Qizhi Zhang


2025

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ObfusLM: Privacy-preserving Language Model Service against Embedding Inversion Attacks
Yu Lin | Ruining Yang | Yunlong Mao | Qizhi Zhang | Jue Hong | Quanwei Cai | Ye Wu | Huiqi Liu | Zhiyu Chen | Bing Duan | Sheng Zhong
Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)

As the rapid expansion of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) for language models, concerns over the privacy of client inputs during inference or fine-tuning have correspondingly escalated. Recently, solutions have been proposed to safeguard client privacy by obfuscation techniques. However, the solutions incur notable decline in model utility and mainly focus on classification tasks, rendering them impractical for real-world applications. Moreover, recent studies reveal that these obfuscation, if not well designed, is susceptible to embedding inversion attacks (EIAs). In this paper, we devise ObfusLM, a privacy-preserving MLaaS framework for both classification and generation tasks. ObfusLM leverages a model obfuscation module to achieve privacy protection for both classification and generation tasks. Based on (k, đťś–)-anonymity, ObfusLM includes novel obfuscation algorithms to reach provable security against EIAs. Extensive experiments show that ObfusLM outperforms existing works in utility by 10% with a nearly 80% resistance rate against EIAs.

2024

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An Inversion Attack Against Obfuscated Embedding Matrix in Language Model Inference
Yu Lin | Qizhi Zhang | Quanwei Cai | Jue Hong | Wu Ye | Huiqi Liu | Bing Duan
Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing

With the rapidly-growing deployment of large language model (LLM) inference services, privacy concerns have arisen regarding to the user input data. Recent studies are exploring transforming user inputs to obfuscated embedded vectors, so that the data will not be eavesdropped by service provides. However, in this paper we show that again, without a solid and deliberate security design and analysis, such embedded vector obfuscation failed to protect users’ privacy. We demonstrate the conclusion via conducting a novel inversion attack called Element-wise Differential Nearest Neighbor (EDNN) on the glide-reflection proposed in (CITATION), and the result showed that the original user input text can be 100% recovered from the obfuscated embedded vectors. We further analyze security requirements on embedding obfuscation and present several remedies to our proposed attack.