People often rely on large language models (LLMs) in situations where they are ill-suited. This miscalibration is understandable: seeing LLMs compose poetry and answer complex questions can lead users to assume, incorrectly, that they will also handle simple tasks, such as basic arithmetic, without error. Prior work has attempted to address this issue by clustering instance embeddings to identify regions where an LLM is likely to fail, then automatically describing the patterns within those regions. These inferred “failure patterns” are taught to users to reduce overreliance. Yet, this approach has not been fully successful. In this paper, we investigate why.We first examine whether the negative results stem from an absence of meaningful failure patterns. Using two datasets, we group instances by their meta-labels and evaluate LLM performance within each group. We then define criteria to identify groups that are both sufficiently large and exhibit high error rates. This process reveals multiple meta-label groups that meet these criteria, indicating that actionable failure patterns do, in fact, exist. Next, we test whether prompting- and embedding-based methods can reliably surface these known failure patterns. This step is critical: if such patterns cannot be surfaced automatically, they cannot be communicated to users. We observe mixed performance across methods, which may explain the limited success of prior approaches. Finally, we revisit how teaching effectiveness is measured. We propose evaluating whether users can apply learned failure patterns to anticipate when an LLM is likely to err. A user study shows that instruction based on this metric yields measurable improvements, unlike standard human–AI team accuracy metrics. Overall, our findings suggest that teaching failure patterns can be an effective way to mitigate overreliance, but its success depends on improved automated methods for discovering these patterns and on evaluation metrics like ours.

A core part of legal work that has been underexplored in Legal NLP is the writing and editing of legal briefs. This requires not only a thorough understanding of the law of a jurisdiction, from judgments to statutes, but also the ability to make new arguments to try to expand the law in a new direction and make novel and creative arguments that are persuasive to judges. To capture and evaluate these legal skills in language models, we introduce BRIEFME, a new dataset focused on legal briefs. It contains three tasks for language models to assist legal professionals in writing briefs: argument summarization, argument completion, and case retrieval. In this work, we describe the creation of these tasks, analyze them, and show how current models perform. We see that today’s large language models (LLMs) are already quite good at the summarization and guided completion tasks, even beating human-generated headings. Yet, they perform poorly on other tasks in our benchmark: realistic argument completion and retrieving relevant legal cases. We hope this dataset encourages more development in Legal NLP in ways that will specifically aid people in performing legal work.

When prompted to think step-by-step, language models (LMs) produce a chain of thought (CoT), a sequence of reasoning steps that the model supposedly used to produce its prediction. Despite much work on CoT prompting, it is unclear if reasoning verbalized in a CoT is faithful to the models’ parametric beliefs. We introduce a framework for measuring parametric faithfulness of generated reasoning and propose Faithfulness by Unlearning Reasoning steps (FUR), an instance of this framework. FUR erases information contained in reasoning steps from model parameters and measures faithfulness as the resulting effect on the model’s prediction. Our experiments with four LMs and five multi-choice question answering (MCQA) datasets show that FUR is frequently able to precisely change the underlying models’ prediction for a given instance by unlearning key steps, indicating when a CoT is parametrically faithful. Further analysis shows that CoTs generated by models post-unlearning support different answers, hinting at a deeper effect of unlearning.

Is explainability a false promise? This debate has emerged from the insufficient evidence that explanations help people in situations they are introduced for. More human-centered, application-grounded evaluations of explanations are needed to settle this. Yet, with no established guidelines for such studies in NLP, researchers accustomed to standardized proxy evaluations must discover appropriate measurements, tasks, datasets, and sensible models for human-AI teams in their studies. To aid with this, we first review existing metrics suitable for application-grounded evaluation. We then establish criteria to select appropriate datasets, and using them, we find that only 4 out of over 50 datasets available for explainability research in NLP meet them. We then demonstrate the importance of reassessing the state of the art to form and study human-AI teams: teaming people with models for certain tasks might only now start to make sense, and for others, it remains unsound. Finally, we present the exemplar studies of human-AI decision-making for one of the identified tasks — verifying the correctness of a legal claim given a contract. Our results show that providing AI predictions, with or without explanations, does not cause decision makers to speed up their work without compromising performance. We argue for revisiting the setup of human-AI teams and improving automatic deferral of instances to AI, where explanations could play a useful role.