Diffusion policies have demonstrated exceptional performance in embodied AI. However, their iterative denoising process results in high latency, and existing acceleration methods often sacrifice physical consistency. To address this, we propose ElasticFlow, a distillation-free, physics-consistent one-step policy framework. We reconstruct the Mean Field Theory by directly modeling the average velocity field, enabling a direct single-step mapping from noise to action. Addressing the Temporal Heterogeneity of robotic tasks, we introduce the Elastic Time Horizons mechanism. This mechanism effectively overcomes Spectral Bias by explicitly encoding control granularity, achieving efficient alignment between semantic instructions and physical execution horizons. Experiments on benchmarks such as LIBERO, CALVIN, and RoboTwin demonstrate that ElasticFlow achieves efficient 1-NFE inference (approximately 71Hz). Furthermore, it outperforms state-of-the-art methods, including OpenVLA and 𝜋₀, on long-horizon tasks, highlighting its potential for efficient, robust, and semantically aligned control.

Addressing the escalating security vulnerabilities in Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models, this study investigates backdoor attacks targeting the visual pathway. We identify a core obstacle causing the failure of traditional attack paradigms: "Gradient Interference." This phenomenon represents an optimization failure triggered by conflicting strategies during end-to-end training. To resolve this, we propose an Adaptive Threat-Aware Adversarial Tuning (ATAAT) framework. Through its core "Threat-Method Adaptive Mapping" mechanism, ATAAT intelligently selects the optimal gradient decoupling strategy based on the adversary’s capabilities. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ATAAT exhibits significant advantages, achieving a highly robust Targeted Attack Success Rate (TASR > 80%) while maintaining extreme stealthiness with merely a 5% poisoning rate. It efficiently handles complex semantic-level triggers and achieves implicit decoupled attacks in data poisoning scenarios for the first time. This work reveals a critical security vulnerability in VLAs and provides theoretical and methodological support for future defense architectures.