Ensuring that Large Language Models (LLMs) return just responses which adhere to societal values is crucial for their broader application. Prior research has shown that LLMs often fail to perform satisfactorily on tasks requiring moral cognizance, such as ethics-based judgments. While current approaches have focused on fine-tuning LLMs with curated datasets to improve their capabilities on such tasks, choosing the optimal learning paradigm to enhance the ethical responses of LLMs remains an open research debate. In this work, we aim to address this fundamental question: can current learning paradigms enable LLMs to acquire sufficient moral reasoning capabilities? Drawing from distributional semantics theory and the pragmatic nature of moral discourse, our analysis indicates that performance improvements follow a mechanism similar to that of semantic-level tasks, and therefore remain affected by the pragmatic nature of morals latent in discourse, a phenomenon we name the pragmatic dilemma. We conclude that this pragmatic dilemma imposes significant limitations on the generalization ability of current learning paradigms, making it the primary bottleneck for moral reasoning acquisition in LLMs.

Moral self-correction has emerged as a promising approach for aligning the output of Large Language Models (LLMs) with human moral values. However, moral self-correction techniques are subject to two primary paradoxes. First, despite empirical and theoretical evidence to support the effectiveness of self-correction, this LLM capability only operates at a superficial level. Second, while LLMs possess the capability of self-diagnosing immoral aspects of their output, they struggle to identify the cause of this moral inconsistency during their self-correction process. To better understand and address these paradoxes, we analyze the discourse constructions in fine-tuning corpora designed to enhance moral self-correction, uncovering the existence of the heuristics underlying effective constructions. We demonstrate that moral self-correction relies on discourse constructions that reflect heuristic shortcuts, and that the presence of these heuristic shortcuts during self-correction leads to inconsistency when attempting to enhance both self-correction and self-diagnosis capabilities jointly. Building on our findings, we propose a method to strengthen moral self-correction through heuristics extracted from curated datasets, underscoring that its generalization is primarily constrained by situational context.

Although there has been growing interest in the self-correction capability of Large Language Models (LLMs), there are varying conclusions about its effectiveness.Prior research has largely concentrated on intrinsic self-correction, extrinsic self-correction, particularly the interplay between internal knowledge and external feedback, remains underexplored. In this paper, we aim to comprehensively investigate the underlying mechanism of moral self-correction by addressing a fundamental question: is moral self-correction an innate capability of LLMs? Specifically, we conduct: (1) a behavioral analysis of LLMs’ moral sensitivity based on a self-distinguishing task; and (2) a mechanistic analysis of the hidden states to examine how key components of self-correction, such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and external feedback, interact to facilitate moral self-correction. Drawing on empirical evidence from both behavioral and mechanistic analyses, we demonstrate that moral self-correction is not an inherent capability of LLMs, as they are neither morally sensitive nor able to effectively incorporate external feedback during the self-correction process.