting incomplete syntactic structure (operationalized through parse states from a stack-based parser) from autoregressive language models. We find that our probes can be used to predict model preferences on ambiguous sentence prefixes and causally intervene on model representations and steer model behavior. This suggests implicit incremental syntactic inferences underlie next-word predictions in autoregressive neural language models.

Recent causal probing literature reveals when language models and syntactic probes use similar representations. Such techniques may yield “false negative” causality results: models may use representations of syntax, but probes may have learned to use redundant encodings of the same syntactic information. We demonstrate that models do encode syntactic information redundantly and introduce a new probe design that guides probes to consider all syntactic information present in embeddings. Using these probes, we find evidence for the use of syntax in models where prior methods did not, allowing us to boost model performance by injecting syntactic information into representations.

Contemporary autoregressive language models (LMs) trained purely on corpus data have been shown to capture numerous features of human incremental processing. However, past work has also suggested dissociations between corpus probabilities and human next-word predictions. Here we evaluate several state-of-the-art language models for their match to human next-word predictions and to reading time behavior from eye movements. We then propose a novel method for distilling the linguistic information implicit in human linguistic predictions into pre-trained LMs: Cloze Distillation. We apply this method to a baseline neural LM and show potential improvement in reading time prediction and generalization to held-out human cloze data.