Boyi Deng


2025

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Unveiling Language-Specific Features in Large Language Models via Sparse Autoencoders
Boyi Deng | Yu Wan | Baosong Yang | Yidan Zhang | Fuli Feng
Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)

The mechanisms behind multilingual capabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) have been examined using neuron-based or internal-activation-based methods. However, these methods often face challenges such as superposition and layer-wise activation variance, which limit their reliability. Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) offer a more nuanced analysis by decomposing the activations of LLMs into a sparse linear combination of SAE features. We introduce a novel metric to assess the monolinguality of features obtained from SAEs, discovering that some features are strongly related to specific languages. Additionally, we show that ablating these SAE features only significantly reduces abilities in one language of LLMs, leaving others almost unaffected. Interestingly, we find some languages have multiple synergistic SAE features, and ablating them together yields greater improvement than ablating individually. Moreover, we leverage these SAE-derived language-specific features to enhance steering vectors, achieving control over the language generated by LLMs. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/Aatrox103/multilingual-llm-features.

2023

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Attack Prompt Generation for Red Teaming and Defending Large Language Models
Boyi Deng | Wenjie Wang | Fuli Feng | Yang Deng | Qifan Wang | Xiangnan He
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2023

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs.