Peiran Wang


2026

Large language models (LLMs) often exhibit undesirable behaviors, such as safety violations and hallucinations. Although inference-time steering offers a cost-effective way to adjust model behavior without updating its parameters, existing methods often fail to be simultaneously effective, utility-preserving, and training-efficient due to their rigid, one-size-fits-all designs and limited adaptability. In this work, we present FineSteer, a novel steering framework that decomposes inference-time steering into two complementary stages—conditional steering and fine-grained vector synthesis—allowing fine-grained control over when and how to steer internal representations. In the first stage, we introduce a Subspace-guided Conditional Steering (SCS) mechanism that preserves model utility by avoiding unnecessary steering. In the second stage, we propose a Mixture-of-Steering-Experts (MoSE) mechanism that captures the multimodal nature of desired steering behaviors and generates query-specific steering vectors for improved effectiveness. Through tailored designs in both SCS and MoSE, FineSteer maintains robust performance on general queries while adaptively optimizing steering vectors for targeted inputs in a training-efficient manner. Extensive experiments on safety and truthfulness benchmarks show that FineSteer outperforms the state-of-the-art methods in overall performance (e.g., a 7.6% improvement on TruthfulQA over Llama-3), achieving stronger steering performance with minimal utility loss. The code is available at https://github.com/YukinoAsuna/FineSteer

2025

Automated vulnerability repair is a crucial field within software engineering and security research. Large Language Models (LLMs) and LLM agents have demonstrated significant potential in this domain by understanding descriptions in natural language and generating corresponding formal code. Although the coding capabilities of LLMs have advanced rapidly, evaluation benchmarks for real-world programming setups are still lagging, preventing the development of LLM and LLM agents in real-world vulnerability repair. To this end, we introduce CVE-Bench, an evaluation framework consisting of 509 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) from four programming languages and 120 popular open-source repositories. Unlike previous vulnerability repair benchmarks, which only involve the code input and output, we provide LLM agents with a test environment that simulates the real-world vulnerability repair process. This environment provides multiple levels of CVE information modeling, such as black-box testing and white-box testing. It enables the agents to use static analysis tools to assist their repair process. Our evaluation reveals that the SWE-agent can only repair 21% of vulnerabilities at its best. Furthermore, they lack expert knowledge about how to use the analysis tool to assist in vulnerability repair.
In this study, we introduce RePD, an innovative attack Retrieval-based Prompt Decomposition framework designed to mitigate the risk of jailbreak attacks on large language models (LLMs). Despite rigorous pre-training and fine-tuning focused on ethical alignment, LLMs are still susceptible to jailbreak exploits. RePD operates on a one-shot learning model, wherein it accesses a database of pre-collected jailbreak prompt templates to identify and decompose harmful inquiries embedded within user prompts. This process involves integrating the decomposition of the jailbreak prompt into the user’s original query into a one-shot learning example to effectively teach the LLM to discern and separate malicious components. Consequently, the LLM is equipped to first neutralize any potentially harmful elements before addressing the user’s prompt in a manner that aligns with its ethical guidelines. RePD is versatile and compatible with a variety of open-source LLMs acting as agents. Through comprehensive experimentation with both harmful and benign prompts, we have demonstrated the efficacy of our proposed RePD in enhancing the resilience of LLMs against jailbreak attacks, without compromising their performance in responding to typical user requests.