@inproceedings{kim-cho-2025-break,
    title = "Break the Breakout: Reinventing {LM} Defense Against Jailbreak Attacks with Self-Refine",
    author = "Kim, Heegyu  and
      Cho, Hyunsouk",
    editor = "Cao, Trista  and
      Das, Anubrata  and
      Kumarage, Tharindu  and
      Wan, Yixin  and
      Krishna, Satyapriya  and
      Mehrabi, Ninareh  and
      Dhamala, Jwala  and
      Ramakrishna, Anil  and
      Galystan, Aram  and
      Kumar, Anoop  and
      Gupta, Rahul  and
      Chang, Kai-Wei",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Trustworthy NLP (TrustNLP 2025)",
    month = may,
    year = "2025",
    address = "Albuquerque, New Mexico",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://preview.aclanthology.org/ingest-emnlp/2025.trustnlp-main.7/",
    doi = "10.18653/v1/2025.trustnlp-main.7",
    pages = "82--102",
    ISBN = "979-8-89176-233-6",
    abstract = "Language models (LMs) are vulnerable to exploitation for adversarial misuse. Training LMs for safety alignment is extensive, making it hard to respond to fast-developing attacks immediately, such as jailbreaks. We propose self-refine with formatting that achieves outstanding safety even in non-safety-aligned LMsand evaluate our method alongside several defense baselines, demonstrating that it is the safest training-free method against jailbreak attacks.Additionally, we proposed a formatting method that improves the efficiency of the self-refine process while reducing attack success rates in fewer iterations. We observed that non-safety-aligned LMs outperform safety-aligned LMs in safety tasks by giving more helpful and safe responses.In conclusion, our findings can achieve less safety risk with fewer computational costs, allowing non-safety LM to be efficiently utilized in real-world service."
}