Neural Machine Translation (NMT) systems exhibit problematic biases, such as stereotypical gender bias in the translation of occupation terms into languages with grammatical gender. In this paper we describe a new source of bias prevalent in NMT systems, relating to translations of sentences containing person names. To correctly translate such sentences, a NMT system needs to determine the gender of the name. We show that leading systems are particularly poor at this task, especially for female given names. This bias is deeper than given name gender: we show that the translation of terms with ambiguous sentiment can also be affected by person names, and the same holds true for proper nouns denoting race. To mitigate these biases we propose a simple but effective data augmentation method based on randomly switching entities during translation, which effectively eliminates the problem without any effect on translation quality.

Neural machine translation (NMT) systems are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, whereby an attacker injects poisoned samples into training such that a trained model produces malicious translations. Nevertheless, there is little research on defending against such backdoor attacks in NMT. In this paper, we first show that backdoor attacks that have been successful in text classification are also effective against machine translation tasks. We then present a novel defence method that exploits a key property of most backdoor attacks: namely the asymmetry between the source and target language sentences, which is used to facilitate malicious text insertions, substitutions and suchlike. Our technique uses word alignment coupled with language model scoring to detect outlier tokens, and thus can find and filter out training instances which may contain backdoors. Experimental results demonstrate that our technique can significantly reduce the success of various attacks by up to 89.0%, while not affecting predictive accuracy.

NLP models are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks. One type of attack can plant a backdoor in a model by injecting poisoned examples in training, causing the victim model to misclassify test instances which include a specific pattern. Although defences exist to counter these attacks, they are specific to an attack type or pattern. In this paper, we propose a generic defence mechanism by making the training process robust to poisoning attacks through gradient shaping methods, based on differentially private training. We show that our method is highly effective in mitigating, or even eliminating, poisoning attacks on text classification, with only a small cost in predictive accuracy.