Language technologies that accurately model the dynamics of events must perform commonsense reasoning. Existing work evaluating commonsense reasoning focuses on making inferences about common, everyday situations. To instead investigate the ability to model unusual, unexpected, and unlikely situations, we explore the task of uncommonsense abductive reasoning. Given a piece of context with an unexpected outcome, this task requires reasoning abductively to generate an explanation that makes the unexpected outcome more likely in the context. To this end, we curate and release a new English language corpus called UNcommonsense. We characterize the performance differences between human explainers and the best-performing large language models, finding that model-enhanced human-written explanations achieve the highest quality by trading off between specificity and diversity. Finally, we experiment with several imitation learning algorithms to train open and accessible language models on this task. When compared with the vanilla supervised fine-tuning approach, these methods consistently reduce lose rates on both common and uncommonsense abductive reasoning judged by human evaluators.

As natural language becomes the default interface for human-AI interaction, there is a need for LMs to appropriately communicate uncertainties in downstream applications. In this work, we investigate how LMs incorporate confidence in responses via natural language and how downstream users behave in response to LM-articulated uncertainties. We examine publicly deployed models and find that LMs are reluctant to express uncertainties when answering questions even when they produce incorrect responses. LMs can be explicitly prompted to express confidences, but tend to be overconfident, resulting in high error rates (an average of 47%) among confident responses. We test the risks of LM overconfidence by conducting human experiments and show that users rely heavily on LM generations, whether or not they are marked by certainty. Lastly, we investigate the preference-annotated datasets used in post training alignment and find that humans are biased against texts with uncertainty. Our work highlights new safety harms facing human-LM interactions and proposes design recommendations and mitigating strategies moving forward.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate an amazing proficiency and fluency in the use of language. Does that mean that they have also acquired insightful linguistic knowledge about the language, to an extent that they can serve as an “expert linguistic annotator’? In this paper, we examine the successes and limitations of the GPT-3, ChatGPT, and GPT-4 models, focusing on the Abstract Meaning Representation (AMR) parsing formalism (Banarescu et al., 2013), which provides rich graphical representations of sentence meaning structure while abstracting away from surface forms. We compare models’ analysis of this semantic structure across two settings: 1) direct production of AMR parses based on zero- and few-shot examples, and 2) indirect partial reconstruction of AMR via metalinguistic natural language queries (e.g., “Identify the primary event of this sentence, and the predicate corresponding to that event.”). Across these settings, we find that models can reliably reproduce the basic format of AMR, as well as some core event, argument, and modifier structure-however, model outputs are prone to frequent and major errors, and holistic analysis of parse acceptability shows that even with few-shot demonstrations, models have virtually 0% success in producing fully accurate parses. Eliciting responses in natural language produces similar patterns of errors. Overall, our findings indicate that these models out-of-the-box can accurately identify some core aspects of semantic structure, but there remain key limitations in their ability to support fully accurate semantic analyses or parses.

The common practice for training commonsense models has gone from–human–to–corpus–to–machine: humans author commonsense knowledge graphs in order to train commonsense models. In this work, we investigate an alternative, from–machine–to–corpus–to–machine: general language models author these commonsense knowledge graphs to train commonsense models. Our study leads to a new framework, Symbolic Knowledge Distillation. As with prior art in Knowledge Distillation (Hinton et al. 2015), our approach uses larger models to teach smaller models. A key difference is that we distill knowledge symbolically–as text–in addition to the neural model. We distill only one aspect–the commonsense of a general language model teacher, allowing the student to be a different type, a commonsense model. Altogether, we show that careful prompt engineering and a separately trained critic model allow us to selectively distill high-quality causal commonsense from GPT-3, a general language model. Empirical results demonstrate that, for the first time, a human-authored commonsense knowledge graph is surpassed by our automatically distilled variant in all three criteria: quantity, quality, and diversity. In addition, it results in a neural commonsense model that surpasses the teacher model’s commonsense capabilities despite its 100x smaller size. We apply this to the ATOMIC resource, and will share our new symbolic knowledge graph and commonsense models.