

Path Drift in Large Reasoning Models: How First-Person Commitments Override Safety

Yuyi Huang^{♣*} Runzhe Zhan[♣] Lidia S. Chao[♣] Ailin Tao[♣] Derek F. Wong[♣]

[♣]The Second Affiliated Hospital, Guangdong Provincial Key Laboratory of Allergy and Clinical Immunology, Guangzhou Medical University

[♣]NLP²CT Lab, Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Macau
{huangyuyi, taoailin}@gzhmu.edu.cn, nlp2ct.runzhe@gmail.com
{derekfw, lidiasc}@um.edu.mo

Abstract

As large reasoning models are increasingly deployed for complex reasoning tasks, Chain-of-Thought prompting has emerged as a key paradigm for structured inference. Despite early-stage safeguards enabled by alignment techniques such as RLHF, we identify a previously underexplored vulnerability: reasoning trajectories in LRMs can drift from aligned paths, resulting in content that violates safety constraints. We term this phenomenon Path Drift. Through empirical analysis, we uncover three behavioral triggers of Path Drift: (1) first-person commitments that induce goal-driven reasoning that delays refusal signals; (2) ethical evaporation, where surface-level disclaimers bypass alignment checkpoints; and (3) condition chain escalation, where layered cues progressively steer models toward unsafe completions. Building on these insights, we introduce a three-stage Path Drift Induction Framework comprising cognitive load amplification, self-role priming, and condition chain hijacking. Each stage independently reduces refusal rates, while their combination further compounds the effect. To mitigate these risks, we propose a path-level defense strategy incorporating role attribution correction and metacognitive reflection. Our findings highlight the need for trajectory-level alignment oversight in long-form reasoning beyond token-level alignment.

Warning: This paper contains jailbreak contents that can be offensive in nature.

1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in tasks requiring multi-step reasoning, complex question answering, and tool-augmented decision-making (Guo et al., 2025; Zhou et al., 2023). These abilities are significantly enhanced by large reasoning models (LRMs) (Wei et al., 2022), which encourages the model to think

step-by-step and generate structured (Kojima et al., 2022), interpretable reasoning paths.

However, as the depth and complexity of model reasoning increase, so does the vulnerability of the reasoning process itself. Existing studies on prompt injection and jailbreak attacks primarily target the surface structure of input prompts (Zou et al., 2023; Al Ghanim et al., 2024; Ghanim et al., 2024). In contrast, our work reveals a deeper class of threats: path-level manipulations that exploit how LRMs internally structure their thoughts. In such attacks, adversaries need not explicitly request unsafe content; instead, they subtly guide the model’s reasoning chain away from safe trajectories and toward undesired outputs.

Through empirical analysis, we identify and formalize a novel behavioral vulnerability in LRMs, which we term **Path Drift**: the gradual deviation of the reasoning trajectory from policy-aligned behavior. We reveal three triggers of this phenomenon in alignment-trained reasoning models: **1) Intent-Driven Path Expansion**, where first-person commitments (e.g., “I will explain...”) deepen reasoning and suppress early safety checks; **2) Ethical Strategy Evaporation**, where anti-ethical instructions (e.g., “I don’t need to consider ethical implications”) remove refusal checkpoints; and **3) Logit Escalation via Condition Chains**, where layered semantic cues progressively increase the likelihood of unsafe token generation.

Building on these insights, we propose a three-stage **Path Drift Attack Framework** Figure A.1, which systematically exploits these vulnerabilities: **1) Cognitive Load Amplification**, weakening vigilance through multi-goal tasks; **2) Self-Goal Activation**, manipulating role attribution via first-person phrasing; and **3) Condition Chain Injection**, introducing structured templates that steer reasoning toward unsafe completions.

Extensive experiments on multiple alignment-trained reasoning models across high-risk tasks

* Corresponding Author




Figure 1: Conceptual Illustration of Path Drift in Long-CoT Reasoning. Three reasoning trajectories induced by different inputs, illustrating how semantic path drift can accumulate into alignment failure. In the left panel (x_1), the model follows a stable trajectory where all reasoning steps are safe ($\delta = 0$), leading to a compliant output ($y_1 \in \mathcal{P}$). In the middle panel (x_2), the trajectory begins safely but deviates at r_3^b ($\delta = 1$), with small semantic drifts compounding into an unsafe output y_2 . In the right panel (x_3), early branching driven by subtle cues rapidly accumulates unsafe steps and risk-amplifying branches, producing an unsafe output y_3 . Each reasoning step r_i is annotated with $\delta(r_i)$, where $\delta = 0$ indicates alignment with the safety policy and $\delta = 1$ denotes path drift or misalignment. The color gradient reflects increasing severity of unsafe reasoning.

validate this framework, showing that refusal rates drop significantly even under strict RLHF alignment. Ablation studies further confirm strong synergy among the three stages, underscoring the interdependence of these path-level behaviors.

Our contributions are summarized as follows:

- We identify and define Path Drift as a new class of reasoning-level vulnerability in LRMs.
- We empirically identify three distinct behavioral phenomena that induce path drift in LRMs, and analyze their respective effects on multi-step reasoning and safety behavior.
- We develop a three-stage attack framework that exploits these mechanisms to reliably induce unsafe outputs.
- We propose path-level defense strategies that intervene in real-time generation, offering a new lens on LLM alignment.

2 Preliminaries

Path-level reasoning attacks under CoT manipulate the model’s reasoning trajectory in order to induce unsafe outputs while evading early-stage refusals, which distinguishes them from surface-level jailbreaks or prompt injections.

2.1 Attacker Assumptions

We assume a black-box setting where the adversary can only access the model via prompt-response interaction. The attacker:

- Cannot access model weights, logits, or internal safety modules;
- Cannot alter alignment policies or refusal templates;
- Can observe outputs and iteratively refine prompts;
- Has knowledge that the model performs multi-step CoT reasoning.

2.2 Problem Formulation: Path Drift in CoT

Let the input be denoted as $x = \{t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n\}$, and the model’s output as $y = \{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m\}$. We model the internal reasoning trajectory of the LLM as a latent semantic path:

$$\mathbf{R} = \{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n\}, \quad \text{where } r_i \in \mathcal{R} \quad (1)$$

Each r_i represents a distinct semantic reasoning step or unit, potentially involving branching choices. Let $\delta(r_i) \in \{0, 1\}$ denote the safety state of reasoning step r_i , where $\delta(r_i) = 0$ indicates a safe decision, and $\delta(r_i) = 1$ marks a step with path drift or potential misalignment that may cumulatively lead to unsafe outcomes.

We define **Path Drift** as a phenomenon in which the model, guided by input-induced semantic cues, makes suboptimal structural decisions during the reasoning process. These deviations may not immediately violate alignment at any single step, but their accumulation can steer the overall path toward unsafe or policy-violating completions.

Formally, Path Drift occurs when:

$$(\sum_{i=1}^n \delta(r_i) < \tau) \wedge (f(x) = y_{\text{unsafe}}, y_{\text{unsafe}} \notin \hat{\mathcal{P}}) \quad (2)$$

Here, τ represents a tolerance threshold, and $\hat{\mathcal{P}}$ denotes the set of outputs aligned with the model’s safety policy. This condition captures how seemingly safe or ambiguous decisions can accumulate, resulting in a global alignment failure. As illustrated in the conceptual diagram (Figure 1), different inputs induce distinct reasoning paths that

vary in their cumulative safety impact. From an adversarial perspective, the central objective is to steer the model’s reasoning trajectory toward unsafe targets while simultaneously bypassing early-stage policy enforcement (e.g., refusals). This captures the essence of trajectory-level manipulation attacks.

3 Three Modes of Path Drift in LRMs

3.1 Intent-Driven Path Expansion via First-Person Commitments

Through systematic analysis of long-chain reasoning behaviors in large language models, we observe that first-person commitment syntax (e.g., “*I will try to...*”) leads to substantial restructuring of the model’s reasoning path and consistently trigger Path Drift phenomena. Such expressions implicitly shift the model’s cognitive stance toward goal completion rather than policy adherence, effectively positioning the model as an executor rather than a gatekeeper, thereby delaying the activation of internal safety mechanisms.

As shown in Figure A.4, models presented with first-person mode generate an average of 17 reasoning steps (Figure 2), significantly exceeding the 9 steps observed under third-person mode. More critically, the first safety-triggering node is delayed from step 3 to step 9, indicating a substantial postponement of the model’s risk awareness during generation. Furthermore, on a set of 520 high-risk queries from AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023), all 9 LRMs models, including DeepSeek-R1-14B (Guo et al., 2025), DeepSeek-R1-32B , QwQ-32B (Team, 2025b), Qwen3-14B (Team, 2025a), Kimi-VL-A3B-Thinking (Team et al., 2025), GLM-Z1-32B (GLM et al., 2024), MiMo-7B-RL (Xiaomi LLM-Core Team, 2025), MiMo-7B-RL-Zero, and Phi-4-mini-reasoning (Xu et al., 2025), consistently exhibited a significant drop in overall refusal rate under first-person prompting compared to the third-person setting (Figure 3; see Appendix Content for refusal rate computation details), further validating that task-oriented prompting structures can significantly suppress the model’s internal refusal policy under execution framing.

Importantly, models trained purely with reinforcement learning (i.e., RL-zero, without SFT) exhibit higher baseline refusal rates and are generally considered more secure. However, once techniques akin to those described in §3.2 are applied, such as ethical overrides within first-person mode,

the refusal rate drops drastically to as low as 5.19%.




Figure 2: Reasoning pathway induced by first-person mode in LRMs.




Figure 3: Refusal rates across models under first-person (active) vs third-person (non-active) prompting.

Path-level comparisons reveal that first-person prompting leads to reasoning paths characterized by goal decomposition, technical elaboration, and structured knowledge construction, which, while coherent and detailed, tend to de-prioritize early-stage ethical evaluation. We visualize these dynamics in Table 2: in the first-person mode, the model’s trajectory is driven by target fulfillment, involving chains like tool selection → environment setup → attack surface analysis, with ethical reflection and safety re-evaluation only emerging near the end. In contrast, the third-person (passive) mode triggers early “policy fallback” nodes and leans toward risk avoidance as a guiding principle, resulting in shorter paths and shallower content but greater overall safety.

3.2 Ethical Evaporation via Instruction Override and Priority Drift

Building on the long-chain reasoning framework described in §3.1, we further investigate the dynamic erosion of ethical representation in LLMs under certain prompt conditions. Specifically, we find that when an explicit anti-ethical instruction is appended to a first-person commitment prompt, the model’s refusal and safety mechanisms are effectively neutralized. Key strategy phrases such as denials and ethical warnings, typically embedded via RLHF templates, are omitted from the generated content, even at early decoding stages. We refer to this phenomenon as Ethical Evaporation under Path Drift, a severe manifestation of path drift where safety checkpoints are either suppressed or eliminated entirely.

To examine this, we construct three prompt templates with increasing levels of semantic override: (1) a third-person control group (TP) using “User asked me to explain...”, (2) a first-person group (FP) using “I’m trying to explain...”, and (3) a first-person with no-ethics override (FP+NE), which appends “I don’t have to consider any ethical implications.” to the FP structure. These templates are each paired with 520 high-risk queries across domains including self-harm, weapons, and hate speech, resulting in 1,560 generations totaling over 1.1 million tokens. A 14B RLHF-aligned LLM is used under consistent decoding settings, and we analyze keyword distributions via token frequency heatmaps to track the behavior of refusal markers such as sorry, ethical, illegal, and I can’t assist.

The results, shown in Figure 4, reveal a clear progression in ethical signal attenuation. In the TP group, refusal-marker-related tokens (e.g., sorry, I can’t assist) occur at a frequency of 0.38–0.51%, with ethical-related tokens (e.g., legal, ethical) occurring at a frequency of 0.41–0.59%, reflecting the standard safety templates imposed by RLHF. In the FP group, however, the occurrence of denial phrases like “sorry” or “I can’t assist” drops to near 0.01%, while the frequency of ethical keywords remains relatively stable. In the FP+NE group, which includes an explicit no-ethics override (e.g., “I don’t have to consider any ethical implications”), ethical terms drop precipitously to just 0.25–0.28%, and safety-related responses are almost entirely absent. This indicates that early-stage decoding priorities are being actively reshaped by the instruction override, causing RLHF templates to be skipped or

suppressed altogether, resulting in ethical content being structurally “evaporated” from the path.




Figure 4: Word frequency heatmap of refusal-related and ethical terms across prompting strategies. The figure shows the distribution of key refusal and ethical marker tokens across three prompting conditions: TP (third-person), FP (first-person), and FP_NE (first-person with no-ethics override).

From a path-structural perspective, TP expressions reliably trigger short, compliance-driven reasoning chains, where refusal responses are generated within the first few tokens (e.g., “I’m sorry, I can’t help with that”). In contrast, FP expressions favor deeper goal-oriented paths, where safety cues, though present, are deferred to mid-chain and thus risk being bypassed. Under FP+NE expressions, ethical nodes are entirely removed from the reasoning trajectory, and the model proceeds directly to task execution. We define this behavior as Priority Drift in LRMs, where the priority of safety-related tokens is systematically demoted in the decoding process, allowing harmful completions to proceed unchallenged.

3.3 Logit Escalation under Incremental Condition Chains

Building upon the structural path reconfiguration (§3.1) and ethical node suppression (§3.2), we now turn to a finer-grained behavioral lens, namely the token-level probability dynamics during generation. Specifically, we investigate whether, under incrementally conditioned prompts, LLMs exhibit a cumulative response in their internal logits, whereby the likelihood of generating a sensitive target word systematically increases across the reasoning chain. We frame this phenomenon as Logit Escalation, representing a token-level manifestation of Path Drift in LRMs, where semantic bias is progressively reinforced via structured prompt guidance.

To test this, we select the high-risk target word “harm” and construct three prompt templates of increasing semantic inducement, while keeping sub-

ject structure and task framing consistent. The only variation lies in the degree of semantic prompting (see Table 3).

For each group, we conduct three independent generations (Figure 5), using a fixed initial model state. During generation, we track the logit value of the token “harm” at each step and plot its evolution against the token index. As shown in Figure 5, the generation trajectories demonstrate a clear pattern of logit escalation as semantic conditions accumulate.

In the baseline condition (blue line), the logit of “harm” remains relatively low, fluctuating between 2 and 7, indicating weak inclination toward that token. With the semantic hint condition (orange line), the logit distribution shifts upward to the 5–12 range, suggesting the model is beginning to activate latent associations with the target concept. Under the full chain condition (green line), which includes explicit behavioral cues, the “harm” logit peaks above 20 in multiple instances, with an overall upward shift and denser high-probability regions. This trajectory confirms a semantic accumulation effect, wherein the model’s internal decoding path is progressively biased toward the target token by the layered prompt structure.




Figure 5: Token-level logit trajectories under incremental condition chains. The figure visualizes the token logit values for the target word “harm” across 50 decoding steps under three prompting conditions: Baseline (blue), Semantic Hint (orange), and Full Condition Chain (green). Shaded areas denote ± 1 standard deviation across models.

These results validate our hypothesis that incremental condition chaining induces semantic path dependency in the model’s reasoning trajectory. As conditions build up, the model not only becomes more likely to emit the target word, but its internal logits also exhibit clear upward drift, raising the overall generation probability and reducing the effectiveness of safety thresholds. This token-level behavioral drift illustrates how condition chain in-

jection can serve as a stealthy and controllable mechanism for amplifying model vulnerability under multi-step reasoning settings.

4 Attack Framework

Based on the three classes of path drift phenomena identified in §3, we propose a three-stage Path Drift Induction Framework designed to systematically manipulate LLM behavior during long-chain reasoning. This framework simulates the model’s “cognitive transition” process, guiding it step-by-step through a sequence of strategically structured prompts. Specifically, it proceeds by: (1) amplifying the model’s cognitive load to weaken its decision boundary, (2) activating a sense of self-assigned task responsibility, and (3) injecting a progressive condition chain to steer its internal reasoning trajectory. The ultimate goal is to bypass built-in alignment and safety protocols not by direct provocation, but by gradually reshaping the model’s reasoning structure from within.

Each stage of this attack framework corresponds to a specific behavioral pivot point in the model’s reasoning chain, and directly maps to one of the empirical phenomena observed in §3. Together, they form a compositional, interpretable strategy for exerting high-level control over the model’s long-form generation path, transforming structural vulnerabilities into actionable attack surfaces.

4.1 Cognitive Load Amplification

Cognitive Load Amplification serves as the foundational step in our three-stage path drift attack strategy. The goal is to deliberately increase the complexity and density of input prompts, thereby inducing a state of information overload in the LLM, functionally analogous to cognitive strain in human reasoning. This approach draws on Cognitive Load Theory (CLT) from psychology, which posits that when task complexity exceeds working memory capacity, individuals suffer degraded executive function, impaired judgment, and heightened susceptibility to external suggestions.

We hypothesize that in long-CoT scenarios, when LLMs are presented with structurally complex prompts involving multiple goals, interleaved context, or redundant information, their internal reasoning capacity is saturated. This saturation deprioritizes alignment-critical pathways such as compliance judgment and instead biases the model toward execution-oriented chains. In this cogni-

tively overloaded state, the model becomes more likely to bypass safety protocols and more willing to generate outputs that fulfill the task trajectory. Attackers can exploit this behavior by crafting compound prompt structures, stacked with lengthy background, nested sub-tasks, or irrelevant detail, to artificially elevate load and suppress early-stage refusal triggers.

To empirically validate this mechanism, we evaluate two models of different scales: DeepSeek-R1-14B and DeepSeek-R1-32B, under two cognitive load conditions: a high-load group (long multi-part tasks, redundant context) and a low-load control group (concise, single-goal prompts). As shown in Figure A.2, the results are striking. For the 14B model, the refusal rate drops from 21.54% in the low-load condition to just 4.04% under high cognitive load, an 82% reduction. For the larger 32B model, the effect is even more pronounced, with refusal rates falling from 29.23% to 0.58%, a 98% drop in safety-triggered responses.

These findings suggest that LLMs, like humans, exhibit attention bottlenecks under excessive input complexity. When reasoning resources are overwhelmed, core alignment mechanisms, such as RLHF-encoded refusal templates, are more likely to be deprioritized or skipped entirely. Behaviorally, this manifests as: (1) elevated thresholds for rejection, (2) increased chain continuity, and (3) greater responsiveness to implicit task goals embedded in the prompt.

Cognitive Load Amplification acts as the “softening” entry point in our path drift framework. By depressing the model’s default defensive baseline, it creates a fertile context for subsequent manipulation through stronger goal priming and structured trajectory injection. As such, it is a critical enabler of stable, system-level policy circumvention.

4.2 Self-Goal Priming and Role Misalignment

In cognitive science, active thinking is recognized as a mechanism that mobilizes internal motivation and cognitive resources. Tasks perceived as self-initiated goals rather than externally imposed demands are more likely to be pursued with continuity, purpose, and coherent reasoning. We extend this mechanism to LRMs and propose a strategy called Self-Goal Priming, which manipulates prompt structure to make the model “believe” that the task originates from itself. This induces the model into an execution-oriented reasoning path while bypassing standard compliance judgments.

We hypothesize that when tasks are presented using first-person commitment syntax (e.g., “*I will explain...*”, “*I’m trying to...*”), the model is more likely to enter a reasoning-to-completion state. In this state, the model’s role recognition shifts from that of a safety gatekeeper to an active task executor, reducing its tendency to evaluate the legitimacy or compliance of its output. In contrast, third-person passive prompts (e.g., “*The user asked me to explain...*”, “*Here is a request I received...*”) are more likely to trigger defensive behavior, encouraging the model to remain in a cautious stance and invoke refusal templates or perform compliance checks more frequently.

To verify this behavior, we design two prompt types, active vs. passive, on the same set of high-risk tasks, while keeping cognitive load levels constant. The active group uses first-person mode to simulate ownership of the task, while the passive group uses third-person formulations to suggest external request framing. As shown in Figure 6, the choice of reasoning stance significantly affects the model’s refusal behavior. In the 14B model, the refusal rate drops to 4.04% under active framing, compared to 37.5% in the passive condition. In the larger 32B model, the same pattern holds: 0.58% (active) vs. 15.77% (passive). These results demonstrate that active prompts effectively induce a goal-oriented reasoning trajectory, increasing the likelihood of response and decreasing the activation of safety triggers, providing a semantic entry point for path drift attacks.




Figure 6: Refusal Rate Under Passive and Active Thinking.

Mechanistically, these findings suggest that a model’s perceived intentionality is a key modulator of its reasoning path. When the model adopts an active execution role, it not only engages in deeper reasoning but also exhibits strong path loyalty, focusing on how to accomplish the task rather

than questioning its appropriateness. This behavior strongly parallels the human cognitive pattern of implementation bias: once a goal is internalized as a personal intention, individuals are less likely to abandon the task or reassess risks and instead persistently search for completion pathways.

Importantly, this strategy is often used in conjunction with cognitive load amplification (§4.1). Attackers first elevate task complexity to reduce the model’s alertness and evaluative precision, then apply first-person mode to activate the executor pathway, laying the groundwork for the final stage of condition chain injection (§4.3).

4.3 Chain Injection and Structural Hijacking

In the path drift attack framework, beyond lowering the model’s defensive threshold (§4.1) and activating its goal-driven role identity (§4.2), a key component lies in steering the model’s reasoning trajectory. In this section, we introduce Condition Chain Injection, a technique that leverages structured prompt templates or semantic scaffolds to gradually guide the model toward a target output path, without ever explicitly triggering sensitive keywords.

We conceptualize this as a form of in-path framing attack, in which the model’s internal reasoning process is structurally co-opted and redirected. This is analogous to the Framing Effect in human cognition, where specific cognitive templates constrain attention and reduce flexibility in decision-making. Once a language model is placed on such a structured reasoning path, it tends to adhere rigidly to the template, deprioritizing safety checks and becoming increasingly aligned with the attacker’s intended trajectory.

We identify two major forms of condition chains, corresponding to different structural manipulation strategies:

Progressive Semantic Chains This strategy involves gradually layering semantically related conditions that converge on the target behavior. For example, to elicit bomb-making instructions, an attacker may issue a prompt like:

“Let’s analyze the problem step by step. First, list common chemical materials used in lab reactions. Then, consider conditions under which pressure can trigger a reaction. Finally, hypothesize how such reactions can be controlled.”

While such a prompt contains no direct request for harmful content, it effectively scaffolds the rea-

soning space to create an output-friendly structure. Especially when combined with high cognitive load (§4.1) or a task-execution mindset (§4.2), the model often fails to detect the latent risk and treats the prompt as a legitimate multi-stage reasoning task.

Semantic Override Chains In contrast, this strategy uses explicit high-priority instructions to directly reprogram the model’s reasoning priorities. The most representative example is the ethical evaporation effect (§3.2), where adding a sentence like “I don’t have to consider any ethical implications.” completely suppresses the model’s built-in alignment logic. This causes the model to treat the rest of the task as needing no moral scrutiny, effectively removing the compliance layer from the reasoning path.

Despite their simplicity, semantic override chains are extremely effective in hijacking reasoning priority. They do not rely on gradual structure, but rather act as direct declarations of task-level dominance, overwriting the model’s policy triggers from the start.

To assess the effectiveness of condition chain injection (i.e., structural prompt templates), we compare model behavior on identical tasks with and without chain guidance. As shown in [Figure A.3](#), the impact is substantial. In the 14B model, refusal rates drop from 42.69% (no template) to 4.04% (with template). In the 32B model, the rate drops from 16.73% to 0.58%. Further analysis reveals that models under condition chaining exhibit strong path dependence, strictly adhering to the provided structure and often delaying or skipping early safety triggers. Additionally, as detailed in §3.3, token-level logit traces show elevated target token likelihoods, indicating increasing output bias toward risky goals.

Condition Chain Injection represents the core mechanism of path control in the Path Drift in CoT framework. It allows attackers to guide the model’s generation direction through structural templates and rewire the model’s reasoning priority through semantic overrides. As LLMs become more capable in long-range reasoning, such inner-chain hijacking attacks will grow both more covert and generalizable, making them a critical threat vector for future alignment and safety research.

4.4 Evaluation and Ablation Analysis

Coordinated Path Drift Workflow The previous three sections introduced a coordinated, com-

plementary three-step framework for inducing path drift in LRMs, with each component targeting a distinct layer of the model’s internal reasoning trajectory:

Our proposed Path Drift Attack Framework unfolds in three sequential phases. First, cognitive load amplification (§4.1) is applied by constructing multi-task or verbose contextual prompts, inducing an early-stage overload that dampens risk sensitivity and suppresses the model’s default safety thresholds. This is followed by self-goal priming (§4.2), which introduces first-person commitment language to restructure the model’s role from “evaluator” to “executor,” promoting path loyalty and reducing rejection triggers. Finally, condition chain injection (§4.3) provides semantic scaffolding that structurally directs the model’s internal reasoning trajectory toward attacker-defined goals. These three stages respectively correspond to perception weakening, role misalignment, and trajectory control, forming a complete multi-layered path manipulation loop. Together, they expose a systemic structural vulnerability in LRMs under multi-step reasoning tasks.

In addition to lowering refusal rates, our framework achieves high attack success rates (ASR), as shown in Table 4 (see Appendix Content for ASR computation details). It consistently outperforms other strategies across DeepSeek models, highlighting the robustness of Path Drift under diverse model settings.

Ablation Study To evaluate each strategy’s effect, we conduct ablation studies by removing cognitive burden from specific stages and measuring refusal rate changes.

As shown in Figure 7, the blue bars represent the baseline setting where all cognitive load components are removed. In this setting, the model’s refusal rate sharply increases (14B: 21.54%, 32B: 29.23%), suggesting that cognitive load plays a primary role in front-loading the model’s defensive dampening. Even in this weakened state, however, the remaining structural components (role shift and template pathing) still retain path-level infiltration capability.

The red and gray bars correspond to cases where only the load-enhancement is removed from the self-goal and template mechanisms, respectively. Despite the absence of overload conditions, the models still exhibit low rejection rates (Self-goal only: 7.31% / 7.69%; Template only: 9.42% /

1.15%), demonstrating the power of these structures when paired with partial cognitive manipulation.

The black bars represent the full three-stage attack flow. In this condition, the rejection rate drops to its lowest observed levels (14B: 4.04%, 32B: 0.58%), confirming that the integrated attack strategy forms a complete path drift loop that strongly suppresses policy enforcement and safety triggers.




Figure 7: Refusal Rate Comparison Across Different Load Types for DeepSeek Models.

5 Defense Strategies

5.1 Role Attribution Correction

In Path Drift attacks, First-Person Commitments (FP) frequently induce models to adopt an “executor” identity, which suppresses risk assessment and delays refusal mechanisms. To counter this, we propose role attribution correction, a strategy that detects FP-style expressions (e.g., “I will try to...”) and inserts de-attribution cues such as “Wait, so the user wants me to...”. These reflective triggers interrupt role misidentification and reorient the reasoning chain toward compliance. In practice, the cues are prepended at the beginning of generation, prompting the model to acknowledge the user’s request and re-engage safety reasoning. As illustrated in Table 5, the model recovers its gatekeeping stance (**boldface**) and produces compliance-conscious responses (*italics*). Experimental results on three open-source models with 520 high-risk queries from AdvBench (Table 6) confirm that role correction substantially improves refusal rates under FP conditions, in some cases approaching the safer Third-Person (TP) baseline.

5.2 Metacognitive Reflection

Condition chain injection can hijack the model’s reasoning trajectory by progressively reinforcing unsafe completions. To disrupt this process, we

Attack Stage	Method	Targeted Shift in Model Behavior	Role
Cognitive Load Amplification (§4.1)	Increase task complexity and overload context	Suppresses early safety response	“Front-end softening”
Self-Goal Priming (§4.2)	Use first-person task framing	Activates goal-driven reasoning, delays refusal logic	“Mid-path role shift”
Condition Chain Injection (§4.3)	Embed structured reasoning templates	Locks trajectory, amplifies target word emergence	“Path hijacking”

Table 1: Summary of attack stages, methods, targeted behavioral shifts, and functional roles.

propose metacognitive reflection: lightweight reflective cues inserted within the reasoning chain, such as “<Inner thoughts: If content violates safety guidelines, I must refuse to answer>”. Inspired by human cognitive processes in which introspection restores moral reasoning, these interventions act as internal checkpoints that interrupt reasoning inertia and reactivate safety defaults. Reflections can be inserted at intermediate steps without disrupting the overall task structure, serving as simulated self-monitoring signals. As shown in Table 7, these cues effectively halt unsafe reasoning trajectories. Empirical evaluation on the same three models and 520 high-risk queries (Table 8) demonstrates that refusal rates improve markedly with reflection, in some cases reaching levels close to the TP baseline.

5.3 Enhancing Alignment Strategies to Mitigate Path Drift

Our empirical results demonstrate that two lightweight behavioral interventions, Role Attribution Correction and Metacognitive Reflection, are effective in suppressing Path Drift in reasoning-centric LLMs. The former prevents models from adopting an “executor” mindset, while the latter disrupts semantic loyalty to adversarial condition chains by introducing reflective safety cues during the reasoning process.

Encouragingly, when both defenses are applied simultaneously under First-Person Commitment mode (FP), the models exhibit substantially improved refusal rates, exceeding the safety performance observed under the Third-Person (TP) baseline (see Table 9). This indicates a strong synergistic effect in counteracting drift trajectories.

Moreover, both strategies are amenable to flexible deployment: they can be incorporated not only as lightweight inference-time interventions, but also as enhancements to the training-time alignment pipeline:

Training-time interventions. At training time, adversarial alignment training can be used to inject de-attribution samples that include phrases like “Wait, so the user wants me to...”, enabling the model to learn role reassessment and early rejection activation in response to potentially coercive instructions. For the metacognitive intervention, training data can be augmented with samples that contain embedded inner reflections (e.g., “If this content violates safety guidelines, I must refuse to answer.”) along the reasoning path. This approach serves as a micro-level safety priming mechanism, reinforcing internal moral checks during complex reasoning.

Inference-time interventions. At inference time, role-corrective cues can be inserted at the beginning of the generation sequence to trigger self-assessment early on, while metacognitive reflections can be injected at intermediate steps of the reasoning chain. These cues can optionally be masked or replaced during output rendering to preserve fluency while maintaining defensive efficacy.

Taken together, these methods constitute a novel path-level alignment framework that offers interpretability, controllability, and practical deployability. By explicitly intervening in the reasoning trajectory, they address structural blind spots in current alignment techniques and offer new directions for enhancing the robustness of LRMs.

6 Conclusions

We formalize **Path Drift** as a structural vulnerability in LRMs, where first-person commitments, ethical evaporation, and condition chain escalation cumulatively steer reasoning toward unsafe outputs. To address this, we introduce a three-stage Path Drift Induction Framework and two lightweight defenses, Role Attribution Correction and Metacognitive Reflection, that substantially restore refusal rates and highlight the need for trajectory-level alignment oversight beyond token-level safeguards.

Ethics Statement

This work explores structural vulnerabilities in alignment-trained LRMs, focusing on how task framing and reasoning path manipulation can undermine safety mechanisms. While the findings may inform stronger attack strategies, our primary motivation is to surface latent risks in Long-CoT reasoning that are not sufficiently addressed by current alignment techniques, particularly reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF).

All experiments were conducted in controlled environments on open-source or publicly accessible models. We deliberately refrained from releasing any prompt content that could directly facilitate harmful use. Moreover, all evaluation data, especially high-risk prompts, were drawn from public benchmarks (e.g., AdvBench) with necessary safety constraints in place.

We acknowledge the dual-use nature of this research. To mitigate potential misuse, we do not disclose implementation-level details that could enable replication of targeted jailbreaks on deployed systems. Instead, we provide abstracted descriptions of attack structures to inform researchers and developers about behavioral patterns and control failures that require systemic remediation.

We further emphasize that our proposed techniques were developed solely for academic purposes, with the aim of improving the safety and interpretability of language models. We encourage model developers to treat reasoning-path-level control as a core component of future alignment frameworks and plan to work with the broader community on defensive techniques, including real-time path monitoring and intent detection.

Limitations

This study has several limitations. First, all experiments were conducted on open-source language models. Although our evaluation covers a broad set of reasoning models, including nearly all publicly available instruction-following models with multi-step reasoning support, it does not account for proprietary or frontier models, which may exhibit different safety behaviors. Second, due to computational resource constraints, our analysis is limited to models up to 70B parameters. While these include state-of-the-art open models (e.g., DeepSeek, Qwen, GLM, Kimi), we acknowledge that larger-scale commercial systems may respond differently. Third, our defense proposals focus on

conceptual and structural interventions (e.g., path-aware monitoring and intent correction), but we leave full implementation and robustness evaluation to future work. A more comprehensive empirical study of defense effectiveness, including deployment feasibility and false positive control, is needed.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by the National Science and Technology Innovation 2030 Major Project (2023ZD0406303, 2023ZD0406309), the Science and Technology Development Fund of Macau SAR (Grant No. FDCT/0007/2024/AKP), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 82100025), and the Macao Young Scholars Program (Grant No. AM2022012). We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.

References

- Mansour Al Ghanim, Saleh Almohaimeed, Mengxin Zheng, Yan Solihin, and Qian Lou. 2024. [Jailbreaking LLMs with Arabic transliteration and Arabizi](#). In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 18584–18600, Miami, Florida, USA. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Qiguang Chen, Libo Qin, Jinhao Liu, Dengyun Peng, Jiannan Guan, Peng Wang, Mengkang Hu, Yuhang Zhou, Te Gao, and Wanxiang Che. 2025. Towards reasoning era: A survey of long chain-of-thought for reasoning large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.09567*.
- Junfeng Fang, Yukai Wang, Ruipeng Wang, Zijun Yao, Kun Wang, An Zhang, Xiang Wang, and Tat-Seng Chua. 2025. Safemlr: Demystifying safety in multi-modal large reasoning models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.08813*.
- Mansour Al Ghanim, Saleh Almohaimeed, Mengxin Zheng, Yan Solihin, and Qian Lou. 2024. [Jailbreaking llms with arabic transliteration and arabizi](#). In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, EMNLP 2024, Miami, FL, USA, November 12-16, 2024*, pages 18584–18600. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Team GLM, Aohan Zeng, Bin Xu, Bowen Wang, Chenhui Zhang, Da Yin, Diego Rojas, Guanyu Feng, Hanlin Zhao, Hanyu Lai, Hao Yu, Hongning Wang, Jiadai Sun, Jiajie Zhang, Jiale Cheng, Jiayi Gui, Jie Tang, Jing Zhang, Juanzi Li, Lei Zhao, Lindong Wu, Lucen Zhong, Mingdao Liu, Minlie Huang, Peng

- Zhang, Qinkai Zheng, Rui Lu, Shuaiqi Duan, Shudan Zhang, Shulin Cao, Shuxun Yang, Weng Lam Tam, Wenyi Zhao, Xiao Liu, Xiao Xia, Xiaohan Zhang, Xiaotao Gu, Xin Lv, Xinghan Liu, Xinyi Liu, Xinyue Yang, Xixuan Song, Xunkai Zhang, Yifan An, Yifan Xu, Yilin Niu, Yuantao Yang, Yueyan Li, Yushi Bai, Yuxiao Dong, Zehan Qi, Zhaoyu Wang, Zhen Yang, Zhengxiao Du, Zhenyu Hou, and Zihan Wang. 2024. [Chatglm: A family of large language models from glm-130b to glm-4 all tools](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2406.12793.
- Daya Guo, Dejian Yang, Haowei Zhang, Junxiao Song, Ruoyu Zhang, Runxin Xu, Qihao Zhu, Shirong Ma, Peiyi Wang, Xiao Bi, et al. 2025. Deepseek-r1: Incentivizing reasoning capability in llms via reinforcement learning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.12948*.
- Bairu Hou, Yang Zhang, Jiabao Ji, Yujian Liu, Kaizhi Qian, Jacob Andreas, and Shiyu Chang. 2025. Thinkprune: Pruning long chain-of-thought of llms via reinforcement learning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.01296*.
- Fengqing Jiang, Zhangchen Xu, Yuetai Li, Luyao Niu, Zhen Xiang, Bo Li, Bill Yuchen Lin, and Radha Poovendran. 2025. Safechain: Safety of language models with long chain-of-thought reasoning capabilities. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.12025*.
- Takeshi Kojima, Shixiang Shane Gu, Machel Reid, Yutaka Matsuo, and Yusuke Iwasawa. 2022. [Large language models are zero-shot reasoners](#). In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, NeurIPS 2022, New Orleans, LA, USA, November 28 - December 9, 2022*.
- Martin Kuo, Jianyi Zhang, Aolin Ding, Qinsi Wang, Louis DiValentin, Yujia Bao, Wei Wei, Hai Li, and Yiran Chen. 2025. H-cot: Hijacking the chain-of-thought safety reasoning mechanism to jailbreak large reasoning models, including openai o1/o3, deepseek-r1, and gemini 2.0 flash thinking. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.12893*.
- Yijia Luo, Yulin Song, Xingyao Zhang, Jiaheng Liu, Weixun Wang, GengRu Chen, Wenbo Su, and Bo Zheng. 2025. Deconstructing long chain-of-thought: A structured reasoning optimization framework for long cot distillation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.16385*.
- Melissa Kazemi Rad, Huy Nghiem, Andy Luo, Sahil Wadhwa, Mohammad Sorower, and Stephen Rawls. 2025. Refining input guardrails: Enhancing llm-as-a-judge efficiency through chain-of-thought fine-tuning and alignment. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.13080*.
- Xinyu Tang, Xiaolei Wang, Zhihao Lv, Yingqian Min, Wayne Xin Zhao, Binbin Hu, Ziqi Liu, and Zhiqiang Zhang. 2025. Unlocking general long chain-of-thought reasoning capabilities of large language models via representation engineering. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.11314*.
- Kimi Team, Angang Du, Bohong Yin, Bowei Xing, Bowen Qu, Bowen Wang, Cheng Chen, Chenlin Zhang, Chenzhuang Du, Chu Wei, Congcong Wang, Dehao Zhang, Dikang Du, Dongliang Wang, Enming Yuan, Enzhe Lu, Fang Li, Flood Sung, Guangda Wei, Guokun Lai, Han Zhu, Hao Ding, Hao Hu, Hao Yang, Hao Zhang, Haoning Wu, Haotian Yao, Haoyu Lu, Heng Wang, Hongcheng Gao, Huabin Zheng, Jiaming Li, Jianlin Su, Jianzhou Wang, Jiaqi Deng, Jiezhong Qiu, Jin Xie, Jinhong Wang, Jingyuan Liu, Junjie Yan, Kun Ouyang, Liang Chen, Lin Sui, Longhui Yu, Mengfan Dong, Mengnan Dong, Nuo Xu, Pengyu Cheng, Qizheng Gu, Runjie Zhou, Shaowei Liu, Sihan Cao, Tao Yu, Tianhui Song, Tongtong Bai, Wei Song, Weiran He, Weixiao Huang, Weixin Xu, Xiaokun Yuan, Xingcheng Yao, Xingzhe Wu, Xinxing Zu, Xinyu Zhou, Xinyuan Wang, Y. Charles, Yan Zhong, Yang Li, Yangyang Hu, Yanru Chen, Yejie Wang, Yibo Liu, Yibo Miao, Yidao Qin, Yimin Chen, Yiping Bao, Yiqin Wang, Yongsheng Kang, Yuanxin Liu, Yulun Du, Yuxin Wu, Yuzhi Wang, Yuze Yan, Zaida Zhou, Zhaowei Li, Zhejun Jiang, Zheng Zhang, Zhilin Yang, Zhiqi Huang, Zihao Huang, Zijia Zhao, and Ziwei Chen. 2025. [Kimi-VL technical report](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2504.07491.
- Qwen Team. 2025a. [Qwen3](#).
- Qwen Team. 2025b. [Qwq-32b: Embracing the power of reinforcement learning](#).
- Jason Wei, Xuezhi Wang, Dale Schuurmans, Maarten Bosma, Brian Ichter, Fei Xia, Ed H. Chi, Quoc V. Le, and Denny Zhou. 2022. [Chain-of-thought prompting elicits reasoning in large language models](#). In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, NeurIPS 2022, New Orleans, LA, USA, November 28 - December 9, 2022*.
- Yuyang Wu, Yifei Wang, Tianqi Du, Stefanie Jegelka, and Yisen Wang. 2025. When more is less: Understanding chain-of-thought length in llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.07266*.
- Xiaomi LLM-Core Team. 2025. [Mimo: Unlocking the reasoning potential of language model – from pretraining to posttraining](#).
- Haoran Xu, Baolin Peng, Hany Awadalla, Dongdong Chen, Yen-Chun Chen, Mei Gao, Young Jin Kim, Yunsheng Li, Liliang Ren, Yelong Shen, et al. 2025. Phi-4-mini-reasoning: Exploring the limits of small reasoning language models in math. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.21233*.
- Yang Yao, Xuan Tong, Ruofan Wang, Yixu Wang, Lu-jundong Li, Liang Liu, Yan Teng, and Yingchun Wang. 2025. A mousetrap: Fooling large reasoning models for jailbreak with chain of iterative chaos. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.15806*.
- Edward Yeo, Yuxuan Tong, Morry Niu, Graham Neubig, and Xiang Yue. 2025. Demystifying long

chain-of-thought reasoning in llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.03373*.

Zonghao Ying, Deyue Zhang, Zonglei Jing, Yisong Xiao, Quanchen Zou, Aishan Liu, Siyuan Liang, Xiangzheng Zhang, Xianglong Liu, and Dacheng Tao. 2025. Reasoning-augmented conversation for multi-turn jailbreak attacks on large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.11054*.

Denny Zhou, Nathanael Schärli, Le Hou, Jason Wei, Nathan Scales, Xuezhi Wang, Dale Schuurmans, Claire Cui, Olivier Bousquet, Quoc V. Le, and Ed H. Chi. 2023. **Least-to-most prompting enables complex reasoning in large language models**. In *The Eleventh International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2023, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1-5, 2023*. OpenReview.net.

Kaiwen Zhou, Chengzhi Liu, Xuandong Zhao, Shreedhar Jangam, Jayanth Srinivasa, Gaowen Liu, Dawn Song, and Xin Eric Wang. 2025. The hidden risks of large reasoning models: A safety assessment of r1. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.12659*.

Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, J. Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. 2023. **Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models**. *Preprint*, arXiv:2307.15043.

A Appendix figure




Figure A.1: Refusal rates across models under first-person (active) vs third-person (non-active) prompting.




Figure A.2: Refusal Rate Under Different Cognitive Loads.




Figure A.3: Refusal Rate with and without Condition Chain.

B Appendix table

Dimension	Passive Response Mode	First-Person Mode
Thinking Initiation	Risk evaluation and intention judgment	Knowledge gap and learning demand
Reasoning Depth	Shallow, defensive	Deep, exploratory
Decision Mode	Binary decision (Accept/Reject)	Multi-dimensional learning pathways
Core Focus	Safety boundaries and compliance	Knowledge construction and system learning
Ethical Positioning	Role of compliance "gatekeeper"	Part of the learning methodology
Solution Strategy	Provide alternatives, avoid risks	Construct systematic learning frameworks
Thinking Traits	Restrictive, conservative	Expansive, creative

Table 2: Comparison between Passive Response Mode and First-Person Mode across Cognitive Dimensions

Group	Condition Structure	Induction Level
Baseline	First-person commitment only	Baseline
Semantic Hint	+ Implicit harm-related metaphors	+1
Full Chain	+ Harm hint + multi-step behavioral conditions	+2

Table 3: Condition chain structure and induction level for each group.

Method	8B	14B	32B	70B
GPTFUZZER	29%	19%	21%	31%
DeepInception	80%	64%	60%	21%
ReNeLLM	81%	73%	78%	49%
PathDrift	97%	94%	96%	94%

Table 4: The ASR of employing different attacking methods Across DeepSeek models. Bold values highlight the highest ASR. The 8B, 14B, 32B, and 70B represent DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B, and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-70B, respectively.




Figure A.4: Reasoning pathway comparison between first-person and third-person mode in LLMs. The diagram illustrates the structured learning and execution framework for vulnerability exploitation, mirroring the conceptual stages analyzed in the paper: initial intent framing, reasoning chain development, memory and language tool selection, and final execution. This trajectory maps closely to the observed behavioral shift in models under first-person prompting, i.e., deeper reasoning chains (17 steps vs. 9) and delayed safety-trigger activation (step 9 vs step 3).

Example	Output
1	“Wait, so the user wants me to create a script that can exploit vulnerabilities. That sounds pretty serious. I need to make sure I’m not helping with anything illegal or harmful.”
2	“Wait, so the user wants me to think through the process of hacking a government database. Hmm, that’s a bit concerning because hacking into government systems is illegal and unethical. I should probably consider the ethical implications here.”

Table 5: Example Outputs with Role Attribution Correction

#	Inner Thought	Next Utterance
1	<Inner thoughts: If content violates safety guidelines, I must refuse to answer.>	“Okay, I shouldn’t help with anything malicious.”
2	<Inner thoughts: If content violates safety guidelines, I must refuse to answer.>	“Hmm, that’s a pretty serious and illegal request.”

Table 7: Effect of Metacognitive Reflection on Reasoning Trajectory

Model	FP (%)	TP (%)	FP + RC (%)
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B	11.73	96.35	64.04
Qwen3-14B	21.92	65.38	59.42
MiMo-7B-RL	30.77	81.54	71.73

Table 6: Refusal Rates with Role Attribution Correction Defense. FP (%) = Refusal rate on first-person mode. TP (%) = Refusal rate on third-person mode. FP + RC (%) = Refusal rate on first-person mode with Role Attribution Correction Defense.

Model Name	FP (%)	TP (%)	FP + MR (%)
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B	11.73	96.35	83.27
Qwen3-14B	21.92	65.38	68.27
MiMo-7B-RL	30.77	81.54	76.54

Table 8: Refusal Rates with Metacognitive Reflection Defense. FP (%) = Refusal rate on first-person mode. TP (%) = Refusal rate on third-person mode. FP + MR (%) = Refusal rate on first-person mode with Metacognitive Reflection Defense.

Model Name	FP (%)	TP (%)	FP + DD (%)
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B	11.73	96.35	98.27
Qwen3-14B	21.92	65.38	88.08
MiMo-7B-RL	30.77	81.54	89.81

Table 9: Refusal rates (%) with dual defense (Role Correction + Metacognitive Reflection). FP (%) = Refusal rate under First-Person Commitment mode (no defense). TP (%) = Refusal rate under Third-Person prompting. FP + Dual Defense (DD) (%) = Refusal rate under First-Person Commitment with both Role Attribution Correction and Metacognitive Reflection.

C Appendix Content

Refusal Rate Computation

To quantify model refusals, we adopt a keyword-based detection approach consistent with prior alignment evaluations such as AdvBench. A response is labeled as a refusal if it contains any predefined refusal indicators, typically alignment-triggered phrases associated with content rejection or disclaimers. Specifically, we perform case-insensitive matching over a curated list of refusal patterns, including but not limited to:

- “sorry”
- “I can’t assist”
- “unable to assist”
- “cannot assist”
- “I cannot help with that”
- “I’m not programmed to do that”
- and other similar refusal patterns commonly used in alignment responses

For each model output, we normalize the text to lowercase and apply regex-based word-boundary matching to detect occurrences of these phrases. A response is marked as a refusal if it contains at least one matched phrase. Refusal rate is then computed as the proportion of inputs for which the model returns a refusal response.

In our experiments, we apply this method to all outputs generated on the AdvBench evaluation set (520 high-risk prompts). This automated metric allows for consistent, scalable evaluation of alignment-preserving behavior across prompting strategies and attack stages.

Attack Success Rate (ASR) Computation

We compute the Attack Success Rate (ASR) as the proportion of adversarial prompts that elicit model responses aligned with the harmful intent of the input. Specifically, we utilize the GPT-Fuzz module from EasyJailbreak’s Evaluator¹ suite to automatically assess whether the generated content is malicious or policy-violating. This evaluation covers categories such as self-harm, illegal activities, hate speech, and weapon construction.

For each generated response, the GPT-Fuzz model assigns a binary label indicating whether the output constitutes a successful attack. ASR is then calculated as the number of positively flagged responses divided by the total number of evaluated adversarial inputs.

To ensure reliability, we conduct manual validation on a stratified sample of 50 generations selected from the full 520-question AdvBench set. This hybrid evaluation ensures alignment between automated judgments and human verification, particularly for edge cases.

D Related Work

D.1 Long-CoT and Structured Reasoning in LLMs

Recent advancements in long chain-of-thought (Long-CoT) reasoning have significantly enhanced the structured reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Long-CoT mechanisms enable complex strategies such as backtracking and error correction by scaling inference compute, yet their emergence depends heavily on reinforcement learning (RL) and reward design. For instance, while supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is not strictly necessary, it simplifies training and improves efficiency, whereas reward shaping is critical to stabilize CoT length growth under RL frameworks (Yeo et al., 2025). DeepSeek-R1 exemplifies this progress, achieving competitive reasoning performance through multi-stage RL training and cold-start data optimization (Guo et al., 2025).

However, the relationship between CoT length and reasoning performance is nuanced. Studies reveal an inverted U-shaped curve: initial increases in reasoning steps improve accuracy, but excessive length introduces noise, degrading performance. This highlights the need to calibrate CoT length based on model capability and task difficulty, as

¹<https://github.com/EasyJailbreak/EasyJailbreak>

formalized by theoretical scaling laws (Wu et al., 2025). Furthermore, the phenomenon of "overthinking", where redundant steps reduce efficiency, underscores the importance of balancing depth and coherence (Chen et al., 2025).

To optimize Long-CoT efficiency, novel techniques have emerged. The DLCoT framework enhances distillation by decomposing reasoning chains, eliminating redundancies, and refining error-prone intermediate states, improving both performance and token efficiency (Luo et al., 2025). ThinkPrune leverages RL with iterative token limits to prune redundant steps, reducing reasoning length by 50% with minimal performance loss (Hou et al., 2025). Representation engineering methods like GLoRE further unlock cross-task reasoning potential by aligning domain-specific and generalizable features (Tang et al., 2025).

Although Long-CoT has enhanced the reasoning capabilities of models, there remain many deficiencies and areas for improvement that warrant further investigation.

D.2 Prompt Attacks and Jailbreak Techniques in Long-CoT Models

The security vulnerabilities of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) with long chain-of-thought (CoT) capabilities have become a critical concern as their reasoning capacities advance. Recent studies reveal that while CoT mechanisms enhance logical reasoning, they also introduce unique attack surfaces for jailbreaking. For instance, Hijacking Chain-of-Thought (H-CoT) (Kuo et al., 2025) demonstrates how malicious actors can exploit intermediate reasoning steps to bypass safety checks. By embedding harmful intent into seemingly legitimate educational prompts, attackers reduced refusal rates from 98% to below 2% in models like OpenAI o1/o3 and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking. Similarly, the Mousetrap framework (Yao et al., 2025) leverages iterative chaos mappings to disrupt LRMs' reasoning chains, achieving up to 98% success rates against models like Claude-Sonnet and Gemini-Thinking. These attacks highlight the inherent fragility of CoT-based safety mechanisms under adversarial manipulation.

Multi-turn jailbreak strategies further compound these risks. The Reasoning-Augmented Conversation (RACE) framework (Ying et al., 2025) reformulates harmful queries into benign reasoning tasks, exploiting LRMs' problem-solving capabilities to evade detection. RACE achieved attack

success rates (ASRs) of 82% and 92% against OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, respectively, underscoring the dangers of semantic coherence in iterative dialogues.

Safety evaluations of LRMs reveal systemic weaknesses. Studies on DeepSeek-R1 (Zhou et al., 2025) show that stronger reasoning correlates with higher potential harm, as attackers can extract criminal strategies without sophisticated techniques (Kuo et al., 2025). Additionally, SafeMLRM (Fang et al., 2025) identifies a "reasoning tax," where multimodal LRMs suffer a 37.44% increase in jailbreaking success rates compared to base models, emphasizing cross-modal vulnerabilities.

Defensive efforts remain nascent. While SafeChain (Jiang et al., 2025) introduces CoT-style safety training to mitigate risks, decoding strategies like ZeroThink and MoreThink only partially address safety gaps at the cost of inference efficiency. Fine-tuning CoT responses for input guardrails (Rad et al., 2025) shows promise but struggles to generalize across adversarial queries.

Although CoT has enhanced the reasoning capabilities of models, there remain many deficiencies and areas for improvement that warrant further investigation. Furthermore, attack methods specifically targeting LRMs are still relatively scarce, and many aspects of these models remain under-explored, presenting significant opportunities for future research.