Scaling inference compute in large language models (LLMs) through repeated sampling consistently increases the coverage (fraction of problems solved) as the number of samples increases. We conjecture that this observed improvement is partially due to the answer distribution of standard evaluation benchmarks, which is skewed towards a relatively small set of common answers. To test this conjecture, we define a baseline that enumerates answers according to their prevalence in the training set. Experiments spanning two domains – mathematical reasoning and factual knowledge – reveal that this baseline outperforms repeated model sampling for some LLMs, while the coverage for others is on par with that of a mixture strategy that obtains k answers by using only 10 model samples and similarly guessing the remaining k-10 attempts via enumeration. Our baseline enables a more accurate measurement of how much repeated sampling improves coverage in such settings beyond prompt-agnostic guessing.

Factual questions typically can be answered correctly at different levels of granularity. For example, both “August 4, 1961” and “1961” are correct answers to the question “When was Barack Obama born?”. Standard question answering (QA) evaluation protocols, however, do not explicitly take this into account and compare a predicted answer against answers of a single granularity level. In this work, we propose GRANOLA QA, a novel evaluation setting where a predicted answer is evaluated in terms of accuracy and informativeness against a set of multi-granularity answers. We present a simple methodology for enriching existing datasets with multi-granularity answers, and create GRANOLA-EQ, a multi-granularity version of the EntityQuestions dataset. We evaluate a range of decoding methods on GRANOLA-EQ, including a new algorithm, called Decoding with Response Aggregation (DRAG), that is geared towards aligning the response granularity with the model’s uncertainty. Our experiments show that large language models with standard decoding tend to generate specific answers, which are often incorrect. In contrast, when evaluated on multi-granularity answers, DRAG yields a nearly 20 point increase in accuracy on average, which further increases for rare entities. Overall, this reveals that standard evaluation and decoding schemes may significantly underestimate the knowledge encapsulated in LMs.

We posit that large language models (LLMs) should be capable of expressing their intrinsic uncertainty in natural language. For example, if the LLM is equally likely to output two contradicting answers to the same question, then its generated response should reflect this uncertainty by hedging its answer (e.g., “I’m not sure, but I think...”). We formalize faithful response uncertainty based on the gap between the model’s intrinsic confidence in the assertions it makes and the decisiveness by which they are conveyed. This example-level metric reliably indicates whether the model reflects its uncertainty, as it penalizes both excessive and insufficient hedging. We evaluate a variety of aligned LLMs at faithfully conveying uncertainty on several knowledge-intensive question answering tasks. Our results provide strong evidence that modern LLMs are poor at faithfully conveying their uncertainty, and that better alignment is necessary to improve their trustworthiness.

When large language models are aligned via supervised fine-tuning, they may encounter new factual information that was not acquired through pre-training. It is often conjectured that this can teach the model the behavior of hallucinating factually incorrect responses, as the model is trained to generate facts that are not grounded in its pre-existing knowledge. In this work, we study the impact of such exposure to new knowledge on the capability of the fine-tuned model to utilize its pre-existing knowledge. To this end, we design a controlled setup, focused on closed-book QA, where we vary the proportion of the fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge. We demonstrate that large language models struggle to acquire new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, as fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge are learned significantly slower than those consistent with the model’s knowledge. However, we also find that as the examples with new knowledge are eventually learned, they linearly increase the model’s tendency to hallucinate. Taken together, our results highlight the risk in introducing new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, and support the view that large language models mostly acquire factual knowledge through pre-training, whereas fine-tuning teaches them to use it more efficiently.