Large language models applied to clinical prediction exhibit case-level heterogeneity: simple cases yield consistent outputs, while complex cases produce divergent predictions under minor prompt changes. Existing single-agent strategies sample from one role-conditioned distribution, and multi-agent frameworks use fixed roles with flat majority voting, discarding the diagnostic signal in disagreement. We propose CAMP (Case-Adaptive Multi-agent Panel), where an attending-physician agent dynamically assembles a specialist panel tailored to each case’s diagnostic uncertainty. Each specialist evaluates candidates via three-valued voting (KEEP/REFUSE/NEUTRAL), enabling principled abstention outside one’s expertise. A hybrid router directs each diagnosis through strong consensus, fallback to the attending physician’s judgment, or evidence-based arbitration that weighs argument quality over vote counts. On diagnostic prediction and brief hospital course generation from MIMIC-IV across four LLM backbones, CAMP consistently outperforms strong baselines while consuming fewer tokens than most competing multi-agent methods, with voting records and arbitration traces offering transparent decision audits.

LLM jailbreaks are a widespread safety challenge. Given this problem has not yet been tractable, we suggest targeting a key failure mechanism: the failure of safety to generalize across semantically equivalent inputs. We further focus the target by requiring desirable tractability properties of attacks to study: explainability, transferability between models, and transferability between goals. We perform red-teaming within this framework by uncovering new vulnerabilities to multi-turn, multi-image, and translation-based attacks. These attacks are semantically equivalent by our design to their single-turn, single-image, or untranslated counterparts, enabling systematic comparisons; we show that the different structures yield different safety outcomes. We then demonstrate the potential for this framework to enable new defenses by proposing a Structure Rewriting Guardrail, which converts an input to a structure more conducive to safety assessment. This guardrail significantly improves refusal of harmful inputs, without over-refusing benign ones. Thus, by framing this intermediate challenge—more tractable than universal defenses but essential for long-term safety—we highlight a critical milestone for AI safety research.

This study presents a computational analysis to classify actionability in teacher feedback. We fine-tuned a RoBERTa model on 662 manually annotated feedback examples from West African classrooms, achieving strong classification performance (accuracy = 0.94, precision = 0.90, recall = 0.96, f1 = 0.93). This enabled classification of over 12,000 feedback instances. A comparison of linguistic features indicated that actionable feedback was associated with lower word count but higher readability, greater lexical diversity, and more modifier usage. These findings suggest that concise, accessible language with precise descriptive terms may be more actionable for teachers. Our results support focusing on clarity in teacher observation protocols while demonstrating the potential of computational approaches in analyzing educational feedback at scale.

This paper mainly describes the dma submission to the TempoWiC task, which achieves a macro-F1 score of 77.05% and attains the first place in this task. We first explore the impact of different pre-trained language models. Then we adopt data cleaning, data augmentation, and adversarial training strategies to enhance the model generalization and robustness. For further improvement, we integrate POS information and word semantic representation using a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) approach. The experimental results show that MoE can overcome the feature overuse issue and combine the context, POS, and word semantic features well. Additionally, we use a model ensemble method for the final prediction, which has been proven effective by many research works.