Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have made significant strides in multimodal comprehension, thanks to extensive pre-training and fine-tuning on large-scale visual datasets. However, despite their robust textual safety mechanisms, they remain vulnerable to harmful visual inputs. Existing safeguards—typically relying on pre-filtering or fine-tuning—incur high costs and diminish overall utility. To address this critical vulnerability, we introduce SafeCLIP, a lightweight method that leverages LVLMs’ inherent multimodal alignment for zero-shot toxic image detection. By projecting CLIP’s discarded CLS token into its text space and matching it with toxic descriptors, SafeCLIP detects harmful content without any architectural changes—adding minimal latency and enabling dynamic safety corrections during inference and fine-tuning. Experiments show that SafeCLIP achieves a 66.9% defense success rate with only 3.2% false positive rate and 7.2% overhead. In contrast, state-of-the-art methods achieve 52.9% success but have a 10.7% false positive rate and 210% overhead. Our work demonstrates that leveraging inherent multimodal alignment can yield efficient, low-cost LVLM safety. Code is available at anonymous.4open.science/r/safeclip-2C01.

Influence functions are important for quantifying the impact of individual training data points on a model’s predictions. Although extensive research has been conducted on influence functions in traditional machine learning models, their application to large language models (LLMs) has been limited. In this work, we conduct a systematic study to address a key question: do influence functions work on LLMs? Specifically, we evaluate influence functions across multiple tasks and find that they consistently perform poorly in most settings. Our further investigation reveals that their poor performance can be attributed to: (1) inevitable approximation errors when estimating the iHVP component due to the scale of LLMs, (2) uncertain convergence during fine-tuning, and, more fundamentally, (3) the definition itself, as changes in model parameters do not necessarily correlate with changes in LLM behavior. Thus, our study suggests the need for alternative approaches for identifying influential samples.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being adopted in a wide range of real-world applications. Despite their impressive performance, recent studies have shown that LLMs are vulnerable to deliberately crafted adversarial prompts even when aligned via Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback or supervised fine-tuning. While existing defense methods focus on either detecting harmful prompts or reducing the likelihood of harmful responses through various means, defending LLMs against jailbreak attacks based on the inner mechanisms of LLMs remains largely unexplored. In this work, we investigate how LLMs respond to harmful prompts and propose a novel defense method termed Layer-specific Editing (LED) to enhance the resilience of LLMs against jailbreak attacks. Through LED, we reveal that several critical safety layers exist among the early layers of LLMs. We then show that realigning these safety layers (and some selected additional layers) with the decoded safe response from identified toxic layers can significantly improve the alignment of LLMs against jailbreak attacks. Extensive experiments across various LLMs (e.g., Llama2, Mistral) show the effectiveness of LED, which effectively defends against jailbreak attacks while maintaining performance on benign prompts. Our code is available at https://github.com/ledllm/ledllm.