Guesstimation—the task of making approximate quantitative estimates about objects or events—is a common real-world skill, yet remains underexplored in large language model (LLM) research. We introduce three guesstimation datasets: MARBLES, FUTURE, and ELECPRED, spanning physical estimation (e.g., how many marbles fit in a cup) to abstract predictions (e.g., the 2024 U.S. presidential election). Inspired by the social science concept of Wisdom of Crowds (WOC)—where the median of multiple estimates improves accuracy—we propose WOC decoding for LLMs. We replicate WOC effects in human participants and find that LLMs exhibit similar benefits: median aggregation across sampled responses consistently improves accuracy over greedy, self-consistency decoding, and mean decoding. This suggests that LLMs encode a world model that supports approximate reasoning. Our results position guesstimation as a useful probe of LLM world knowledge and highlight WOC decoding as a strategy for enhancing LLM guesstimation performance on real-world tasks.

Accurately simulating human opinion dynamics is crucial for understanding a variety of societal phenomena, including polarization and the spread of misinformation. However, the agent-based models (ABMs) commonly used for such simulations often over-simplify human behavior. We propose a new approach to simulating opinion dynamics based on populations of Large Language Models (LLMs). Our findings reveal a strong inherent bias in LLM agents towards producing accurate information, leading simulated agents to consensus in line with scientific reality. This bias limits their utility for understanding resistance to consensus views on issues like climate change. After inducing confirmation bias through prompt engineering, however, we observed opinion fragmentation in line with existing agent-based modeling and opinion dynamics research. These insights highlight the promise and limitations of LLM agents in this domain and suggest a path forward: refining LLMs with real-world discourse to better simulate the evolution of human beliefs.

Neural network models of language have long been used as a tool for developing hypotheses about conceptual representation in the mind and brain. For many years, such use involved extracting vector-space representations of words and using distances among these to predict or understand human behavior in various semantic tasks. In contemporary language models, however, it is possible to interrogate the latent structure of conceptual representations using methods nearly identical to those commonly used with human participants. The current work uses three common techniques borrowed from cognitive psychology to estimate and compare lexical-semantic structure in both humans and a well-known large language model, the DaVinci variant of GPT-3. In humans, we show that conceptual structure is robust to differences in culture, language, and method of estimation. Structures estimated from the LLM behavior, while individually fairly consistent with those estimated from human behavior, depend much more upon the particular task used to generate behavior responses–responses generated by the very same model in the three tasks yield estimates of conceptual structure that cohere less with one another than do human structure estimates. The results suggest one important way that knowledge inhering in contemporary LLMs can differ from human cognition.