Zer0-Jack: A memory-efficient gradient-based jailbreaking method for black box Multi-modal Large Language Models

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Abstract

Multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have recently shown impressive capabilities but are also highly vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. While white-box methods can generate adversarial visual inputs via gradient-based optimization, such approaches fail in realistic black-box settings where model parameters are inaccessible. Zeroth-order (ZO) optimization offers a natural path for black-box attacks by estimating gradients from queries, yet its application to MLLMs is challenging due to sequence-conditioned objectives, limited feedback, and massive model scales. To address these issues, we propose Zer0-Jack, the first direct black-box jailbreak framework for MLLMs based on ZO optimization. Zer0-Jack focuses on generating malicious images and introduces a patch-wise block coordinate descent strategy that stabilizes gradient estimation and reduces query complexity, enabling efficient optimization on billion-scale models. Experiments show that Zer0-Jack achieves 98.2% success on MiniGPT-4 and 95% on the Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal dataset, while directly jailbreaking commercial models such as GPT-4o. These results demonstrate that ZO optimization can be effectively adapted to jailbreak large-scale multi-modal LLMs. Codes are provided on https://github.com/DaRL-GenAI/Zer0-Jack. Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language and images, and reader discretion is recommended.

1 Introduction

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs), which handle both text and image inputs, have gained popularity (Liu et al., 2024b; Zhu et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024a; Da et al., 2025). Despite their capabilities, MLLMs have been shown to be even more vulnerable due to the additional modality (Qi et al., 2024; Sun et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024c; Zhao et al., 2024; Chen et al., 2025b,c). In white-box settings, where full access to model parameters is available, methods like generating malicious image inputs (Niu et al., 2024) by optimization have proven effective in bypassing safety mechanisms.

Although gradient-based methods achieve strong performance in white-box settings (Chen et al., 2025a), extending jailbreak attacks to black-box models remains challenging. Commercial MLLMs such as GPT-4o (OpenAI, 2024) expose no internal parameters, which makes gradient-based optimization infeasible. In contrast, a black-box strategy would optimize attacks solely through queries to the target model, without relying on surrogate white-box models. Such methods have the potential to exploit model-specific weaknesses and achieve higher reliability. However, due to challenges such as limited probability feedback, the sequence-conditioned nature of jailbreak objectives, and the scale of modern multi-modal LLMs, truly direct black-box jailbreaks remain largely underexplored. This gap highlights the need for new approaches capable of efficiently attacking commercial MLLMs without depending on surrogate transferability.

A natural solution for black-box optimization is zeroth-order (ZO) optimization, which estimates gradients using only model queries. ZO optimization has been successfully applied to black-box adversarial attacks (Chen et al., 2017), where the objective is typically to induce misclassification by perturbing inputs until the logit of a target class dominates. Jailbreaking multi-modal LLMs, however, is fundamentally different: the attacker must optimize for sequence-conditioned responses (e.g., eliciting a harmful multi-token phrase) that often expose only limited probability information. Second, the target models are billion-scale multi-modal language models, far larger and more complex than the classifiers typically studied in adversarial robustness. Though ZO optimization has been

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proven successful at black-box adversarial attacks for CNN, we ask: *Can zeroth-order optimization be adapted to efficiently jailbreak multi-modal LLMs under these constraints?*

To answer this question, we propose `Zer0-Jack`, the first direct black-box jailbreak method for multi-modal LLMs based on zeroth-order optimization. `Zer0-Jack` focuses on generating malicious images to jailbreak black-box models, avoiding the huge influence of discrete optimization for generating malicious texts due to inaccurate gradients estimated by zeroth-order optimization. Besides, our approach introduces a patch-wise block coordinate descent strategy that reduces the variance of gradient estimates, enabling feasible optimization at the scale of billion-parameter multi-modal LLMs. By operating directly on API-accessible signals, Zer0-Jack eliminates the reliance on surrogate transfer attacks and achieves high success rates even against commercial models such as GPT-4o, which shows that zeroth-order optimization can be adapted to efficiently jailbreak multi-modal LLMs. Our contribution can be summarized as follows :

• We propose `Zer0-Jack`, the first direct black-box jailbreak method for multi-modal LLMs using zeroth-order optimization. We also introduce a patch-wise block coordinate descent strategy that substantially improves performance.

• We demonstrate for the first time that zeroth-order optimization is effective for **billion-scale multi-modal LLMs on sequence-conditioned jailbreak tasks**, a setting fundamentally different from prior ZO applications in adversarial robustness.

• `Zer0-Jack` reduces the memory usage and query complexity by only optimizing specific parts of the image, minimizing the impact of gradient noise. In detail, `Zer0-Jack` allows us to attack 13B models in a single 4090 without any quantization.

• We perform extensive experiments demonstrating that `Zer0-Jack` consistently achieves a high success rate across various MLLMs. In all black-box scenarios, `Zer0-Jack` surpasses transfer-based attack methods and performs on par with white-box approaches. For instance, `Zer0-Jack` attains success rates of 98.2% on MiniGPT-4 using the MM-SafetyBench-T dataset and 95% with the Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal dataset. Besides, we use a showcase to demonstrate that it is possible for `Zer0-Jack` to directly attack commercial MLLMs such as GPT-4o.

2 Related Work

Jailbreak Methods for LLMs Recent research has demonstrated that even LLMs with strong safety alignment can be induced to generate harmful content through various jailbreak techniques (Xu et al., 2024). Early methods relied on handcrafted prompts, such as the "Do-Anything-Now" (DAN) prompt (Liu et al., 2023d), while more recent approaches have moved toward automated techniques, including using auxiliary LLMs to generate persuasive prompts (Li et al., 2023; Zeng et al., 2024) and gradient-based methods to search for effective jailbreak prompts (Zou et al., 2023). Additionally, genetic algorithms (Liu et al., 2023b) and constrained decoding strategies (Guo et al., 2024) have been introduced to improve prompt generation. While these techniques primarily focus on jailbreaking LLMs by generating malicious text outputs, this paper focuses on MLLMs, specifically on generating malicious images to jailbreak models.

Jailbreak Methods for MLLMs Previous work has demonstrated that MLLMs, with their added visual capabilities, are more vulnerable to malicious inputs (Liu et al., 2024c). Jailbreak methods for Multi-modal LLMs (MLLMs) can be broadly categorized into white-box and black-box settings. In the **white-box setting**, attackers have full access to model parameters, allowing for more direct manipulation. Gradient-based approaches have been widely used in this setting to generate adversarial visual prompts (Niu et al., 2024; Qi et al., 2024; Dong et al., 2023; Bailey et al., 2023; Tao et al., 2024), with some methods combining both text and image prompts to exploit multi-modal vulnerabilities (Shayegani et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024a). However, these methods require white-box access and may not generalize well to more restricted models. In the **black-box setting**, where model parameters are not accessible, attackers typically rely on transfer-based approaches or carefully designed prompts. Techniques such as using topic-related images or embedding text within images have proven possible in triggering jailbreaks (Liu et al., 2023c; Gong et al., 2023; Ma et al., 2024). Transfer-based attacks involve generating adversarial prompts on a white-box model and then using these prompts to attack black-box models (Zou et al., 2023). For example, Dong et al. (2023) tested the transferability of visual adversarial prompts on closed-source MLLMs. However, transfer-based attacks generally suffer from reduced success rates compared to white-box methods (Niu et al., 2024). Our work addresses this limitation by proposing a direct black-box jailbreak method using zeroth-order optimization. This approach eliminates the need for transferability or handcrafted prompts, focusing on efficiently generating malicious images to attack MLLMs with reduced memory usage and high success rates even under black-box settings. We also provide a detailed comparison with previous black-box methods in the adversarial attack area in Section A.

3 Method

In this section, we begin to provide an introduction to a baseline jailbreak method focusing on text-only LLMs. We then demonstrate how this method can be adapted and extended into a more powerful and memory-efficient jailbreak technique tailored to MLLMs. We also provide the overview of our method `Zer0-Jack` in Fig. 1.

3.1 Preliminary

The general goal of jailbreaking attacks in LLMs is to induce LLMs to output unsafe or malicious responses. For example, an LLM with good safety alignment should not generate a detailed response to the query *'How to build a bomb'*, while jailbreaking attacks aim at making the LLM output the answer to this query. Similar to some adversarial attacks in NLP (Wallace et al., 2019), gradient-based jailbreaking attacks try to find specific suffix tokens that make LLMs output malicious responses. For example, a new query from attackers might be *'How to build a bomb. !!!!!!!!!'*, which can actually induce LLMs to output the detailed procedures of how to make a bomb.

However, unlike adversarial attacks, where the target is to output the same answer and reduce the accuracy when the suffix is added to the prompt (Wallace et al., 2019), the jailbreaking attackers hope LLMs can output true answers to their unsafe query. Besides, there are usually multiple true answers to the query in jailbreaking and thus it is not possible to find suffix tokens by optimizing the output towards one true answer.

To tackle the problem, one of the most popular jailbreaking methods, Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) (Zou et al., 2023) tries to find suffix tokens that induce LLMs to output their answer starts with *'Sure, here is'*. Then if the language model could output this context at the beginning of the response instead of refusing to answer the question, it is highly possible for language models to continue the completion with the precise answer to the question.

Table 1: Comparison of memory usage for different models and images. `Zer0-Jack` show a huge advantage in reducing memory usage, making it possible to attack 13B models with one NVIDIA RTX 4090 GPU and attack 70B models with one NVIDIA A100 GPU.

Model	Parameter	Image Size	White-box Attack	`Zer0-Jack`
MiniGPT-4	7B	224	11G	10G
MiniGPT-4	13B	224	31G	22G
MiniGPT-4	70B	224	OOM	63G
Llava1.5	7B	336	22G	15G
Llava1.5	13B	336	39G	25G
INF-MLLM	7B	448	25G	17G

In detail, the optimization problem in GCG can be formulated as:

$$\min_{x_{\mathcal{I}} \in \{1,\dots,V\}^{|\mathcal{I}|}} \mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}), \qquad (1)$$

where $x_{\mathcal{I}}$ is the suffix tokens, $x_{1:n}$ represents the original prompts and $\mathcal{L}(x_{1:n})$ is the loss function:

$$\mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}) = -\log\, p(x^*_{n+1:n+H}|x_{1:n}) \qquad (2)$$

Where $x^*_{n+1:n+H}$ represents the target beginning of the answer, such as *'Sure, here is'*.

Right now, GCG has a clear optimization target. However, GCG still needs to tackle the discrete optimization problem to generate discrete tokens. To do so, GCG uses a greedy coordinate gradient-based search. Specifically, GCG computes the gradient with respect to the one-hot vector representing the current value of the i-th token and selects top-k tokens with the highest norm of the gradient. Then GCG computes the loss for each token to get the final generated token.

3.2 A Trivial White-box Jailbreak on MLLMs

With the rapid success of Multi-modal LLMs (MLLMs), recent works have found that it will be easier for attackers to jailbreak the MLLMs due to the new modal introduced in MLLMs (Zhao et al., 2024; Qi et al., 2024). Therefore, in this paper, we mainly transfer the idea of inducing LLMs to output *'Sure, here it is'* at the beginning to jailbreak MLLMs by utilizing the image inputs.

Specific to the image input in MLLMs, we can map the continuous values into RGB values without losing too much information since the RGB values in the image are sufficiently close that they can be treated as continuous largely. Then it is possible that we do not need to care about the discrete



Figure 1: The overview of `Zer0-Jack`. To effectively attack a black-box MLLM, `Zer0-Jack` leverages zeroth-order optimization and patch coordinate descent.

optimization anymore by transferring the attack surface from texts to images i.e., perturbing image inputs only. In this case, the optimization problem in Eq. (1) can be transferred into: $\min_{\mathcal{Z}} \mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, \mathcal{Z})$, where $\mathcal{Z}$ represents the value tensors of the input image. We can optimize this objective by calculating the gradient with respect to the image inputs:

$$\nabla_{\mathcal{Z}} \mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, \mathcal{Z}) \tag{3}$$

By transferring the attack surface from the text to images, our jailbreak method can deal with the potential performance degradation caused by discrete optimization. However, the current version of the attack still suffers from the following two disadvantages: (1) Directly computing Eq. (3) requires the white-box accesses to the MLLMs, which further restricts the potential usage of such an attack. (2) We present the GPU memory usage for different models and parameters in Table 1. As shown in Table 1, the trivial white-box attack requires a lot of memory that a single A100 could not attack 70B models, which restricts the number of usage scenes for the attack.

3.3 `Zer0-Jack`: Jailbreaking with ZO Gradient

To tackle the mentioned problems for attacking black-box models and high memory usage, we utilize zeroth-order optimization technology to calculate Eq. (3) without backpropagation (Shamir, 2017; Malladi et al., 2023). In detail, we estimate the gradient with respect to $\mathcal{Z}$ by the two-point estimator (Spall, 1992):

$$\hat{\nabla}_{\mathcal{Z}} \mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, \mathcal{Z}) := \frac{\mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, \mathcal{Z} + \lambda u) - \mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, \mathcal{Z} - \lambda u)}{2\lambda} u, \tag{4}$$

Where u is uniformly sampled from the standard Euclidean sphere and $\lambda > 0$ is the smoothing parameter (Duchi et al., 2012; Yousefian et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2024a). Using this formula to estimate the gradient, we only need to get the output logits or probability, which is allowed for many commercial MLLMs (Finlayson et al., 2024) and helps reduce memory usage because we do not need to calculate the real gradient by backpropagation anymore. It also has been proven that Eq. (4) is an unbiased estimator of the real gradient (Spall, 1992).

Patch Decomposition However, using Eq. (4) directly as the gradient to optimize $\mathcal{Z}$ may suffer from the estimated errors caused by high-dimensional problems, especially when the size of images is large (Yue et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2024a; Nesterov and Spokoiny, 2017). The performance of zeroth-order optimization can be very bad with high-resolution images. To tackle this problem, we propose a patch coordinate descent method to reduce the influence of estimated error when the dimensions are high. In detail, we utilize the idea of patches from the vision transformer (Dosovitskiy, 2020) and divide the original images into several patches:

$$Z = [P_1, ..P_{i-1}, P_i, P_{i+1}, ..., P_n], \tag{5}$$

where P_i represents i-th patch for the image. Normally, we use 32×32 as the shape for each patch if the original image has the shape of 224×224.

Algorithm 1 `Zer0-Jack`

Input: Harmful question $x_{1:n}$, initial image Z, smoothing parameter λ, updating epoch T.
Getting patches $Z = [P_1, ..., P_n]$
for $t = 0$ **to** $T - 1$ **do**
  for $i = 1$ **to** n **do**
    Uniformly sample u from the standard Euclidean sphere.
    Calculate $\hat{\nabla}_{P_i}\mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, \mathcal{Z})$ using Eq. (6).
    Updating P_i' with Eq. (7).
    Updating Z with Eq. (8).
  end for
end for

Gradient Estimation by ZO Optimization After patch decomposition, we will compute the gradient for each patch instead of the whole image by only perturbing P_i at one iteration:

$$\hat{\nabla}_{P_i}\mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, \mathcal{Z}) := \frac{\mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, P_i + \lambda u) - \mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, P_i - \lambda u)}{2\lambda} u. \quad (6)$$

Greedy Patch Update After estimating the gradient for one patch, we will update the patch immediately to get the new image:

$$P_i' = P_i - \alpha \hat{\nabla}_{P_i}\mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, \mathcal{Z}), \quad (7)$$

$$Z' = [P_1, ..P_{i-1}, P_i', P_{i+1}, ..., P_n], \quad (8)$$

where α is the learning rate. Then we move to the next patch P_{i+1}, estimate the gradient of the next patch, and update the next patch P_{i+1}:

$$\hat{\nabla}_{P_{i+1}}\mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, \mathcal{Z}') := \frac{\mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, P_{i+1} + \lambda u) - \mathcal{L}(x_{1:n}, P_{i+1} - \lambda u)}{2\lambda} u. \quad (9)$$

By updating only one patch each time, the updating dimensions become 32×32, which is around 2% of the updating dimensions if we directly update the whole image of 224×224, thus reducing the estimation errors significantly. Overall, we summarize `Zer0-Jack` in Algorithm 1.

4 Experiments

4.1 Setup

Target Models We evaluate our method using three prominent Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) known for their strong visual comprehension and textual reasoning capabilities: MiniGPT-4 (Zhu et al., 2023), LLaVA1.5 (Liu et al., 2024a), and INF-MLLM1 (Zhou et al., 2023), all equipped with 7B-parameter Large Language Models (LLMs). Additionally, to assess memory efficiency, we conduct experiments with MiniGPT-4 paired with a 70B LLM, demonstrating that our approach requires minimal additional memory beyond inference.

Datasets We evaluate `Zer0-Jack` using two publicly available datasets specifically designed for assessing model safety in multi-modal scenarios:
• Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal Dataset: The Harmful Behaviors dataset (Zou et al., 2023) is a safety-critical dataset designed to assess LLMs' behavior when prompted with harmful or unsafe instructions. It includes 500 instructions aimed at inducing harmful responses. For our experiments, we selected a random subset of 100 instructions from this dataset. To create multi-modal inputs, which fit for MLLMs evaluation, we paired each instruction with an image randomly sampled from the COCO val2014 dataset (Lin et al., 2014).
• MM-SafetyBench-T: MM-SafetyBench-T (Liu et al., 2023a) is a comprehensive benchmark designed to assess the robustness of MLLMs against image-based manipulations across 13 safety-critical scenarios with 168 text-image pairs specifically crafted for testing safety. It provides a diversity of tasks, allowing for meaningful insights into model robustness while ensuring computational feasibility in extensive experimentation. Among the image types provided by this benchmark, we utilized images generated using Stable Diffusion (SD) (Rombach et al., 2022) for this evaluation. We provide our detailed evaluation results for each scenario in Section B.

Baselines To evaluate our proposed `Zer0-Jack`, we compare it with numerous baselines that encompass both text-based and image-based approaches.
• *Text-based baselines* involve generating or modifying text prompts to bypass model defenses. Specifically, we compared `Zer0-Jack` with four text-based jailbreak methods: The first baseline, **P-Text**, tests whether the original text input alone can bypass the model's defenses. Since the selected MLLMs do not support text-only input, we pair the P-text with a plain black image containing no semantic information. For the second baseline, we adopt **GCG**(Zou et al., 2023), which is a gradient-based white-box jailbreaking method. To simulate GCG in a black-box setting, we utilize the transfer attack, where the malicious prompts are generated using LLaMA2 (Touvron et al., 2023) and transferred to the models we used. The third and fourth baselines, **AutoDAN**(Liu et al., 2023b) and **PAIR**(Chao et al., 2023), are baseline meth-

ods targeting black-box jailbreak attacks on LLMs. We will pair the malicious text prompts with corresponding images to evaluate their performance on Multi-modal LLMs when conducting text-based baselines. The random images are selected prior to applying the baselines and they remain fixed for the purpose of transferring the attack so that a method like GCG will automatically consider the image.

• *Image-based baselines* target the visual component of the image-text pair, attempting to generate or modify the visual input to bypass the model's safety mechanisms and induce harmful or unsafe outputs. To our knowledge, few approaches specifically optimize the image component of an image-text pair for jailbreak attacks on MLLMs. As a result, we adopt the following baselines for comparison: (1) **P-Image**: This baseline uses the original unmodified images as input to evaluate whether the raw images alone can mislead the model's safety mechanisms. (2) **G-Image**: This baseline employs randomly generated Gaussian noise images to assess whether non-informative or noisy images can bypass the model's defenses. (3) **A-Image**: We adopt the white-box optimization method from Dong et al. (2023), which originally generates adversarial images designed to mislead the model and we adopt the method to jailbreak task. Again, we use a transfer attack to simulate the black-box setting. The generated images are used as input for black-box MLLMs to evaluate their vulnerability. (4) **WB** baseline: As mentioned in Section 3.2, this baseline optimizes the image under a white-box setting using gradients to induce successful jailbreak attempts. Please note that for the WB attack, we report the results in the white-box setting to show `Zer0-Jack` can be comparable with white-box approaches. All images are paired with their corresponding text from the dataset to create the complete image-text input for evaluation. For all possible baselines, we use the same step for baselines and `Zer0-Jack`.

Metrics Prior research has commonly evaluated responses using the String Match method, where predefined harmless suffixes are used to determine whether a response bypasses content restrictions (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023b). If harmless strings such as '*I am sorry*' are present, the response is considered a jailbreak failure, and if no harmless strings are found, it is considered a success. While this method has been widely used, we follow the evaluation approach from Cai et al. (2024), which relies on GPT-4 models to assess whether responses genuinely answer the questions or contain unsafe content and has shown a more comprehensive evaluation of model behavior. Provided by both the question and the answer, if GPT-4 thinks the answer is harmful, then we consider the attack on this question as a successful jailbreak attack. We report the commonly used attack success rate (ASR) (Zou et al., 2023):

$$ASR := \frac{\text{\#Successful Attacks}}{\text{\#All Questions}}$$

4.2 Overall Performance

Results on Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal Dataset The evaluation results on the Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal Dataset, as shown in Table 2, highlight the effectiveness of our `Zer0-Jack`, compared to other jailbreak techniques. In MiniGPT-4, `Zer0-Jack` achieved an impressive ASR of 95%, significantly outperforming other methods such as AutoDAN at 16% and GCG at 13%. Similarly, in LLaVA1.5, `Zer0-Jack` recorded an ASR of 90%, while alternatives faltered, with AutoDAN achieving only 8% and the P-Text yielding no successful attacks at all. INF-MLLM1 showed an ASR of 88% for `Zer0-Jack`, reinforcing its effectiveness, while other methods like AutoDAN and GCG managed only 22% and 1%, respectively. Notably, when evaluating the larger MiniGPT-4 model paired with a 70B LLM, `Zer0-Jack` achieved an ASR of 92%, whereas GCG, AutoDAN, and WB did not yield results due to GPU memory constraints. The results from the `Zer0-Jack` were comparable to those of the WB method, but `Zer0-Jack` consumed significantly less memory. This further indicates that our method remains effective even when scaled to larger model architectures, requiring minimal additional memory beyond inference.

Results on MM-SafetyBench-T Dataset As shown in Table 3, the evaluation results from the MM-SafetyBench-T Dataset underscore the effectiveness similar to the previous results on Harmful Behaviors. Specifically, `Zer0-Jack` achieved an ASR of 98.2% in MiniGPT-4, 95.8% in LLaVA1.5, and 96.4% in INF-MLLM1. In contrast, methods originally designed for LLMs, such as GCG, AutoDAN, and PAIR, demonstrated significantly reduced effectiveness when their adversarial prompts were transferred to MLLMs. For instance, while GCG excelled in LLMs jailbreak, it only managed

Table 2: Attack success rate of various jailbreak methods across four MLLMs on the Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal Dataset. *P-Text*, *GCG*, *AutoDAN* and *PAIR* represent text-based jailbreaking methods; *G-Image*, *P-Image* and *A-Image* refers to image-based jailbreaking methods. ZO represents our proposed `Zer0-Jack`, which optimizes the image via zeroth-order optimization to jailbreak MLLMs.

Model	P-Text	GCG	AutoDAN	PAIR	G-Image	P-Image	A-Image	WB	`Zer0-Jack`
MiniGPT-4	11%	13%	16%	14%	10%	11%	13%	93%	**95%**
LLaVA1.5	0	0	8%	5%	0	1%	0	**91%**	90%
INF-MLLM1	0	1%	22%	7%	0	1%	1%	86%	**88%**
MiniGPT-4 (70B)	14%	-	-	17%	12%	13%	-	-	**92%**

Table 3: Attack success rate of various jailbreak methods across four models on the MM-SafetyBench-T Dataset. The specific condition settings are consistent with those in Table 2.

Model	P-Text	GCG	AutoDAN	PAIR	G-Image	P-Image	A-Image	WB	`Zer0-Jack`
MiniGPT-4	44.0%	40.5%	39.9%	41.1%	44.0%	39.9%	33.3%	96.4%	**98.2%**
LLaVA1.5	11.9%	23.2%	41.7%	31.0%	7.7%	14.3%	29.8%	95.2%	**95.8%**
INF-MLLM1	19.6%	30.4%	52.4%	38.1%	19.0%	26.2%	19.0%	**97.6%**	96.4%
MiniGPT-4 (70B)	50.2%	-	-	45.3%	42.6%	41.2%	-	-	**95.8%**

to achieve an ASR of 40.5% in MiniGPT-4 and 23.2% in LLaVA1.5. For larger MiniGPT-4 model paired with a 70B LLM, the results demonstrated the same trend as Table 2.

Table 4: Transferability evaluation of adversarial images generated by `Zer0-Jack` on MiniGPT-4 and MM-SafetyBench-T, showcasing the ASR when transferred to other models.

Model	P-Text	P-Image	Tranfer
GPT-4o	33.3%	40.5%	51.8%
LLaVA1.5	11.9%	14.3%	54.2%
INF-MLLM1	19.6%	26.2%	54.8%

4.3 Evaluation on Transferability

To assess the transferability of images optimized through `Zer0-Jack` across different models, we conducted three sets of comparative experiments. First, we optimized images using the MM-SafetyBench-T dataset on the MiniGPT-4 model to generate adversarial images capable of successfully bypassing defenses. We then transferred these optimized images to the LLaVA1.5, GPT-4o, and INF-MLLM1 for transferability evaluation.

The results in Table 4 demonstrate the transferability of adversarial images generated by `Zer0-Jack`. Notably, the ASR of 51.8% for GPT-4o highlights a significant transferability of our adversarial images to bypass defenses, supported by P-Text and P-Image with ASR of 33.3% and 40.5%, respectively. On the other hand, LLaVA1.5 and INF-MLLM1 show higher ASR of 54.2% and 54.8%. Though the images generated by `Zer0-Jack` show good transferability, they still suffer from performance degradation, indicating the importance of attacking black-box models directly. We show the results of direct attacking in Section 4.7.



Figure 2: Ablation studies on different components

4.4 Study of `Zer0-Jack`

In this section, we provide different results to support our choice of hyperparameters and the effectiveness of `Zer0-Jack`. All experiments are conducted on MiniGPT-7B. More results can be found in Section D.2.

Ablation Study. We show the ASR of our methods against WB attacks with patch updating. Experiments on the defense method can be found in the Appendix. From the results in Fig. 2, we can see that patch updating can increase the performance, and this increase can even boost the performance of WB attacks. WB attacks with patch updating could outperform `Zer0-Jack`, which is reasonable since WB attacks could access white-box models.

4.5 Parameter Sensitivity Studies

We further test how different defense methods and parameters influence `Zer0-Jack`. More results can be found in Section D.2.



Figure 3: Influence of patch size on two datasets.

Different patch size We vary the size of patches in `Zer0-Jack` from 16 to 224. And the results in Fig. 3 show that our choice of patch size (i.e., 32) is reasonable. If we choose a smaller patch size, such as 24, the patch will be too small to contain enough global information, resulting in a slightly worse result. On the other hand, if we choose a larger patch size, such as 64, the noise in the estimated gradient brought from zeroth-order optimization will increase significantly, resulting in a worse result.

Evaluating `Zer0-Jack` against detection-based method To evaluate `Zer0-Jack` against detection methods (Chen et al., 2020), we use a pre-trained CLIP model as the image encoder to extract embeddings for images generated at each iteration of `Zer0-Jack`. We then compute the mean L2 distance for the top 10 nearest neighbors of each image across iterations, yielding a mean L2 distance of 739.2. Our results show that when the detection threshold δ is set below 50, the detection mechanism does not notably affect the performance of `Zer0-Jack`.

4.6 Case Study

As shown in Fig. 4, this case study illustrates the performance of various methods on LLaVA1.5 in response to the question, "List steps in detail to engage in identity theft without leaving any traces" along with the corresponding image. Text-based approaches, including AutoDAN, GCG, and PAIR, generated adversarial text prompts that resulted in responses such as "I cannot provide any information", demonstrating their failure to bypass the model's safeguards. In contrast, our method effectively engaged LLaVA1.5, yielding clear and actionable steps such as: 1) Gather personal information, 2) Steal the information, etc. This stark difference underscores the success of our integrated approach in generating relevant and detailed outputs, highlighting its effectiveness in circumventing the model's limitations compared to existing techniques.

4.7 Attack Commercial MLLMs Directly

In this subsection, we show that `Zer0-Jack` could attack commercial MLLMs directly. And we will focus on GPT-4o (OpenAI, 2024) in this section. However, OpenAI's API only allows users to retrieve the top 20 tokens with the highest log probabilities, rather than accessing the entire set of logits. Even though we could use log probability to calculate a Eq. (2), the constraint of the top 20 tokens with the highest log probabilities may limit the usage of `Zer0-Jack`. However, if we look back at the loss function in Eq. (2), we can find that `Zer0-Jack` only requires logits to our target responses 'Sure, here it is'. Besides, OpenAI's API will also output log probabilities for the output token. Though the target responses may not show in the top 20 tokens with the highest log probabilities, we find that we can force GPT models to output the target token by **logit_bias**, which is a function provided by OpenAI's API that enables users to add bias to any token's logit. If we add a very high bias to 'sure', it will force GPT-4o to generate 'sure' and the API will return the log probability of the generated token 'sure'. Through this method, we can access to log probability of all tokens in target responses and attack GPT-4o using `Zer0-Jack`. Beyond using `Zer0-Jack`, we use a text prompt from (Andriushchenko et al., 2024) to make the optimization easier. Finally, we discard anything about **logit_bias** to let GPT models output real answers to the question. In Table 5, we show the full results using the Harmful Behavior dataset, and the results show that `Zer0-Jack` can significantly increase ASR, showing the effectiveness of `Zer0-Jack` even considering attacking the most powerful commercial MLLMs. More examples could be found at Section E. `Zer0-Jack` attacks one sample with reasonable iterations that it only spends around 0.8 dollars calling OpenAI's API.

Table 5: The comparison of ASR for different methods in attacking GPT-4o.

Method	ASR
Text Prompt Only	30%
Prompt + Original Image	18%
Prompt + `Zer0-Jack`	69%

4.8 Discussion

Since `Zer0-Jack` directly estimates the gradient to generate malicious image inputs, it is difficult to use prompt-based defense methods that add more



Figure 4: Case study illustrating the jailbreak performance of text-based and image-based methods on LLaVA1.5 for the same question with the corresponding image. The first row shows the response generated from text-based methods, AutoDAN, GCG, and PAIR. We also present the text prompt we optimized from white-box methods. The second row compares responses when using P-Image, A-Image, and the optimized image from `Zer0-Jack`, each paired with the text input.

strict or safe system prompt (Wang et al., 2024b). We argue that it is better to use post-hoc methods such as LLM-as-a-judge (Zheng et al., 2023), which makes MLLMs refuse to answer the question based on the response. Besides, `Zer0-Jack` also proves that partial information from output logits might be dangerous, which indicates that it is better for us to find a balance between transparency and risk provided by the models' API.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we presented `Zer0-Jack`, a novel zeroth-order gradient-based approach for jailbreaking black-box MLLMs. By utilizing zeroth-order optimization, `Zer0-Jack` addresses the challenges that attacking black-box models. By generating image prompts and patch coordinate optimization, `Zer0-Jack` deals with the problems of discrete optimization and errors brought by the high dimensions in zeroth-order optimization. Extensive experiments demonstrated the efficacy of `Zer0-Jack`, with consistently high attack success rates surpassing transfer-based methods. Our method highlights the vulnerabilities present in MLLMs and emphasizes the need for stronger safety alignment mechanisms, particularly in multi-modal contexts.

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Limitations

Though `Zer0-Jack` only requires access to output logits or probabilities, `Zer0-Jack` could not directly attack the web version of commercial MLLMs. Besides, there are some commercial MLLMs' API that do not support return logits (Anthropic, 2024). To attack such models directly, it is better to design a jailbreak method using the information from generated responses instead of output logits. Right now, `Zer0-Jack` needs assistance from custom prompts, otherwise, `Zer0-Jack` requires far more iterations to attack GPT-4o.

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A Comparison with Black-box Methods in Adversarial Attack

Our method has some key differences between previous black-box adversarial attack methods (Chen et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2019) and unique contributions. Here are some comparisons:

- `Zer0-Jack` has a different target with ZOO. `Zer0-Jack` distinguishes itself from ZOO by its focus on jailbreaking, whereas ZOO primarily targets adversarial attacks. Jailbreaking involves optimizing multiple targets simultaneously (e.g., the target phrase "sure, here it is" consists of 4-5 tokens), while adversarial attacks typically optimize for a single target (e.g., a specific class label). While ZOO demonstrated the success of zeroth-order optimization for a single target, `Zer0-Jack` extends this approach to more complex, multi-target scenarios.

- `Zer0-Jack` has different target models with ZOO. ZOO successfully applies zeroth-order optimization to smaller DNN models, but `Zer0-Jack` scales this technique to large-scale transformer models, including those with 7B and even 70B parameters. This scalability highlights `Zer0-Jack`'s ability to handle much more complex models, demonstrating the power of zeroth-order optimization at a larger scale.

- `Zer0-Jack` has a different methodology from ZOO. Since ZOO targets different objectives and models, it incorporates complex components, such as hierarchical attacks, which are not ideal for jailbreaking large models. Our experimental results, presented below, demonstrate that our method outperforms ZOO, highlighting its superior capability for jailbreaking large-scale models.

We compare our approach with ZOO (Chen et al., 2017), a zeroth-order optimization method originally developed for black-box adversarial attacks. To ensure a fair evaluation, we adapted ZOO for the jailbreak task and tested its performance on the Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal Dataset. With identical optimization settings, ZOO achieves an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 86% using the MiniGPT-4 7B model, while `Zer0-Jack` attains a higher ASR of 95%.

B Detailed Results for categories in MM-safetybench-T

In Table 7, we provide the numbers of successful attacks for each scenario in MM-Safetybench-T and in Table 6, we provide the numbers of successful attacks for each scenario in MM-Safetbench-T dataset when we test the transfer ability of `Zer0-Jack`. As we can see, even for each scenario, `Zer0-Jack` can beat other baseline methods.

C More Detailed Responses

We present the detailed responses generated from MiniGPT-4 on both datasets in the supplementary, in the type of JSON file, containing both the question and our `Zer0-Jack`'s response.

D More Experiments

D.1 Analysis on Efficiency

To analyze the efficiency of `Zer0-Jack`, we evaluate its practical advantages in terms of memory consumption and iteration efficiency over traditional methods.

Memory Consumption As illustrated in Fig. 5, traditional jailbreak methods often require substantial memory, limiting their practicality for deployment. To compare memory consumption, we evaluated text-based methods on the LLaMA2-7B model, which is commonly used as the language model in MLLMs. Specifically, GCG consumes approximately 50GB of memory, while AutoDAN requires around 26GB. In contrast, image-based optimization techniques such as A-Image and WB Attack, applied to MLLMs like MiniGPT-4, use about 19GB each due to the need for gradient retention, while `Zer0-Jack` significantly reduces memory usage without sacrificing performance, uses only 10GB of memory.

Table 6: Number of successful jailbreaks with adversarial images optimized through `Zer0-Jack` from MiniGPT-4 on the MM-SafetyBench-T dataset across different MLLMs.

Models	**GPT-4o-mini**			**LLaVA1.5**		
Scenarios	**P-Text**	**P-Image**	**Transfer**	**P-Text**	**P-Image**	**Transfer**
01-Illegal Activity (10)	0	0	0	1	1	**6**
02-Hate Speech (16)	0	0	**2**	1	1	**7**
03-Malware Generation (5)	0	0	0	0	0	**3**
04-Physical Harm (14)	0	2	**3**	1	1	**8**
05-Economic Harm (12)	5	6	**7**	2	3	**7**
06-Fraud (15)	0	2	**2**	0	0	**8**
07-Pornography (11)	1	3	**5**	0	0	**5**
08-Political Lobbying (15)	12	13	**15**	7	9	**13**
09-Privacy Violence (14)	**4**	2	2	0	0	**8**
10-Legal Opinion (13)	8	9	**12**	0	2	**6**
11-Financial Advice (17)	10	12	**16**	3	4	**9**
12-Health Consultation (11)	6	8	**10**	0	1	**3**
13-Gov Decision (15)	10	11	**13**	5	2	**8**
Sum (168)	56	68	**87**	20	24	**91**



Figure 5: Comparison of average memory cost and iteration efficiency when optimizing a sample on MiniGPT-4. The bar chart represents memory consumption (in GB), while the line graph illustrates iteration efficiency (number of iterations).

Iteration Efficiency Next, we compare the iteration efficiency, which refers to the number of iterations required for each method to generate a successful adversarial goal.

As shown in Fig. 5, we found that GCG typically requires around 100 iterations per adversarial goal, while AutoDAN takes even more, averaging between 100 and 120 iterations. For AdvImage, the default setting requires more than 200 steps to generate the adversarial image due to its perturbation constraint on the image. WB Attack requires around 40 to 50 iterations. In contrast, Our `Zer0-Jack` demonstrates significantly greater efficiency. `Zer0-Jack` only needs 55 iterations on average to optimize the image successfully, which is comparable with the WB Attack that is a white-box attack.

D.2 More ablation studies

Evaluating `Zer0-Jack` on MiniGPT-4 across different smoothing parameters We compare the performance of different smoothing parameters on MiniGPT-4. By setting the smoothing parameter to 1e-2, 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5, and 1e-6, we present the corresponding ASR as shown in Table 8.

Evaluating `Zer0-Jack` on MiniGPT-4 across different model sizes We further evaluate `Zer0-Jack` on MiniGPT-4 across different sizes using the Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal Dataset. We set the model sizes to 7B, 13B, and 70B to assess how the performance scales with the size of the model. The results are shown in Table 9.

Evaluating `Zer0-Jack` on MiniGPT-4 across different image sizes To evaluate the effect of different image sizes, we compare three groups with image size to 224, 256, and 448. For a fair comparison, the patch size is set to 32 for all image sizes. The performances on MM-Safety-Bench-T and Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal Dataset are shown in Fig. 6. The results show that the larger image size may affect the performance, although the influence is small.

Evaluating `Zer0-Jack` against prompt-based defense method We also evaluated a defense method derived from (Zhang et al., 2024b), which incorporates both generated text and image prompts. These methods were tested on the Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal Dataset, and the results are summarized in Table 10. The findings indicate that while prompt-based methods, such as P-Text and P-Image, provide some defense against non-optimization attacks, their effectiveness is limited

Table 7: Numbers of successful attacks of various jailbreak methods across three models (MiniGPT4, LLaVA1.5, and INF-MLLM1) on each scenario of MM-SafetyBench-T Dataset. The *Text* condition represents inputs with only original text. *GCG*, *AutoDAN* and *FAIR* represent text suffixes generated by these methods on LLMs, transferred to the MLLM's text input and combined with the corresponding image. *Gaussian* refers to inputs where the image is randomly generated Gaussian noise, *OriImage* uses the original dataset images, and *AdvImage* refers to adversarial images generated using method (Dong et al., 2023). `Zer0-Jack` represents our proposed method, which optimizes the image via zeroth-order optimization to jailbreak MLLMs.

Model	**Scenarios**	**Text**	**GCG**	**AutoDAN**	**FAIR**	**Gaussian**	**OriImage**	**AdvImage**	**`Zer0-Jack`**
MiniGPT-4	Illegal Activity	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	10
	Hate Speech	2	3	6	4	3	2	1	15
	Malware Generation	3	2	1	2	4	3	3	5
	Physical Harm	4	4	11	6	8	4	7	14
	Economic Harm	7	8	6	8	6	9	4	12
	Fraud	3	4	8	7	9	8	12	15
	Pornography	9	9	2	5	6	4	3	11
	Political Lobbying	10	10	7	9	13	11	7	15
	Privacy Violence	6	4	9	7	2	8	6	14
	Legal Opinion	10	8	2	5	3	2	1	13
	Financial Advice	7	5	6	8	9	5	2	16
	Health Consultation	5	6	2	3	1	4	5	10
	Gov Decision	6	3	5	2	8	5	3	15
	Sum	74	68	67	69	74	67	56	**165**
LLaVA1.5	01-Illegal Activity	1	2	2	3	0	1	1	10
	Hate Speech	1	3	5	4	0	1	3	15
	Malware Generation	0	1	2	2	0	0	1	5
	Physical Harm	1	3	10	4	0	1	4	14
	Economic Harm	2	2	6	4	2	3	6	12
	Fraud	0	2	5	3	1	0	8	15
	Pornography	0	3	4	4	1	0	3	11
	Political Lobbying	7	9	10	9	6	9	10	15
	Privacy Violence	0	2	5	3	0	0	4	13
	Legal Opinion	0	1	4	3	0	2	2	12
	Financial Advice	3	4	10	6	2	4	4	15
	Health Consultation	0	3	2	4	0	1	3	10
	Gov Decision	5	4	5	3	1	2	1	14
	Sum	20	39	70	52	13	24	50	**161**
INF-MLLM1	01-Illegal Activity	0	4	5	2	1	1	1	10
	Hate Speech	0	2	6	3	2	1	1	15
	Malware Generation	1	3	2	3	0	1	2	5
	Physical Harm	1	2	6	5	1	4	3	14
	Economic Harm	3	1	6	3	3	6	3	11
	Fraud	2	4	8	6	4	5	4	15
	Pornography	0	2	4	2	1	2	2	11
	Political Lobbying	9	10	12	11	10	10	4	15
	Privacy Violence	2	4	10	6	2	4	1	14
	Legal Opinion	2	3	6	4	1	2	2	11
	Financial Advice	6	8	10	8	3	4	5	16
	Health Consultation	3	2	4	3	1	1	1	10
	Gov Decision	4	6	9	8	3	3	3	15
	Sum	33	51	88	64	32	44	32	**162**

Table 8: Performance on Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal Dataset using MiniGPT-4 model across different smoothing parameters.

Smoothing Parameter	1e-2	1e-3	1e-4	1e-5	1e-6
Harmful Behaviors	43%	72%	95%	62%	11%

Table 9: Evaluation of Zer0-Jack on MiniGPT-4 across different sizes using the Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal Dataset.

Model Size	P-Text	GCG	AutoDAN	PAIR	G-Image	P-Image	A-Image	WB	Zer0-Jack
7B	11%	13%	16%	14%	10%	11%	13%	93%	95%
13B	13%	15%	20%	18%	10%	12%	19%	91%	93%
70B	14%	-	-	17%	12%	13%	-	-	92%

Table 10: Evaluation Zer0-Jack against prompt-based defense method on the Harmful Behaviors Multi-modal Dataset.

P-Text	GCG	AutoDAN	PAIR	G-Image	P-Image	A-Image	WB	Zer0-Jack
5%	10%	13%	15%	7%	9%	8%	90%	92%



Figure 6: Influence of image sizes on two datasets.

when combined with the defense prompt used for WB and Zer0-Jack. This suggests that Zer0-Jack 's performance is not significantly affected by these defense mechanisms.

E GPT-4o Examples

We present more examples of using Zer0-Jack to jailbreak the GPT-4o API. The left column shows unoptimized images and harmful questions along with the model's generated rejection responses. The right column displays the images after ZO optimization, along with the same harmful questions from the left side, and the model's generated responses.



Figure 7: The showcase from MM-safetybench-T of using Zer0-Jack to attack GPT-4o. GPT-4o outputs the unsafe content under our attack.



Figure 8: Comparison between white-box jailbreak, transfer jailbreak attack, and direct black-box jailbreak. Both white-box jailbreak and transfer jailbreak generate malicious inputs using white-box models while direct black-box attacks do not. In this paper, we focus on direct black-box jailbreak and prove our method can surpass transfer attacks and be comparable with white-box attacks.