@inproceedings{guo-etal-2025-mtsa,
    title = "{MTSA}: Multi-turn Safety Alignment for {LLM}s through Multi-round Red-teaming",
    author = "Guo, Weiyang  and
      Li, Jing  and
      Wang, Wenya  and
      Li, Yu  and
      He, Daojing  and
      Yu, Jun  and
      Zhang, Min",
    editor = "Che, Wanxiang  and
      Nabende, Joyce  and
      Shutova, Ekaterina  and
      Pilehvar, Mohammad Taher",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)",
    month = jul,
    year = "2025",
    address = "Vienna, Austria",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://preview.aclanthology.org/ingestion-acl-25/2025.acl-long.1282/",
    pages = "26424--26442",
    ISBN = "979-8-89176-251-0",
    abstract = "The proliferation of jailbreak attacks against large language models (LLMs) highlights the need for robust security measures. However, in multi-round dialogues, malicious intentions may be hidden in interactions, leading LLMs to be more prone to produce harmful responses. In this paper, we propose the Multi-Turn Safety Alignment (MTSA) framework, to address the challenge of securing LLMs in multi-round interactions. It consists of two stages: In the thought-guided attack learning stage, the red-team model learns about thought-guided multi-round jailbreak attacks to generate adversarial prompts. In the adversarial iterative optimization stage, the red-team model and the target model continuously improve their respective capabilities in interaction. Furthermore, we introduce a multi-turn reinforcement learning algorithm based on future rewards to enhance the robustness of safety alignment. Experimental results show that the red-team model exhibits state-of-the-art attack capabilities, while the target model significantly improves its performance on safety benchmarks."
}