Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as the new recommendation engines, surpassing traditional methods in both capability and scope, particularly in code generation. In this paper, we reveal a novel **provider bias** in LLMs: without explicit directives, these models show systematic preferences for services from specific providers in their recommendations (e.g., favoring Google Cloud over Microsoft Azure). To systematically investigate this bias, we develop an automated pipeline to construct the dataset, incorporating 6 distinct coding task categories and 30 real-world application scenarios. Leveraging this dataset, we conduct the **first** comprehensive empirical study of provider bias in LLM code generation across seven state-of-the-art LLMs, utilizing approximately 500 million tokens (equivalent to $5,000+ in computational costs). Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit significant provider preferences, predominantly favoring services from Google and Amazon, and can autonomously modify input code to incorporate their preferred providers without users’ requests. Such a bias holds far-reaching implications for market dynamics and societal equilibrium, potentially contributing to digital monopolies. It may also deceive users and violate their expectations, leading to various consequences. We call on the academic community to recognize this emerging issue and develop effective evaluation and mitigation methods to uphold AI security and fairness.

Despite prior safety alignment efforts, LLMs can still generate harmful and unethical content when subjected to jailbreaking attacks. Existing jailbreaking methods fall into two main categories: template-based and optimization-based methods. The former requires significant manual effort and domain knowledge, while the latter, exemplified by GCG, which seeks to maximize the likelihood of harmful LLM outputs through token-level optimization, also encounters several limitations: requiring white-box access, necessitating pre-constructed affirmative phrase, and suffering from low efficiency. This paper introduces ECLIPSE, a novel and efficient black-box jailbreaking method with optimizable suffixes. We employ task prompts to translate jailbreaking objectives into natural language instructions, guiding LLMs to generate adversarial suffixes for malicious queries. A harmfulness scorer provides continuous feedback, enabling LLM self-reflection and iterative optimization to autonomously produce effective suffixes. Experimental results demonstrate that ECLIPSE achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 0.92 across three open-source LLMs and GPT-3.5-Turbo, significantly outperforming GCG by 2.4 times. Moreover, ECLIPSE matches template-based methods in ASR while substantially reducing average attack overhead by 83%, offering superior attack efficiency.

Backdoor attack is a severe threat to the trustworthiness of DNN-based language models. In this paper, we first extend the definition of memorization of language models from sample-wise to more fine-grained sentence element-wise (e.g., word, phrase, structure, and style), and then point out that language model backdoors are a type of element-wise memorization. Through further analysis, we find that the strength of such memorization is positively correlated to the frequency of duplicated elements in the training dataset. In conclusion, duplicated sentence elements are necessary for successful backdoor attacks. Based on this, we propose a data-centric defense. We first detect trigger candidates in training data by finding memorizable elements, i.e., duplicated elements, and then confirm real triggers by testing if the candidates can activate backdoor behaviors (i.e., malicious elements). Results show that our method outperforms state-of-the-art defenses in defending against different types of NLP backdoors.