Hengyu An
2026
ACIArena: Toward Unified Evaluation for Agent Cascading Injection
Hengyu An | Minxi Li | Jinghuai Zhang | Naen Xu | Chunyi Zhou | Changjiang Li | Xiaogang Xu | Tianyu Du | Shouling Ji
Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
Hengyu An | Minxi Li | Jinghuai Zhang | Naen Xu | Chunyi Zhou | Changjiang Li | Xiaogang Xu | Tianyu Du | Shouling Ji
Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
Collaboration and information sharing empower Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) but also introduce a critical security risk known as Agent Cascading Injection (ACI). In such attacks, a compromised agent exploits inter-agent trust to propagate malicious instructions, causing cascading failures across the system. However, existing studies consider only limited attack strategies and simplified MAS settings, limiting their generalizability and comprehensive evaluation. To bridge this gap, we introduce ACIArena, a unified framework for evaluating the robustness of MAS. ACIArena offers systematic evaluation suites spanning multiple attack surfaces (i.e., external inputs, agent profiles, inter-agent messages) and attack objectives (i.e., instruction hijacking, task disruption, information exfiltration). Specifically, ACIArena establishes a unified specification that jointly supports MAS construction and attack–defense modules. It covers six widely used MAS implementations and provides a benchmark of 1,356 test cases for systematically evaluating MAS robustness. Our benchmarking results show that evaluating MAS robustness solely through topology is insufficient; robust MAS require deliberate role design and controlled interaction patterns. Moreover, defenses developed in simplified environments often fail to transfer to real-world settings; narrowly scoped defenses may even introduce new vulnerabilities. ACIArena aims to provide a solid foundation for advancing deeper exploration of MAS design principles.
PerMemSafe: Benchmarking Implicit Personalized Safety of Long Horizon Self-Evolving Agents
Hengyu An | Minxi Li | Naen Xu | Chunyi Zhou | Xiaogang Xu | Tianyu Du | Jinbao Li | Shouling Ji
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026
Hengyu An | Minxi Li | Naen Xu | Chunyi Zhou | Xiaogang Xu | Tianyu Du | Jinbao Li | Shouling Ji
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026
Self-evolving agents achieve personalization by accumulating user-specific memories over long horizons. This capability, however, introduces novel safety risks, as responses that are generally safe may become harmful in user-specific contexts. Such safety-relevant contexts often emerge implicitly and evolve over time during long-horizon conversations, rendering traditional context-independent safety evaluations insufficient. To address this, we formally define Implicit Personalized Safety and present PerMemSafe, the first benchmark for evaluating implicit personalized safety of self-evolving agents in long-horizon interactions. Empirical results reveal significant limitations of existing self-evolving agents, with even the strongest achieving only around 50% safety rate, highlighting systematic failures in reasoning about personalized safety risks. To mitigate this, we propose SentinelMem, an active risk-aware memory framework that explicitly models personalized risk inference and memory evolution. Experiments show that SentinelMem improves implicit personalized safety by 23.8% over prior memory frameworks while maintaining helpfulness in long-horizon interactions.
2025
IPIGuard: A Novel Tool Dependency Graph-Based Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
Hengyu An | Jinghuai Zhang | Tianyu Du | Chunyi Zhou | Qingming Li | Tao Lin | Shouling Ji
Proceedings of the 2025 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
Hengyu An | Jinghuai Zhang | Tianyu Du | Chunyi Zhou | Qingming Li | Tao Lin | Shouling Ji
Proceedings of the 2025 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
Large language model (LLM) agents are widely deployed in real-world applications, where they leverage tools to retrieve and manipulate external data for complex tasks. However, when interacting with untrusted data sources (e.g., fetching information from public websites), tool responses may contain injected instructions that covertly influence agent behaviors and lead to malicious outcomes, a threat referred to as Indirect\ Prompt\ Injection (IPI). Existing defenses typically rely on advanced prompting strategies or auxiliary detection models. While these methods have demonstrated some effectiveness, they fundamentally rely on assumptions about the model’s inherent security, which lacks structural constraints on agent behaviors. As a result, agents still retain unrestricted access to tool invocations, leaving them vulnerable to stronger attack vectors that can bypass the security guardrails of the model. To\ prevent\ malicious\ tool\ invocations\ at\ the\ source, we propose a novel defensive task execution paradigm, called IPIGuard, which models the agents’ task execution process as a traversal over a planned Tool\ Dependency\ Graph (TDG). By explicitly decoupling action planning from interaction with external data, IPIGuard significantly reduces unintended tool invocations triggered by injected instructions, thereby enhancing robustness against IPI attacks. Experiments on the AgentDojo benchmark show that IPIGuard achieves a superior balance between effectiveness and robustness, paving the way for the development of safer agentic systems in dynamic environments.