Rodolfo Quispe
2026
Post Hoc Agentic Refinement for Improving Precision in Multilingual Clinical Text De-identification
Justin Xu | Alistair Johnson | Thomas Lin | David Eyre | Rodolfo Quispe
BioNLP 2026
Justin Xu | Alistair Johnson | Thomas Lin | David Eyre | Rodolfo Quispe
BioNLP 2026
De-identification systems prioritize recall to protect privacy, but excessive over-tagging reduces data utility. We propose an agentic refiner that reviews high-recall annotations using lightweight tools (validation functions, adaptive context retrieval, persistent to-do state, and modular review skills) to improve precision while minimizing recall loss. Experiments across three multilingual datasets show that the agent achieves significant improvements to binary precision. To support fine-grained analysis, we further introduce a synthetic error dataset of common and systemic failure modes, on which the agent corrects 99% of injected errors in the medical datasets. Our results suggest that agent-based refinement provides a flexible and effective mechanism for improving de-identification precision as a modular extension to existing high-recall systems.
2023
Assessing Privacy Risks in Language Models: A Case Study on Summarization Tasks
Ruixiang Tang | Gord Lueck | Rodolfo Quispe | Huseyin Inan | Janardhan Kulkarni | Xia Hu
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2023
Ruixiang Tang | Gord Lueck | Rodolfo Quispe | Huseyin Inan | Janardhan Kulkarni | Xia Hu
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2023
Large language models have revolutionized the field of NLP by achieving state-of-the-art performance on various tasks. However, there is a concern that these models may disclose information in the training data. In this study, we focus on the summarization task and investigate the membership inference (MI) attack: given a sample and black-box access to a model’s API, it is possible to determine if the sample was part of the training data. We exploit text similarity and the model’s resistance to document modifications as potential MI signals and evaluate their effectiveness on widely used datasets. Our results demonstrate that summarization models are at risk of exposing data membership, even in cases where the reference summary is not available. Furthermore, we discuss several safeguards for training summarization models to protect against MI attacks and discuss the inherent trade-off between privacy and utility.