@inproceedings{fu-etal-2026-steering,
    title = "Steering Away from Refusal: A Black-box Jailbreak Method Based on First-Token Distribution",
    author = "Fu, Shuangjie  and
      Su, Du  and
      Chen, Xin  and
      Sun, Fei  and
      Shen, Huawei  and
      Cheng, Xueqi",
    editor = "Liakata, Maria  and
      Moreira, Viviane P.  and
      Zhang, Jiajun  and
      Jurgens, David",
    booktitle = "Findings of the {A}ssociation for {C}omputational {L}inguistics: {ACL} 2026",
    month = jul,
    year = "2026",
    address = "San Diego, California, United States",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://preview.aclanthology.org/ingest-acl/2026.findings-acl.1294/",
    pages = "25969--25979",
    ISBN = "979-8-89176-395-1",
    abstract = "Investigating black-box jailbreak attacks is crucial for revealing the actual security risks faced by operational Large Language Models (LLMs). The primary challenge in black-box jailbreak attack is the absence of direct optimization signals, such as gradients, to guide the refinement of adversarial prompts. While current mainstream methods like PAIR and TAP attempt to leverage the model{'}s textual output as feedback, facing a critical limitation when models consistently generate static refusal responses, depriving the attacker of any actionable signal to distinguish better prompts. To overcome the bottleneck and reveal whether there is potential risk to open access to partial logprobs information, we investigate LLM output distribution. Our empirical analysis reveals that refusal responses exhibit a highly consistent distributional pattern at the first generated token, suggesting that the deviation from this standard pattern can serve as a quantifiable metric for LLM generating refusal response. Based on this insight, we propose Distribution Jailbreak (DJ), an attack method that select effective jailbreak templates and then iteratively optimizes adversarial suffixes by maximizing the KL divergence from the standard refusal distribution. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DJ achieves state-of-the-art Attack Success Rate(ASR). Notably, DJ achieves over 90{\%} ASR on all tested open-source models, and delivers over 94{\%} ASR on GPT-4.1. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/Zed630/DistributionJailbreak."
}