Chunrong Fang
2025
Token-Budget-Aware LLM Reasoning
Tingxu Han
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Zhenting Wang
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Chunrong Fang
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Shiyu Zhao
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Shiqing Ma
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Zhenyu Chen
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2025
Reasoning is critical for large language models (LLMs) to excel in a wide range of tasks. While methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning and enhance LLM performance by decomposing problems into intermediate steps, they also incur significant overhead in token usage, leading to increased costs. We find that the reasoning process of current LLMs is unnecessarily lengthy and it can be compressed by including a reasonable token budget in the prompt, but the choice of token budget plays a crucial role in the actual compression effectiveness. We then propose a token-budget-aware LLM reasoning framework that dynamically adjusts the number of reasoning tokens based on the reasoning complexity of each problem. Experiments show that our method effectively reduces token costs in CoT reasoning with only a slight performance reduction, offering a practical solution to balance efficiency and accuracy in LLM reasoning. Code: https://github.com/GeniusHTX/TALE.
2023
Backdooring Neural Code Search
Weisong Sun
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Yuchen Chen
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Guanhong Tao
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Chunrong Fang
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Xiangyu Zhang
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Quanjun Zhang
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Bin Luo
Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
Reusing off-the-shelf code snippets from online repositories is a common practice, which significantly enhances the productivity of software developers. To find desired code snippets, developers resort to code search engines through natural language queries. Neural code search models are hence behind many such engines. These models are based on deep learning and gain substantial attention due to their impressive performance. However, the security aspect of these models is rarely studied. Particularly, an adversary can inject a backdoor in neural code search models, which return buggy or even vulnerable code with security/privacy issues. This may impact the downstream software (e.g., stock trading systems and autonomous driving) and cause financial loss and/or life-threatening incidents. In this paper, we demonstrate such attacks are feasible and can be quite stealthy. By simply modifying one variable/function name, the attacker can make buggy/vulnerable code rank in the top 11%. Our attack BADCODE features a special trigger generation and injection procedure, making the attack more effective and stealthy. The evaluation is conducted on two neural code search models and the results show our attack outperforms baselines by 60%. Our user study demonstrates that our attack is more stealthy than the baseline by two times based on the F1 score.