As large language models (LLMs) advance in linguistic competence, their reasoning abilities are gaining increasing attention.In humans, reasoning often performs well in domain specific settings, particularly in normative rather than purely formal contexts.Although prior studies have compared LLM and human reasoning, the domain specificity of LLM reasoning remains underexplored.In this study, we introduce a new Wason Selection Task dataset that explicitly encodes deontic modality to systematically distinguish deontic from descriptive conditionals, and use it to examine LLMs’ conditional reasoning under deontic rules.We further analyze whether observed error patterns are better explained by confirmation bias (a tendency to seek rule-supporting evidence) or by matching bias (a tendency to ignore negation and select items that lexically match elements of the rule).Results show that, like humans, LLMs reason better with deontic rules and display matching-bias-like errors.Together, these findings suggest that the performance of LLMs varies systematically across rule types and that their error patterns can parallel well-known human biases in this paradigm.

Normative reasoning is a type of reasoning that involves normative or deontic modality, such as obligation and permission. While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across various reasoning tasks, their ability to handle normative reasoning remains underexplored. In this paper, we systematically evaluate LLMs’ reasoning capabilities in the normative domain from both logical and modal perspectives. Specifically, to assess how well LLMs reason with normative modals, we make a comparison between their reasoning with normative modals and their reasoning with epistemic modals, which share a common formal structure. To this end, we introduce a new dataset covering a wide range of formal patterns of reasoning in both normative and epistemic domains, while also incorporating non-formal cognitive factors that influence human reasoning. Our results indicate that, although LLMs generally adhere to valid reasoning patterns, they exhibit notable inconsistencies in specific types of normative reasoning and display cognitive biases similar to those observed in psychological studies of human reasoning. These findings highlight challenges in achieving logical consistency in LLMs’ normative reasoning and provide insights for enhancing their reliability. All data and code are released publicly at https://github.com/kmineshima/NeuBAROCO.

This paper explores the question of how accurately current large language models can perform logical reasoning in natural language, with an emphasis on whether these models exhibit reasoning biases similar to humans. Specifically, our study focuses on syllogistic reasoning, a form of deductive reasoning extensively studied in cognitive science as a natural form of human reasoning. We present a syllogism dataset called NeuBAROCO, which consists of syllogistic reasoning problems in English and Japanese. This dataset was originally designed for psychological experiments to assess human reasoning capabilities using various forms of syllogisms. Our experiments with leading large language models indicate that these models exhibit reasoning biases similar to humans, along with other error tendencies. Notably, there is significant room for improvement in reasoning problems where the relationship between premises and hypotheses is neither entailment nor contradiction. We also present experimental results and in-depth analysis using a new Chain-of-Thought prompting method, which asks LLMs to translate syllogisms into abstract logical expressions and then explain their reasoning process. Our analysis using this method suggests that the primary limitations of LLMs lie in the reasoning process itself rather than the interpretation of syllogisms.

This paper investigates whether current large language models exhibit biases in logical reasoning, similar to humans. Specifically, we focus on syllogistic reasoning, a well-studied form of inference in the cognitive science of human deduction. To facilitate our analysis, we introduce a dataset called NeuBAROCO, originally designed for psychological experiments that assess human logical abilities in syllogistic reasoning. The dataset consists of syllogistic inferences in both English and Japanese. We examine three types of biases observed in human syllogistic reasoning: belief biases, conversion errors, and atmosphere effects. Our findings demonstrate that current large language models struggle more with problems involving these three types of biases.