Role-playing enables large language models (LLMs) to engage users in immersive and personalized interactions, but it also introduces significant safety risks. Existing role-play fine-tuning techniques improve role adaptability but may degrade safety performance, particularly for villainous characters. In this work, we conduct the first comprehensive assessment of role-play fine-tuning risks by training 95 role-specific LLMs using RoleBench. Our experiments reveal that role-play fine-tuning leads to a noticeable decline in safety performance, with safety risks varying based on character traits. To tackle this challenge, we propose Safety-Aware Role-Play Fine-Tuning (SaRFT), a novel method designed to balance role-playing capabilities and safety. Extensive experiments on LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct, Gemma-2-9B-it, and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct demonstrate that SaRFT consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines under both LoRA and full-parameter fine-tuning settings. Our findings highlight the necessity of role-adaptive safety measures and provide insights into mitigating role-specific safety risks in role-playing LLMs.

Despite extensive efforts in safety alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Activation steering offers a training-free defense method but relies on fixed steering coefficients, resulting in suboptimal protection and increased false rejections of benign inputs. To address this, we propose AdaSteer, an adaptive activation steering method that dynamically adjusts model behavior based on input characteristics. We identify two key properties: Rejection Law (R-Law), which shows that stronger steering is needed for jailbreak inputs opposing the rejection direction, and Harmfulness Law (H-Law), which differentiates adversarial and benign inputs. AdaSteer steers input representations along both the Rejection Direction (RD) and Harmfulness Direction (HD), with adaptive coefficients learned via logistic regression, ensuring robust jailbreak defense while preserving benign input handling. Experiments on LLaMA-3.1, Gemma-2, and Qwen2.5 show that AdaSteer outperforms baseline methods across multiple jailbreak attacks with minimal impact on utility. Our results highlight the potential of interpretable model internals for real-time, flexible safety enforcement in LLMs.