Unlearning evaluation has traditionally followed the retrieval paradigm, where adversaries attempt to extract residual knowledge of an unlearning target by issuing queries to a language model. However, the absence of retrievable knowledge does not necessarily prevent an adversary from inferring which targets have been intentionally unlearned in the post-training optimization. Such inferences can still pose significant privacy risks, as they may reveal the sensitive data in the model’s training set and the internal policies of model creators. To quantify such privacy risks, we propose a new evaluation framework **Forensic Unlearning Membership Attacks (FUMA)**, drawing on principles from membership inference attacks. FUMA assesses whether unlearning leaves behind detectable artifacts that can be exploited to infer membership in the forget set. Specifically, we evaluate four major optimization-based unlearning methods on 258 models across diverse unlearned settings and show that examples in the forget set can be identified up to 99% accuracy. This highlights privacy risks not covered in existing retrieval-based benchmarks. We conclude by discussing recommendations to mitigate these vulnerabilities.