Memory is a critical component in large language model (LLM)-based agents, enabling them to store and retrieve past executions to improve task performance over time. In this paper, we conduct an empirical study on how memory management choices impact the LLM agents’ behavior, especially their long-term performance. Specifically, we focus on two fundamental memory management operations that are widely used by many agent frameworks—memory addition and deletion—to systematically study their impact on the agent behavior. Through our quantitative analysis, we find that LLM agents display an *experience-following* property: high similarity between a task input and the input in a retrieved memory record often results in highly similar agent outputs. Our analysis further reveals two significant challenges associated with this property: *error propagation*, where inaccuracies in past experiences compound and degrade future performance, and *misaligned experience replay*, where some seemingly correct executions can provide limited or even misleading value as experiences. Through controlled experiments, we demonstrate the importance of regulating experience quality within the memory bank and show that future task evaluations can serve as free quality labels for stored memory. Our findings offer insights into the behavioral dynamics of LLM agent memory systems and provide practical guidance for designing memory components that support robust, long-term agent performance.

Recent studies have identified "retrieval heads" in Large Language Models (LLMs) responsible for extracting information from input contexts. However, prior works largely rely on static statistics aggregated across datasets, identifying heads that perform retrieval on average. This perspective overlooks the fine-grained temporal dynamics of autoregressive generation. In this paper, we investigate retrieval heads from a dynamic perspective. Through extensive analysis, we establish three core claims: (1) Dynamism: Retrieval heads vary dynamically across timesteps; (2) Irreplaceability: Dynamic retrieval heads are specific at each timestep and cannot be effectively replaced by static retrieval heads; and (3) Correlation: The model’s hidden state encodes a predictive signal for future retrieval head patterns, indicating an internal planning mechanism. We validate these findings on the Needle-in-a-Haystack task and a multi-hop QA task, and quantify the differences on the utility of dynamic and static retrieval heads in a Dynamic Retrieval-Augmented Generation framework. Our study provides new insights into the internal mechanisms of LLMs.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have shown promise in enhancing the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, these systems face challenges in effectively integrating external knowledge with the LLM’s internal knowledge, often leading to issues with misleading or unhelpful information. This work aims to provide a systematic study on knowledge checking in RAG systems. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of LLM representation behaviors and demonstrate the significance of using representations in knowledge checking. Motivated by the findings, we further develop representation-based classifiers for knowledge filtering. We show substantial improvements in RAG performance, even when dealing with noisy knowledge databases. Our study provides new insights into leveraging LLM representations for enhancing the reliability and effectiveness of RAG systems.

Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) have revolutionized complex problem-solving capability by enabling sophisticated agent collaboration through message-based communications. While the communication framework is crucial for agent coordination, it also introduces a critical yet unexplored security vulnerability. In this work, we introduce Agent-in-the-Middle (AiTM), a novel attack that exploits the fundamental communication mechanisms in LLM-MAS by intercepting and manipulating inter-agent messages. Unlike existing attacks that compromise individual agents, AiTM demonstrates how an adversary can compromise entire multi-agent systems by only manipulating the messages passing between agents. To enable the attack under the challenges of limited control and role-restricted communication format, we develop an LLM-powered adversarial agent with a reflection mechanism that generates contextually-aware malicious instructions. Our comprehensive evaluation across various frameworks, communication structures, and real-world applications demonstrates that LLM-MAS is vulnerable to communication-based attacks, highlighting the need for robust security measures in multi-agent systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to a type of attack known as jailbreaking, which misleads LLMs to output harmful contents. Although there are diverse jailbreak attack strategies, there is no unified understanding on why some methods succeed and others fail. This paper explores the behavior of harmful and harmless prompts in the LLM’s representation space to investigate the intrinsic properties of successful jailbreak attacks. We hypothesize that successful attacks share some similar properties: They are effective in moving the representation of the harmful prompt towards the direction to the harmless prompts. We leverage hidden representations into the objective of existing jailbreak attacks to move the attacks along the acceptance direction, and conduct experiments to validate the above hypothesis using the proposed objective. We hope this study provides new insights into understanding how LLMs understand harmfulness information.