	An experiment by Subbotsky demonstrates that even non-life-threatening circumstances can yield similar non-rational behavior in adults.  As the risks of maintaining rational cause-effect beliefs increase, alternate modes of reasoning may come into play to safeguard the self against perceived threats.
	In 1997, Subbotsky conducted a series of experiments to test his hypotheses on the coexistence of multiple forms of reasoning in adults and children.  His fourth experiment consisted of 28 university students who were asked to place a postage stamp inside a box that was rigged to exchange the original postage stamp with one that had been cut in half once the box was closed.  While the box was sealed, an experimenter performed separate manipulations in front of the participant, one of which involved using a small piece of paper which he cut it in half with a pair of scissors.  Afterward, the participant was asked to open the box, revealing the severed postage stamp.  Ostensibly, then, a relationship could be drawn between the experimenter's manipulation and the stamp's destruction, although in reality no such cause-effect relationship occurred.  The next trial of the experiment required the participants to deposit their driving license in the box and shut the lid.  Then, the experimenter asked whether or not the participant would allow him to perform the same manipulations as he did during the postage-stamp trial.  Participants could forbid the experimenter from performing one or more manipulations, or allow all the manipulations to take place.
	Contrary to the results from Subbotsky's first experiment, in which almost none of the adults explained the alteration of the postage stamp using phenomenalistic reasoning, six out of fourteen participants in this experiment expressly forbade the experimenter from one or more manipulations while their driving license was inside the box.  The result of this experiment sheds light on the fact that expressions of phenomenalistic belief are not limited only to the verbal domain, but can also be reflected behaviorally (e.g. participants disallowing the experimenter's manipulations while continuing to express incredulity about the experimenter's “magic” ability).  Subbotsky claims that “the very speed with which many adults shifted from a clear rejection of the phenomenalistic causal connection to an acceptance of it . . . shows that there was a certain 'residue' in the adults' minds that enable such a critical and fast shift”.
	A residual dependence on cause-effect reasoning not in line with scientifically based beliefs also cropped up in a sample of 6- and 9-year-old children that participated in Subbotsky's first experiment.  The experiment followed the same general procedures as his aforementioned fourth experiment: participants were asked to place a postage stamp inside a box that would substitute the original stamp with an altered stamp once the box was closed; while the box was closed, an experimenter performed various manipulations of objects in plain sight of the participants.  Then, the participant was asked to reopen the box, only to find that the stamp inside had been altered.  Next, participants were asked if they thought the experimenter's manipulations had caused the stamp inside the box to be physically changed.  The majority of children believed that the manipulations had caused the alteration of the postage stamp; adult participants who believed the manipulations had affected the stamp, on the other hand, were in the minority.  That children are more susceptible to phenomenalistic explanations is apparent based on the fact that they readily made a connection between two unrelated events (manipulations of objects and the alteration of a postage stamp), latching onto the experimenter's manipulations as the cause of the postage stamp's change in appearance.  However, very few associated the inexplicable event as arising from any “magic” on the experimenter's part.  Thus, Subbotsky conducted an additional experiment with the object of assessing if children's tendencies toward phenomenalistic thinking could indeed develop into magical thinking given certain conditions.
