Existing methods for generating adversarial code examples face several challenges: limted availability of substitute variables, high verification costs for these substitutes, and the creation of adversarial samples with noticeable perturbations. To address these concerns, our proposed approach, RNNS, uses a search seed based on historical attacks to find potential adversarial substitutes. Rather than directly using the discrete substitutes, they are mapped to a continuous vector space using a pre-trained variable name encoder. Based on the vector representation, RNNS predicts and selects better substitutes for attacks. We evaluated the performance of RNNS across six coding tasks encompassing three programming languages: Java, Python, and C. We employed three pre-trained code models (CodeBERT, GraphCodeBERT, and CodeT5) that resulted in a cumulative of 18 victim models. The results demonstrate that RNNS outperforms baselines in terms of ASR and QT. Furthermore, the perturbation of adversarial examples introduced by RNNS is smaller compared to the baselines in terms of the number of replaced variables and the change in variable length. Lastly, our experiments indicate that RNNS is efficient in attacking defended models and can be employed for adversarial training.

Backdoor attacks for neural code models have gained considerable attention due to the advancement of code intelligence. However, most existing works insert triggers into task-specific data for code-related downstream tasks, thereby limiting the scope of attacks. Moreover, the majority of attacks for pre-trained models are designed for understanding tasks. In this paper, we propose task-agnostic backdoor attacks for code pre-trained models. Our backdoored model is pre-trained with two learning strategies (i.e., Poisoned Seq2Seq learning and token representation learning) to support the multi-target attack of downstream code understanding and generation tasks. During the deployment phase, the implanted backdoors in the victim models can be activated by the designed triggers to achieve the targeted attack. We evaluate our approach on two code understanding tasks and three code generation tasks over seven datasets. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our approach effectively and stealthily attacks code-related downstream tasks.