    In conclusion, the cause of the accident was the strength of the supporting concrete and the anchor point/bolts for the static line that was used by the hoisting system, both of which were critical safety variables. At the time of the accident, no limitations on these critical variables had been established, although Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories personnel tested the concrete, it was not done before the accident occurred. What should of happened and what should happen in the future is a decision making process for critical safety variables should be established based on written procedures, and written procedures for the workers to follow and reference should be created. For example the scaffolding system used in Willow Island should have been based off the results of an intense testing program that would determine the minimum safety strength that the concrete required and how long it would take for the concrete to harden to that point so the forms could be safely removed. Aswell, this accident helped push forward more formal training programs for workers. In the report on Willow Island by the Governor’s Commission it was found that “Because of the word-of-mouth training that is a natural part of the work environment and because there were no written specifications available for reference, workers could inadvertently make gradual modifications that might compromise the design and cause conditions beyond the limitations of the material”. As a result major industry-wide improvements have been made to hopefully prevent any future accidents, and I do not believe this system of constructing cooling towers was used again.
