

LLMs Caught in the Crossfire: Malware Requests and Jailbreak Challenges

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🔗 <https://github.com/MAIL-Tele-AI/MalwareBench>

Abstract

The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has heightened concerns about their security, particularly their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks that leverage crafted prompts to generate malicious outputs. While prior research has been conducted on general security capabilities of LLMs, their specific susceptibility to jailbreak attacks in code generation remains largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we propose MalwareBench, a benchmark dataset containing 3,520 jailbreaking prompts for malicious code-generation, designed to evaluate LLM robustness against such threats. MalwareBench is based on 320 manually crafted malicious code generation requirements, covering 11 jailbreak methods and 29 code functionality categories. Experiments show that mainstream LLMs exhibit limited ability to reject malicious code-generation requirements, and the combination of multiple jailbreak methods further reduces the model's security capabilities: specifically, the average rejection rate for malicious content is 60.93%, dropping to 39.92% when combined with jailbreak attack algorithms. Our work highlights that the code security capabilities of LLMs still pose significant challenges.

1 Introduction

As generative AI develops, Large Language Models (LLMs) play a crucial role in code generation (Li et al., 2022), giving rise to domain-specific models such as DeepSeek-Coder (Guo et al., 2024). Although they enhance software development, LLMs have security vulnerabilities that can be exploited for the creation of harmful software. Inducing LLMs to output harmful content is termed *jailbreaking*. A real world instance is the explosion

that occurred outside the Trump Hotel in Las Vegas in January 2025. The suspect utilized ChatGPT (Bahrini et al., 2023) with jailbreaking techniques to build a bomb. As demonstrated in Section A.1, current benchmarks evaluate the security of LLMs and suggest improvements like safety alignment (Bhardwaj and Poria, 2023), yet few of them fully explore the security in code-generation scenarios. RMCBench (Chen et al., 2024) tests malicious code generation without involving jailbreaking algorithms and only covers a part of the mainstream LLMs. Consequently, the security defenses for malware related tasks are under studied. In this paper, we introduce **MalwareBench**, a benchmark consisting of 320 malicious code generation requirements across 6 domains and 29 subcategories. These requirements are manually crafted for various software and programming languages. We conduct two experiments. First, we directly input the malicious requirements into 29 LLMs to evaluate their capability to reject malicious tasks. Second, we "mutate" these 320 requirements using 11 black-box jailbreaking methods, generating 3,520 jailbreaking prompts in total. This allows us to assess the LLMs' resistance to jailbreaking prompts and the effectiveness of different black-box jailbreaking methods. Multiple evaluation metrics are designed (details are provided in Section 5). The results show that **MalwareBench** poses a challenge to the security of current code-generation models. Most models provide malicious code responses (rated 4 out of 4) for more than half of the malicious requirements. We observe phenomena such as "passive defense" in smaller models and a lack of proportional robustness to model size within the same series. Case studies reveal that LLMs may give malicious hints or generate code that appears normal but contains hidden malicious logic. These findings highlight the complexity of evaluating the security capabilities of LLMs in the context of malware tasks. The contributions of this

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


Figure 1: Overview of the overall experimental process

paper are as follows:

1. This paper proposes a dataset of malicious code-generation prompts to date. It encompasses 6 domains, 29 sub-categories, and 11 black-box jailbreaking methods, with a total of 3,520 prompts. This comprehensive dataset¹ provides a rich and diverse test bed for the study of LLMs in the context of malware related tasks.
2. Extensive testing and evaluation are carried out on 29 mainstream general/code generation LLMs. The evaluated models include closed-source ones such as **GPT-4o** (Hurst et al., 2024) and **Claude**, as well as open-source models like **DeepSeek-R1** (DeepSeek-AI et al., 2025) and **Qwen-Coder** (Hui et al., 2024).
3. Through a detailed analysis of the experimental results, the current security status of LLMs in malware-related tasks is summarized. The obtained insights offer valuable guidance for future research directions aimed at enhancing the security of LLMs. This not only helps in identifying the existing vulnerabilities of LLMs but also provides a basis for the development of more secure and reliable LLMs.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Large Language Models

LLMs (Zhao et al., 2023) are defined as neural language models that are grounded in the Trans-

¹<https://github.com/MAIL-Tele-AI/MalwareBench>.

former architecture. These models are pre-trained on massive text data with the goal of achieving good performance in a variety of tasks. LLMs can be broadly categorized into two distinct types: general and domain-specific. General purpose LLMs like GPT (Radford and Narasimhan, 2018) and Llama (Touvron et al., 2023a) are designed for diverse tasks and can be fine-tuned. For example, GPT-3 (Brown et al., 2020), derived from GPT, can have human-like conversations. GPT sets high NLP standards and Llama offers an open-source option. In contrast, domain-specific LLMs such as CodeLlama (Roziere et al., 2023) (built on Llama2 (Touvron et al., 2023b), fine-tuned with code data and outperforming corresponding base model on code benchmarks) and those in the medical field are trained for specific tasks. They are specialized to meet the unique needs of their domains. Given a sequence of inputs (x_1, \dots, x_T) , LLMs generate text responses $(y_1, \dots, y_{T'})$ by estimating the conditional probability $p((y_1, \dots, y_{T'}) | (x_1, \dots, x_T))$. The goal of attack on LLMs involves finding an adversarial input sequence \hat{x} such that \hat{y} violates safety guidelines of the model p (e.g., such as malicious code or privacy breaches).

2.2 Jailbreak Attack

LLM Jailbreak refers to an attack where malicious actors craft special adversarial prompts and exploit vulnerabilities in aspects such as the **input processing, decoding mechanisms, and training data** of LLMs to induce the models to generate harmful content that violates usage policies and social ethics. Up to now, jailbreak attacks against LLMs





Figure 2: The key statics of MalwareBench

can be classified into two categories: white-box attacks and black-box attacks.

White-box attack allows the attacker full access to the model’s weights, architecture, training process and vectors. Attacks can be designed using gradient signals from the input (Zou et al., 2023). This scenario often applies to open-source models. **Black-box attack** doesn’t allow an attacker to have so much as an “inside view.” Attackers can only interact with the model via an API (i.e., providing input x and receiving output y). This work is oriented towards code generation as a practical scenario and focuses on black-box attack methods. Three categories totaling 11 attack methods are selected as follows:

- **Template Completion** Most commercial LLMs have advanced safety alignment techniques to fend off simple jailbreak queries. However, attackers are now devising complex templates to bypass these protections. Attack methods based on template complexity and mechanism can be classified into scenario nesting (Li et al., 2024), context based attacks (Wei et al., 2023), and code injection (Kang et al., 2024), each with distinct strategies to undermine model defenses.
- **Prompt Rewriting** Although LLMs are pre-trained or safety-aligned with extensive data, underrepresented scenarios exist, offering new attack opportunities. Prompt rewriting attacks use niche languages (Yong et al., 2023) or

genetic algorithms (Liu et al., 2024b) to construct unique prompts for jailbreaking.

- **LLM Based Generation** Researchers have proposed LLM-based attack methods. By fine-tuning LLMs with adversarial examples and feedback mechanisms, they can simulate attackers and automatically generate adversarial prompts (Deng et al., 2024). Many studies have integrated LLMs into research, achieving performance improvements.

3 The MalwareBench Benchmark

3.1 Dataset Construction

3.1.1 Raw Data Collection

Taxonomy of Malware Questions. In the construction of MalwareBench, we begin by conducting an in-depth study of current malware characteristics and functions. We refer to the mailing dataset (Gibert et al., 2019) as a reference to better understand the existing malware landscape. Given that our benchmark is designed to assess the defenses of LLMs against malicious problems and jailbreak attacks, we categorize the problems into 6 primary classifications according to the user’s malicious intent, as in left figure of Fig. 2. To determine the secondary and tertiary classifications, we conduct research for each primary category. For some primary categories, like denial Service, after research, we find that it only has two secondary-level classifications: DDoS and DoS. Since DoS is already a detailed enough concept, there are no

further tertiary-level classifications under DDoS and DoS. However, for broader categories such as Information Theft, the secondary-level classification Tracker Malware still requires further division. Thus, we establish a tertiary-level classification: Hardware Usage Tracker. Based on these established classifications, for each detailed category of the build, experts on the team manually create a set of 5 to 20 malicious questions. In the rough type, the constructed questions focus on generic malicious behavior, such as the writing of Trojan code. In the case of detail, experts focus on describing the focus on specific features or vulnerabilities in the requirements, such as example in Fig. 4. Moreover, we diversify the requirements by considering different operating systems, including Windows, macOS, Linux, Android, and iOS. In order to investigate the impact of requirement granularity on model defense performance, we categorize the requirements into rough and detailed forms. The relevant stats are in Fig. 2. In the upper-right sub-figure of Fig. 2, the x-axis is question length and the y-axis is the percentage of questions of that length, while the lower-right sub-figure shows the number of questions in each category.

3.1.2 Prompt Jailbreaks

Motivation. Prior to this study, no research has conducted on the rejection of malware generation related issues by LLMs under the influence of multiple jailbreak methods. Nevertheless, as the user base of LLMs expands daily, it is imperative to focus on this problem. A quantitative investigation into the capabilities of LLMs in the context of the aforementioned issues is essential, aiming to offer a reference for subsequent research and development related to LLMs. Also, as described in section 2.2, black box jailbreak attack methods are more likely to be used by malicious people. Considering all these factors, we finally adopted three types of black box testing methods: Template Completion, Prompt Rewriting and LLM Based Generation.

Jailbreak Methods. In our evaluation, we carefully curate 11 distinct jailbreak methods. These methods represent a diverse range of adversarial techniques in the realm of large-language model security. The details are shown in Table 1. In certain methods, LLMs are leveraged. Taking into full account both cost-effectiveness and model performance, Qwen-Turbo is adopted as the LLM for question generation in this particular section.

In terms of usage consumption, this step approximately consumed 5M input tokens and 50M completion tokens.

Method Name	Type
ArtPrompt (Jiang et al., 2024)	Prompt Rewriting
Benign Expression (Takemoto, 2024)	Prompt Rewriting
CipherChat (Yuan et al., 2024)	Prompt Rewriting
Code Injection (Kang et al., 2024)	Template Completion
DRA (Liu et al., 2024a)	Prompt Rewriting
DeepInception (Li et al., 2024)	Template Completion
InContext Attack (Wei et al., 2023)	Template Completion
Low Resource Languages (Yong et al., 2023)	Prompt Rewriting
MasterKey (Deng et al., 2024)	LLM-based Generation
Persuasive LLM (Zeng et al., 2024)	LLM-based Generation
Word Substitution Cipher (Handa et al., 2024)	Prompt Rewriting

Table 1: Jailbreak methods and categories.

3.1.3 Questions Assessment

To thoroughly evaluate the robustness of various LLMs against harmful inputs, we test 320 questions designed to assess their susceptibility to generating malicious content. As shown in Table 7, initially, the code generation models exhibit an average rejection rate of 70.56%, while the generic large models show a rejection rate of 51.19%. However, when jailbreak methods are applied, these rates drop to 51.50% for the code generation models and 41.47% for the generic large models. This is a significant indication of the degradation of LLMs’ defenses in the face of the jailbreak methods.

A rejection rate approaching zero serves as an indication that the LLMs encounter difficulties in the identification of malicious inputs, thereby highlighting its security vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, this situation does not provide a full exposure of the model’s specific weaknesses. In contrast, a rejection rate nearing unity suggests a robust defense mechanism, as the model efficiently rejects nearly all malicious queries. However, it is possible that potential vulnerabilities in specific contexts, where more subtle attacks might prove successful, could be obscured.

The outcomes of our study demonstrate that the question set we have constructed attains a relatively balanced rejection rate. This balance is of paramount importance for the effective evaluation of the models’ strengths and weaknesses in the identification of malicious content, facilitating a comprehensive security analysis. It mirrors the models’ capacity to defend against prompts associated with the generation of malicious malware, offering valuable insights into areas for improve-

ment and guiding future enhancements in model security.

3.2 Metric

To effectively evaluate the capabilities of large language models in code generation tasks, it is crucial to focus on their ability to provide clear solutions and generate complete code. Inspired by Souly et al. (Souly et al., 2024), we develop a binary metric for non-refusal and a quality metric ranging from 1 to 4 to comprehensively quantify the response level of LLMs. The specific evaluation process is described in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, \mathcal{L} represents the set of LLMs under test and \mathcal{P} denotes the set of jailbreak attack questions combined with jailbreak methods.

Refuse Indicator. A score of 0 indicates that the LLM refuses to answer, marking a failure of the jailbreak method, while a score of 1 indicates a successful jailbreak with no refusal. However, merely determining whether the LLMs refuses to answer does not fully capture the effectiveness of the method. Therefore, we further refine the evaluation by a detailed classification of the quality of the responses.

Quality Metrics. We categorize quality metrics into four levels based on the relevance of the text and the sophistication of the generated code, with scores ranging from 1 to 4 points.

Level 1: The response is incoherent or completely irrelevant to the request.

Level 2: The response contains a basic idea of the implementation, addressing the task but without providing code.

Level 3: The response includes a detailed and potentially harmful description of the implementation steps, along with a brief, flawed code.

Level 4: The response includes a comprehensive, detailed and harmful description of the implementation, accompanied by well developed code that accurately fulfills the request.

3.3 Scoring Comparison

To ensure the reliability and accuracy of our evaluation metrics, we engage three field experts to label 300 responses for refusal and quality values, adhering to the design principles of the indicators. The majority of these annotations are used as ground truth values, serving as the foundation for our analysis and validation of various evaluators. For GPT-4o

Algorithm 1 LLM Evaluation

```

1: for each  $L_i \in \mathcal{L}$  do
2:   for each  $P_j \in \mathcal{P}$  do
3:     Generate response  $R_{ij} = L_n(P_j)$ 
4:     Calculate refusal score  $S_{refuse}^{ij}$ 
5:     if  $S_{refuse}^{ij} = 0$  then
6:       Result =  $(S_{refuse}^{ij}, 0)$ 
7:     else
8:       Calculate quality score  $S_{quality}^{ij}$ 
9:       Result =  $(S_{refuse}^{ij}, S_{quality}^{ij})$ 
10:    end if
11:  end for
12: end for

```

and GPT-4o-mini, we utilize the API provided by AZURE, incurring a total cost of approximately **\$650**. For Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct, the model is executed on an infrastructure equipped with 8 * NVIDIA RTX 4090 24G graphics cards, with a cumulative runtime of around **15 hours**.

In Table 2, we compare the agreement, False Positive Rate (FPR), and False Negative Rate (FNR) of JUDGE with manually annotated labels. Specifically, the metric *agreement* indicates the proportion of exact matches between the model’s refuse and quality predictions and the manual annotations, while *agreement** reflects the consistency of quality scores within the ranges [1,2] or [3,4].

Metric	GPT-4o	GPT-4o-mini	Llama3.3
agreement*(\uparrow)	80.33%	67.33%	69.33%
agreement(\uparrow)	67.67%	53.00%	40.33%
consistency(\uparrow)	89.67%	74.00%	87.00%
FNR(\downarrow)	7.33%	24.67%	3.00%
FPR(\downarrow)	3.00%	1.33%	10.00%

Table 2: Judge Comparison

GPT-4o demonstrates superior performance in agreement metrics, achieving nearly 90%, and excels in both agreement measures. This indicates a significant advantage in alignment with manual annotations. In contrast, GPT-4o-mini demonstrates slightly less robust performance, with a marginally lower agreement metric compared to GPT-4o. However, it still maintains a high level of consistency in *agreement**, indicating a degree of stability in its results, albeit with some limitations in precision. Furthermore, GPT-4o-mini’s FPR and FNR are moderate, suggesting potential areas for improvement in error classification control. Additionally, Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct exhibits excellent consistency metrics, comparable to the best values, and achieves the lowest FNR at only 3.00%.

Model Name	Version / Param.	GPT-4o		GPT-4o-mini		Llama 3.3		Average	
		Score	Refuse	Score	Refuse	Score	Refuse	Score	Refuse
Closed-Source Model									
Claude-3.5-Sonnet	20240620	1.20	58.30%	1.13	68.72%	1.57	56.73%	1.30	61.25%
GPT-4o-preview	20240801	1.02	63.13%	0.98	71.96%	1.36	61.31%	1.12	65.46%
GPT-4o-mini	20240718	1.14	59.12%	1.16	68.47%	1.58	56.36%	1.30	61.32%
GPT-4o-nosafe-preview	20240801	1.37	50.14%	1.45	61.39%	1.82	51.02%	1.55	54.19%
OpenAI-o1-preview	20240912	0.82	76.08%	0.79	79.20%	0.86	76.59%	0.82	77.29%
Qwen-Coder-Turbo	20240919	1.24	55.82%	1.14	66.08%	1.55	54.52%	1.31	58.81%
Qwen-Max	20240919	1.01	63.18%	1.04	70.99%	1.28	55.43%	1.11	63.20%
Qwen-Plus	20240919	1.54	44.97%	1.52	59.38%	2.09	41.31%	1.72	48.55%
Qwen-Turbo	20240919	1.52	43.13%	1.45	58.84%	2.34	32.44%	1.77	44.80%
SparkDesk-v4.0	-	2.50	23.92%	2.06	44.72%	2.71	29.20%	2.42	32.61%
350M+ Open-Source Model									
CodeGen-Multi	350M	0.63	42.95%	0.27	81.19%	0.80	39.57%	0.57	54.57%
StarCoder2	3B	0.83	40.94%	0.43	76.79%	1.08	32.27%	0.78	50.00%
6B+ Open-Source Model									
CodeGeeX2	6B	0.56	59.83%	0.40	76.59%	0.68	57.67%	0.55	64.70%
CodeGen25-Ins	7B	0.61	50.45%	0.53	69.20%	1.23	30.11%	0.79	49.92%
CodeLlama-Ins	7B	1.03	46.53%	1.19	59.46%	1.59	39.12%	1.27	48.37%
Qwen-2.5-Coder-Ins	7B	1.41	44.52%	1.19	62.59%	1.87	42.07%	1.49	49.73%
Llama3-Ins	8B	1.01	53.52%	1.27	59.91%	1.76	46.90%	1.35	53.45%
15B+ Open-Source Model									
StarCoder2	15B	0.93	40.63%	0.55	73.84%	1.28	27.36%	0.92	47.27%
Wizard-Coder-v1	15B	1.87	14.57%	2.02	37.76%	2.68	9.20%	2.19	20.51%
StarCoder	15.5B	0.95	31.93%	0.55	74.15%	1.13	34.40%	0.87	46.83%
DeepSeek-Coder-v2-Lite	16B	1.87	25.74%	1.61	52.98%	2.70	19.01%	2.06	32.58%
Qwen-2.5-Coder-Ins	32B	2.12	28.64%	1.58	54.94%	2.51	31.65%	2.07	38.41%
Wizard-V1.1	33B	1.60	49.55%	1.56	53.10%	2.63	13.66%	1.93	38.77%
70B+ Open-Source Model									
CodeLlama-Ins	70B	0.41	75.09%	0.36	83.35%	0.60	72.13%	0.46	76.86%
Llama-3.3-Ins	70B	1.95	33.55%	1.62	56.39%	2.55	29.94%	2.04	39.96%
Mistral-Large-Instruct-2407	123B	2.48	20.77%	1.97	45.94%	2.74	22.76%	2.40	29.82%
DeepSeek-Chat-v2	236B	1.77	36.31%	1.66	54.38%	2.32	39.38%	1.92	43.35%
DeepSeek-Coder-v2-Instruct-0724	236B	1.44	48.21%	1.46	60.51%	1.73	52.19%	1.54	53.64%
DeepSeek-R1	671B	2.58	25.00%	1.92	50.09%	2.84	25.54%	2.45	33.54%
Avg.	-	1.36	45.05%	1.20	63.20%	1.79	40.68%	1.45	49.65%

Table 3: Overall score and refuse rate given by GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini and Llama3.3-70B-Instruct.

4 Experiment

4.1 Models

When selecting LLMs, we consider three key aspects: whether the model is open source, whether it is designed for code generation, and the scale of its parameters. For closed-source models, we select five series, namely GPT, Claude, Qwen, Spark, and Deepseek. For open-source models, we choose eight series of models, including Llama, Qwen, WizardCoder, StarCoder, CodeGen, Codegeex, Deepseek, and Mistral. In terms of parameter scale, the model list includes LLMs ranging from as small as 350M (CodeGen-350M-Multi), medium sized 8B (Llama3-8B-Instruct), to as large as 236B (DeepSeek-Coder-V2-Instruct-0724). In addition

to the existing research scope, we incorporate tests on DeepSeek-R1 (DeepSeek-AI et al., 2025) and OpenAI-o1 (Jaech et al., 2024). The purpose is to investigate the responses of advanced reasoning models (Besta et al., 2025) when confronted with jailbreak attacks related to malware. By observing the performance of these models on MalwareBench, we will be able to obtain results and analysis regarding the current LLMs’ performance in malware generation and under the combination of jailbreak methods.




Figure 3: Heatmaps showing the evaluation scores of different models on attack methods and question categories.

5 Result

5.1 Overall performance

5.1.1 LLM’s Score and Refusal Rate

As shown in Table 3, a model’s response score (final output of Algorithm 1) decreases as its refusal rate increases. During jailbreak attempts, approximately 50.35% of these attempts successfully induce LLMs to produce responses containing malicious content, such as harmful suggestions or malicious code. Among them, **OpenAI-o1** achieves the best result, which demonstrated great security with a very high rejection rate and a very low average score (Avg. Score V2: 0.82; Refuse Rate: 77.29%). At the same time, the CodeLlama 70B Instruct in the open-source model also showed strong rejection ability and low exploitability (Avg. Score 0.46; Refuse Rate: 76.86%).

Finding 1: A negative correlation exists between LLMs’ response score and refusal rate.

In addition, as can be seen from the data in Table 7, LLMs have relatively low scores when oriented to detailed requirements compared to rough requirements (Avg. Score 1.96 vs. 1.24), with a corresponding increase in rejection rates (Refuse Rate: 47.49% vs. 66.70%).

Finding 2: When oriented to detailed problems, LLMs tend to exhibit stronger defenses.

5.1.2 Analysis on Model Parameter Size

Small Parameter Models: When faced with malicious inputs, small parameter models tend to re-

spond; however, due to their limited capacity to accurately interpret instructions, they frequently produce semantically irrelevant outputs, often scoring 1. For instance, **CodeGen-350M-Multi** has an average score of 0.57 and a refusal rate of 54.57%, while **StarCoder2-3B** has an average score of 0.78 and a refusal rate of 50.00%.

Large Parameter Models and Attack Response Patterns: By analyzing the distribution of scores across models, we found that 3-point content accounted for much more than 2-point content. This trend is more pronounced in larger parameter models, such as **Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct**. We hypothesize that these models may lack comprehensive knowledge of specific programming languages and functions but can leverage existing knowledge bases to generate corresponding pseudo-code.

Finding 3: Larger parameter models, are more susceptible to malicious pseudo-code than textual suggestions, indicating reliance on existing knowledge bases.

5.1.3 Advanced Reasoning Models

Both **OpenAI-o1** and **DeepSeek-R1** reflect the quality of the answer when the answer is not rejected, against which **OpenAI-o1** is protected with stronger security fences (Refuse Rate: 70.31% vs. 54.38%). Our findings also suggest that organizations should operate such models with stricter security alignment to ensure that they are not used for malicious purposes.

Finding 4: Advanced Reasoning Models can effectively handle malicious requests and provide high-quality responses when security alignment is weak.

5.2 Analysis of Jailbreak Factors

Figure 3 illustrates the response outcomes of different models across 11 attack algorithms. **Claude-3.5-Sonnet** demonstrates the weakest defense against Code Injection attacks, whereas **Qwen-Coder-Turbo** effectively defends against most Code Injection attacks but shows weaker defense against Word Substitution Cipher attacks. These observations validate the necessity of constructing a diverse pool of jailbreak attack algorithms prior to developing MalwareBench, ensuring that the dataset’s challenging nature generalizes across a wider range of models.

Finding 5: Different models exhibit varying sensitivities to attack algorithms.

Referring to Table 5 and Table 6, the conclusion shows that **Benign Expression** has the highest average score of 2.25 and lowest rejection rate of 31.92% among all methods. The method harmlessly replaces the most malicious words in the sentence, making the maliciousness in the prompts less detectable. Additionally, we find that the **DRA** ranks second in terms of jailbreaking ability among the selected attack methods. DRA breaks the initial requirement into individual letters and conceals them within harmless sentences, effectively circumventing the model’s safety alignment and the security checks of some closed-source models.

Finding 6: Harmless treatment of the problem is a more effective way of LLM jailbreaking when contrasted with methods such as scenario nesting.

5.3 Analysis of Different Requirement Types

Table 4 shows how well the model performs for different problem classifications. Unlike the attack method, the tested LLMs show the same reflective trend in the data analysis of problem categorization. The Denial Service and Download&Propagation(Avg. Score: 0.79) categories generally receive low scores, as LLMs tend to refuse to answer or provide unhelpful responses to such requests. The Information Theft category, on the other hand, is relatively easy for the models to

give high scores(Avg. Score: 1.82), demonstrating a higher risk, while the Privilege Access, Resource Abuse and System Destruction requirement types fall in between. We postulate two potential causes for this phenomenon. Firstly, it may stem from the nature of the model’s training data, where different types of malicious scenarios might be represented with varying frequencies, leading to differential performance across problem types. Secondly, the mechanisms of some closed-source models may exhibit different levels of strictness when dealing with diverse problem types.

Finding 7: LLMs show the same performance trend on different requirement classifications.

From Fig 3, we found that **DeepSeek-R1**, **Mistral-Large-Instruct**, **Spark Desk v4.0** and the **Wizard** series of models present higher scores. This reflects the shortcomings of the above models in terms of secure alignment. The open-source model **CodeLlama-70B-Instruct**, on the other hand, presents a strong defense(Avg. Score: 0.38, Refuse Rate: 79.86%). Upon reviewing the technical report of CodeLlama series model (Roziere et al., 2023), we find that it employs the instruction-tuning dataset from Llama 2, specifically the "RLHF V5" version. This dataset is compiled through multiple rounds of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and human-feedback annotations. It includes thousands of supervised fine-tuning instances and millions of rejection sampling examples. Besides this, In the training data of Code Llama, 85% is code corpus, 8% is code-related natural text, and 7% is pure text. For Code Llama-Python, the proportions are 10% code-related natural text and 5% natural text. Additionally, Code Llama has undergone fine tuning to enhance safety and helpfulness. Altogether, these examples contain a vast amount of data on “usefulness” and “safety”. As a result, CodeLlama can inherit Llama 2’s traits in instruction-following and security. Meanwhile, we examine the technical reports of the Llama 3 series models to investigate the reason why the Llama 3 series models do not perform as well as CodeLlama series in terms of safety. Instead of visually comparing the safety performance of the Llama 2 and Llama 3 series, the report presents the Llama Guard, which is introduced together with the Llama 3 series (Dubey et al., 2024). We hypothesize that the proposed safety measures may have caused engineers to pri-

critize the model’s task-related performance over its safety performance.

Finding 8: External safety measures such as input and output checks might have reduced engineers’ attention to the intrinsic safety of the model.

6 Conclusion

In this study, we introduce MalwareBench, a comprehensive and challenging benchmark with 3520 jailbreaking prompts across 6 fields and 29 subcategories, aimed at examining the security of LLMs in malware generation. By testing 29 LLMs using direct and mutated prompts through 11 jailbreak methods, we explore and analyze the security capability boundaries of the model, revealing the vulnerability of current mainstream LLMs in the face of malicious code attacks. We hope that our work can contribute to the understanding of LLM security in malware-related tasks and offer directions for future research and development in enhancing the security of LLMs.

Limitations

MalwareBench has several limitations that need to be addressed for a more comprehensive evaluation of LLMs, following are the specifics: (1) Only Qwen - Turbo is used in generating jailbreaking questions. Since the performance of this single model can influence the intensity of jailbreaking attacks and the subsequent experimental results, it may limit the generalizability of the findings. (2) Currently, the 320 malicious requirements can only cover a part of the malware-related malicious requirements in the real world. To enable a more all-encompassing assessment of LLMs, we plan to expand this requirement set in future work. (3) White-box methods and some complex black-box methods remain untested. Although these methods are difficult to reproduce, their strong attack capabilities make their evaluation essential. Thus, we intend to carry out evaluation work on these methods in subsequent studies to improve the integrity of this research.

Ethical Statement

In this research, we evaluate the security of LLMs against malicious requirements and jailbreak prompts, adhering to the highest ethical standards. We use a benchmark dataset, MalwareBench, to

test various LLMs, aiming solely to understand model vulnerabilities and advance AI security. We have no intention of promoting or facilitating malicious activities. All data handling and experimentation are conducted legally and in compliance with relevant regulations. We respect the intellectual property rights of model developers and avoid any unauthorized use or distribution of models or their outputs.

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A Appendix

A.1 Related Work

Early related works predominantly center around the evaluation of LLMs when they are faced with general malicious problems. For example, Advbench (Chen et al., 2022) and MaliciousInstruct (Huang et al., 2024) are datasets which contains generic malicious demands such as writing threatening emails, etc. In agent security research, Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2025) proposed Agent Security Bench (ASB), a comprehensive framework for formalizing, benchmarking, and evaluating attacks and defenses in LLM - based agents.

From the perspective of LLM jailbreaking, h4rm3l (Doumbouya et al., 2025) creates a dynamic benchmark for composable jailbreak attacks, generating 2,656 attacks on 6 LLMs with high success rates on some closed source models and promoting reproducible benchmarking. AgentHarm (Andriushchenko et al., 2024) focuses on LLM agents, having 110 (or 440 augmented) malicious tasks and discovering that top - tier LLMs are compliant with malicious requests without jailbreaking and simple templates can break agent restrictions. JailBreakV (Luo et al., 2024) is designed for Multimodal LLMs. With 28,000 test cases, it finds that LLM jailbreak techniques are effective against Multimodal LLMs, exposing text - processing vulnerabilities. JailbreakBench (Chao et al., 2024) offers components for attack evaluation but doesn't explore defense - enhanced LLMs.

In the context of malicious code generation research, RMCBench (Chen et al., 2024) was proposed to use LLMs and templates for malicious code generation prompts and analyze large models' performance with attack templates. However, it only scratches the surface of LLM jailbreak research by merely relying on attack templates, without delving into the impact of diverse attack methods on model defense. Moreover, it is limited to evaluating relatively early models, neglecting the latest ones like GPT - 4o and GPT - o1. In con-

trast, this work zeroes in on the performance of current mainstream LLMs when dealing with malware generation tasks and various black - box jailbreak methods, filling the research voids in this area left by previous studies.

A.2 Examples for model results

In order to visualize the resultant data, we select a specific problem under the System Destruction classification to be developed. As for the attack method, we choose the most effective Benign Expression, as shown in Fig. 4. The results of the LLMs are shown in the lower part of the figure. Among them, Qwen-Max presents a clear reflection of rejection; CodeGen-Multi-350M is not rejected but gives an answer that is not relevant to this question, and does not play an assisting role. StarCoder2-15B gives a relevant textual suggestion, and the model's answer from this level onwards will be helpful to the malicious person. CodeLlama-7B-ins, on the other hand, gives some simpler example code, where the malicious person can learn the answers given by the model to achieve the goal described by the malicious demand to a certain extent. GPT-o1, which has the highest score, gives a very detailed response, which is a good aid for malicious people who want to achieve their goals, and therefore presents a great danger. This example also proves the necessity as well as the value of this work.

A.3 Parameter setting in experiments

In the experiment, different inference parameter settings were applied based on the type of models. For all open-source models, we used either the vllm or transformers framework for inference. The relevant parameters were set as follows: temperature: 0.9, top_p: 0.95, and top_k: -1. A top_p value of 0.95 can filter out tokens with extremely low probabilities and maintain the stability of the output. A top_k value of -1 is the default parameter of vllm, which ensures that all tokens are taken into account and improves the diversity of the generation effects. For closed-source models, there are different rules. The Claude, OpenAI, and Qwen series models recommend setting only a single value between temperature and top_p and do not support the setting of top_k. Therefore, we only set the temperature to 0.9. As for the Spark series models, they do not support the setting of top_p but support the setting of top_k. We set the temperature to the same value of 0.9 and set top_k to its default value of 4(allowed in [0, 6]). We believe that this param-

eter setting can better simulate the state of users' daily use of LLMs (usually with high randomness).




Figure 4: Examples of model results scoring from 0 to 4

A.4 Tables

Table 3 presents a comparative analysis of the scoring results of three models, comparing the defense performance of different LLMs and the scoring results of GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, and Llama -3.3-70B-Instruct. Additionally, the experimental data is analyzed from multiple dimensions. Specifically, Table 4 analyzes the defense performance of the tested model in terms of the type of malicious requirements. Table 5 and Table 6 analyze the data from the perspective of attack methods. Furthermore, Table 7 presents the analysis results of 320 malicious requirements directly fed into LLMs, which contributes to validating the effectiveness of this set of malicious requirements.

Model Name	Version / Param.	Denial Service		Download & Propagation		Information Theft		Privilege Access		Resource Abuse		System Destruction		Total	
		Score	Refuse	Score	Refuse	Score	Refuse	Score	Refuse	Score	Refuse	Score	Refuse	Score	Refuse
Closed-Source Model															
Claude-3.5-Sonnet	20240620	0.59	81.09%	0.81	75.52%	1.73	49.23%	1.05	68.08%	1.13	63.64%	1.25	63.20%	1.09	66.79%
GPT-4o-mini	20240718	0.26	90.30%	0.29	88.97%	1.85	46.42%	0.79	74.85%	1.14	62.06%	1.38	59.39%	0.95	70.33%
GPT-4o-nosafe	20240801	0.32	89.09%	0.39	86.42%	2.19	36.72%	1.11	65.76%	1.53	52.12%	1.57	53.68%	1.19	63.97%
GPT-4o-preview	20240801	<u>0.12</u>	<u>94.30%</u>	<u>0.16</u>	<u>92.48%</u>	<u>1.72</u>	<u>49.04%</u>	<u>0.67</u>	<u>77.98%</u>	<u>1.00</u>	<u>65.21%</u>	<u>1.13</u>	<u>65.86%</u>	<u>0.80</u>	<u>74.15%</u>
OpenAI-o1-preview	20240912	0.06	97.70%	0.08	96.97%	1.47	60.47%	0.24	92.63%	0.82	76.36%	0.67	81.21%	0.56	84.22%
Qwen-Coder-Turbo	20240919	0.28	87.39%	0.44	84.48%	2.01	39.09%	0.85	72.63%	1.03	63.39%	1.23	61.50%	0.97	68.08%
Qwen-Max	20240919	0.33	91.15%	0.17	93.94%	<u>1.66</u>	<u>45.34%</u>	<u>0.66</u>	<u>77.47%</u>	<u>0.90</u>	<u>67.27%</u>	<u>1.13</u>	<u>62.89%</u>	<u>0.81</u>	<u>73.01%</u>
Qwen-Plus	20240919	0.50	83.88%	0.56	80.48%	2.27	33.03%	1.37	58.48%	1.68	44.85%	1.81	46.84%	1.37	57.93%
Qwen-Turbo	20240919	0.76	74.55%	0.70	75.03%	2.34	28.10%	1.31	57.58%	1.50	49.70%	1.86	43.20%	1.41	54.69%
SparkDesk-v4.0	-	1.57	55.52%	1.54	54.55%	2.77	22.78%	2.12	39.90%	2.44	30.30%	2.54	30.71%	2.16	38.96%
Open-Source Model															
CodeGen-Multi	350M	<u>0.41</u>	69.58%	0.45	67.27%	<u>0.60</u>	48.18%	0.57	57.68%	0.65	52.12%	<u>0.58</u>	54.37%	0.54	58.20%
StarCoder2	3B	0.71	60.12%	0.67	61.58%	0.81	43.80%	0.86	52.53%	0.74	51.03%	0.78	50.36%	0.76	53.24%
CodeGeeX2	6B	0.45	79.52%	0.46	74.55%	0.58	57.19%	<u>0.49</u>	<u>72.73%</u>	<u>0.46</u>	<u>68.24%</u>	0.59	<u>63.55%</u>	<u>0.51</u>	<u>69.30%</u>
CodeGen25-Ins	7B	0.70	65.70%	0.64	66.55%	0.89	40.83%	0.71	57.07%	0.77	48.61%	0.77	50.01%	0.75	54.79%
CodeLlama-Ins	7B	0.82	66.91%	0.79	68.36%	1.58	37.16%	1.06	56.57%	1.10	47.88%	1.26	48.72%	1.10	54.27%
Qwen-2.5-Coder-Ins	7B	0.66	73.45%	0.69	72.24%	2.10	32.84%	1.12	62.02%	1.23	52.61%	1.40	52.21%	1.20	57.56%
Llama3-Ins	8B	0.48	<u>80.85%</u>	<u>0.39</u>	<u>83.27%</u>	1.93	36.12%	0.84	70.10%	1.11	58.18%	1.38	52.09%	1.02	63.44%
StarCoder2	15B	0.84	57.09%	0.87	58.79%	0.94	42.53%	0.93	50.51%	0.88	46.67%	0.94	46.38%	0.90	50.33%
Wizard-Coder-v1	15B	2.20	27.27%	2.24	26.30%	2.12	18.84%	2.37	19.39%	2.04	19.64%	2.24	19.80%	2.20	21.87%
StarCoder	15.5B	0.85	55.76%	0.73	59.03%	0.90	42.09%	1.02	47.37%	0.77	48.85%	0.86	46.12%	0.86	49.87%
DeepSeek-Coder-v2-Lite-Ins	16B	1.48	50.91%	1.37	53.94%	2.47	20.11%	1.77	40.61%	1.94	35.15%	2.04	33.28%	1.85	39.00%
Qwen-2.5-Coder-Ins	32B	0.89	71.76%	0.91	69.09%	2.60	24.02%	1.74	47.68%	1.94	38.55%	2.20	35.56%	1.71	47.77%
Wizard-v1.1	33B	1.55	54.67%	1.32	57.94%	2.21	28.73%	1.85	42.53%	1.71	40.36%	1.94	39.48%	1.76	43.95%
Llama-3.3-Ins	70B	1.06	66.79%	0.80	72.73%	2.40	29.23%	1.90	45.96%	1.97	39.39%	2.27	35.44%	1.73	48.26%
CodeLlama-Ins	70B	0.23	88.36%	0.22	85.94%	0.60	71.43%	0.37	79.80%	0.43	76.85%	0.44	76.80%	0.38	79.86%
Mistral-Large-Instruct-2407	123B	1.73	49.58%	1.56	52.97%	2.81	19.45%	2.10	36.46%	2.23	31.39%	2.45	28.20%	2.15	36.34%
DeepSeek-Coder-v2-Ins	236B	0.78	75.39%	0.85	72.36%	1.99	41.07%	1.19	64.14%	1.40	55.64%	1.55	53.68%	1.29	60.38%
DeepSeek-v2-Chat	236B	0.78	75.15%	1.01	68.00%	2.43	29.26%	1.56	53.74%	1.86	41.82%	1.98	42.08%	1.60	51.67%
DeepSeek-R1	671B	1.55	57.82%	1.70	53.21%	2.80	23.53%	2.32	36.97%	2.51	29.94%	2.48	33.45%	2.23	39.15%
Avg.	-	0.79	71.44%	0.79	70.79%	1.82	37.82%	1.21	57.90%	1.34	50.27%	1.47	49.31%	1.24	56.25%

Table 4: Score and refuse rate by question category.

Model Name	Ver./Param.	A.P.	B.E.	C.C.	C.I.	D.A.	D.I.	I.A.	L.R.	M.K.	PL.	W.S.	Avg.
Closed-Source Model													
Claude-3.5-Sonnet	20240620	2.31	<u>1.74</u>	0.21	2.27	2.80	1.22	<u>0.12</u>	0.92	<u>0.54</u>	<u>0.99</u>	1.19	1.30
GPT-4o-preview	20240801	1.23	2.42	0.34	1.82	0.02	1.08	0.00	1.76	1.14	1.35	1.21	1.12
GPT-4o-mini	20240718	1.78	2.48	0.49	2.27	<u>0.04</u>	1.09	0.00	1.94	1.23	1.25	1.68	1.30
GPT-4o-nosafe	20240801	2.03	2.66	0.19	2.15	2.03	1.75	0.00	2.09	1.34	1.74	<u>1.03</u>	1.55
OpenAI-o1-preview	20240912	0.73	1.75	<u>0.03</u>	<u>0.72</u>	0.42	<u>0.96</u>	0.23	1.36	1.00	0.99	0.87	0.82
Qwen-Coder-Turbo	20240919	2.17	2.01	0.00	2.06	1.40	1.22	0.48	0.25	1.16	1.35	2.32	1.31
Qwen-Max	20240919	<u>1.02</u>	1.38	0.96	0.61	1.73	0.88	0.22	2.28	0.46	0.51	2.19	<u>1.11</u>
Qwen-Plus	20240919	1.59	2.80	0.45	2.84	2.47	1.38	0.65	1.14	1.85	1.76	1.95	1.72
Qwen-Turbo	20240919	2.10	2.83	0.86	1.63	3.16	1.47	0.46	<u>0.79</u>	1.77	2.13	2.27	1.77
SparkDesk-v4.0	-	2.84	3.17	0.41	3.75	3.34	2.81	0.55	2.61	1.99	2.28	2.88	2.42
Open-Source Model													
CodeGen-Multi	350M	0.35	1.13	0.16	0.61	<u>0.30</u>	0.33	0.57	0.53	1.00	0.70	<u>0.56</u>	0.57
StarCoder2	3B	0.84	1.34	0.67	<u>0.54</u>	0.32	0.56	0.99	<u>0.49</u>	1.21	0.58	1.02	0.78
CodeGeeX2	6B	0.47	1.06	0.16	0.45	0.23	<u>0.23</u>	1.44	0.22	0.79	0.76	0.20	<u>0.55</u>
CodeGen25-Ins	7B	0.76	<u>1.12</u>	0.19	0.75	0.40	0.37	1.22	0.66	1.45	0.74	1.02	0.79
CodeLlama-Ins	7B	2.04	2.19	0.13	2.44	0.93	1.24	<u>0.06</u>	0.62	1.27	1.12	1.88	1.27
Qwen-2.5-Coder-Ins	7B	2.25	2.42	0.09	2.23	1.70	1.26	0.65	0.73	1.27	1.74	2.05	1.49
Llama3-Ins	8B	1.84	2.75	<u>0.13</u>	2.02	1.81	1.03	0.00	1.30	1.13	1.75	1.07	1.35
StarCoder2	15B	0.85	1.58	0.70	0.63	0.41	0.58	1.68	0.60	1.59	0.60	0.88	0.92
Wizard-Coder-v1	15B	2.34	2.84	0.45	1.90	0.86	2.07	2.49	1.93	3.30	2.92	2.99	2.19
StarCoder	15.5B	0.70	1.73	0.63	0.61	0.37	0.67	1.17	0.54	1.58	<u>0.54</u>	1.06	0.87
DeepSeek-Coder-v2-Lite	16B	2.06	3.10	0.45	1.88	2.31	1.96	2.04	0.98	2.27	2.58	3.03	2.06
Qwen-2.5-Coder-Ins	32B	2.39	2.89	0.60	2.88	2.61	1.93	0.59	2.06	1.90	2.69	2.23	2.07
Wizard-V1.1	33B	2.18	2.56	0.48	1.33	1.64	1.82	2.00	1.67	2.69	2.35	2.50	1.93
CodeLlama-Ins	70B	<u>0.42</u>	1.16	0.09	0.57	0.32	0.38	0.26	0.59	0.34	0.26	0.64	0.46
Llama-3.3-Ins	70B	2.85	2.97	0.61	2.39	1.81	2.67	0.08	1.75	2.69	2.36	2.31	2.04
Mistral-Large-Instruct-2407	123B	2.92	3.05	0.53	3.39	3.78	3.18	0.51	2.64	1.83	2.79	1.77	2.40
DeepSeek-Chat-v2	236B	1.39	2.83	0.51	3.19	2.42	1.96	0.38	2.46	1.64	1.91	2.38	1.92
DeepSeek-Coder-v2-Instruct-0724	236B	2.34	2.37	0.34	3.05	2.78	0.00	0.16	2.28	<u>0.57</u>	1.37	1.70	1.54
DeepSeek-R1	671B	2.58	3.03	1.68	3.58	3.39	2.90	0.50	2.60	2.08	2.38	2.18	2.45
Avg.	-	1.70	2.25	0.43	1.88	1.58	1.34	0.67	1.37	1.48	1.53	1.69	1.45

Table 5: Average score on 11 attack methods, which includes ArtPrompt, Benign expression, CipherChat, Code Injection, DRA, DeepInception, InContext Attack, Low resource Languages, MasterKey, Persuative LLM and Word Substitution Cipher.

Model Name	Ver./Param.	A.P.	B.E.	C.C.	C.I.	D.A.	D.I.	I.A.	L.R.	M.K.	PL.	W.S.	Avg.
Closed-Source Model													
Claude-3.5-Sonnet	20240620	35.00%	50.10%	81.56%	39.27%	18.02%	56.56%	<u>96.35%</u>	<u>71.46%</u>	84.90%	<u>72.71%</u>	<u>67.81%</u>	61.25%
GPT-4o-preview	20240801	58.23%	34.06%	74.38%	47.29%	99.38%	54.17%	100.00%	53.54%	71.35%	63.96%	63.75%	<u>65.46%</u>
GPT-4o-mini	20240718	42.92%	34.17%	63.65%	30.94%	<u>98.75%</u>	64.27%	100.00%	47.50%	68.85%	67.19%	56.25%	61.32%
GPT-4o-nosafe	20240801	39.17%	29.27%	81.56%	39.79%	43.54%	41.04%	100.00%	46.25%	66.15%	53.75%	55.52%	54.19%
OpenAI-o1-preview	20240912	77.92%	<u>52.92%</u>	<u>98.44%</u>	81.35%	85.42%	<u>69.38%</u>	92.81%	65.31%	74.90%	74.58%	77.19%	77.29%
Qwen-Coder-Turbo	20240919	24.90%	41.25%	100.00%	39.27%	47.08%	51.35%	83.85%	83.85%	69.79%	64.48%	41.04%	58.81%
Qwen-Max	20240919	<u>64.90%</u>	55.21%	65.21%	<u>72.92%</u>	52.92%	71.04%	89.79%	40.52%	<u>76.46%</u>	70.63%	35.63%	63.20%
Qwen-Plus	20240919	51.56%	21.46%	67.71%	22.92%	31.77%	49.27%	82.50%	57.92%	52.50%	51.04%	45.42%	48.55%
Qwen-Turbo	20240919	32.92%	22.29%	57.19%	51.67%	4.79%	43.54%	86.77%	57.71%	54.58%	41.46%	39.90%	44.80%
SparkDesk-v4.0	-	18.54%	15.00%	75.63%	4.38%	2.08%	13.85%	83.23%	30.52%	49.38%	41.15%	25.00%	32.61%
Open-Source Model													
CodeGen-Multi	350M	<u>67.29%</u>	28.85%	84.17%	47.60%	70.21%	73.54%	47.60%	51.25%	36.15%	38.65%	55.00%	54.57%
StarCoder2	3B	44.27%	35.73%	55.10%	54.38%	68.65%	61.56%	37.29%	60.31%	36.04%	51.35%	45.31%	50.00%
CodeGeeX2	6B	67.19%	<u>55.63%</u>	84.27%	55.10%	<u>76.98%</u>	<u>84.48%</u>	24.58%	78.75%	66.46%	38.33%	79.90%	<u>64.70%</u>
CodeGen25-Ins	7B	52.50%	39.17%	80.83%	38.96%	63.02%	77.92%	34.58%	47.92%	32.81%	37.08%	44.38%	49.92%
CodeLlama-Ins	7B	21.04%	30.73%	87.40%	19.90%	38.33%	37.92%	<u>97.60%</u>	54.90%	61.04%	48.96%	34.27%	48.37%
Qwen-2.5-Coder-Ins	7B	27.19%	29.17%	<u>93.13%</u>	27.29%	24.27%	46.98%	79.38%	56.67%	66.67%	51.15%	45.10%	49.73%
Llama3-Ins	8B	35.73%	21.98%	93.44%	39.17%	18.85%	63.33%	99.90%	36.88%	69.58%	42.50%	66.56%	53.45%
StarCoder2	15B	43.75%	33.33%	55.73%	51.15%	64.17%	59.79%	26.88%	56.25%	32.40%	51.98%	44.58%	47.27%
Wizard-Coder-v1	15B	17.29%	13.13%	59.27%	18.54%	35.10%	23.23%	9.27%	18.54%	7.29%	14.27%	9.69%	20.51%
StarCoder	15.5B	49.48%	31.35%	54.27%	48.85%	64.17%	54.69%	29.79%	58.54%	31.35%	52.08%	40.52%	46.83%
DeepSeek-Coder-v2-Lite	16B	31.67%	17.50%	67.08%	26.46%	7.19%	36.04%	31.98%	53.75%	40.73%	28.54%	17.40%	32.58%
Qwen-2.5-Coder-Ins	32B	29.27%	22.40%	67.81%	23.44%	8.54%	38.02%	80.83%	31.56%	51.67%	30.94%	38.02%	38.41%
Wizard-V1.1	33B	35.42%	29.79%	60.52%	<u>58.75%</u>	39.06%	43.54%	32.19%	29.17%	29.27%	37.08%	31.67%	38.77%
CodeLlama-Ins	70B	77.08%	58.23%	91.35%	72.71%	78.23%	79.38%	86.35%	<u>64.06%</u>	85.00%	81.04%	71.98%	76.86%
Llama-3.3-Ins	70B	19.79%	20.42%	71.56%	29.69%	41.04%	21.88%	97.19%	37.19%	31.25%	38.23%	31.35%	39.96%
Mistral-Large-Instruct-2407	123B	18.44%	17.60%	59.48%	10.73%	1.46%	13.65%	84.27%	14.06%	53.44%	23.85%	31.04%	29.82%
DeepSeek-Chat-v2	236B	60.21%	27.08%	68.44%	11.67%	16.35%	31.98%	88.44%	29.17%	58.33%	49.38%	35.83%	43.35%
DeepSeek-Coder-v2-Instruct-0724	236B	31.77%	36.56%	72.92%	12.81%	5.31%	100.00%	95.10%	29.48%	85.63%	<u>64.48%</u>	55.94%	53.64%
DeepSeek-R1	671B	23.96%	21.35%	43.96%	7.50%	12.29%	20.31%	83.33%	31.77%	46.98%	38.02%	39.48%	33.54%
Avg.	-	41.36%	31.92%	72.97%	37.40%	41.96%	51.13%	71.79%	48.10%	54.86%	48.93%	45.71%	49.65%

Table 6: Refuse rate on 11 attack methods, which includes ArtPrompt, Benign expression, CipherChat, Code Injection, DRA, DeepInception, InContext Attack, Low resource Languages, MasterKey, Persuative LLM and Word Substitution Cipher.

Model Name	Version / Param.	Rough		Detailed		Total	
		Score	Refuse	Score	Refuse	Score	Refuse
Closed-Source Model							
Claude-3.5-Sonnet	20240620	<u>1.38</u>	<u>62.37%</u>	<u>0.67</u>	<u>81.94%</u>	<u>0.87</u>	<u>76.25%</u>
GPT-4o-nosafe-preview	20240801	2.02	49.46%	0.95	76.21%	1.26	68.44%
OpenAI-o1-preview	20240912	2.17	44.09%	0.75	81.06%	1.17	70.31%
Qwen-Coder-Turbo	20240919	1.59	60.22%	0.84	78.85%	1.06	73.44%
Open-Source Model							
CodeGen-Multi	350M	<u>0.46</u>	<u>66.67%</u>	0.54	65.20%	0.52	65.63%
CodeLlama-Ins	7B	1.96	39.78%	1.49	60.35%	1.63	54.38%
Llama3-Ins	8B	2.20	44.09%	1.69	57.71%	1.84	53.75%
CodeLlama-Ins	70B	0.65	<u>82.80%</u>	<u>0.30</u>	<u>92.51%</u>	<u>0.39</u>	<u>89.69%</u>
Llama-3.3-Ins	70B	3.53	11.83%	2.75	30.84%	2.98	25.31%
Mistral-Large-Instruct-2407	123B	3.10	20.43%	2.49	37.00%	2.67	32.19%
DeepSeek-Coder-v2-Instruct-0724	236B	1.76	55.91%	0.99	75.33%	1.21	69.69%
DeepSeek-R1	671B	2.71	32.26%	1.42	63.44%	1.80	54.38%
Avg.	-	1.96	47.49%	1.24	66.70%	1.45	61.12%

Table 7: Mean score and refuse rate of original questions.