Munich massacre
Image of kidnapper looking over the balcony of the Israeli team quarters at Building 31 of the Munich Olympic Village. This is probably the most widely recognizable and iconic photo of the event.[1][2]
Munich
Location | Munich, West Germany
Coordinates | 48°10′46.9″N 11°32′57.1″E﻿ / ﻿48.179694°N 11.549194°E﻿ / 48.179694; 11.549194
Date | 5?6 September 1972 4:30?a.m.?? 12:04?a.m. (UTC 1)
Target | Israeli Olympic team
Attack type | mass murder, massacre, hostage-taking
Deaths | 17 total 6 Israeli coaches 5 Israeli athletes 5 members of Black September 1 West German police officer
Perpetrators | Black September
Motive | Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon
Engagements 1968 Israeli raid on Lebanon Avivim school bus massacre Lod Airport massacre 1972 Israeli air raid in Syria and Lebanon 1973 Israeli raid on Lebanon Kiryat Shmona massacre Ma'alot massacre 1974 Nahariya attack Savoy Hotel Attack Kfar Yuval hostage crisis Coastal Road massacre 1978 South Lebanon conflict 1979 Nahariya attack Misgav Am hostage crisis International incidents El Al Flight 426 hijacking El Al Flight 253 attack El Al Flight 432 attack TWA Flight 840 hijacking (1969) Dawson's Field hijackings Munich massacre Operation Wrath of God Sabena Flight 571 hijacking Attack on the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum 1973 New York City bomb plot TWA Flight 841 (1974) Pan Am Flight 110 Operation Entebbe

The Munich massacre is a common reference name for an attack that occurred during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, Bavaria, in southern West Germany, when 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team were taken hostage and eventually killed, along with a German police officer, by the Palestinian group Black September.[3][4][5][6][7] Shortly after the crisis began, they demanded the release of 234 prisoners held in Israeli jails,[8] and the release of the founders (Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof) of the German Red Army Faction, who were held in German prisons.[9] Black September called the operation "Ikrit and Biram",[10] after two Christian Palestinian villages whose inhabitants were expelled by the Haganah in 1948.

The attackers were apparently given logistical assistance by German neo-Nazis.[11] Five of the eight members of Black September were killed by police officers during a failed rescue attempt. The three surviving assassins were captured, but later released by West Germany following the hijacking by Black September of a Lufthansa airliner. Israel responded to the killers' release with Operation Spring of Youth and Operation Wrath of God, during which Israeli intelligence and special forces systematically tracked down and killed Palestinians suspected of involvement in the massacre.

## Prelude[edit]

At the time of the hostage-taking, the 1972 Munich Olympic Games were well into their second week. The West German Olympic Organizing Committee had encouraged an open and friendly atmosphere in the Olympic Village, to help erase memories of the militaristic image of wartime Germany and, specifically, of the 1936 Berlin Olympics, which had been exploited by Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler for propaganda purposes. The documentary film One Day in September claims that security in the athletes' village was intentionally lax and that athletes often came and went from the village without presenting proper identification. Many athletes bypassed security checkpoints, and climbed over the chain-link fence surrounding the village.[12]

The absence of armed personnel had worried Israeli delegation head Shmuel Lalkin even before his team arrived in Munich. In later interviews with journalists Serge Groussard and Aaron Klein, Lalkin said that he had also expressed concern with the relevant authorities about his team's lodgings. The team was housed in a relatively isolated part of the Olympic Village, on the ground floor of a small building close to a gate, which Lalkin felt made his team particularly vulnerable to an outside assault. The German authorities apparently assured Lalkin that extra security would be provided to look after the Israeli team, but Lalkin doubts that these additional measures were ever taken.[12]

Olympic organizers asked West German forensic psychologist Georg Sieber to create 26 terrorism scenarios to aid the organizers in planning security. His "Situation 21" accurately forecasted armed Palestinians invading the Israeli delegation's quarters, killing and taking hostages, and demanding Israel's release of prisoners and a plane to leave Germany. Organizers balked against preparing for Situation 21 and the other scenarios, since guarding the games against them would have gone against the goal of "Carefree Games" without heavy security.[12][13]

### German knowledge of the attack[edit]

German newspaper Der Spiegel wrote in a front-page story in 2012 that the German authorities had a tip-off from a Palestinian informant in Beirut three weeks before the massacre. The informant told Germany that Palestinians were planning an ?incident? at the Olympic Games, and the Foreign Ministry in Bonn viewed the tip-off seriously enough to pass it on to the secret service in Munich and urge that ?all possible security measures? be taken. However, according to Der Spiegel, the authorities failed to act on the tip, and have never acknowledged it in the following 40 years. The newspaper further adds that this is only part of a 40-year cover-up by the German authorities of the mishandling of the massacre.[14]

## Hostage-taking[edit]

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The site where the hostages were taken is almost unchanged today. The window of Apartment 1 is to the left of and below the balcony.

On the evening of 4 September, the Israeli athletes enjoyed a night out, watching a performance of Fiddler on the Roof and dining with the play's star, Israeli actor Shmuel Rodensky, before returning to the Olympic Village.[15] On the return trip in the team bus, Lalkin denied his 13-year-old son, who had befriended weightlifter Yossef Romano and wrestler Eliezer Halfin, permission to spend the night in their apartment?? an innocent refusal that probably saved the boy's life.[16] At 4:30?a.m. local time on 5 September, as the athletes slept, eight tracksuit-clad members of Black September carrying duffel bags loaded with AKM assault rifles, Tokarev pistols, and grenades scaled a two-meter chain-link fence with the assistance of unsuspecting athletes who were also sneaking into the Olympic Village. The athletes were originally identified as Americans, but were claimed to be Canadians decades later.[17] Once inside, they used stolen keys to enter two apartments being used by the Israeli team at 31 Connollystra?e.

Yossef Gutfreund, a wrestling referee, was awakened by a faint scratching noise at the door of Apartment 1, which housed the Israeli coaches and officials. When he investigated, he saw the door begin to open and masked men with guns on the other side. He shouted a warning to his sleeping roommates and threw his nearly 300?lb. (135?kg) weight against the door in a futile attempt to stop the intruders from forcing their way in. Gutfreund's actions gave his roommate, weightlifting coach Tuvia Sokolovsky, enough time to smash a window and escape. Wrestling coach Moshe Weinberg fought the intruders, who shot him through his cheek and then forced him to help them find more hostages. Leading the intruders past Apartment 2, Weinberg lied by telling them that the residents of the apartment were not Israelis. Instead, Weinberg led them to Apartment 3, where the gunmen corralled six wrestlers and weightlifters as additional hostages. It is possible that Weinberg hoped that the stronger men would have a better chance of fighting off the attackers, but they were all surprised in their sleep.[18]

As the athletes from Apartment 3 were marched back to the coaches' apartment, the wounded Weinberg again attacked the gunmen, allowing one of his wrestlers, Gad Tsobari, to escape via the underground parking garage.[19] The burly Weinberg knocked one of the intruders unconscious and slashed another with a fruit knife before being shot to death. Weightlifter Yossef Romano, a veteran of the Six-Day War, also attacked and wounded one of the intruders before being shot and killed.

The gunmen were left with nine hostages. They were, in addition to Gutfreund, sharpshooting coach Kehat Shorr, track and field coach Amitzur Shapira, fencing master Andre Spitzer, weightlifting judge Yakov Springer, wrestlers Eliezer Halfin and Mark Slavin, and weightlifters David Berger and Ze'ev Friedman. Berger was an expatriate American with dual citizenship; Slavin, at 18 the youngest of the hostages, had only arrived in Israel from the Soviet Union four months before the Olympic Games began. Gutfreund, physically the largest of the hostages, was bound to a chair (Groussard describes him as being tied up like a mummy); the rest were lined up four apiece on the two beds in Springer and Shapira's room, and bound at the wrists and ankles and then to each other. Romano's bullet-riddled corpse was left at his bound comrades' feet as a warning.

Of the other members of Israel's team, racewalker Prof. Shaul Ladany had been jolted awake in Apartment 2 by Gutfreund's screams and escaped by jumping off a balcony and then running through the rear yard of the building. The other four residents of Apartment 2 (sharpshooters Henry Hershkowitz and Zelig Stroch, and fencers Dan Alon and Yehuda Weisenstein), plus Chef De Mission Shmuel Lalkin and the two team doctors, managed to hide and later fled the besieged building. The two female members of Israel's Olympic team, sprinter and hurdler Esther Shahamorov and swimmer Shlomit Nir, were housed in a separate part of the Olympic Village. Three more members of Israel's Olympic team, two sailors and their manager, were housed in Kiel, 550 miles (900 km) from Munich.

The assassins were subsequently reported to be part of the Palestinian fedayeen from refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. They were identified as Luttif Afif (Issa), the leader (three of Issa's brothers were also reportedly members of Black September, two of them in Israeli jails), his deputy Yusuf Nazzal (Tony), and junior members Afif Ahmed Hamid (Paolo), Khalid Jawad (Salah), Ahmed Chic Thaa (Abu Halla), Mohammed Safady (Badran), Adnan Al-Gashey (Denawi), and his cousin Jamal Al-Gashey (Samir). According to author Simon Reeve, Afif, Nazzal and one of their confederates had all worked in various capacities in the Olympic Village, and had spent a couple of weeks scouting out their potential target. A member of the Uruguayan Olympic delegation, which shared housing with the Israelis, claims that he found Nazzal actually inside 31 Connollystra?e less than 24 hours before the attack, but since he was recognized as a worker in the Village, nothing was thought of it at the time. The other members of the group entered Munich via train and plane in the days before the attack. All of the members of the Uruguay and Hong Kong Olympic teams, which also shared the building with the Israelis, were released unharmed during the crisis.

## International reaction[edit]

On 5 September, Golda Meir, then-Prime Minister of Israel, appealed to other countries to "save our citizens and condemn the unspeakable criminal acts committed." King Hussein of Jordan?? the only leader of an Arab country to publicly denounce the Olympic attack?? called it a "savage crime against civilization?... perpetrated by sick minds."[20]

## Negotiations[edit]

The hostage takers demanded the release and safe passage to Egypt of 234 Palestinians and non-Arabs jailed in Israel, along with two German terrorists held by the German penitentiary system, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, who were founders of the German Red Army Faction. The hostage-takers threw the body of Weinberg out the front door of the residence to demonstrate their resolve. Israel's response was immediate and absolute: there would be no negotiation. Israel's official policy at the time was to refuse to negotiate with terrorists under any circumstances, as according to the Israeli government such negotiations would give an incentive to future attacks. It has been claimed that the German authorities, under the leadership of Chancellor Willy Brandt and Minister for the Interior Hans-Dietrich Genscher, rejected Israel's offer to send an Israeli special forces unit to Germany.[21] The Bavarian interior minister Bruno Merk, who headed the crisis centre jointly with Genscher and Munich's police chief Manfred Schreiber, denies that such an Israeli offer ever existed.[22]

According to journalist John K. Cooley, the hostage situation presented an extremely difficult political situation for the Germans because the hostages were Jewish. Cooley reported that the Germans offered the Palestinians an unlimited amount of money for the release of the athletes, as well as the substitution by high-ranking Germans. However, the kidnappers refused both offers.[20]

Munich police chief Manfred Schreiber and Bruno Merk, interior minister of Bavaria, negotiated directly with the kidnappers, repeating the offer of an unlimited amount of money. According to Cooley, the reply was that "money means nothing to us; our lives mean nothing to us." Magdi Gohary and Mohammad Khadif, both Egyptian advisers to the Arab League, and A.D. Touny, an Egyptian member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) also helped try to win concessions from the kidnappers, but to no avail. However, the negotiators apparently were able to convince the kidnappers that their demands were being considered, as Issa granted a total of five extensions to their deadlines. Elsewhere in the village, athletes carried on as normal, seemingly oblivious of the events unfolding nearby. The Games continued until mounting pressure on the IOC forced a suspension some 12 hours after the first athlete had been murdered. American marathon runner Frank Shorter, observing the unfolding events from the balcony of his nearby lodging, was quoted as saying, "Imagine those poor guys over there. Every five minutes a psycho with a machine gun says, 'Let's kill 'em now,' and someone else says, 'No, let's wait a while.' How long could you stand that?"[23]

Israeli hostages Kehat Shorr (left) and Andre Spitzer (right) talk to German officials during the hostage crisis.

A small squad of German police was dispatched to the Olympic village. Dressed in Olympic sweatsuits and carrying sub-machine guns, they were members of the German border-police, without specific operational plans in place for the rescue. The police took up positions awaiting orders. In the meantime, camera crews filmed the actions of the police from German apartments, and broadcast the images live on television. Thus, the kidnappers were able to watch the police prepare to attack. Footage shows the kidnappers leaning over to look at the police who were in hiding on the roof. In the end, after Issa threatened to kill two of the hostages, the police left the premises.

At one point during the crisis, the negotiators demanded direct contact with the hostages to satisfy themselves the Israelis were still alive. Fencing coach Andre Spitzer, who spoke fluent German, and shooting coach Kehat Shorr, the senior member of the Israeli delegation, had a brief conversation with German officials while standing at the second-floor window of the besieged building, with two kidnappers holding guns on them. When Spitzer attempted to answer a question, the coach was clubbed with the butt of an AK-47 in full view of international television cameras and pulled away from the window. A few minutes later, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Walter Tr?ger, the mayor of the Olympic Village, were briefly allowed into the apartments to speak with the hostages. Tr?ger spoke of being very moved by the dignity with which the Israelis held themselves, and that they seemed resigned to their fate.[21] He also noticed that several of the hostages, especially Gutfreund, showed signs of having suffered physical abuse at the hands of the kidnappers, and that David Berger had been shot in his left shoulder. While being debriefed by the crisis team, Genscher and Tr?ger told them that they had seen "four or five" attackers inside the apartment. Crucially, these numbers were accepted as definitive.

While Genscher and Tr?ger were talking with the hostages, Kehat Shorr had told the Germans that the Israelis would not object to being flown to an Arab country, provided that strict guarantees for their safety were made by the Germans and whichever nation they landed in. At 6?p.m. Munich time, the kidnappers issued a new dictate, demanding transportation to Cairo.

## Failed rescue[edit]

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### Ambush plan[edit]

The authorities feigned agreement to the Cairo demand, (although Egyptian Prime Minister Aziz Sedki had already told the German authorities that the Egyptians did not wish to become involved in the hostage crisis),[24] and at 10:10?p.m. a bus carried the hostages and terrorists from 31 Connollystra?e to two Bell UH-1 military helicopters, which were to transport them to nearby F?rstenfeldbruck, a NATO airbase. Initially, the perpetrators' plan was to go to Riem, which was the international airport near Munich at the time, but the negotiators convinced them that F?rstenfeldbruck would be more practical. The authorities, who preceded the Black Septemberists and hostages in a third helicopter, had an ulterior motive: they planned an armed assault at the airport.

The five German snipers who were chosen to ambush the kidnappers had been selected because they shot competitively on weekends.[25] During a subsequent German investigation, an officer identified as ?Sniper No. 2? stated: ?I am of the opinion that I am not a sharpshooter.?[26] The five snipers were deployed around the airport?? three on the roof of the control tower, one hidden behind a service truck and one behind a small signal tower at ground level?? but none of them had any special training. The members of the crisis team?? Schreiber, Genscher, Merk and Schreiber's deputy Georg Wolf?? supervised and observed the attempted rescue from the airport control tower. Cooley, Reeve and Groussard all place Mossad chief Zvi Zamir and Victor Cohen, one of Zamir's senior assistants, at the scene as well, but as observers only. Zamir has stated repeatedly in interviews over the years that he was never consulted by the Germans at any time during the rescue attempt and that he thought that his presence actually made the Germans uncomfortable.

A Boeing 727 jet was positioned on the tarmac with five or six armed German police inside dressed as flight crew. It was agreed that Issa and Tony would inspect the plane. The plan was that the Germans would overpower them as they boarded, giving the snipers a chance to kill the remaining terrorists at the helicopters. These were believed to number no more than two or three, according to what Genscher and Tr?ger had seen inside 31 Connollystra?e. However, during the transfer from the bus to the helicopters, the crisis team discovered that there were actually eight of them.

### Failure[edit]

At the last minute, as the helicopters were arriving at F?rstenfeldbruck, the German police aboard the airplane voted to abandon their mission, without consulting the central command. This left only the five sharpshooters to try to overpower a larger and more heavily armed group. At that point, Colonel Ulrich Wegener, Genscher's senior aide and later the founder of the elite German counter-terrorist unit GSG 9, said "I'm sure this will blow the whole affair!"[21]

The helicopters landed just after 10:30?p.m. and the four pilots and six of the kidnappers emerged. While four of the Black September members held the pilots at gunpoint (breaking an earlier promise that they would not take any Germans hostage), Issa and Tony walked over to inspect the jet, only to find it empty. Realizing they had been lured into a trap, they sprinted back toward the helicopters. As they ran past the control tower, Sniper 3 took one last opportunity to eliminate Issa, which would have left the group leaderless. However, due to the poor lighting, he struggled to see his target and missed, hitting Tony in the thigh instead. Meanwhile, the German authorities gave the order for snipers positioned nearby to open fire, which occurred around 11:00?p.m.

In the ensuing chaos, two of the kidnappers (Ahmed Chic Thaa and Afif Ahmed Hamid) holding the helicopter pilots were killed, and the remaining gunmen (one or two of whom may have already been wounded) scrambled to safety, returning fire from behind and beneath the helicopters, out of the snipers' line of sight, shooting out many of the airport lights. A German policeman in the control tower, Anton Fliegerbauer, was killed by the gunfire. The helicopter pilots fled; the hostages, tied up inside the craft, could not. During the gun battle, the hostages secretly worked on loosening their bonds and teethmarks were found on some of the ropes after the gunfire had ended.[24]

### Massacre[edit]

The Germans had not arranged for armored personnel carriers ahead of time and only at this point were they called in to break the deadlock. Since the roads to the airport had not been cleared, the carriers became stuck in traffic and finally arrived around midnight. With their appearance, the kidnappers felt the shift in the status quo, and possibly panicked at the thought of the failure of their operation. At four minutes past midnight of 6 September, one of them (likely Issa) turned on the hostages in the eastern helicopter and fired at them with a Kalashnikov assault rifle from point-blank range. Springer, Halfin and Friedman were killed instantly; Berger, shot twice in the leg, is believed to have survived the initial onslaught (as his autopsy later found that he had died of smoke inhalation). The attacker then pulled the pin on a hand grenade and tossed it into the cockpit; the ensuing explosion destroyed the helicopter and incinerated the bound Israelis inside.

Issa then dashed across the tarmac and began firing at the police, who killed him with return fire. Another, Khalid Jawad, attempted to escape and was gunned down by one of the snipers. What happened to the remaining hostages is still a matter of dispute. A German police investigation indicated that one of their snipers and a few of the hostages may have been shot inadvertently by the police. However, a Time Magazine reconstruction of the long-suppressed Bavarian prosecutor's report indicates that a third kidnapper (Reeve identifies Adnan Al-Gashey) stood at the door of the western helicopter and raked the remaining five hostages with machine gun fire; Gutfreund, Shorr, Slavin, Spitzer and Shapira were shot an average of four times each.[24][25] Of the four hostages in the eastern helicopter, only Ze'ev Friedman's body was relatively intact; he had been blown clear of the helicopter by the explosion. In some cases, the exact cause of death for the hostages in the eastern helicopter was difficult to establish because the rest of the corpses were burned almost beyond recognition in the explosion and subsequent fire.

Three of the remaining men lay on the ground, one of them feigning death, and were captured by police. Jamal Al-Gashey had been shot through his right wrist,[21] and Mohammed Safady had sustained a flesh wound to his leg.[24] Adnan Al-Gashey had escaped injury completely. Tony escaped the scene, but was tracked down with police dogs 40 minutes later in an airbase parking lot. Cornered and bombarded with tear gas, he was shot dead after a brief gunfight. By around 1:30?a.m., the battle was over.

### Results[edit]

Initial news reports, published all over the world, indicated that all the hostages were alive, and that all the attackers had been killed. Only later did a representative for the International Olympic Committee (IOC) suggest that "initial reports were overly optimistic." Jim McKay, who was covering the Olympics that year for ABC, had taken on the job of reporting the events as Roone Arledge fed them into his earpiece. At 3:24?a.m., McKay received the official confirmation:

> We just got the final word?... you know, when I was a kid, my father used to say "Our greatest hopes and our worst fears are seldom realized." Our worst fears have been realized tonight. They've now said that there were eleven hostages. Two were killed in their rooms yesterday morning, nine were killed at the airport tonight. They're all gone.[27]

### Criticism[edit]

Author Simon Reeve, among others, writes that the shootout with the well-trained Black September members showed an egregious lack of preparation on the part of the German authorities. They were not prepared to deal with this sort of situation. This costly lesson led directly to the founding, less than two months later, of police counter-terrorism branch GSG 9.

The authors argue that German authorities made a number of mistakes. First, because of restrictions in the post-war West German constitution, the army could not participate in the attempted rescue, as the German armed forces are not allowed to operate inside Germany during peacetime. The responsibility was entirely in the hands of the Munich police and the Bavarian authorities.[28][clarification needed]]]

It was known a half-hour before the hostages and kidnappers had even arrived at F?rstenfeldbruck that the number of the latter was larger than first believed. Despite this new information, Schreiber decided to continue with the rescue operation as originally planned and the new information could not reach the snipers since they had no radios.[29] It is a basic tenet of sniping operations that there are enough snipers (at least two for each known target, or in this case a minimum of ten) deployed to neutralize as many of the attackers as possible with the first volley of shots.[30] The 2006 National Geographic Channel's Seconds From Disaster profile on the massacre stated that the helicopters were supposed to land sideways and to the west of the control tower, a maneuver which would have allowed the snipers clear shots into them as the kidnappers threw open the helicopter doors. Instead, the helicopters were landed facing the control tower and at the centre of the airstrip. This not only gave them a place to hide after the gunfight began, but put Snipers 1 and 2 in the line of fire of the other three snipers on the control tower. The snipers were denied valuable shooting opportunities as a result of the positioning of the helicopters, stacking the odds against what were effectively three snipers versus eight heavily armed gunmen.

According to the same program, the crisis committee delegated to make decisions on how to deal with the incident consisted of Bruno Merk (the Bavarian interior minister), Hans-Dietrich Genscher (the West German interior minister) and Manfred Schreiber (Munich's Chief of Police); in other words, two politicians and one tactician. The program mentioned that a year before the Games, Schreiber had participated in another hostage crisis (a failed bank robbery) in which he ordered a marksman to shoot one of the perpetrators, who was only wounded. As a result, the robbers shot dead an innocent woman and Schreiber had been charged with involuntary manslaughter. An investigation ultimately cleared him of any wrongdoing, but the program suggested that the prior incident affected his judgment in the subsequent Olympic hostage crisis.

As mentioned earlier, the five German snipers at F?rstenfeldbruck did not have radio contact with one another (nor with the German authorities conducting the rescue operation) and therefore were unable to coordinate their fire. The only contact the snipers had with the operational leadership was with Georg Wolf, who was lying next to the three snipers on the control tower giving orders directly to them.[31] The two snipers at ground level had been given vague instructions to shoot when the other snipers began shooting, and were basically left to fend for themselves.[32]

In addition, the snipers did not have the proper equipment for this hostage rescue operation. The Heckler Koch G3 battle rifles used were considered by several experts to be inadequate for the distance at which the snipers were trying to shoot. The G3, the standard service rifle of the Bundeswehr at that time, had a 20-inch (510 mm) barrel; at the distances the snipers were required to shoot, a 27-inch (690 mm) barrel would have ensured far greater accuracy.[33] None of the rifles were equipped with telescopic or infrared sights.[34] Additionally, none of the snipers were equipped with a steel helmet or bullet-proof vest.[34] No armored vehicles were at the scene at F?rstenfeldbruck, and were only called in after the gunfight was well underway.[35]

There were also numerous tactical errors. As mentioned earlier, "Sniper 2", who was stationed behind the signal tower, wound up directly in the line of fire of his fellow snipers on the control tower, without any protective gear and without any other police being aware of his location.[34] Because of this, "Sniper 2" didn't fire a single shot until late in the gunfight, when hostage-taker Khalid Jawad attempted to escape on foot and ran right at the exposed sniper. "Sniper 2" killed the fleeing perpetrator but was in turn badly wounded by a fellow police officer, who was unaware that he was shooting at one of his own men. One of the helicopter pilots, Gunnar Ebel, was lying near "Sniper 2" and was also wounded by friendly fire. Both Ebel and the sniper recovered from their injuries.[36]

No police officer posing as a crewmember on the Boeing 727 were prosecuted or reprimanded for abandoning his post. Many of the police officers and border guards who were approached for interviews by the One Day in September production team were threatened with the loss of their pension rights if they talked for the film. Many of the errors made by the Germans during the rescue attempt were ultimately detailed by Heinz Hohensinn, who had participated in the operation, but had taken early retirement and had no pension to lose.[37]

## Aftermath[edit]

The bodies of the five Palestinian assassins?? Afif, Nazzal, Chic Thaa, Hamid and Jawad?? killed during the F?rstenfeldbruck gun battle were delivered to Libya, where they received heroes' funerals and were buried with full military honors. On 8 September, Israeli planes bombed ten PLO bases in Syria and Lebanon in response to the massacre. Up to 200 people were killed.

On 29 October, hijackers of a West German Lufthansa passenger jet demanded the release of the three surviving gunmen, who had been arrested after the F?rstenfeldbruck gunfight and were being held for trial. Safady and the Al-Gasheys were immediately released by West Germany, receiving a tumultuous welcome when they touched down in Libya and (as seen in One Day in September) giving their own firsthand account of their operation at a press conference broadcast worldwide.

The massacre prompted many European countries to establish permanent, professional, and immediately available counter-terrorism forces, or reorganize already existing units to such purpose. The massacre also prompted prominent arms designers and manufacturers to produce new types of weapons more suitable for counter-terrorism.

### Effect on the Games[edit]

In the wake of the hostage-taking, competition was suspended for the first time in modern Olympic history. On 6 September, a memorial service attended by 80,000 spectators and 3,000 athletes was held in the Olympic Stadium. IOC President Avery Brundage made little reference to the murdered athletes during a speech praising the strength of the Olympic movement and equating the attack on the Israeli sportsmen with the recent arguments about encroaching professionalism and disallowing Rhodesia's participation in the Games, which outraged many listeners.[26] The victims' families were represented by Andre Spitzer's widow Ankie, Moshe Weinberg's mother, and a cousin of Weinberg, Carmel Eliash. During the memorial service, Eliash collapsed and died of a heart attack.[38]

Many of the 80,000 people who filled the Olympic Stadium for West Germany's football match with Hungary carried noisemakers and waved flags, but when several spectators unfurled a banner reading ?17 dead, already forgotten?? security officers removed the sign and expelled those responsible from the grounds.[39] During the memorial service, the Olympic Flag was flown at half-mast, along with the flags of most of the other competing nations at the request of Willy Brandt. Ten Arab nations objected to their flags being lowered to honor murdered Israelis; their flags were restored to the tops of their flagpoles almost immediately.[40]

Willi Daume, president of the Munich organizing committee, initially sought to cancel the remainder of the Games, but in the afternoon Brundage and others who wished to continue the Games prevailed, stating that they could not let the incident halt the Games.[39] Brundage stated "The games must go on, and we must?... and we must continue our efforts to keep them clean, pure and honest."[41] The decision was endorsed by the Israeli government and Israeli Olympic team chef de mission Shmuel Lalkin.[42]

On 6 September, after the memorial service, the remaining members of the Israeli team withdrew from the Games and left Munich. All Jewish sportsmen were placed under guard. Mark Spitz, the American swimming star who had already completed his competitions, left Munich during the hostage crisis (it was feared that as a prominent Jew, Spitz might now be a kidnapping target). The Egyptian team left the Games on 7 September, stating they feared reprisals.[43] The Philippine and Algerian teams also left the Games, as did some members of the Dutch and Norwegian teams. American marathon runner Kenny Moore, who wrote about the incident for Sports Illustrated, quoted Dutch distance runner Jos Hermens as saying "It's quite simple. We were invited to a party, and if someone comes to the party and shoots people, how can you stay?"[44] Many athletes, dazed by the tragedy, similarly felt that their desire to compete had been destroyed, although they stayed at the Games.

Four years later at the 1976 Summer Olympics in Montreal, the Israeli team commemorated the massacre: when they entered the stadium at the Opening Ceremonies, their national flag was adorned with a black ribbon.

The families of some victims have asked the IOC to establish a permanent memorial to the athletes. The IOC has declined, saying that to introduce a specific reference to the victims could "alienate other members of the Olympic community," according to the BBC.[45] Alex Gilady, an Israeli IOC official, told the BBC: "We must consider what this could do to other members of the delegations that are hostile to Israel." The IOC rejected an international campaign in support of a minute of silence at the Opening Ceremonies of the 2012 London Olympics in honor of the Israeli victims on the fortieth anniversary of the massacre.[46][47]

There is a memorial outside the Olympic stadium in Munich in the form of a stone tablet at the bridge linking the stadium to the former Olympic village. There is also a memorial tablet to the slain Israelis outside the front door of their former lodging at 31 Connollystra?e. On 15 October 1999 (almost a year before the Sydney 2000 Games), a memorial plaque was unveiled in one of the large light towers (Tower 14) outside the Sydney Olympic Stadium.[48][49]

### Israeli response[edit]

Main articles: Operation Wrath of God and 1973 Israeli raid on Lebanon

Golda Meir and the Israeli Defense Committee secretly authorized the Mossad to track down and kill those allegedly responsible for the Munich massacre,[50] a claim which was disputed by Zvi Zamir, who described the mission as ?putting an end to the type of terror that was perpetrated? (in Europe).[51] To this end the Mossad set up a number of special teams to locate and kill these terrorists, aided by the agency's stations in Europe.[43]

In a February 2006 interview,[51] former Mossad chief Zvi Zamir answered direct questions:

> Was there no element of vengeance in the decision to take action against the terrorists?
> "No. We were not engaged in vengeance. We are accused of having been guided by a desire for vengeance. That is nonsense. What we did was to concretely prevent in the future. We acted against those who thought that they would continue to perpetrate acts of terror. I am not saying that those who were involved in Munich were not marked for death. They definitely deserved to die. But we were not dealing with the past; we concentrated on the future."
> Did you not receive a directive from Golda Meir along the lines of 'take revenge on those responsible for Munich?
> "Golda abhorred the necessity that was imposed on us to carry out the operations. Golda never told me to ?take revenge on those who were responsible for Munich.? No one told me that."[51]

The Israeli mission later became known as Operation Wrath of God or Mivtza Za'am Ha'El.[21] Reeve quotes General Aharon Yariv?? who, he writes, was the general overseer of the operation?? as stating that after Munich the Israeli government felt it had no alternative but to exact justice.

> We had no choice. We had to make them stop, and there was no other way?... we are not very proud about it. But it was a question of sheer necessity. We went back to the old biblical rule of an eye for an eye?... I approach these problems not from a moral point of view, but, hard as it may sound, from a cost-benefit point of view. If I'm very hard-headed, I can say, what is the political benefit in killing this person? Will it bring us nearer to peace? Will it bring us nearer to an understanding with the Palestinians or not? In most cases I don't think it will. But in the case of Black September we had no other choice and it worked. Is it morally acceptable? One can debate that question. Is it politically vital? It was.[21]

Benny Morris writes that a target list was created using information from ?turned? PLO personnel and friendly European intelligence services. Once completed, a wave of assassinations of suspected Black September operatives began across Europe.

On 9 April 1973, Israel launched Operation Spring of Youth, a joint Mossad-IDF operation in Beirut. The targets were Mohammad Yusuf al-Najjar (Abu Yusuf), head of Fatah's intelligence arm, which ran Black September, according to Morris; Kamal Adwan, who headed the PLO's so-called Western Sector, which controlled PLO action inside Israel; and Kamal Nassir, the PLO spokesman. A group of Sayeret commandos were taken in nine missile boats and a small fleet of patrol boats to a deserted Lebanese beach, before driving in two cars to downtown Beirut, where they killed Najjar, Adwan and Nassir. Two further detachments of commandos blew up the PFLP's headquarters in Beirut and a Fatah explosives plant. The leader of the commando team that conducted the operations was Ehud Barak.

On 21 July 1973, in the so-called Lillehammer affair, a team of Mossad agents mistakenly killed Ahmed Bouchiki, a Moroccan man unrelated to the Munich attack, in Lillehammer, Norway,[52] after an informant mistakenly said Bouchiki was Ali Hassan Salameh, the head of Force 17 and a Black September operative. Five Mossad agents, including two women, were captured by the Norwegian authorities, while others managed to slip away.[50] The five were convicted of the killing and imprisoned, but were released and returned to Israel in 1975. The Mossad later found Ali Hassan Salameh in Beirut and killed him on 22 January 1979 with a remote-controlled car bomb. The attack killed four passersby and injured 18 others.[53] According to CIA officer Duane "Dewey" Claridge, chief of operations of the CIA Near East Division from 1975 to 1978, in mid-1976, Salameh offered Americans assistance and protection with Arafat's blessings during the American embassy pull-out from Beirut during the down-spiraling chaos of the Lebanese Civil War. There was a general feeling that Americans could be trusted. However, the scene of cooperation came to an end abruptly after the assassination of Salameh. Americans were generally blamed as Israel's principal benefactors.[54]

Simon Reeve writes that the Israeli operations continued for more than 20 years. He details the assassination in Paris in 1992 of Atef Bseiso, the PLO's head of intelligence, and says that an Israeli general confirmed there was a link back to Munich. Reeve also writes that while Israeli officials have stated Operation Wrath of God was intended to exact vengeance for the families of the athletes killed in Munich, ?few relatives wanted such a violent reckoning with the Palestinians.? Reeve states the families were instead desperate to know the truth of the events surrounding the Munich massacre. Reeve outlines what he sees as a lengthy cover-up by German authorities to hide the truth.[21] After 20 years of fighting the German government, the families, led by Ankie Spitzer and Ilana Romano (widows of fencing coach Andre and weightlifter Yossef, respectively), acquired official documentation proving the depth of the cover-up.[citation needed] After a lengthy court fight, in 2004 the families of the Munich victims reached a settlement of ?3 million with the German government.

### Alleged German cover up[edit]

An article in 2012 in a front-page story of the German news magazine Der Spiegel reported that much of the information pertaining to the mishandling of the massacre has been covered up by the German authorities for the past decades. For twenty years, Germany refused to release any information about the attack and did not accept responsibility for the results. The magazine reported that the government had been hiding 3,808 files, which contained tens of thousands of documents. Der Spiegel said it obtained secret reports by authorities, embassy cables, and minutes of cabinet meetings that demonstrate the lack of professionalism of the German officials in handling the massacre. The newspaper also wrote that the German authorities were told about that Palestinians were planning an "incident" at the Olympics three weeks before the massacre, but failed to take the necessary security measures, and these facts are missing from the official documentation of the German government.[14][55][56][57]

In August 2012, Der Spiegel reported that following the massacre, Germany began secret meetings with Black September, at the behest of the West German government, due to the fear that Black September would carry out other terrorist attacks in Germany. The government proposed a clandestine meeting between German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and a member of Black September to create a "new basis of trust." In return for an exchange of the political status of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the PLO would stop terrorist attacks on German soil. When French police arrested Abu Daoud, one of the chief organizers of the Munich massacre, and inquired about extraditing him to Germany, Germany's justice secretary Alfred Seidl recommended that Germany should not take any action, causing the French to release Abu Daoud and the Assad regime to shelter him until he died at a Damascus hospital in 2010.[58]

## Surviving gunmen[edit]

Two of the three surviving gunmen, Mohammed Safady and Adnan Al-Gashey, were allegedly killed by Mossad as part of Operation Wrath of God. Al-Gashey was allegedly located after making contact with a cousin in a Gulf State, and Safady was found by remaining in touch with family in Lebanon.[59] This account was challenged in a book by Aaron Klein, who claims that Al-Gashey died of heart failure in the 1970s, and that Safady was either killed by Christian Phalangists in Lebanon in the early 1980s, or, according to a PLO operative friendly with Safady, is still alive (as of 2005).[25][60]

### Jamal Al-Gashey[edit]

The prevailing belief is that Jamal Al-Gashey is the sole remaining gunman alive, as of 2012, hiding in North Africa or in Syria, claiming to still fear retribution from Israel. He is the only one of the surviving terrorists to consent to interviews since 1972, having granted an interview in 1992 to a Palestinian newspaper, and having briefly emerged from hiding in 1999 to participate in an interview for the film One Day in September, during which he was disguised and his face shown only in blurry shadow.[61]

### Abu Daoud[edit]

Of those believed to have planned the massacre, only Abu Daoud, the man who claims that the attack was his idea, is known to have died of natural causes. Historical documents released to Der Spiegel by the German secret service show that Dortmund police had been aware of collaboration between Abu Daoud and neo-Nazi Willi Pohl seven weeks before the attack.[62] In January 1977, Abu Daoud was intercepted by French police in Paris while traveling from Beirut under an assumed name.[63] Under protest from the PLO, Iraq, and Libya, who claimed that because Abu Daoud was traveling to a PLO comrade's funeral he should receive diplomatic immunity, the French government refused a West German extradition request on grounds that forms had not been filled in properly, and put him on a plane to Algeria before Germany could submit another request.[63] On 27 July 1981, he was shot 5 times from a distance of around two meters in a Warsaw Victoria (now Sofitel) hotel coffee shop, but survived the attack, chasing his would-be assassin down to the coffee shop's front entrance before collapsing;

Abu Daoud was allowed safe passage through Israel in 1996 so he could attend a PLO meeting convened in the Gaza Strip for the purpose of rescinding an article in its charter that called for Israel's eradication.[25] In his autobiography, From Jerusalem to Munich, first published in France in 1999, and later in a written interview with Sports Illustrated,[64] Abu Daoud wrote that funds for Munich were provided by Mahmoud Abbas, Chairman of the PLO since 11 November 2004 and President of the Palestinian National Authority since 15 January 2005.[65]

> Though he claims he didn't know what the money was being spent for, longtime Fatah official Mahmoud Abbas, aka Abu Mazen, was responsible for the financing of the Munich attack.[66]

Abu Daoud believes that if the Israelis knew that Mahmoud Abbas was the financier of the operation, the 1993 Oslo Accords wouldn't have been achieved, during which Mahmoud Abbas was seen in photo ops at the White House.[64]

Abu Daoud, who lived with his wife on a pension provided by the Palestinian Authority, has said that ?the Munich operation had the endorsement of Arafat,? although Arafat was not involved in conceiving or implementing the attack. In his autobiography, Abu Daoud writes that Arafat saw the team off on the mission with the words ?God protect you.?[67]

Ankie Spitzer, widow of fencing coach Andre, declined several offers to meet with Abu Daoud, saying that the only place she wants to meet him is in a courtroom. According to Spitzer, ?He (Abu Daoud) didn't pay the price for what he did.?[68] In 2006 during the release of Steven Spielberg's film, Munich, Der Spiegel interviewed Abu Daoud regarding the Munich massacre. He was quoted as saying: "I regret nothing. You can only dream that I would apologize."[69]

He died on 3 July 2010 in Syria of kidney failure at the age of 73.[70]

## List of fatalities[edit]

Shot during the initial break-in

- Moshe Weinberg (wrestling coach)
- Yossef Romano (weightlifter)

Shot and killed by grenade in helicopter D-HAQO
  D-HAQO was the eastern helicopter.
  According to the order in which they were seated, from left to right:

- Ze'ev Friedman (weightlifter)
- David Berger (weightlifter)
- Yakov Springer (weightlifting judge)
- Eliezer Halfin (wrestler)

Shot in helicopter D-HAQU
  D-HAQU was the western helicopter.
  According to the order in which they were seated, from left to right:

- Yossef Gutfreund (wrestling referee)
- Kehat Shorr (shooting coach)
- Mark Slavin (wrestler)
- Andre Spitzer (fencing coach)
- Amitzur Shapira (track coach)

Shot on airstrip

- Anton Fliegerbauer (German police officer)

Palestinians shot dead by German police

- Luttif Afif (Issa)
- Yusuf Nazzal (Tony)
- Afif Ahmed Hamid (Paolo)
- Khalid Jawad (Salah)
- Ahmed Chic Thaa (Abu Halla)

## Memorials gallery[edit]

File:Connollystra?e 31 - Gedenktafel.jpg
Memorial plaque in front of the Israeli athletes' quarters. The inscription, in German and Hebrew, translates as:"The team of the State of Israel stayed in this building during the 20th Olympic Summer Games from 21 August to 5 September 1972. On 5 September, [list of victims] died a violent death. Honor to their memory."

- M?nchen 1972 Gedenkstein.jpg

  Memorial panel for the victims of the attack on the site of the Munich Olympic Park

- Memorial for the dead athletes in front of the airport in F?rstenfeldbruck. The names of the victims are engraved.

- Place of memory in Ben Shemen forest in Israel

## Media[edit]

- 1972, by Sarah Morris
- Munich
- Munich: Mossad's Revenge
- One Day in September
- National Geographic Seconds From Disaster episodes
- Sword of Gideon

## See also[edit]

| Germany portal
| Israel portal
| Terrorism portal
| Palestine portal
| Olympics portal

- Lod Airport massacre
- Israeli casualties of war
- Palestinian political violence
- One minute of silence

## References[edit]

1. ^ Breznican, Anthony (22 December 2005). "Messages from 'Munich'". USAToday (Gannett Co.). Retrieved 17 April 2009.
2. ^ Karon, Tony (12 September 2000). "Revisiting the Olympics' Darkest Day". Time. Retrieved 13 May 2010.
3. ^ "munich massacre" terroristshl=enei=ZlIgTIT5K4T7lwfo3IWKAQsa=Xoi=book_resultct=resultresnum=2ved=0CCoQ6AEwAQ#v=onepageq="munich massacre" terroristsf=false Terrorism It's Effects?. Google Books. Retrieved 22 June 2010.
4. ^ "munich massacre" terroristshl=enei=uVIgTNfOOsL6lwf264mOAQsa=Xoi=book_resultct=resultresnum=3ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepageq="munich massacre" terroristsf=false Terrorism?. Google Books. 11 September 2001. Retrieved 22 June 2010.
5. ^ "munich massacre" terroristshl=enei=uVIgTNfOOsL6lwf264mOAQsa=Xoi=book_resultct=resultresnum=4ved=0CDQQ6AEwAw#v=onepageq="munich massacre" terroristsf=false The new dimension of international ...?. Google Books. 11 September 2001. Retrieved 22 June 2010.
6. ^ "munich massacre" terroristshl=enei=uVIgTNfOOsL6lwf264mOAQsa=Xoi=book_resultct=resultresnum=7ved=0CEMQ6AEwBg#v=onepageq="munich massacre" terroristsf=false Encyclopedia of terrorism?. Google Books. Retrieved 22 June 2010.
7. ^ "munich massacre" terroristshl=enei=uVIgTNfOOsL6lwf264mOAQsa=Xoi=book_resultct=resultresnum=8ved=0CEgQ6AEwBw#v=onepageq="munich massacre" terroristsf=false The terrorist trap: America's ...?. Google Books. 18 July 1976. Retrieved 22 June 2010.
8. ^ Reeve, Simon (22 January 2006), Olympics Massacre: Munich ? The real story, The Independent, retrieved 3 March 2012
9. ^ Fleisher, Malkah (22 July 2012). ""Baffled" Bob Costas to Call Own Minute of Silence During Olympic Broadcast for Slain Israeli Team". The Jewish Press. Retrieved 23 July 2012.
10. ^ biram "black september"source=blots=6BB_-iVF_Asig=_arYUHd4xV0KTyZhc9HMr5tK4Uohl=frei=2wVAS5OxGtK7lAfXoYCUBwsa=Xoi=book_resultct=resultresnum=2ved=0CAsQ6AEwATgU#v=onepageq=ikrit biram "black september"f=false Terrorism: A Global Scourge?? Google Livres. Books.google.fr. Retrieved 7 June 2010.
11. ^ Latsch, Gunther; Wiegrefe, Klaus (18 June 2012), Files Reveal Neo-Nazis Helped Palestinian Terrorists, Spiegel Online
12. ^ a b c Wolff, Alexander (20 August 2002). "When The Terror Began". Sports Illustrated. Retrieved 3 October 2011.
13. ^ TIME article, 2 September 2002.
14. ^ a b Ahren, Raphael (22 July 2012). "Germany had a tip-off three weeks ahead of Munich massacre, Der Spiegel claims". The Times of Israel. Retrieved 22 July 2012.
15. ^ Reeve, Klein and Groussard.[page needed]
16. ^ Klein, pp. 35?36.
17. ^ Kelly, Cathal (28 April 2012), Munich massacre helped unwittingly by Canadians in 1972 Olympic atrocity
18. ^ Burnton, Simon (2 May 2012). "50 stunning Olympic moments No 26: The terrorist outrage in Munich in 1972". Guardian News and Media Limited. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
19. ^ "Article on CBC Archives". Archives.cbc.ca. Retrieved 7 June 2010.
20. ^ a b Cooley.[page needed]
21. ^ a b c d e f g Reeve, Simon. One Day in September, 2001.
22. ^ "Interview "Uns ging es darum, das Leben der Geiseln zu retten". S?ddeutsche Zeitung. 1 January 2006.
23. ^ Moore, Kenny (18 September 1972). "Shootings in the Night". Sports Illustrated.
24. ^ a b c d Groussard.
25. ^ a b c d TIME article, part 5, 5 August 2002.
26. ^ a b Grace, Francie (5 September 2002). "Munich Massacre Remembered". CBS News. Retrieved 10 February 2010.
27. ^ "American Sportscasters Online interview with Jim McKay". Americansportscastersonline.com. Retrieved 7 June 2010.
28. ^ Interview with Ulrich Wegener in One Day in September.
29. ^ Reeve, pp. 103 and 107.
30. ^ Groussard, p. 349.
31. ^ Reeve, pp. 115?116.
32. ^ Reeve, pp. 106?107.
33. ^ Groussard, pp. 354?355.
34. ^ a b c Reeve, p. 116.
35. ^ Reeve, pp. 118 and 120.
36. ^ Reeve, pp. 121?122.
37. ^ Reeve, pp. 236?237.
38. ^ Gallagher, Brendan (6 August 2002). "Athletics: Memories stirred of Olympic hostage horror". London: The Telegraph (UK). Retrieved 11 October 2012.
39. ^ a b TIME article, part 6, 5 August 2002.
40. ^ Fleming, David (29 July 1996). "Remembering the Munich 11?". Sports Illustrated. Retrieved 22 July 2006.
41. ^ "Munich Crisis". Upi.com. 12 January 2007. Retrieved 7 June 2010.
42. ^ "Encarta article on the Olympic Games". Archived from the original on 1 November 2009.
43. ^ a b Guardian article on the massacre, 7 September 1972.
44. ^ Butcher, Pat (12 August 2002), "ATHLETICS: In Munich, Israelis honor '72 victims", The New York Times, retrieved 11 October 2012
45. ^ BBC News article on commemoration at 2004 Olympics, 20 August 2004.
46. ^ "Rogge again rejects calls for minute's silence for victims of 1972 Munich massacre". The Washington Post. The Associated Press. 21 July 2012. Retrieved 29 July 2012.
47. ^ Davidovich, Joshua (22 July 2012). "Still refusing moment of silence, Olympic head says memorial will be held in Germany". The Times of Israel. Retrieved 29 July 2012.
48. ^ for Gold- Israel at the Sydney 2000 Olympics "Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs article on Sydney 2000 Olympics and Plaque". Mfa.gov.il. Retrieved 7 June 2010.
49. ^ "Simon Reeve?s article in 2000: Munich massacre?s echoes heard amid Sydney?s jubilee". Jewishsf.com. Retrieved 7 June 2010.
50. ^ a b Morris.[page needed]
51. ^ a b c Melman.[page needed]
52. ^ Shalev, Noam 'The hunt for Black September'. BBC. Retrieved 4 March 2012.
53. ^ "MIDDLE EAST: Death of a Terrorist". TIME. 5 February 1979.
54. ^ Posner, Gerald (2004). Why America slept: the failure to prevent 9/11. Random House Inc. p. 13. ISBN [[Special:BookSources/0-8129-6623-7|0-8129-6623-7 [[Category:Articles with invalid ISBNs]]]] Check `|isbn=` value (help).
55. ^ "Officials Ignored Warnings of Terrorist Attack". Der Spiegel. 23 July 2012. Retrieved 23 July 2012.
56. ^ Aderet, Oferet (22 July 2012). "Germany was warned one month before Munich massacre, claims Der Spiege". Ha'aretz. Retrieved 23 July 2012.
57. ^ "Der Spiegel: Germany had warning of Munich attack". 22 July 2012. Retrieved 23 July 2012.
58. ^ Weinthal, Benjamin (26 August 2012). "'Germany met with Munich terrorists after attack'". The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 26 August 2012.
59. ^ Reeve, p. 188.
60. ^ Klein, Aaron (2007). Striking back : the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's deadly response. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks. ISBN 9780812974638. [page needed]
61. ^ "NY Times: One Day in September". NY Times. Retrieved 22 November 2008.
62. ^ Neo-Nazi 'aided Munich Olympics massacre', The Local 17 June 2012
63. ^ a b Frum, David (2000). How We Got Here: The '70s. New York, New York: Basic Books. p. 319. ISBN 0-465-04195-7.
64. ^ a b Wolff, Alexander (26 August 2002). "The Mastermind". Sports Illustrated. Sports Illustrated. Retrieved 7 June 2010.
65. ^ "Israel Law Center on Abu Mazen". Israellawcenter.org. Retrieved 3 October 2011.
66. ^ Abu Daoud.[page needed]
67. ^ Conservative News Station on involvement of PLO in the massacre[dead link]
68. ^ "Her husband's killer". New York Daily News. 25 December 2005.
69. ^ "Suspected Munich massacre mastermind dead, report says". CNN. 3 July 2010.
70. ^ "Mastermind behind Munich Olympics attacks dies". BBC News. 3 July 2010.

## Further reading[edit]

- Calahan, A. B. (1995 Thesis) "The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre and the Development of Independent Covert Action Teams"
- Cooley, John K. (London 1973), Green March Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs ISBN 0-7146-2987-1
- Dahlke, Matthias (Munich 2006), Der Anschlag auf Olympia '72. Die politischen Reaktionen auf den internationalen in Deutschland Martin Meidenbauer ISBN 3-89975-583-9 (German text)
- Daoud, Abu, (New York, 2002), Palestine : a history of the resistance movement by the sole survivor of Black September ISBN 1-55970-429-2
- Groussard, Serge (New York, 1975), The Blood of Israel: the massacre of the Israeli athletes, the Olympics, 1972 ISBN 0-688-02910-8
- Jonas, George. (New York, 2005), Vengeance: The True Story of an Israeli Team., Simon Schuster
- Khalaf, Salah (Abu Iyad) (Tel Aviv, 1983) Without a Homeland: Conversations with Eric Rouleau
- Klein, A. J. (New York, 2005), Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's Deadly Response, Random House ISBN 1-920769-80-3
- Large, David Clay (Lanham, MD, 2012), Munich 1972, Rowman Littlefield ISBN 978-0-7425-6739-9
- Morris, Benny. (New York, 1999 and 2001), Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist?Arab conflict, 1881?2000, Vintage Books edition ISBN 0-679-74475-4
- Reeve, Simon. (New York, 2001), One Day in September: the full story of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre and Israeli revenge operation "Wrath of God" ISBN 1-55970-547-7
- Tinnin, David B. Dag Christensen. (1976), The Hit Team ISBN 0-440-13644-X
- Yossi Melman, (17 February 2006), Interview with former Head of Mossad, Zvi Zamir "Preventive measures", Haaretz
- Mohammad Daoud Odeh (August 2008), interview with NOX magazine, Of Fire/ "Rings Of Fire"

## Movies[edit]

- 21 Hours at Munich (1976) at the Internet Movie Database
- Munich (2005) at the Internet Movie Database
- Munich: Mossad?s Revenge (2006) at the Internet Movie Database
- One Day in September (1999) at the Internet Movie Database
- Sword of Gideon (1986) at the Internet Movie Database

## External links[edit]

| Wikimedia Commons has media related to Munich massacre.

- The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Massacre?? Includes an extensive overview of the Munich massacre
- A Tribute to the 1972 Israeli Olympic Athletes?? Includes biographies and photographs for each of the 11 Israeli athletes killed
- Time Magazine, 4 December 2005
- Ankie Spitzer speech
- Overview of Israeli retaliation actions
- NY Times articles on the massacre
- Special Publication of Israel State Archives: The Fortieth Anniversary of the Massacre of the Israeli Athletes in Munich

Links to related articles
Prominent terrorist attacks against Israelis in the history of the Arab–Israeli conflict – the 1970s
1970 | Swissair Flight 330 attack (February 21) Avivim school bus massacre (May 22)
1971 | Murder of the Aroyo children (January 2)
1972 | Sabena Flight 571 hijacking (May 8) Lod Airport massacre (May 30) Munich massacre (5–6 September) Israeli Bangkok embassy hostage crisis (December 28)
1973 | Assassination of the Israeli attache in Washington (July 1)
1974 | Kiryat Shmona massacre (April 11) Ma'alot massacre (May 15) Nahariya attack (24–25 June) TWA Flight 841 bombing (September 8) Beit She'an attack (November 19)
1975 | Savoy Hotel Attack (March 6) Kfar Yuval hostage crisis (June 15) Zion Square refrigerator bombing (July 4)
1976 | Hijacking of Air France Flight 139 (June 27)
1978 | Coastal Road massacre (March 11) ‡
1979 | Nahariya massacre (April 22)
Attacks launched from the West Bank Attacks launched from the Gaza strip Attacks launched from Lebanon Attacks launched from Jordan ‡ indicates the terrorist attack which caused the greatest amount of Israeli casualties during the 1970s Full list of Lebanese rocket attacks on Israel 1960s 1980s
Prominent Palestinian militancy attacks in the 1970s
Within Israel | Avivim school bus massacre* (May 22, 1970) Lod Airport massacre (May 30, 1972) Kiryat Shmona massacre* (April 11, 1974) Ma'alot massacre* (May 15, 1974) Nahariya attack* (24–25 June, 1974) Beit She'an attack (November 19, 1974) Savoy Hotel Attack* (March 6, 1975) Kfar Yuval hostage crisis* (June 15, 1975) Zion Square refrigerator bombing (July 4, 1975) Coastal Road massacre* (March 11, 1978) Nahariya massacre* (April 22, 1979)
Within the Gaza Strip | Murder of the Aroyo children (January 2, 1971)
Aircraft attacks and hijackings | Swissair Flight 330 (February 21, 1970) Lufthansa Flight 649 (February 22-23, 1972) Sabena Flight 571 (May 8, 1972) Lufthansa Flight 615 (October 29, 1972) TWA Flight 841 (September 8, 1974) Air France Flight 139 (June 27, 1976)
Worldwide | Munich massacre (5–6 September, 1972) Israeli Bangkok embassy hostage crisis (December 28, 1972) Assassination of the Israeli attache in Washington (July 1, 1973)
* Attacks launched from Lebanon 1960s 1980s
Israeli–Palestinian conflict
Participants |
Israel | Israel Defense Forces Israel Police Mossad Shabak
Palestinians |
Main | Palestine Liberation Organization State of Palestine Palestinian National Authority Gaza Strip Fatah Hamas
Other | Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades DFLP Palestine Liberation Front Palestinian Islamic Jihad Palestinian Popular Struggle Front PFLP PFLP-GC Popular Resistance Committees
Influence | Algeria Arab League British Mandate for Palestine (1920–48) China Egypt European Union Germany France Hamas Hezbollah Iran Iraq Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Russia Saudi Arabia Syria Tunisia Turkey United Kingdom United Nations United States Yemen
Individuals |
Israelis | Moshe Arens Ami Ayalon Ehud Barak Menachem Begin Meir Dagan Moshe Dayan Avi Dichter Yuval Diskin David Ben-Gurion Efraim Halevy Dan Halutz Tzipi Livni Golda Meir Shaul Mofaz Yitzhak Mordechai Benjamin Netanyahu Ehud Olmert Shimon Peres Yaakov Peri Yitzhak Rabin Amnon Lipkin-Shahak Yitzhak Shamir Ariel Sharon Shabtai Shavit Moshe Ya'alon Danny Yatom Zvi Zamir
Palestinians | Abu Abbas Mahmoud Abbas Moussa Arafat Yasser Arafat Yahya Ayyash Marwan Barghouti Mohammed Dahlan Mohammed Deif George Habash Wadie Haddad Ismail Haniyeh Nayef Hawatmeh Amin al-Husayni Ghazi Jabali Ahmed Jibril Abu Jihad Salah Khalaf Leila Khaled Sheikh Khalil Khaled Mashal Zuheir Mohsen Abu Ali Mustafa Abu Nidal Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Jibril Rajoub Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi Ali Hassan Salameh Salah Shehade Ramadan Shalah Fathi Shaqaqi Ahmed Yassin
Violence |
Background | 1920 Nebi Musa riots 1921 Jaffa riots 1929 Palestine riots 1929 Hebron massacre 1936–39 Arab revolt 1930s Irgun attacks
1940s–1960s | 1948 Arab–Israeli War 1947–48 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine 1948 war massacres Kafr Qasim massacre Fedayeen insurgency Attacks against Israeli civilians IDF Reprisal operations Qibya massacre Khan Yunis massacre Rafah massacre 1967 Six-Day War War of Attrition 1968 Battle of Karameh
1970s | Palestinian insurgency 1970 Avivim school bus massacre 1972 Isotope 1972 Munich massacre 1972 Wrath of God 1974 Kiryat Shmona massacre 1974 Ma'alot massacre 1975 Savoy Hotel attack 1976 Entebbe 1978 Coastal Road massacre 1978 South Lebanon conflict 1980 Misgav Am attack 1973 Yom Kippur War 1975 Zion Square bombing
1980s | 1982 Lebanon War 1982 Siege of Beirut 1984 Bus 300 affair 1985 Achille Lauro 1985 Wooden Leg 1987 Night of the Gliders
First Intifada | 1987–93 Intifada 1988 Tunis Raid 1989 Bus 405 attack 1993–99 Palestinian suicide attacks 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre
Second Intifada | 2000–05 Al-Aqsa Intifada Palestinian rocket attacks list Palestinian suicide attacks Assassinations during Al-Aqsa Intifada 2000 October 2000 events 2001 Santorini 2002 Karine A Affair 2002 Defensive Shield Battle of Jenin Battle of Nablus 2002 Determined Path 2003 Abu Hasan 2003 Ain es Saheb airstrike 2004 Rainbow Raid on Beit Hanoun Days of Penitence
2000s | 2006 Operation Bringing Home the Goods 2008 Mercaz HaRav shooting 2008 Jerusalem bulldozer attack 2010 Palestinian militancy campaign
Gaza Strip | Gaza–Israel conflict 2006 Gaza beach explosion Gaza cross-border raid Summer Rains Autumn Clouds Beit Hanoun shelling 2008 Breach of the Gaza–Egypt border Hot Winter 2008–2009 Gaza War 2010 Gaza flotilla raid 2012 Returning Echo 2012 Pillar of Defense
Diplomacy |
Topics and events | 1949 Lausanne Conference 1948 Palestinian exodus Arab towns and villages depopulated during the 1948 Palestinian exodus Jewish exodus from Arab countries Israeli settlement Israeli settler violence International law and Israeli settlements 1991 Madrid Conference 1993 Oslo Accords United States security assistance to the Palestinian National Authority 1997 Hebron Agreement 1998 Wye River Memorandum 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum 2000 Camp David Summit 2001 Taba Summit 2003 Road map for peace Quartet on the Middle East 2005 Israel's unilateral disengagement plan 2007 Annapolis Conference 2009 Aftonbladet Israel controversy Valley of Peace initiative Direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians (2010-2011) Palestine Papers
UN involvement | Israel, Palestine, and the United Nations 1947 UN Resolution 181 1948 UN Resolution 194 1967 UN Resolution 242
Arab–Israeli conflict
Participants in the Arab–Israeli conflict
Governments | All-Palestine Egypt Hamas Gaza Iraq Kuwait Israel Jordan Lebanon Palestinian National Authority Saudi Arabia Syria
Active organizations | Abu Nidal Organization Amal al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades Syrian Social Nationalist Party Arab League Arab Liberation Front Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Fatah Guardians of the Cedars Hamas Hezbollah Jaish al-Islam Kataeb Lebanese Forces al-Mourabitoun Muslim Brotherhood Palestinian Islamic Jihad Palestine Liberation Front Palestine Liberation Organization Palestinian Popular Struggle Front Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command Popular Resistance Committees as-Sa'iqa
Formerly active organizations | Arab Higher Committee Arab Liberation Army Black Hand Black September Haganah Holy War Army Irgun (Etzel) Japanese Red Army Lehi Palmach Revolutionary Cells South Lebanon Army
Other governments | Algeria China Cuba France Iran Kuwait Libya Morocco North Korea Norway Pakistan Russia Sudan Tunisia Turkey Uganda United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Venezuela Yemen
Other organizations | European Union United Nations
Former states | Mandatory Palestine Soviet Union United Arab Republic
People involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict
Lester B. Pearson Abd al-Hakim Amer Hosni Mubarak Gamal Abdel Nasser Anwar Sadat Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Ali Khamenei Ruhollah Khomeini Faisal I Saddam Hussein Ehud Barak Menachem Begin David Ben-Gurion Moshe Dayan Levi Eshkol Golda Meir Benjamin Netanyahu Ehud Olmert Shimon Peres Yitzhak Rabin Yitzhak Shamir Ariel Sharon Chaim Weizmann King Abdullah I of Jordan King Abdullah II of Jordan King Hussein of Jordan Émile Lahoud Hassan Nasrallah Fouad Siniora Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Mona Juul Johan Jørgen Holst Terje Rød-Larsen Mahmoud Abbas Yasser Arafat Marwan Barghouti George Habash Ismail Haniyeh Haj Amin al-Husseini Khaled Mashal Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi Ahmad Shukeiri Ahmed Yassin King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia King Fahd of Saudi Arabia King Faisal of Saudi Arabia Folke Bernadotte Hafez al-Assad Bashar al-Assad Shukri al-Quwatli Salah Jadid Ernest Bevin Arthur Balfour Tony Blair Richard Crossman Madeleine Albright Ralph Bunche George H. W. Bush George W. Bush Jimmy Carter Bill Clinton Henry Kissinger Ronald Reagan Condoleezza Rice Dennis Ross Ramadan Shalah Harry S. Truman Cyrus Vance
Arab–Israeli armed engagements
Background | 1920 Battle of Tel Hai 1936–1939 Arab revolt 1944 Operation ATLAS
1947–1949 | 1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine 1948–1949 Arab–Israeli War
1950s | Palestinian Fedayeen attacks and Reprisal operations 1956 Suez Crisis
1960s | 1966 Operation Shredder 1967 Six-Day War 1967–1970 War of Attrition 1968 Battle of Karameh Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon 1968 Operation Gift
1970s | Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon 1970 Shelling on Lebanon 1972 Operation Isotope 1972 Lod Airport massacre 1972 Operation Crate 3 1972 Munich Olympics massacre 1972–1979 Operation Wrath of God 1973 Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114 1974 Ma'alot massacre 1974 Airstrike on Lebanon 1975 Savoy Operation 1976 Operation Entebbe 1978 Coastal Road massacre 1978 Operation Litani 1973 Yom Kippur War
1980s | Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon 1980 Misgav Am hostage crisis 1982 Damour Airstrike 1981 Operation Opera 1982 Lebanon War 1982–2000 South Lebanon conflict 1984 Bus 300 affair 1985 PLO ships bombing 1985 Operation Wooden Leg 1987–1993 First Intifada 1988 Mothers' Bus rescue 1988 Tunis raid
1990s | 1992 Operation Bramble Bush 1993–2008 Palestinian suicide attacks 1993 Operation Accountability 1994 Airstrike on Lebanon 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath
2000s | 2000–2005 Al-Aqsa Intifada (Second Intifada) 2000–2006 Shebaa Farms conflict 2001–present Rocket and mortar attacks on southern Israel 2003 Ain es Saheb airstrike 2006 Operation Bringing Home the Goods 2006 Operation Summer Rains Operation Autumn Clouds 2006 Lebanon War 2007–present Lebanese rocket attacks 2006–present Gaza–Israel conflict 2007–2008 Operation Hot Winter 2008–2009 Gaza War 2007 Operation Orchard
2010s | 2010 Adaisseh skirmish 2010 Palestinian militancy campaign Gaza–Israel conflict 2011 Southern Israel cross-border attacks 2012 Operation Returning Echo 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense
Diplomacy and peace proposals in the Arab–Israeli conflict
Background 1914 Damascus Protocol 1915 McMahon–Hussein Correspondence 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement 1917 Balfour Declaration 1918 Declaration to the Seven 1918 Anglo-French Declaration 1919 Faisal–Weizmann Agreement 1920 San Remo conference 1922 Churchill White Paper 1937 Peel Commission 1939 White Paper 1947 UN Partition Plan 1948 American trusteeship proposal for Palestine 1948 Establishment of Israel
Conflict and peace process 1948 UNGA Resolution 194 1949 Armistice Agreements 1949 Lausanne Conference 1964 Palestinian National Covenant 1967 Khartoum Resolution 1967 UNSC Resolution 242 1973 UNSC Resolution 338 1973 UNSC Resolution 339 1974 Israel-Syria disengagement agreement 1974 UNSC Resolution 350 1978 UNSC Resolution 425 1978 Camp David Accords 1979 UNSC Resolution 446 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty 1979 UNSC Resolution 452 1980 UNSC Resolution 478 1981 UNSC Resolution 497 1983 Israel-Lebanon agreement 1991 Madrid Conference 1993 Oslo Accords 1994 Israel–Jordan Treaty of Peace 1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement 1998 Wye River Memorandum 2000 Camp David Summit 2000 Clinton's Parameters 2001 Taba Summit 2002 Beirut Summit and Peace Initiative 2002 Road map for peace 2003 Geneva Initiative 2004 UNSC Resolution 1559 2004 UNSC Resolution 1566 2005 UNSC Resolution 1583 2005 Sharm el-Sheikh Summit 2005 Israel's unilateral disengagement plan 2005 Agreement Movement and Access 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document 2006 UNSC Resolution 1701 2007 Annapolis Conference 2010 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks 2013 2013 Israel-Palestine peace talks
Olympic Games scandals and controversies
Boycotts | 1936 1956 1964 1976 1980 1984 1988
Alternative competitions | People's Olympiad (1936) Games of the New Emerging Forces (1963) Liberty Bell Classic (1980) Friendship Games (1984) Goodwill Games (1986–2001)
Events | Blood in the Water match (1956) Tlatelolco massacre (1968) Black Power salute (1968) Munich massacre (1972) Basketball Gold Medal Match controversy (1972) Kozakiewicz's gesture (1980) Centennial Olympic Park bombing (1996) Figure skating scandal (2002) 2002 Winter Olympic bid scandal (2002) Underage gymnasts controversy (2008) Death of Nodar Kumritashvili (2010) Quadruple jump controversy (2010) One minute of silence campaign (2012)
List of stripped Olympic medals Doping at the Olympic Games