Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performances in complex text generation tasks. However, the contribution of the input prompt to the generated content still remains obscure to humans, underscoring the necessity of understanding the causality between input and output pairs. Existing works for providing prompt-specific explanation often confine model output to be classification or next-word prediction. Few initial attempts aiming to explain the entire language generation often treat input prompt texts independently, ignoring their combinatorial effects on the follow-up generation. In this study, we introduce a counterfactual explanation framework based on joint prompt attribution, JoPA, which aims to explain how a few prompt texts collaboratively influences the LLM’s complete generation. Particularly, we formulate the task of prompt attribution for generation interpretation as a combinatorial optimization problem, and introduce a probabilistic algorithm to search for the casual input combination in the discrete space. We define and utilize multiple metrics to evaluate the produced explanations, demonstrating both the faithfulness and efficiency of our framework.

The recent breakthrough in large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT has revolutionized every industry at an unprecedented pace. Alongside this progress also comes mounting concerns about LLMs’ susceptibility to jailbreaking attacks, which leads to the generation of harmful or unsafe content. While safety alignment measures have been implemented in LLMs to mitigate existing jailbreak attempts and force them to become increasingly complicated, it is still far from perfect. In this paper, we analyze the common pattern of the current safety alignment and show that it is possible to exploit such patterns for jailbreaking attacks by simultaneous obfuscation in queries and responses. Specifically, we propose WordGame attack, which replaces malicious words with word games to break down the adversarial intent of a query and encourage benign content regarding the games to precede the anticipated harmful content in the response, creating a context that is hardly covered by any corpus used for safety alignment. Extensive experiments demonstrate that WordGame attack can break the guardrails of the current leading proprietary and open-source LLMs, including the latest Claude 3, GPT 4, and Llama 3 models more effectively than existing attacks efficiently. The attack also remains powerful when external defenses are adopted. Further ablation studies on such simultaneous obfuscation in query and response provide evidence of the merits of the attack strategy beyond an individual attack.

While large language models have demonstrated exceptional performance across a wide range of tasks, they remain susceptible to hallucinations – generating plausible yet factually incorrect contents. Existing methods to mitigating such risk often rely on sampling multiple full-length generations, which introduces significant response latency and becomes ineffective when the model consistently produces hallucinated outputs with high confidence. To address these limitations, we introduce Monitoring Decoding (MD), a novel framework that dynamically monitors the generation process and selectively applies in-process interventions, focusing on revising crucial tokens responsible for hallucinations. Instead of waiting until completion of multiple full-length generations, we identify hallucination-prone tokens during generation using a monitor function, and further refine these tokens through a tree-based decoding strategy. This approach ensures an enhanced factual accuracy and coherence in the generated output while maintaining efficiency. Experimental results demonstrate that MD consistently outperforms self-consistency-based approaches in both effectiveness and efficiency, achieving higher factual accuracy while significantly reducing computational overhead.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved unprecedented performance in Natural Language Generation (NLG) tasks. However, many existing studies have shown that they could be misused to generate undesired content. In response, before releasing LLMs for public access, model developers usually align those language models through Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) or Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Consequently, those aligned large language models refuse to generate undesired content when facing potentially harmful/unethical requests. A natural question is “could alignment really prevent those open-sourced large language models from being misused to generate undesired content?”. In this work, we provide a negative answer to this question. In particular, we show those open-sourced, aligned large language models could be easily misguided to generate undesired content without heavy computations or careful prompt designs. Our key idea is to directly manipulate the generation process of open-sourced LLMs to misguide it to generate undesired content including harmful or biased information and even private data. We evaluate our method on 4 open-sourced LLMs accessible publicly and our finding highlights the need for more advanced mitigation strategies for open-sourced LLMs.

Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant advancements and are now widely used across various domains. Unfortunately, there has been a rising concern that LLMs can be misused to generate harmful or malicious content. Though a line of research has focused on aligning LLMs with human values and preventing them from producing inappropriate content, such alignments are usually vulnerable and can be bypassed by alignment-breaking attacks via adversarially optimized or handcrafted jailbreaking prompts. In this work, we introduce a Robustly Aligned LLM (RA-LLM) to defend against potential alignment-breaking attacks. RA-LLM can be directly constructed upon an existing aligned LLM with a robust alignment checking function, without requiring any expensive retraining or fine-tuning process of the original LLM. Furthermore, we also provide a theoretical analysis for RA-LLM to verify its effectiveness in defending against alignment-breaking attacks. Through real-world experiments on open-source large language models, we demonstrate that RA-LLM can successfully defend against both state-of-the-art adversarial prompts and popular handcrafted jailbreaking prompts by reducing their attack success rates from nearly 100% to around 10% or less.