Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) have revolutionized complex problem-solving capability by enabling sophisticated agent collaboration through message-based communications. While the communication framework is crucial for agent coordination, it also introduces a critical yet unexplored security vulnerability. In this work, we introduce Agent-in-the-Middle (AiTM), a novel attack that exploits the fundamental communication mechanisms in LLM-MAS by intercepting and manipulating inter-agent messages. Unlike existing attacks that compromise individual agents, AiTM demonstrates how an adversary can compromise entire multi-agent systems by only manipulating the messages passing between agents. To enable the attack under the challenges of limited control and role-restricted communication format, we develop an LLM-powered adversarial agent with a reflection mechanism that generates contextually-aware malicious instructions. Our comprehensive evaluation across various frameworks, communication structures, and real-world applications demonstrates that LLM-MAS is vulnerable to communication-based attacks, highlighting the need for robust security measures in multi-agent systems.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have shown promise in enhancing the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, these systems face challenges in effectively integrating external knowledge with the LLM’s internal knowledge, often leading to issues with misleading or unhelpful information. This work aims to provide a systematic study on knowledge checking in RAG systems. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of LLM representation behaviors and demonstrate the significance of using representations in knowledge checking. Motivated by the findings, we further develop representation-based classifiers for knowledge filtering. We show substantial improvements in RAG performance, even when dealing with noisy knowledge databases. Our study provides new insights into leveraging LLM representations for enhancing the reliability and effectiveness of RAG systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to a type of attack known as jailbreaking, which misleads LLMs to output harmful contents. Although there are diverse jailbreak attack strategies, there is no unified understanding on why some methods succeed and others fail. This paper explores the behavior of harmful and harmless prompts in the LLM’s representation space to investigate the intrinsic properties of successful jailbreak attacks. We hypothesize that successful attacks share some similar properties: They are effective in moving the representation of the harmful prompt towards the direction to the harmless prompts. We leverage hidden representations into the objective of existing jailbreak attacks to move the attacks along the acceptance direction, and conduct experiments to validate the above hypothesis using the proposed objective. We hope this study provides new insights into understanding how LLMs understand harmfulness information.