Research on mental state reasoning in language models (LMs) has the potential to inform theories of human social cognition—such as the theory that mental state reasoning emerges in part from language exposure—and our understanding of LMs themselves. Yet much published work on LMs relies on a relatively small sample of closed-source LMs, limiting our ability to rigorously test psychological theories and evaluate LM capacities. Here, we replicate and extend published work on the false belief task by assessing LM mental state reasoning behavior across 41 open-weight models (from distinct model families). We find sensitivity to implied knowledge states in 34% of the LMs tested; however, consistent with prior work, none fully "explain away" the effect in humans. Larger LMs show increased sensitivity and also exhibit higher psychometric predictive power. Finally, we use LM behavior to generate and test a novel hypothesis about human cognition: both humans and LMs show a bias towards attributing false beliefs when knowledge states are cued using a non-factive verb ("John thinks...") than when cued indirectly ("John looks in the..."). Unlike the primary effect of knowledge states, where human sensitivity exceeds that of LMs, the magnitude of the human knowledge cue effect falls squarely within the distribution of LM effect sizes—suggesting that distributional statistics of language can in principle account for the latter but not the former in humans. These results demonstrate the value of using larger samples of open-weight LMs to test theories of human cognition and evaluate LM capacities.

Crosslingual transfer is crucial to contemporary language models’ multilingual capabilities, but how it occurs is not well understood. Weask what happens to a monolingual language model when it begins to be trained on a second language. Specifically, we train small bilingual models for which we control the amount of data for each language and the order of language exposure. To find evidence of shared multilingual representations, we turn to structural priming, a method used to study grammatical representations in humans. We first replicate previous crosslingual structural priming results and find that after controlling for training data quantity and language exposure, there are asymmetrical effects across language pairs and directions. We argue that this asymmetry may shape hypotheses about human structural priming effects. We also find that structural priming effects are less robust for less similar language pairs, highlighting potential limitations of crosslingual transfer learning and shared representations for typologically diverse languages.

Can language models reliably predict that possible events are more likely than merely improbable ones? By teasing apart possibility, typicality, and contextual relatedness, we show that despite the results of previous work, language models’ ability to do this is far from robust. In fact, under certain conditions, all models tested—including Llama 3, Gemma 2, and Mistral NeMo—perform at worse-than-chance level, assigning higher probabilities to impossible sentences such as ‘the car was given a parking ticket by the brake’ than to merely unlikely sentences such as ‘the car was given a parking ticket by the explorer’.

How well do language models deal with quantification? In this study, we focus on ‘few’-type quantifiers, as in ‘few children like toys’, which might pose a particular challenge for language models because the sentence components with out the quantifier are likely to co-occur, and ‘few’-type quantifiers are rare. We present 960 English sentence stimuli from two human neurolinguistic experiments to 22 autoregressive transformer models of differing sizes. Not only do all the models perform poorly on ‘few’-type quantifiers, but overall the larger the model, the worse its performance. This inverse scaling is consistent with previous work suggesting that larger models increasingly reflect online rather than offline human processing, and we argue that the decreasing performance of larger models may challenge uses of language models as the basis for natural language systems.

Does inverse scaling only occur as a function of model size, or can it also occur over the course of training? We carry out an exploratory study investigating whether the performance of language models on specific tasks can decrease (while general performance remains high) during training on the language modeling task. We find 8 tasks on which Pythia 12B (Biderman et al., 2023) shows decreased performance over the course of training. Five of these tasks (TruthfulQA-MC1, TruthfulQA-MC2, Hindsight Neglect, Memo Trap, and Pattern Match Suppression) additionally show a consistent relationship whereby larger language models show a greater decrease in performance the more they are trained, despite showing standard (positive) scaling overall. This highlights the importance of testing performance at all relevant benchmarks any time models are trained on additional data, even if their overall performance improves.

Abstract grammatical knowledge—of parts of speech and grammatical patterns—is key to the capacity for linguistic generalization in humans. But how abstract is grammatical knowledge in large language models? In the human literature, compelling evidence for grammatical abstraction comes from structural priming. A sentence that shares the same grammatical structure as a preceding sentence is processed and produced more readily. Because confounds exist when using stimuli in a single language, evidence of abstraction is even more compelling from crosslingual structural priming, where use of a syntactic structure in one language primes an analogous structure in another language. We measure crosslingual structural priming in large language models, comparing model behavior to human experimental results from eight crosslingual experiments covering six languages, and four monolingual structural priming experiments in three non-English languages. We find evidence for abstract monolingual and crosslingual grammatical representations in the models that function similarly to those found in humans. These results demonstrate that grammatical representations in multilingual language models are not only similar across languages, but they can causally influence text produced in different languages.

Are the predictions of humans and language models affected by similar things? Research suggests that while comprehending language, humans make predictions about upcoming words, with more predictable words being processed more easily. However, evidence also shows that humans display a similar processing advantage for highly anomalous words when these words are semantically related to the preceding context or to the most probable continuation. Using stimuli from 3 psycholinguistic experiments, we find that this is also almost always also the case for 8 contemporary transformer language models (BERT, ALBERT, RoBERTa, XLM-R, GPT-2, GPT-Neo, GPT-J, and XGLM). We then discuss the implications of this phenomenon for our understanding of both human language comprehension and the predictions made by language models.

Some languages allow arguments to be omitted in certain contexts. Yet human language comprehenders reliably infer the intended referents of these zero pronouns, in part because they construct expectations about which referents are more likely. We ask whether Neural Language Models also extract the same expectations. We test whether 12 contemporary language models display expectations that reflect human behavior when exposed to sentences with zero pronouns from five behavioral experiments conducted in Italian by Carminati (2005). We find that three models - XGLM 2.9B, 4.5B, and 7.5B - capture the human behavior from all the experiments, with others successfully modeling some of the results. This result suggests that human expectations about coreference can be derived from exposure to language, and also indicates features of language models that allow them to better reflect human behavior.

We investigate the extent to which word surprisal can be used to predict a neural measure of human language processing difficulty—the N400. To do this, we use recurrent neural networks to calculate the surprisal of stimuli from previously published neurolinguistic studies of the N400. We find that surprisal can predict N400 amplitude in a wide range of cases, and the cases where it cannot do so provide valuable insight into the neurocognitive processes underlying the response.