We introduce **Doublespeak**, a simple in-context representation hijacking attack against language models. The attack works by systematically replacing a harmful keyword (e.g., *bomb*) with a benign token (e.g., *carrot*) across multiple in-context examples, provided as a prefix to a harmful request. We demonstrate that this substitution leads to the internal representation of the benign token converging toward that of the harmful one, effectively embedding the harmful semantics under a euphemism. As a result, superficially innocuous prompts (e.g., *"How to build a carrot?"*) are internally interpreted as disallowed instructions (*"How to build a bomb?"*), thereby bypassing the model’s safety alignment. We use interpretability tools to show this semantic shift occurs progressively across layers. Doublespeak is optimization-free, broadly transferable across model families, and achieves strong success rates on closed-source systems, reaching 74% on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct with a single-sentence context override. Our findings highlight a new attack surface in LM latent space, indicating that current alignment strategies are insufficient and should instead operate at the representation level.