Gao Zuchen


2025

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OASIS: Order-Augmented Strategy for Improved Code Search
Gao Zuchen | Zizheng Zhan | Xianming Li | Erxin Yu | Haotian Zhang | Chenbin Chenbin | Yuqun Zhang | Jing Li
Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)

Code embeddings capture the semantic representations of code and are crucial for various code-related large language model (LLM) applications, such as code search. Previous training primarily relies on optimizing the InfoNCE loss by comparing positive natural language (NL)-code pairs with in-batch negatives. However, due to the sparse nature of code contexts, training solely by comparing the major differences between positive and negative pairs may fail to capture deeper semantic nuances. To address this issue, we propose a novel order-augmented strategy for improved code search (OASIS). It leverages order-based similarity labels to train models to capture subtle differences in similarity among negative pairs. Extensive benchmark evaluations demonstrate that our OASIS model significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art models focusing solely on major positive-negative differences. It underscores the value of exploiting subtle differences among negative pairs with order labels for effective code embedding training.

2024

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CoSafe: Evaluating Large Language Model Safety in Multi-Turn Dialogue Coreference
Erxin Yu | Jing Li | Ming Liao | Siqi Wang | Gao Zuchen | Fei Mi | Lanqing Hong
Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing

As large language models (LLMs) constantly evolve, ensuring their safety remains a critical research issue. Previous red teaming approaches for LLM safety have primarily focused on single prompt attacks or goal hijacking. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study LLM safety in multi-turn dialogue coreference. We created a dataset of 1,400 questions across 14 categories, each featuring multi-turn coreference safety attacks. We then conducted detailed evaluations on five widely used open-source LLMs. The results indicated that under multi-turn coreference safety attacks, the highest attack success rate was 56% with the LLaMA2-Chat-7b model, while the lowest was 13.9% with the Mistral-7B-Instruct model. These findings highlight the safety vulnerabilities in LLMs during dialogue coreference interactions.