Despite the rapid progress of large vision-language models (LVLMs), fine-grained, state-conditioned GUI interaction remains challenging. Current evaluations offer limited coverage, imprecise target-state definitions, and an overreliance on final-task success, obscuring where and why agents fail.To address this gap, we introduce FineState-Bench, a benchmark that evaluates whether an agent can correctly ground an instruction to the intended UI control and reach the exact target state.FineState-Bench comprises 2,209 instances across desktop, web, and mobile platforms, spanning four interaction families and 23 UI component types, with each instance explicitly specifying an exact target state for fine-grained state setting.We further propose FineState-Metrics, a four-stage diagnostic pipeline with stage-wise success rates: Localization Success Rate (SR@Loc), Interaction Success Rate (SR@Int), Exact State Success Rate at Locate (ES-SR@Loc), and Exact State Success Rate at Interact (ES-SR@Int), and a plug-and-play Visual Diagnostic Assistant (VDA) that generates a Description and a bounding-box Localization Hint to diagnose visual grounding reason via controlled w/ vs. w/o comparisons.On FineState-Bench, exact goal-state success remains low: ES-SR@Int peaks at 32.8% on Web and 22.8% on average across platforms. With VDA localization hints, Gemini-2.5-Flash gains +14.9 ES-SR@Int points, suggesting substantial headroom from improved visual grounding, yet overall accuracy is still insufficient for reliable fine-grained state-conditioned interaction Github.

The rise of Large Audio-Language Models (LAMs) brings both potential and risks, as their audio outputs may contain harmful or unethical content. However, current research lacks a systematic, quantitative evaluation of LAM safety, especially against jailbreak attacks, which are challenging due to the temporal and semantic nature of speech. To bridge this gap, we introduce AJailBench, the first benchmark specifically designed to evaluate jailbreak vulnerabilities in LAMs. We begin by constructing -Base, a dataset of 1,495 adversarial audio prompts spanning 10 policy-violating categories. Using this dataset, we evaluate several state-of-the-art LAMs and reveal that none exhibit consistent robustness across attacks. To further strengthen jailbreak testing and simulate more realistic attack conditions, we propose a method to generate dynamic adversarial variants. Our Audio Perturbation Toolkit (APT) applies targeted distortions across time, frequency, and amplitude domains. To preserve the original jailbreak intent, we enforce a semantic consistency constraint and employ Bayesian optimization to efficiently search for perturbations that are both subtle and highly effective. This results in AJailBench-APT+, an extended dataset of optimized adversarial audio samples. Our findings demonstrate that even small, semantically preserved perturbations can significantly reduce the safety performance of leading LAMs, underscoring the need for more robust and semantically aware defense mechanisms. We release AJailBench to facilitate future research: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AudioJailbreak-4262/