Weikai Lu


2025

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SEA: Low-Resource Safety Alignment for Multimodal Large Language Models via Synthetic Embeddings
Weikai Lu | Hao Peng | Huiping Zhuang | Cen Chen | Ziqian Zeng
Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have serious security vulnerabilities. While safety alignment using multimodal datasets consisting of text and data of additional modalities can effectively enhance MLLM’s security, it is costly to construct these datasets. Existing low-resource security alignment methods, including textual alignment, have been found to struggle with the security risks posed by additional modalities. To address this, we propose Synthetic Embedding augmented safety Alignment (SEA), which optimizes embeddings of additional modality through gradient updates to expand textual datasets. This enables multimodal safety alignment training even when only textual data is available. Extensive experiments on image, video, and audio-based MLLMs demonstrate that SEA can synthesize a high-quality embedding on a single RTX3090 GPU within 24 seconds. SEA significantly improves the security of MLLMs when faced with threats from additional modalities. To assess the security risks introduced by video and audio, we also introduced a new benchmark called VA-SafetyBench. High attack success rates across multiple MLLMs validate its challenge. Our code and data will be available at https://github.com/ZeroNLP/SEA.

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SDD: Self-Degraded Defense against Malicious Fine-tuning
ZiXuan Chen | Weikai Lu | Xin Lin | Ziqian Zeng
Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)

Open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) often employ safety alignment methods to resist harmful instructions. However, recent research shows that maliciously fine-tuning these LLMs on harmful data can easily bypass these safeguards. To counter this, we theoretically uncover why malicious fine-tuning succeeds and identify potential defense strategies. Building on the theoretical analysis, we introduce the Self-Degraded Defense (SDD) framework. SDD encourages LLMs to produce high-quality but irrelevant responses to harmful prompts. When attackers attempt malicious fine-tuning, the general capability of the LLM aligned by SDD will significantly decrease, rendering it incapable of following harmful instructions. Our experimental results confirm SDD’s effectiveness against such attacks.Our code is available at https://github.com/ZeroNLP/SDD.