While humans are inherently social creatures, the challenge of identifying when and how to assist and collaborate with others - particularly when pursuing independent goals - can hinder cooperation. To address this challenge, we aim to develop an AI system that provides useful feedback to promote prosocial behaviour - actions that benefit others, even when not directly aligned with one’s own goals. We introduce ProToM, a Theory of Mind-informed facilitator that promotes prosocial actions in multi-agent systems by providing targeted, context-sensitive feedback to individual agents. ProToM first infers agents’ goals using Bayesian inverse planning, then selects feedback to communicate by maximising expected utility, conditioned on the inferred goal distribution. We evaluate our approach against baselines in two multi-agent environments: Doors, Keys, and Gems, as well as Overcooked. Our results suggest that state-of-the-art large language and reasoning models fall short of communicating feedback that is both contextually grounded and well-timed - leading to higher communication overhead and lower success rates. In contrast, ProToM provides targeted and helpful feedback, achieving a higher success rate, shorter task completion times, and is consistently preferred by human users.

How do people understand and evaluate claims about others’ beliefs, even though these beliefs cannot be directly observed? In this paper, we introduce a cognitive model of epistemic language interpretation, grounded in Bayesian inferences about other agents’ goals, beliefs, and intentions: a language-augmented Bayesian theory-of-mind (LaBToM). By translating natural language into an epistemic “language-of-thought” with grammar-constrained LLM decoding, then evaluating these translations against the inferences produced by inverting a generative model of rational action and perception, LaBToM captures graded plausibility judgments of epistemic claims. We validate our model in an experiment where participants watch an agent navigate a maze to find keys hidden in boxes needed to reach their goal, then rate sentences about the agent’s beliefs. In contrast with multimodal LLMs (GPT-4o, Gemini Pro) and ablated models, our model correlates highly with human judgments for a wide range of expressions, including modal language, uncertainty expressions, knowledge claims, likelihood comparisons, and attributions of false belief.

Drawing real world social inferences usually requires taking into account information from multiple modalities. Language is a particularly powerful source of information in social settings, especially in novel situations where language can provide both abstract information about the environment dynamics and concrete specifics about an agent that cannot be easily visually observed. In this paper, we propose Language-Informed Rational Agent Synthesis (LIRAS), a framework for drawing context-specific social inferences that integrate linguistic and visual inputs. LIRAS frames multimodal social reasoning as a process of constructing structured but situation-specific agent and environment representations – leveraging multimodal language models to parse language and visual inputs into unified symbolic representations, over which a Bayesian inverse planning engine can be run to produce granular probabilistic judgments. On a range of existing and new social reasoning tasks derived from cognitive science experiments, we find that our model (instantiated with a comparatively lightweight VLM) outperforms ablations and state-of-the-art models in capturing human judgments across all domains.