Evidence-enhanced detectors present remarkable abilities in identifying malicious social text. However, the rise of large language models (LLMs) brings potential risks of evidence pollution to confuse detectors. This paper explores potential manipulation scenarios including basic pollution, and rephrasing or generating evidence by LLMs. To mitigate the negative impact, we propose three defense strategies from the data and model sides, including machine-generated text detection, a mixture of experts, and parameter updating. Extensive experiments on four malicious social text detection tasks with ten datasets illustrate that evidence pollution significantly compromises detectors, where the generating strategy causes up to a 14.4% performance drop. Meanwhile, the defense strategies could mitigate evidence pollution, but they faced limitations for practical employment. Further analysis illustrates that polluted evidence (i) is of high quality, evaluated by metrics and humans; (ii) would compromise the model calibration, increasing expected calibration error up to 21.6%; and (iii) could be integrated to amplify the negative impact, especially for encoder-based LMs, where the accuracy drops by 21.8%.

While recent advances in fake news video detection have shown promising potential, existing approaches typically (1) focus on a specific domain (e.g., politics) and (2) assume the availability of multiple modalities, including video, audio, description texts, and related images. However, these methods struggle to generalize to real-world scenarios, where questionable information spans diverse domains and is often modality-incomplete due to factors such as upload degradation or missing metadata. To address these challenges, we introduce two real-world multi-domain news video benchmarks that reflect modality incompleteness and propose IMOL, an incomplete-modality-tolerant learning framework for multi-domain fake news video detection. Inspired by cognitive theories suggesting that humans infer missing modalities through cross-modal guidance and retrieve relevant knowledge from memory for reference, IMOL employs a hierarchical transferable information integration strategy. This consists of two key phases: (1) leveraging cross-modal consistency to reconstruct missing modalities and (2) refining sample-level transferable knowledge through cross-sample associative reasoning. Extensive experiments demonstrate that IMOL significantly enhances the performance and robustness of multi-domain fake news video detection while effectively generalizing to unseen domains under incomplete modality conditions.

Social media platforms provide an ideal environment to spread misinformation, where social bots can accelerate the spread. This paper explores the interplay between social bots and misinformation on the Sina Weibo platform. We construct a large-scale dataset that includes annotations for both misinformation and social bots. From the misinformation perspective, the dataset is multimodal, containing 11,393 pieces of misinformation and 16,416 pieces of verified information. From the social bot perspective, this dataset contains 65,749 social bots and 345,886 genuine accounts, annotated using a weakly supervised annotator. Extensive experiments demonstrate the comprehensiveness of the dataset, the clear distinction between misinformation and real information, and the high quality of social bot annotations. Further analysis illustrates that: (i) social bots are deeply involved in information spread; (ii) misinformation with the same topics has similar content, providing the basis of echo chambers, and social bots would amplify this phenomenon; and (iii) social bots generate similar content aiming to manipulate public opinions.