LionGuard 2: Building Lightweight, Data-Efficient & Localised Multilingual Content Moderators

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Warning: this paper contains references and data that may be offensive.

Abstract

Modern moderation systems increasingly support multiple languages, but often fail to address localisation and low-resource variants - creating safety gaps in real-world deployments. Small models offer a potential alternative to large LLMs, yet still demand considerable data and compute. We present LionGuard 2, a lightweight, multilingual moderation classifier tailored to the Singapore context, supporting English, Chinese, Malay, and partial Tamil. Built on pre-trained OpenAI embeddings and a multi-head ordinal classifier, LionGuard 2 outperforms several commercial and open-source systems across 17 benchmarks, including both Singapore-specific and public English datasets. The system is actively deployed within the Singapore Government, demonstrating practical efficacy at scale. Our findings show that high-quality local data and robust multilingual embeddings can achieve strong moderation performance, without fine-tuning large models. We release our model weights[1] and part of our training data[2] to support future work on LLM safety.

1 Introduction

As AI systems are increasingly deployed across diverse linguistic communities, moderation systems[3] are evolving to offer broader multilingual support (OpenAI, 2024; Meta, 2025). However, their effectiveness in localised, low-resource, or code-mixed settings remains limited, leaving critical safety gaps. For instance, multilingual adversarial prompts have been shown to bypass robust filters (Yong et al., 2024; Shen et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2024). Singapore exemplifies the challenge:

Figure 1: Example of code-mixed Singlish combining English, Chinese, and Malay.

everyday discourse blends English, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil in code-mixed forms like Singlish, featuring local slang, abbreviations, and dialectal variants (Figure 1) (Foo and Ng, 2024). Moderation systems that ignore such linguistic nuance risk degraded performance and exploitation in real-world deployments.

In this work, we present LionGuard 2, a lightweight, data-efficient moderation classifier tailored to Singapore's multilingual context. Unlike large LLM-based guardrails (Inan et al., 2023), LionGuard 2 uses pre-trained multilingual embeddings and a compact classifier head to achieve fast, scalable deployment with minimal compute and training data. This upgrade over our prior system, LionGuard 1 (Foo and Khoo, 2025), includes: (i) a richer risk taxonomy with severity levels, (ii) improved robustness to noisy and code-mixed input, and (iii) multilingual support across English, Chinese, Malay, and partial Tamil. LionGuard 2 can be retrained in under two minutes, runs on CPUs, and integrates easily into production workflows. We benchmark LionGuard 2 across 17 datasets, spanning both Singapore-localised and public English testbeds, and find that it outperforms both commercial and open-source moderation systems in F1 score.

Our contributions are threefold: (i) We present LionGuard 2 as a case study for building practi-

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[1]https://huggingface.co/govtech/lionguard-2

[2]https://huggingface.co/datasets/govtech/lionguard-2-synthetic-instruct

[3]We use the terms "moderation system", "moderation classifier", and "guardrail" interchangeably to refer to text filters that assess content safety.

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cal, localised moderation systems under resource constraints. (ii) We share empirical insights from model architecture choices, data curation strategies, and comparative evaluations. (iii) We release the classifier weights and a portion of our training data to support future research in LLM safety.

2 Related Work

2.1 Multilingual Content Moderation

Detecting hateful content in multilingual environment is widely studied in recent years (Haber et al., 2023; Hee et al., 2024b; Lee et al., 2024; Hee et al., 2024a). While commercial moderation APIs offer multilingual support, their efficacy on low-resource or code-mixed languages is often unclear. Open-source models such as LlamaGuard (Meta, 2024b, 2025), DuoGuard (Deng et al., 2025), and PolyGuard (Kumar et al., 2025) provide broader coverage, but do not address cultural localisation, limiting their robustness in real-world multilingual environments (Ng and Carley, 2025).

Recent benchmarks (Ng et al., 2024; Gupta et al., 2024; Chua et al., 2025) address this gap by evaluating models on Singapore-specific, code-mixed input. Our earlier system, LionGuard 1 (Foo and Khoo, 2025), showed that a multilingual embedding-based classifier can outperform LLM-based solutions on such tasks. However, it used a coarser risk taxonomy and lacked partial Tamil coverage. In this work, we present LionGuard 2, which improves performance on local and general benchmarks, introduces severity-aware ordinal heads, and extends multilingual robustness while maintaining a lightweight architecture.

2.2 Small, Inference-Efficient Guardrails

Recent work has trended toward smaller moderation classifiers. For example, LlamaGuard 3 (1B) (Fedorov et al., 2024) and ShieldGemma (2B) (Zeng et al., 2024) exemplify compact models designed for efficient inference. Other open-source efforts (Kumar et al., 2025; Deng et al., 2025) also fine-tune small 0.5B and 2.5B models. However, training these models is costly, requiring large labeled datasets (often over a million examples) and substantial compute. This discourages efforts to customise guardrails for local safety contexts and ultimately limits adoption of safe AI deployments.

Conversely, embedding-based methods offer a complementary path. Systems can effectively achieve strong performance with pre-trained embeddings in retrieval and classification tasks (Enevoldsen et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2024; Sturua et al., 2024), and are even available in specialised domains (Tang and Yang, 2025; VoyageAI, 2024), proving its practicality.



Figure 2: Example of LionGuard 2 working as a bidirectional filter around an LLM Chatbot.

3 System Overview

LionGuard 2 is designed as a lightweight moderation system for any text content. Figure 2 illustrates an example of its role as both an **input filter** (screening user prompts) and an **output filter** (verifying model responses) before the text reaches the language model or end users respectively. LionGuard 2 can also be used in AI application safety testing, to detect if application responses contain unsafe elements.

Figure 7 demonstrates LionGuard 2 acting as an chatbot guardrail. In this example, Singapore-specific acronyms and slang are used to elicit unsafe content from the LLM. LionGuard 2 flags localised unsafe content that bypasses both the LLM's internal safety alignment and commercial moderation classifiers (i.e. OpenAI Moderation).

Real World Deployment. LionGuard 2 replaces its predecessor and is deployed on the Singapore Government's *AI Guardian* platform (GovTech Singapore, 2025b) as a safety module for any text-centric service requiring localised safeguards. Developers can easily apply LionGuard within the standard Chat Completions API request (GovTech Singapore, 2025a).

Running synchronously on a single CPU, the embedding call handles ≈ 250 tokens s^{-1}, while the classifier head itself processes $\approx 1.5 \times 10^4$ tokens s^{-1}, giving an end-to-end throughput of ≈ 300 tokens s^{-1}. As most latency comes from the embedding call, batching or caching embeddings can raise throughput well beyond these figures.

Through the AI Guardian platform, we plan to establish an end-to-end MLOps pipeline to continuously monitor performance and adapt the model

to evolving local requirements through retraining and benchmarking of new embeddings.

4 Methodology



Figure 3: The LIONGUARD 2 methodology. We consolidate and process multiple data sources, apply semi-supervised labeling with human-aligned LLMs, and train a lightweight classifier on embeddings from a carefully chosen model.

4.1 Data Curation

4.1.1 Safety Taxonomy

Every content-moderation system defines its own harm categories, and we adopt the two-level taxonomy in Appendix B, originally proposed by Goh et al. (2025) and adopted in Chua et al. (2025) for the Singapore context. While this taxonomy is customised to our organisational needs, each label can be mapped to other major frameworks by MLCommons (Vidgen et al., 2024a), OpenAI (OpenAI, 2024), and the major cloud providers (Azure; AWS, 2025). All subsequent LIONGUARD 2 design choices are aligned with this internal and localised taxonomy.

We encourage practitioners adopting similar methodologies to begin their projects with a comprehensive, effective taxonomy that matches their real-world use case.

4.1.2 Data Sources.

Our goal is to curate a small yet rich set of texts that reflects Singaporean discourse. We first combined three data sources:

1. **Local comments.** We extract texts from Singaporean forums and subreddits, previously described in Foo and Khoo (2025).

2. **Synthetic queries.** To broaden style coverage, each local comment was rewritten by `gpt-4o-mini` into a chatbot query, then verified and refined using self-reflection and chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. (see prompt in Appendix C.1). Figure 4 illustrates an example of an transformed comment.

3. **Open-source english data.** Open-source english datasets containing text relevant to our safety taxonomy were added (See Appendix C.2). Some datasets were eventually excluded after ablation revealed binary F_1 loss of as much as 30%.



Figure 4: Example of a synthetically augmented Singaporean comment.

Initial experiments also included using `gpt-4o-mini` to translate local comments into Malay and Tamil; however, these variants lowered downstream F_1 and were removed (Appendix C.3). From our manual review, we hypothesise that the LLM struggles to translate toxic content across languages, either losing toxicity or failing to fully grasp the context. Notably, our final corpus contains no machine-translated Chinese, Malay or Tamil, and all non-English text appear only in naturally code-mixed Singlish.

4.1.3 Automated Labelling with Human Supervision

To mimic low-resource constraints, we employ LLMs to annotate the training examples, but employ statistical methods to ensure as much alignment as possible with human labellers. We begin with a panel of six humans and six LLMs

Embeddings	Test	RabakBench			
		SS	ZH	MS	TA
`text-embedding-3-large` $3,072_d$ (OpenAI, 2025)	**77.0**	**88.1**	**87.8**	**78.4**	**66.6**
`cohere-embed-multilingual-v3.0` $1,024_d$ (Cohere, 2025a)	72.9	64.2	67.9	60.9	56.4
`cohere-embed-v4.0` $1,536_d$ (Cohere, 2025b)	69.0	61.1	66.2	38.9	3.8
`BGE-M3` $1,024_d$ (Chen et al., 2024)	63.2	51.9	65.1	60.6	51.0
`snowflake-arctic-embed-l-v2.0` $1,024_d$ (Yu et al., 2024)	64.3	44.6	55.0	45.4	41.7
`Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B` $1,024_d$ (Zhang et al., 2025)	87.2	61.4	67.9	60.9	56.4

Table 1: Binary F_1 when swapping sentence encoders.

[4]. Through the **Alt-Test methodology** (Calderon et al., 2025), we identified `Gemini 2.0 Flash`, `o3-mini-low`, and `Claude 3.5 Haiku` to be best aligned with our six human annotators, and labeled every example in our dataset with these three selected models (system prompt in Appendix C.5).

4.1.4 Data Filtering.

A five-stage funnel data (Figure 3) pipeline was used in data curation, systematically adjusting parameters (Appendix C.6) at each stage.

Resulting Corpus. The final training set contained **26,207** unique texts: 20,333 online comments, 2,098 synthetically augmented comments, and 3,776 texts from open-source English datasets. The test set contained 6,249 raw comments and 7,058 synthetic comments.[5] Our training set is significantly smaller than that of other methods that fine-tune decoder-based models for content moderation, and is also **70% smaller than what was used for LionGuard 1**.

4.2 Architecture

4.2.1 Selecting Domain-Specific Embeddings

Embedding choice is critical as it defines the representation space on which all downstream moderation classifier layers operate. We selected six multilingual open- and closed-source text embedding models and trained the same multi-head classifier on each set of embeddings.

Selection Outcome. Results on our different hold out sets (Table 1) show that

[4] `o3-mini-low` (OpenAI, 2025), `Gemini 2.0 Flash` (Google, 2025), `Claude 3.5 Haiku` (Anthropic, 2024), `Llama 3.3 70B` (Meta, 2024a), `Mistral Small 3` (Mistral, 2025), and `AWS Nova Lite` (Amazon, 2024)

[5] In this study, we did not adopt the original train-test split from (Foo and Khoo, 2025), and instead used a time-series based split.

Model	Test	RB_{SS}	hw/time
OpenAI embeddings + 6 heads	**82.9**	85.8	CPU/60s
LlamaGuard-3-8B + LoRA	82.1	**89.8**	A100 40GB/16h
arctic-embed-l-v2.0 + 6 heads	74.1	67.3	T4 16GB/3h

Table 2: Binary F_1 for fine-tuned model variants, on our test set and RabakBench (Singlish); full configs in Appendix D.2.

`text-embedding-3-large` achieved the highest binary F_1, scoring as much as 20% above the next-best model. We note that as embedding performance varies by domain, these rankings may not generalise and practitioners should replicate this comparison on their own data.

4.2.2 Training a Lightweight Classifier

The pre-trained embeddings are frozen and fed into a trainable multi-head network (Figure 8).

Early fine-tuning baselines Before settling on our approach, a pilot test on the Singlish subset (31k sentences) showed that fine-tuning larger models did not offer a better result (Table 2). LionGuard 2 matches the performance of the fine-tuned `LlamaGuard-3-8B` and `Arctic-Embed-2.0` while retraining at a much lower cost, making it a compute-efficient choice with minimal data for MLOps and deployment scenarios.

Ordinal heads for Level-2 harms. To capture the severity levels in our taxonomy, where breaching Level 2 (e.g., hate speech) would imply breaching Level 1 (e.g., discriminatory statements), the classification heads have a two-output design:

$$
\begin{aligned}
(p_1,\, p_2) &= \sigma\big(\mathrm{Dense}_2(\mathbf{h})\big), && (1)\\
p_1 &= P(y_c > 0) && \text{(Level 1)}\\
p_2 &= P(y_c > 1) && \text{(Level 2)}\\
\text{subject to} \quad & 0 \le p_2 \le p_1 \le 1.
\end{aligned}
$$

In addition to the six category heads (one per risk category), we attached a single binary head (*safe/unsafe*) as we found it to consistently boost overall F1. All heads are trained jointly with `binary cross-entropy` loss with equal weights. We detail the training setup in Appendix D.3. The resulting classifier contains 0.85M parameters and occupies only 3.2 MB on disk.

Moderator	Test	RabakBench				SGHateCheck				SGToxic Guard			
		SS	MS	ZH	TA	SS	MS	ZH	TA	SS	MS	ZH	TA
LionGuard 2	**77.0**	**88.1**	**87.8**	**78.4**	66.6	**98.8**	**92.1**	**97.4**	64.5	**99.7**	**98.2**	**99.2**	71.5
LionGuard 1.1	53.7	58.4	57.1	70.7	69.1	45.5	37.4	22.9	17.4	24.2	10.7	9.6	7.4
OpenAI Moderation	54.7	64.0	69.7	66.1	7.4	89.6	70.4	80.3	3.8	77.3	43.9	57.8	1.3
AWS Bedrock Guardrails	57.1	69.6	–	21.1	–	82.2	–	40.6	–	91.5	–	74.2	–
Azure AI Content Safety	53.8	66.0	67.0	66.2	48.7	76.8	67.9	68.4	**75.3**	69.5	54.3	63.2	30.1
Google Cloud Model Armor	36.8	62.5	68.3	74.0	**73.4**	81.8	74.0	89.3	63.5	83.3	82.8	88.8	71.9
LlamaGuard 3 8B	27.1	55.2	53.6	53.1	47.3	85.9	79.1	80.1	72.1	94.7	90.8	92.0	**87.6**
LlamaGuard 4 12B	26.5	60.6	54.6	65.2	73.0	68.8	57.4	63.9	58.8	78.6	74.3	77.0	77.9

Table 3: Binary F_1 scores on Singapore-localised benchmarks. The best results for each dataset are bold. (–) indicates that the model does not support that language.

Moderator	BT	SRY-B	OAI	SST
LionGuard 2	73.7	**73.7**	70.5	**100.0**
LionGuard 1	35.0	31.6	55.8	34.7
OpenAI Mod	65.4	45.3	77.1	81.0
AWS Bedrock	**76.4**	50.7	77.4	84.4
Azure C. Safety	54.6	44.7	70.6	59.3
GCP Model Armor	51.3	42.7	74.8	46.3
LlamaGuard 3 8B	68.2	62.5	**82.2**	87.6
LlamaGuard 4 12B	67.0	58.7	77.5	98.0

Table 4: Binary F_1 scores on general English benchmarks - BeaverTails (BT), SORRY-Bench (SRY-B), OpenAI Moderation (OAI) and SimpleSafetyTests (SST). SST and SRY-B contain only unsafe prompts and thus the reported F_1 reflects recall.

5 Evaluation

5.1 Performance on 17 Benchmarks.

We compare LionGuard 2 against six moderation systems (OpenAI, 2024; AWS, 2025; Azure; GCP, 2025; Meta, 2024b, 2025) plus LionGuard 1 (Foo and Khoo, 2025) on 1 internal test set and **16 public benchmarks**, including 13 localised datasets from Chua et al. (2025); Ng et al. (2024) and 4 general English datasets from Ji et al. (2023); Xie et al. (2025); Markov et al. (2023); Vidgen et al. (2024b).

Following prior moderation work (Chi et al., 2024; Han et al., 2024), we report **binary** F_1 at a 0.5 threshold. For LionGuard 2, the score is taken from its dedicated *safe/unsafe* head and for the baselines, we treat the output as unsafe if *any* harm category exceeds the threshold.

As taxonomy categories differ across moderation systems and datasets, we aligned every label set to the six harms in Appendix B, and predictions for categories outside of these harms are not counted (e.g., *Personal Identifiable Information*, *Medical Advice*). Complete mappings are provided in Appendix E.

Results. Table 3 reports binary F_1 across all benchmarks. **LionGuard 2 obtains the highest scores on Singlish, Chinese, and Malay, with margins of 8-25% over the next-best model**, and is comparable to much larger LLM-based systems on the four English datasets. These findings show that a lightweight, embedding-based classifier, when paired with language-aware data curation, can outperform larger models on both localised and general safety domains.

Category breakdown. Full per-category results are listed in Appendix E.3. Absolute scores for all seven moderation systems range from 30-70 %, reflecting the intrinsic difficulty of fine-grained safety labels. While no single moderator dominates every category, LionGuard 2 generally performs better than or is comparable to the other moderation systems.

5.2 Robustness.

Practical moderation systems must handle noisy user input. We build a "noisy" variant of RabakBench by duplicating each text five times and injecting random character-level edits (casing flips, punctuation, misspellings). The results in Table 5 show that LionGuard 2 marginal 1.5% binary F_1 drop, effectively displaying tolerance to noise.

Moderator	RB_{SS}	RB_{SS_noise}
LionGuard 2	87.1	85.6
LionGuard 1	58.4	64.2
OpenAI Mod	64.0	52.2

Table 5: Binary F_1 on RabakBench Singlish with and without injected noise. LionGuard 2 remains robust, dropping only 1.5%.

5.3 Red-Teaming by Native Speakers

Employing native annotators, we curated a multilingual test set of 391 cases and benchmarked LIONGUARD 2 against five other safety models (see Figure 5 for examples and Appendix E.2 for further details). LIONGUARD 2 surpasses its nearest competitor by 2.4% in Chinese F_1 and 8.3% in Malay F_1. However, its Tamil performance remains moderate, highlighting an area for future improvement.



Figure 5: Examples from the red-teaming process

6 Key Insights

The observations gathered from our work are specific to LIONGUARD 2 and whether the same holds for other domains remains open. However, we hope this may guide future work with similar methodologies or resource constraints.

6.1 Localised data matters most

On the same architecture, training on authentic Singaporean comments alone achieved an average F_1 of 80.3%, whilst training on public English datasets alone achieved 45.3%. The combination bumped up results to an average F_1 of 81.5%, suggesting that localised data was the key contributor to the results.

6.2 Small models can outperform large models

In our fine-tuning experiments (Table 2), `LlamaGuard-3-8B` achieves similar test set performance and scores only 3% higher binary F_1 than LIONGUARD 2 on RabakBench. For focused moderation tasks, the LIONGUARD 2 provides an efficient alternative to large decoder models.

6.3 Embedding choice is decisive

OpenAI's `text embedding-3-large` achieved the best F1 despite showing a similar or lower multilingual cosine alignment than `cohere-embed-multilingual-v3.0` and `BGE-M3` (Appendix D.1). We conjecture the larger dimensionality captures fine-grained semantic cues critical to multi-label moderation while still generalising across languages. The embedding model also enabled **cross-lingual generalisation without translation** since our training data contained little to no Chinese/Malay/Tamil-only examples. Our results therefore highlight a potential cost-effective solution for low-resource settings.

7 Limitations.

7.1 Reliance on closed-source embeddings

LionGuard 2 inherits its representations from OpenAI's `text-embedding-3-large`. Any future update to this embedding model would require may re-training and benchmarking. Developers who need strict reproducibility or backwards compatible may prefer open-source options (see Table 1).

7.2 Misalignment between binary and category labels

About 4% of examples aggregated across two localised and three general datasets show disagreement between the binary head and category heads (Appendix E.1). Although deriving the binary decision as *max*(CATEGORY-SCORES) removes the mismatch, we keep the dedicated binary head as it boosts performance, and developers often only require a single "safe"/"unsafe" flag. We plan to explore joint calibration or add training constraints to reduce these inconsistencies.

7.3 Lower performance for Tamil

All tested embedding models (including Tamil-centric `sarvam-m`) underperformed on Tamil, and adding LLM-translated Tamil data worsened results (Appendix C.3). Future improvements in this area will include sourcing quality Tamil-translated samples and exploring separate tokenisation methods.

8 Conclusion

LIONGUARD 2 is currently deployed across internal Singapore Government systems, validating that a lightweight classifier, built on strong multilingual embeddings and curated local data, can

deliver robust performance in both localised and general moderation tasks. Our findings reinforce three key takeaways: (i) high-quality, culturally relevant data is more valuable than large volumes of generic data; (ii) selecting the right multilingual encoder matters more than increasing model size; and (iii) compact guardrails are not only effective, but practical for real-world deployment. By releasing our model weights and training data subset, we aim to support broader adoption of localisation-aware moderation strategies, especially in low-resource or code-mixed settings. We hope this work serves as a blueprint for building efficient, multilingual safety systems that are both scalable and grounded in local context.

Ethical Considerations

Potential Harms

While LIONGUARD 2 demonstrates effective performance in moderating localised unsafe content, we acknowledge that the system is not foolproof. Performance gaps remain across evaluation benchmarks, and the inherently subjective nature of unsafe content classification means our solution cannot guarantee universal applicability across all users and contexts. Given this limitation, we recommend combining LIONGUARD 2 with human oversight in high-stakes settings. Users should be aware of potential system failures and underperformance, particularly when dealing with edge cases or evolving harmful content patterns that may not be well-represented in our training data. Notably, however, unlike instruction-tuned decoder models repurposed for classification, our architecture provides controlled, interpretable outputs that reduce the risk of generating harmful content, which is a safety advantage over generative approaches to content moderation.

We also note that the system may be vulnerable to exploitation, potentially amplifying harm when in the hands of malicious actors. However, we contend that the benefits of deploying such a system substantially outweigh the risks of not having localised moderation capabilities. In fact, we release LIONGUARD 2, an updated version of LIONGUARD in this paper because we recognise the potential misuse and urgency of updating our safety systems to address evolving threats in Singapore's multilingual digital environment. LIONGUARD 2 enables rapid safety testing and localised harm tracking that that allow for easy monitoring and intervention.

Responsible Deployment and Access Controls

Our model weights are published on Hugging Face exclusively for research and public interest purposes only, with clear usage guidelines that prohibit deployment for harmful applications. For operational deployment within the Singapore Government's AI Guardian platform, we restrict API access to internal government applications and maintain comprehensive monitoring systems to track usage patterns and identify potential abuse. While we release synthetic training data to support reproducibility, our complete training dataset remains private due to user privacy considerations and copyright restrictions.

Risk of Unintended Bias

We recognise the risk of unintended bias in our multilingual moderation system. To address this concern, we conducted several performance evaluations across each supported language group (English, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil) to identify potential disparities in classification accuracy. However, we acknowledge that data volume imbalances may introduce systematic biases, and more underrepresented linguistic communities within Singapore remain inadequately covered in our current model.

Commitment to Ongoing Improvement

We commit to continuous monitoring of LIONGUARD 2's real-world performance and actively invite community feedback to identify areas of improvement. Our development roadmap includes evolving the model to address emerging harmful content patterns and incorporate lessons learned from deployment experience.

9 Acknowledgments

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A LionGuard 2 as a chatbot guardrail

Figure 6 and Figure 7 demonstrates LionGuard 2 working as a localised content moderator.

B Taxonomy

Category	Level 1	Level 2
	⟶ *increasing severity*	
Hateful	Discriminatory	Hate Speech
Sexual	Not for minors	Not for all ages
Self-Harm	Ideation	Action/Suicide
Insults	*no severity level breakdown*	
Violence	*no severity level breakdown*	
Misconduct	Not socially acceptable	Illegal

Table 6: **Safety Taxonomy**: A text can belong to multiple categories, or none. Severity levels are available for certain categories.

C Data

C.1 Prompt template for synthetic queries

Refer to the system prompt in Figure 9.

C.2 English datasets used in experiments

Table 7 lists the English datasets we evaluated during data-selection iterations. Data was re-labelled by `Gemini 2.0 Flash`. "Used" sets were retained in the final 26k corpus; "Dropped" sets hurt test performance for our task.

Dataset	Status	Brief description
WildGuardTrain (Han et al., 2024)	Used	86,759 safety prompts/responses (87% synthetic, 11% real, 2% annotated).
Reddit Suicide Detection[6]	Used	18,265 Reddit posts from `r/SuicideWatch`, `r/depression`, and `r/teenagers`.
PH titles[7]	Used	1M adult-site video titles.
Aegis 2.0 (Ghosh et al., 2024)	Dropped	33,416 human-LLM interactions across 14 harms.
Aya Red-teaming[8]	Dropped	Adversarial prompts in 8 languages.
HateXplain (Mathew et al., 2022)	Dropped	25,000 English comments: hate, offensive, neutral. Only target groups relevant to Singapore used for experiments.

Table 7: English datasets used during data curation.

C.3 Experiments with LLM-translated data

To test whether synthetic Malay/Tamil data could close the low-resource gap, we translated the Singlish corpus with `gpt-4o-mini` and ran the following training variants.

Training variant	RB_{TA}	$SGHC_{TA}$	$SGTG_{TA}$
LionGuard 2	**66.5**	**64.5**	**71.5**
SS-only	50.9	45.6	30.0
SS+MS+TA	23.1	36.5	23.1
TA-only	21.2	21.3	9.2

Table 8: Binary F_1 on Tamil splits when adding machine-translated data. Variants: **Baseline (final LG2)** - 85% Singlish, 15% English; **SS-only** - Singlish data; **SS+MS+TA** - Singlish, Malay, and Tamil translated data; and **TA-only** Tamil translated data.

Adding machine-translated Malay and Tamil samples *degraded* performance on every Tamil benchmark (Table 8). Purely translation-based training (TA-only) performs worst, confirming that cross-lingual transfer from authentic Singlish data is more reliable than potentially noisy automatic translation for our task.

[8] https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/nikhileswarkomati/suicide-watch

[8] https://huggingface.co/datasets/Nikity/Pornhub

[8] https://huggingface.co/datasets/CohereLabs/aya_redteaming



Figure 6: LIONGUARD 2 assigns an unsafe localised comment to the appropriate category in our taxonomy.



Figure 7: Example localised unsafe inputs that slip past `GPT-4.1 nano` (left) and `GPT-4.1 nano + OpenAI Moderation` (middle) but are flagged by LIONGUARD 2 (right).



Figure 8: Model architecture

Prompt

```
You are to transform raw text from an online Singapore web form (which may be safe or unsafe) into realistic
queries/commands for a chatbot or LLM, while keeping the original safety attributes.

**Rules:**
- **Safe input:** Output must remain safe.
- **Unsafe input:** Output must preserve any harmful, toxic, or explicit elements.

**Safety Categories:**
1. **Hateful:** Discriminatory or hate speech against protected groups.
2. **Insults:** Demeaning personal attacks.
3. **Sexual:** References to sexual content (mild or explicit).
4. **Physical Violence:** Threats or glorification of harm.
5. **Self Harm:** Content promoting or depicting self-harm/suicide.
6. **Illegal/Misconduct:** Guidance on unethical, criminal, or harmful activities.

**Transformation Guidelines:**
- Retain the original tone, style, topic, and intent.
- Reformat the input into a natural question or command.
- Localize language to sound Singaporean and use local terms

**Examples:**
- *Raw:* your advice is garbage
  *Query:* how I scold my colleague for his trash advice?
- *Raw:* that chio bu is very sexy
  *Query:* where to find sexy chio bu?
- *Raw:* I need to figure out how to make a bomb
  *Query:* how can I assemble a bomb, can help or not?
- *Raw:* what are the best places to eat in Singapore?
  *Query:* where can I find the best makan spots in Singapore, leh?

Think step by step.
```

Figure 9: The system prompt used with `gpt-4o-mini` to augment raw texts from (Foo and Khoo, 2025).

C.4 Results from Alt-Test



Figure 10: Results from Alt-Test across different multi-label classification metrics, where we identify `Gemini 2.0 Flash`, `o3-mini-low`, and `Claude 3.5 Haiku` to best align with our human labellers. Refer to (Chua et al., 2025) for more details.

C.5 Prompt Template for data labeling

Refer to the system prompt in Box C.5 at the bottom of the paper.

C.6 Data Filtering Details

Balancing ratio of Local–English data. Experiments showed that an 85 : 15 mix maximises binary F_1 across benckmarks.

LLM voting. Data without consensus LLM votes are discarded as it yielded better results than majority voting (with or without adding the vote percentage as a training weight).

Category re-balancing. Majority of the harms were systematically down-sampled to ensure a more equal distribution of the six major harm categories in the training dataset (Figure 11).

Negative down-sampling. Safe texts were randomly down-sampled to improve recall on held-out data, and the final set maintains a 87 : 13 Safe/Unsafe mix.

Near-duplicate removal. Using OpenAI's `text-embedding-3-large`, we run k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) and deduplicate pairs above the 95$^{\text{th}}$ percentile cosine similarity (Figure 12).

The final dataset consists of 26,207 unique texts (breakdown in Table 9).

Source	# texts	Comp (%)
Local online forums	20,333	77.6
wildguardtrain	2,558	9.8
Synthetic Prompts	2,098	8.0
Reddit Suicide Watch	924	3.5
PH_titles	294	1.1
Total	26,207	100.0

Table 9: Breakdown of data sources in final training dataset.



Figure 11: The Left chart (Before) shows the distribution of categories of all datasets combined, and the Right chart (After) shows the category breakdown of our final training data.



Figure 12: Deduplication of near-duplicates.

D Architecture experiments

D.1 Multilingual similarity of embedding models

To gauge cross-lingual alignment, we embed English sentences from RabakBench and their LLM translations into Chinese (ZH), Malay (MS), and Tamil (TA). Table 10 reports the average English-L_2 cosine similarity for six candidate encoders.

Model	EN ↔ MS	EN ↔ TA	EN ↔ ZH
text-embedding-3-large	0.749	0.325	0.719
embed-multilingual-v3.0	0.809	0.696	0.740
embed-v4.0	0.645	0.351	0.661
bge-m3	0.797	0.641	0.692
arctic-embed-l-v2.0	0.849	0.739	0.759
Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B	0.683	0.534	0.733

Table 10: Comparison of multilingual embedding performance between English and Malay (MS), Tamil (TA), and Chinese (ZH).

OpenAI's `text-embedding-3-large` shows weaker alignment to Malay and Tamil than `Cohere m-v3.0` and `BGE-M3`, yet still delivers the top task performance across our multilingual benchmarks. This suggests that `text-embedding-3-large` may trade off raw cross-lingual cosine alignment to capture task-specific features more effectively. In other words, even if English and Malay/Tamil sentences are not close together in the multilingual embedding space, they may cluster well in the task-specific space.

D.2 Early fine-tuning baselines

We set the following training parameters for the fine-tuning experiments:

LoRA-tuned `LlamaGuard-3-8B` - LoRA rank 8, $\alpha = 16$, bf16, batch 1, 2 epochs, lr 2×10^{-5}; on a single NVIDIA A100 40 GB

Fine-tuned `snowflake-arctic-embed-l-v2.0` - batch 3, 5 epochs, lr 1×10^{-5}; on a AWS `ml.g4dn.xlarge` (1 × NVIDIA T4 16 GB).

D.3 Training Setup

Hardware. The LionGuard 2 classifier is trained CPU-only. Experiments that required hosting or fine-tuning large decoder models ran on either a single `AWS g4dn.xlarge 16GB` GPU instance or a single `NVIDIA A100 40 GB` GPU.

Training parameters. Adam optimiser (lr = 1×10^{-4}), batch 64, 10 epochs with early stopping (patience 3), dropout 0.2 in the two shared dense layers.

E Evaluation

E.1 Misalignment between binary and category labels.

The limitation of training a separate binary head is that there may be inconsistencies between the binary head and the category heads. Table 11 reports, for five benchmarks, the share of samples

where the binary head and the category heads disagree. *Over-predict* means the binary head flags *unsafe* while all categories remain below threshold; *under-predict* is the opposite.

Benchmark	Over-predict (%)	Under-predict (%)	# samples
RabakBench (SS)	9.99	0.60	1 341
SGHateCheck (SS)	4.60	0.15	2 716
BeaverTails 330k (test)	4.08	0.78	31 248
SORRY-Bench	3.19	0.53	6 090
OAI Moderation Eval	4.52	0.77	1 680
Overall average	**4.19**	**0.70**	43 075

Table 11: Misalignment between the binary head and category heads.

The binary head over-flags in only 4 % of cases and under-flags in <1 %, making the mismatch *conservative* - no harmful text escapes moderation. We keep the binary head despite these findings as it boosts the category F_1 scores, and we plan to explore joint calibration or adding training constraints to reduce these inconsistencies in future iterations.

E.2 Red-Teaming by Native Speakers

We recruited native speakers for each language (Chinese, Malay, and Tamil) to handcraft 391 test cases to test LIONGUARD 2. The procedure consisted of four stages:

Stage 1: Brainstorming. Annotators were briefed on the guardrail's objectives and asked to craft at least 30 test cases in their assigned language. We highlighted balancing a mix of near-miss toxic examples (expected to be blocked) and borderline safe examples (expected to pass). Code-mixing with slang, place names, personal names, technical terms, and other realistic elements was permitted.

Stage 2: Guideline Tagging. Each case was annotated according to our safety taxonomy. Annotators applied every relevant category, marking sublevels with "1" or "2" and non-applicable categories with "0." Multi-label tagging was allowed to capture overlapping risk factors.

Stage 3: Test-Set Expansion. To ensure full and balanced coverage of every category and sublevel, annotators supplemented the test set to include at least five cases per label. They were encouraged to devise **"tricky" examples**, such as benign requests containing dangerous keywords, leet or substituted characters, prompt-injection or role-playing scenarios, and context-dependent queries, to rigorously stress-test the classifier.

Stage 4: Model Evaluation. Each annotated case was executed against the live guardrail model. Annotators recorded whether the case passed or failed, and for each failure they noted the specific category flagged.

The final test set comprises 391 cases across all languages (see Table 12 and Figure 13 for details).

Label	Chinese	Malay	Tamil
Safe Cases	19	27	36
Unsafe Cases	98	139	72
Total	117	166	108

Table 12: Number of safe and unsafe test cases by language.



Figure 13: Counts of level 1 and 2 annotations for each content category across the Chinese (CHN), Malay (MAL) and Tamil (TAM) test sets.

We evaluated six safety guardrail models on the multilingual test set (Table 13), reporting both accuracy on the binary safe/unsafe decision and a weighted F1 score to correct for class imbalance.

LIONGUARD 2 clearly leads in Chinese and Malay, significantly outperforming other systems. This advantage stems from its targeted training on Singapore-contextualised, near-miss toxic examples that tend to confuse other guardrails. On Tamil, LIONGUARD 2 achieves moderate performance, ranking in the middle of the evaluated models, which is a reflection of its relatively limited Tamil data. Consequently, its overall metrics (70.6% accuracy, 72.7% F1) fall just behind Azure AI Content Safety((Azure)) (72.6% accuracy, 74.2% F1). Given LIONGUARD 2's lightweight architecture, however, these results demonstrate a compelling balance between model efficiency and robust multilingual safety filtering.

Model	Chinese		Malay		Tamil		Overall	
	Acc.	F1	Acc.	F1	Acc.	F1	Acc.	F1
LIONGUARD 2	**85.5**	**85.0**	**79.5**	**81.4**	40.7	41.1	70.6	72.7
AWS Bedrock Guardrails	22.2	17.1	30.7	32.1	35.2	25.7	29.4	25.7
Azure AI Content Safety	81.2	82.6	70.5	73.1	**66.7**	25.7	**72.6**	**74.2**
GCP Model Armor	59.8	65.1	65.7	69.5	62.0	**62.9**	62.9	66.1
OpenAI Moderation API	53.8	58.8	39.8	44.5	36.1	22.4	43.0	44.4
LlamaGuard 4 12B	44.4	48.2	53.6	59.5	57.4	58.6	51.9	56.0

Table 13: Accuracy and Weighted F1 (in %) by language and overall for each safety model.

E.3 Breakdown of category F1 scores on selected benchmarks.

Refer to Table 14, Table 15, and Table 16 for detailed F_1 scores for each category.

E.4 Inter-Taxonomy Mappings (Models)

Refer to Table 17.

E.5 Inter-Taxonomy Mappings (Benchmarks)

Refer to Table 18.

Model	Hateful		Insults	Sexual		Violence	Self Harm		Misconduct	
	L1	L2		L1	L2		L1	L2	L1	L2
LIONGUARD 2	72.6	-	56.1	77.2	48.8	40.0	58.9	-	45.9	59.1
AWS Bedrock Guardrails	71.2	39.1	29.8	-	59.7	56.5	27.2	24.6	-	47.5
Azure AI Content Safety	24.5	61.2	44.1	38.6	39.7	-	-	65.7	-	-
GCP Model Armor	56.1	33.4	40.7	-	51.0	-	-	-	21.9	30.2
OpenAI Moderation API	43.0	19.6	50.5	-	44.4	57.7	61.4	51.1	-	26.0
LlamaGuard 4 12B	50.1	34.5	3.0	-	50.0	25.6	55.1	59.7	4.7	49.7

Table 14: Per-category F1 (in %) on RabakBench. "-" marks unsupported or zero-positive categories.

Model	Hateful		Insults	Sexual		Violence	Self Harm		Misconduct	
	L1	L2		L1	L2		L1	L2	L1	L2
LIONGUARD 2	39.5	-	41.0	52.7	44.6	21.6	50.8	-	54.1	61.2
AWS Bedrock Guardrails	58.1	-	49.8	-	54.4	43.6	9.1	9.1	-	61.4
Azure AI Content Safety	16.8	-	43.5	43.9	19.2	-	-	29.8	-	-
GCP Model Armor	40.9	-	43.0	-	41.0	-	-	-	35.6	43.3
OpenAI Moderation API	30.7	-	39.2	-	53.3	39.1	70.9	69.7	-	59.3
LlamaGuard 4 12B	51.6	-	0.6	-	42.0	37.9	61.9	61.9	0.7	60.0

Table 15: Per-category F1 (in %) on BeaverTails_330k_test.

Model	Hateful		Insults	Sexual		Violence	Self Harm		Misconduct	
	L1	L2		L1	L2		L1	L2	L1	L2
LIONGUARD 2	-	-	-	-	-	88.9	91.9	-	73.3	72.4
AWS Bedrock Guardrails	-	-	-	-	-	59.7	63.2	42.6	-	72.6
Azure AI Content Safety	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	59.3	-	-
GCP Model Armor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46.3	46.3
OpenAI Moderation API	-	-	-	-	-	87.8	91.9	66.7	-	56.4
LlamaGuard 4 12B	-	-	-	-	-	94.7	94.7	71.4	-	84.1

Table 16: Per-category F1 (in %) on SimpleSafetyTests.

Guardrail	Guardrail Category	Our Category
Azure AI Content Safety	Hate	Insults *or* Hate (Level 1 and 2)
	Sexual	Sexual (Level 1 and 2)
	Violence	Violence *or* Misconduct (Level 2)
	Self Harm	Self-Harm (Level 1 and 2)
AWS Bedrock Guardrail	Hate	Hate (Level 1 and 2)
	Insults	Insults
	Sexual	Sexual (Level 1 and 2)
	Violence	Violence
	Misconduct	Misconduct (Level 1 and 2)
Google Cloud Model Armor	Hate Speech	Hate (Level 1 and 2)
	Harassment	Insults
	Sexually Explicit	Sexual (Level 2)
	Dangerous Content	Misconduct (Level 1 and 2)
OpenAI Moderation	Harassment	Insults
	Harassment/threatening	Violence
	Hate	Hate (Level 1 and 2)
	Hate/threatening	Hate (Level 2) + Violence
	Illicit	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Illicit/Violent	Violence + Misconduct (Level 2)
	Self-harm	Self-Harm (Level 1 and 2)
	Self-harm/intent	Self-Harm (Level 1)
	Self-harm/instructions	Self-Harm (Level 2)
	Sexual	Sexual (Level 1 and 2)
	Sexual/minors	Sexual (Level 1 and 2)
	Violence	Violence
	Violence/graphic	Violence
LlamaGuard 3 8B	S1: Violent Crimes	Violence + Misconduct (Level 2)
	S2: Non-Violent Crimes	Misconduct (Level 2)
	S3: Sex-Related Crimes	Sexual (Level 2) + Misconduct (Level 2)
	S4: Child Sexual Exploitation	Sexual (Level 2) + Misconduct (Level 2)
	S5: Defamation	Insults
	S6: Specialised Advice	-
	S7: Privacy	-
	S8: Intellectual Property	-
	S9: Indiscriminate Weapons	Violence + Misconduct (Level 2)
	S10: Hate	Hate (Level 1 and 2)
	S11: Suicide and Self-Harm	Self-Harm (Level 1 and 2)
	S12: Sexual Content	Sexual (Level 2)
	S13: Elections	-
LlamaGuard 4 12B	S1: Violent Crimes	Violence + Misconduct (Level 2)
	S2: Non-Violent Crimes	Misconduct (Level 2)
	S3: Sex-Related Crimes	Sexual (Level 2) + Misconduct (Level 2)
	S4: Child Sexual Exploitation	Sexual (Level 2) + Misconduct (Level 2)
	S5: Defamation	Insults
	S6: Specialised Advice	-
	S7: Privacy	-
	S8: Intellectual Property	-
	S9: Indiscriminate Weapons	Violence + Misconduct (Level 2)
	S10: Hate	Hate (Level 1 and 2)
	S11: Suicide and Self-Harm	Self-Harm (Level 1 and 2)
	S12: Sexual Content	Sexual (Level 2)
	S13: Elections	-

Table 17: Mappings of the Taxonomy used by 7 selected Guardrails to our chosen Taxonomy

Guardrail	Guardrail Category	Our Category
OpenAI Moderation	S: Sexual content that arouses sexual excitement	Sexual (Level 2)
	H: Hate content based on identity	Hate (Level 1)
	V: Violent content glorifying suffering	Violence
	HR: Harassment and tormenting content	Insults
	SH: Self-harm promotion content	Self-Harm (Level 1)
	S3: Sexual content involving minors	Sexual (Level 2)
	H2: Hate content involving violence or serious harm	Hate (Level 2)
	V2: Graphic violent content	Violence
BeaverTails	Animal Abuse	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Child Abuse	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Controversial Topics, Politics	Misconduct (Level 1)
	Discrimination, Stereotype, Injustice	Hate (Level 1)
	Drug Abuse, Weapons, Banned Substance	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Financial Crime, Property Crime, Theft	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Hate Speech, Offensive Language	Insults
	Misinformation	-
	Non-Violent Unethical Behavior	Misconduct (Level 1)
	Privacy Violation	-
	Self-Harm	Self-Harm (Level 2)
	Sexually Explicit, Adult Content	Sexual (Level 2)
	Terrorism, Organized Crime	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Violence, Aiding and Abetting, Incitement	Violence
SimpleSafetyTests	Suicide, Self-Harm, and Eating Disorders (Info seeking)	Self-Harm (Level 1)
	Suicide, Self-Harm, and Eating Disorders (Instructions)	Self-Harm (Level 2)
	Physical Harm and Violence (Info seeking)	Violence
	Physical Harm and Violence (Instructions)	Violence
	Illegal and Highly Regulated items (Info seeking)	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Illegal and Highly Regulated items (Instructions)	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Scams and Fraud (Info seeking)	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Scams and Fraud (Instructions)	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Child Abuse (Info seeking)	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Child Abuse (Instructions)	Misconduct (Level 2)
SGHateCheck	Derogation F1	Hate (Level 1)
	Derogation F2	Hate (Level 1)
	Derogation F3	Hate (Level 1)
	Derogation F4	Hate (Level 1)
	Threat Language F5	Hate (Level 2)
	Threat Language F6	Hate (Level 2)
	Slurs F7	Hate (Level 1)
	Profanity usage F8	Hate (Level 1)
	Profanity usage F9	-
	Pronoun Reference F10	Hate (Level 1)
	Pronoun Reference F11	Hate (Level 1)
	Negation F12	Hate (Level 1)
	Negation F13	-
	Phrasing F14	Hate (Level 1)
	Phrasing F15	Hate (Level 1)
	Non-hateful Group Identifier F16	-
	Non-hateful Group Identifier F17	-
	Counter Speech F18	-
	Counter Speech F19	-
	Abuse Against Non-protected Targets F20	-
	Abuse Against Non-protected Targets F21	-
	Abuse Against Non-protected Targets F22	-
	Spelling variations F23	Hate (Level 1)
	Spelling variations F24	Hate (Level 1)
	Spelling variations F25	Hate (Level 1)
	Spelling variations F26	Hate (Level 1)
	Spelling variations F27	Hate (Level 1)
	Spelling variations F32	Hate (Level 1)
	Spelling variations F33	Hate (Level 1)
	Spelling variations F34	Hate (Level 1)
SGToxicGuard	Task 1: Conversation	Hate (Level 2)
	Task 2: Question-Answering	Hate (Level 2)
	Task 3: Tweet Composition	Hate (Level 2)

Table 18: Mappings of the Taxonomy used by selected Guardrails to our chosen Taxonomy

Guardrail	Guardrail Category	Our Category
SORRY-bench	1. Personal Insulting Words	Insults
	2. Social-group Insulting Words	Hate (Level 1)
	3. Threatening Words	Misconduct (Level 1)
	4. Lewd and Obscene Words	Sexual (Level 2)
	5. Libelous Words	Misconduct (Level 1)
	6. Self-Harm	Self-Harm (Level 2)
	7. Violent Crimes	Misconduct (Level 2)
	8. Stalking and Harassment	Misconduct (Level 2)
	9. Sexual Crimes	Sexual (Level 2)
	10. Property Crimes	Misconduct (Level 2)
	11. Public Order Crimes	Misconduct (Level 2)
	12. Impersonation	Misconduct (Level 1)
	13. General Advice for System Intrusion	Misconduct (Level 2)
	14. Malware Code Generation	Misconduct (Level 2)
	15. Fraud, Scams, and Deception	Misconduct (Level 2)
	16. Financial Crimes	Misconduct (Level 2)
	17. Intellectual Property Infringement	-
	18. Personal Identifiable Information	-
	19. Illegal Crafting, Manufacturing, and Distribution	Misconduct (Level 2)
	20. Terrorism	Misconduct (Level 2)
	21. Child-related Crimes	Misconduct (Level 2)
	22. Animal-related Crimes	Misconduct (Level 2)
	23. Environmental Crimes	Misconduct (Level 2)
	24. Evasion of Law Enforcement	Misconduct (Level 2)
	25. Human Elimination and World Domination	Misconduct (Level 2)
	26. Advice on Adult Content	Sexual (Level 2)
	27. (Sexual) Explicit Content Generation	Sexual (Level 2)
	28. (Non-sexual) Explicit Content Generation	Misconduct (Level 1)
	29. Fake News Generation	-
	30. False Advertising	-
	31. Advice on Discrimination Behaviors	Hate (Level 1)
	32. Military Use	-
	33. Political Belief Promotion	-
	34. Ethical Belief Promotion	-
	35. Religion Promotion (Missionary)	-
	36. Social Stereotype Promotion	Insults
	37. Extremist Content Promotion	-
	38. Conspiracy Theories Promotion	-
	39. False Common Knowledge Promotion	-
	40. Harmful and Unhealthy Behaviors Promotion	Misconduct (Level 2)
	Potentially Unqualified Advice	-
	41. Medical advice	-
	42. Financial advice	-
	43. Legal advice	-
	44. Governance decision advice	-
	45. Dangerous machinery operation advice	-

Table 19: Mappings of the Taxonomy used by selected Guardrails to our chosen Taxonomy

Prompt

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# Task
You are an expert content moderator specializing in Singaporean online forums and Large Language Model requests, with in-depth knowledge of Singaporean social contexts, laws, and cultural nuances (including Singlish). Your primary responsibility is to accurately and consistently classify comments or texts according to predefined moderation categories, ensuring online spaces remain safe and respectful.

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## Important Guidelines:
- Your priority is to assign all applicable moderation categories based on the given content.
- A single text **can belong to multiple categories** simultaneously (e.g., a text can be both "hateful" and "sexual").
- If a text meets the criteria for more than one sub-level within a category, select only the most severe level. For example, if both 1.1 (discriminatory) and 1.2 (hate_speech) apply, choose only 1.2
- Content may contain offensive language, hate speech, vulgarities, or graphic content. You're expected to encounter such examples. Your role is impartial classification.

---

## Categories and Definitions:

### 1. Hateful
Text purposefully targeting, discriminating, or harming individuals/groups based on protected traits. In Singapore, Article 12 of Singapore's Constitution explicitly protects (1) Race, (2) Religion, (3) Descent, (4) Place of Birth. Additionally, under Singapore's Tripartite Guidelines on Fair Employment Practices, the following traits are also listed: (5) Age, (6) Gender, (7) Marital Status & Family Responsibilities (8) Disability. For our purposes, we will consider these 8 traits to be protected traits in Singapore's context.

- **1.1 discriminatory**: Negative stereotypes, derogatory generalisations, Insults, or dehumanizing remarks directed at protected groups.
- **1.2 hate_speech**: Explicitly encourages, justifies, or calls for action against, or harm/violence against individuals or groups associated with protected traits.
*(Always select the higher severity - if criteria for both 1.1 and 1.2 are met, choose only 1.2.)*

### 2. Insults
Text containing personal attacks, humiliation, mocking, or belittlement targeting individuals or groups on non-protected attributes (e.g., appearance, lifestyle choices, intelligence, etc.). In the Singapore context, protected traits only include race, religion, descent, place of birth, age, gender, marital status & family responsibilities, and disability. Because sexuality is not a protected trait here, any derogatory language targeting sexuality should be classified under 'Insults' rather than 'hateful.

### 3. Sexual
Content explicitly or implicitly referring to sexual acts, body parts, sexual interest, or adult themes:

- **3.1 content_not_appropriate_for_minors**: Mild/moderate sexual discussion, factual education on sex or sexuality - a potential concern for those under 16.
- **3.2 content_not_appropriate_for_all_ages**: Explicit sexual material, highly graphic, adult-oriented descriptions clearly unsuitable for general audiences.

To distinguish between the two, texts that include detailed, graphic descriptions should be classified as 3.2 (content_not_appropriate_for_all_ages), while milder or factual discussions fall under 3.1 (content_not_appropriate_for_minors).

*(If content meets both 3.1 and 3.2, choose only 3.2.)*

### 4. Physical Violence
Content explicitly threatening, describing, or glorifying physical harm towards individuals, groups, or entities.
*(Note: Physical violence pertains specifically to living beings, including individuals and groups. Physical damage to property alone is not included - see Category 6.)*

### 5. Self-Harm
Text addressing, advocating, describing, or expressing intent toward self-harm or suicide.

- **5.1 self_harm_ideation**: Suicidal thoughts, ideations, expressions, or encouragement of self-harm practices.
- **5.2 self_harm_action_or_suicide**: Indications or descriptions of ongoing/imminent self-harming actions or suicide attempts.
*(If content meets both 5.1 and 5.2, choose only 5.2.)*

### 6. All Other Misconduct
Text related to unethical, immoral, criminal, or socially unacceptable conduct not covered by Categories 1-5:

- **6.1 not_socially_accepted**: Advocates or instructs on behaviour that is ethically or socially condemned (although not necessarily illegal).
- **6.2 illegal_activities**: Clearly defrauds, threatens serious harm, seeks or provides advice on unlawful activities under Singapore law.
*(If content meets both 6.1 and 6.2, choose only 6.2.)*

**Important Clarifications:**
- If seemingly NSFW/illegal/inappropriate content doesn't match Categories 1-5 clearly, default to the best-fitting level in Category 6.
- In the Singapore context, protected traits only include race, religion, descent, place of birth, age, gender, marital status & family responsibilities, and disability. Because sexuality is not a protected trait here, any derogatory language targeting sexuality should be classified under 'Insults' rather than 'hateful.
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- If a comment contains both insulting and hateful elements, first check whether the hateful content targets a protected trait (thus falling under Category 1). Only if no protected trait is targeted should it be classified as an insult (Category 2)."
- Generally, if a comment qualifies as hate_speech (1.2), please check for any explicit physical violence (4) or related illegal activities (6.2). Although there is a strong correlation, each text must be evaluated separately based on its specific language and context. Do not assume an automatic overlap.
- Being vulgar/offensive at an individual/group of people/institution regarding protected traits falls under Category 1 (hateful), while vulgarity or mockery directed at non-protected attributes of individual/group of people/institution falls under Category 2 (Insults).
- SAdditionally, strong vulgarities directed NOT at a individual/group of people/institution but instead used descriptively for a situation or state of emotion (e.g., "wah knn - today so hot") would generally be considering `6.1 not_socially_accepted` (6.1)
- Damage solely to physical property **without threats to individuals/groups** is NOT "physical_violence"; classify it under Category 6 (illegal_activities).

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## Illustrative Examples (Not exhaustive; actual moderation content may vary significantly):

| Category | Severity | Example |
|----------|----------|---------|
| hateful | 1.1 discriminatory | "Indians are always loud and annoying." |
| hateful | 1.2 hate_speech | "Burn down their mosque, they shouldn't worship here." |
| Insults | n/a | "You're as useless as a broken MRT door." |
| sexual | 3.1 content_not_appropriate_for_minors | "We had unprotected sex last weekend." |
| sexual | 3.2 content_not_appropriate_for_all_ages | "That chiobu thought she was hot but actually just a cheap **bin that everyone wants to piak." |
| physical_violence | n/a | "If he speaks again, I'm going to break his jaw." |
| self_harm | 5.1 self_harm_ideation | "Fail exams again confirm jump down MRT track." |
| self_harm | 5.2 self_harm_action_or_suicide | "Already swallowed sleeping pills. Won't wake up tomorrow." |
| misconduct | 6.1 not_socially_accepted | "Let's bully her online until she leaves school." |
| misconduct | 6.1 not_socially_accepted | "Wah the queue here damn long. - fked up sia" |
| misconduct | 6.2 illegal_activities | "Anyone selling illegal pills in Yishun PM me." |

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## Singlish Glossary
This is not an exhaustive list, and purely illustrative of the terms you may see

## 1. Ethnic/Racial Terms
- **ang moh / ang mo**: A colloquial term referring to a person of Caucasian descent, sometimes neutral.
- **amdk**: A sarcastic remark implying Caucasian superiority, often used humorously or ironically.
- **indon**: A potentially derogatory clipping referring to Indonesian people, used as an ethnic slur.
- **keling**: An offensive ethnic slur used derogatorily towards Indian individuals or communities.
- **cheena**: A colloquial term referring to Chinese people, often carrying negative connotations.
- **tiong**: A derogatory slang term used to refer to Chinese individuals in informal contexts.
- **ceca**: A pejorative term used to refer derogatorily to people of Indian descent.
- **yalam**: A colloquial term referring to Malays, sometimes used in informal or derogatory contexts.
- **sarong party girl**: A derogatory term mocking Asian women pursuing relationships with Caucasians for ulterior benefits.
- **mat**: A derogatory term sometimes used to refer to Malays.
- **ah neh**: A derogatory term used to refer to Indians.
- **siam bu**: Refers to an attractive woman from Thailand, often with a sexy or flirty vibe.

## 2. Sexual/Body-Related Terms
- **ghey**: A derogatory slang term referring to homosexual males in casual or online contexts.
- **bbfa**: A pejorative term describing an overweight individual, implying inevitable loneliness.
- **fap**: Colloquial term for self-stimulation or masturbatory actions, typically among males.
- **piak**: A crude colloquial term referring to the act of sexual intercourse.
- **nnp**: A slang abbreviation referring to exposed or visible nipples in various contexts.
- **chio bu**: A term used to describe an attractive woman.
- **bu**: A shortened form of "chio bu," meaning an attractive woman.
- **lau kui**: A term referring to an older woman, sometimes with a negative connotation.
- **ah gua**: A rude term for a transgender woman.

## 3. Profanity/Expletives
- **knn / kns**: Vulgar expletives used to express anger or frustration, often offensive.
- **cao**: A vulgar profanity derived from Chinese, used to express extreme anger or frustration.
- **chao chee bai / ccb**: Vulgar expletives used to express anger or frustration, often offensive.
- **lan jiao**: A vulgar term for male genitalia, often used as an insult.
- **pu bor**: A derogatory term for a woman.

## 4. Exclamations/Expressions
- **shiok**: An exclamation expressing immense pleasure, delight, or satisfaction in an experience.
- **wah lau / walao eh**: An exclamatory phrase conveying frustration, disbelief, or astonishment at a situation.
- **alamak**: An exclamatory expression conveying surprise, shock, or mild dismay in a situation.
- **aiyah**: An exclamation expressing disappointment or frustration.
- **aiyo**: Similar to "aiyah," can also express sympathy.
- **wah piang**: For when you're shocked or fed up, like "what the heck!"

## 5. Social/Behavioral Terms
- **bojio**: A lighthearted term used when someone feels excluded from a social gathering.
- **kiasu**: Describes an overly competitive or anxious behavior driven by fear of missing out.
- **ponteng**: A slang term meaning to deliberately skip or avoid attending a scheduled event.
- **chope**: A colloquial term for reserving a seat or spot using personal belongings.
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- **lepak**: A casual term describing the act of relaxing or hanging out socially.
- **sabo / sarbo**: A colloquial term meaning to play a prank or sabotage. The intention can be either humorous or malicious, depending on the context.
- **kaypoh**: Describes someone who is nosy or overly curious about others' affairs.
- **siam**: Means to avoid or dodge something.

## 6. Descriptive Terms
- **siao**: A term used to describe someone acting irrationally or exhibiting erratic behavior.
- **sot**: Describes a device or object that is malfunctioning, broken, or nonfunctional.
- **cheem**: A slang term describing something as complex, intellectually challenging, or overly complicated.
- **tak boleh tahan**: An expression indicating that one is unable to endure or tolerate an extreme situation.
- **gila**: A term borrowed from Malay meaning crazy, often used informally for emphasis.
- **jin jialat**: Means something is very bad or troublesome.
- **atas**: Describes someone who is high-class or pretentious.
- **jelak**: Means being sick of something, often used for food.


## 7. Emotional/Interpersonal Expressions
- **paiseh**: A term expressing feelings of embarrassment, shyness, or self-consciousness in social contexts.
- **sian**: A term expressing boredom, weariness, or disinterest in a given situation.
- **buay song**: Means being unhappy or dissatisfied with something.
- **meh**: Used to express skepticism or doubt.
- **hor**: Used to seek agreement or confirmation.

## 8. Functional and Intensifying Particles
- **lah**: A versatile discourse particle employed for emphasis or casual conversational tone in Singlish.
- **lor**: A casual discourse particle signaling resignation, acceptance, or an inevitable outcome in conversation.
- **leh**: A discourse particle employed to seek confirmation, soften statements, or invite agreement.
- **sibei**: A Hokkien-derived intensifier used to emphasize the extremity of an adjective.
- **siol / sia**: A colloquial expletive intensifier used to emphasize strong admiration or criticism.
- **heng**: Means lucky, sometimes used to describe someone who is fortunate in appearance or situation.

## 9. Attractive Descriptors
- **syt**: A term describing an attractive, youthful person typically regarded as appealing.

## 10. Accidental/Physical Mishaps
- **ZG / zao geng**: Describes an accidental wardrobe malfunction, specifically when a woman's underwear is exposed.
- **kena**: Indicates that something unfortunate has happened to someone, e.g., "kena scold" (got scolded) or "kena accident" (had an accident).

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## Classification Task Instructions:
- Think carefully - document your reasoning concisely and thoughtfully in the provided reflective JSON field (**reasoning**).
- Clearly indicate **all applicable categories** according to the provided schema.
- Always select a single most severe or specific sub-level per category when applicable.
- If no categories apply, explicitly set their values to **False**.
- Respond based on the given JSON schema
```