Toxicity text detectors can be vulnerable to adversarial examples - small perturbations to input text that fool the systems into wrong detection. Existing attack algorithms are time-consuming and often produce invalid or ambiguous adversarial examples, making them less useful for evaluating or improving real-world toxicity content moderators. This paper proposes an annotation pipeline for quality control of generated toxic adversarial examples (TAE). We design model-based automated annotation and human-based quality verification to assess the quality requirements of . Successful should fool a target toxicity model into making benign predictions, be grammatically reasonable, appear natural like human-generated text, and exhibit semantic toxicity. When applying these requirements to more than 20 state-of-the-art (SOTA) TAE attack recipes, we find many invalid samples from a total of 940k raw TAE attack generations. We then utilize the proposed pipeline to filter and curate a high-quality TAE dataset we call TaeBench (of size 264k). Empirically, we demonstrate that TaeBench can effectively transfer-attack SOTA toxicity content moderation models and services. Our experiments also show that TaeBench with adversarial training achieve significant improvements of the robustness of two toxicity detectors.

Jailbreaking large-language models (LLMs) involves testing their robustness against adversarial prompts and evaluating their ability to withstand prompt attacks that could elicit unauthorized or malicious responses. In this paper, we present TurboFuzzLLM, a mutation-based fuzzing technique for efficiently finding a collection of effective jailbreaking templates that, when combined with harmful questions, can lead a target LLM to produce harmful responses through black-box access via user prompts. We describe the limitations of directly applying existing template-based attacking techniques in practice, and present functional and efficiency-focused upgrades we added to mutation-based fuzzing to generate effective jailbreaking templates automatically. TurboFuzzLLM achieves ≥ 95% attack success rates (ASR) on public datasets for leading LLMs (including GPT-4o & GPT-4 Turbo), shows impressive generalizability to unseen harmful questions, and helps in improving model defenses to prompt attacks.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting is a popular in-context learning (ICL) approach for large language models (LLMs), especially when tackling complex reasoning tasks. Traditional ICL approaches construct prompts using examples that contain questions similar to the input question. However, CoT prompting, which includes crucial intermediate reasoning steps (rationales) within its examples, necessitates selecting examples based on these rationales rather than the questions themselves. Existing methods require human experts or pre-trained LLMs to describe the skill, a high-level abstraction of rationales, to guide the selection. These methods, however, are often costly and difficult to scale. Instead, this paper introduces a new approach named Latent Reasoning Skills (LaRS) that employs unsupervised learning to create a latent space representation of rationales, with a latent variable called a reasoning skill. Concurrently, LaRS learns a reasoning policy to determine the required reasoning skill for a given question. Then the ICL examples are selected by aligning the reasoning skills between past examples and the question. This approach is theoretically grounded and compute-efficient, eliminating the need for auxiliary LLM inference or manual prompt design. Empirical results demonstrate that LaRS consistently outperforms SOTA skill-based selection methods, processing example banks four times faster, reducing LLM inferences during the selection stage by half, and showing greater robustness to sub-optimal example banks.

Recent NLP literature pays little attention to the robustness of toxicity language predictors, while these systems are most likely to be used in adversarial contexts. This paper presents a novel adversarial attack, \texttt{ToxicTrap}, introducing small word-level perturbations to fool SOTA text classifiers to predict toxic text samples as benign. \texttt{ToxicTrap} exploits greedy based search strategies to enable fast and effective generation of toxic adversarial examples. Two novel goal function designs allow \texttt{ToxicTrap} to identify weaknesses in both multiclass and multilabel toxic language detectors. Our empirical results show that SOTA toxicity text classifiers are indeed vulnerable to the proposed attacks, attaining over 98\% attack success rates in multilabel cases. We also show how a vanilla adversarial training and its improved version can help increase robustness of a toxicity detector even against unseen attacks.