Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated an impressive level of general knowledge. However, they often struggle in highly specialized and sensitive domains such as drug discovery and rare disease research due to the lack of expert knowledge, which is often costly to obtain. In this paper, we propose a novel framework (PU-ADKA) designed to efficiently enhance domain-specific LLMs by actively engaging domain experts within a fixed budget. Unlike traditional fine-tuning approaches, PU-ADKA proactively identifies and queries the most appropriate expert from a team, taking into account each expert’s availability, competency, knowledge boundaries, and consultation cost. We train PU-ADKA using simulations on PubMed publication data and validate it through domain expert interactions, showing promising improvements in LLM domain knowledge acquisition. Furthermore, our experiments with a real-world drug development team validate that PU-ADKA can significantly enhance LLM performance in specialized domains while adhering to strict budget constraints. In addition to outlining our methodological innovations and experimental results, we release a new benchmark dataset, CKAD, for cost-effective LLM domain knowledge acquisition to foster further research in this challenging area.

Retrieval-Augmented Generative (RAG) models enhance Large Language Models (LLMs) by integrating external knowledge bases, improving their performance in applications like fact-checking and information searching. In this paper, we demonstrate a security threat where adversaries can exploit the openness of these knowledge bases by injecting deceptive content into the retrieval database, intentionally changing the model’s behavior. This threat is critical as it mirrors real-world usage scenarios where RAG systems interact with publicly accessible knowledge bases, such as web scrapings and user-contributed data pools. To be more realistic, we target a realistic setting where the adversary has no knowledge of users’ queries, knowledge base data, and the LLM parameters. We demonstrate that it is possible to exploit the model successfully through crafted content uploads with access to the retriever. Our findings emphasize an urgent need for security measures in the design and deployment of RAG systems to prevent potential manipulation and ensure the integrity of machine-generated content.

Sentence-level attacks craft adversarial sentences that are synonymous with correctly-classified sentences but are misclassified by the text classifiers. Under the black-box setting, classifiers are only accessible through their feedback to queried inputs, which is predominately available in the form of class probabilities. Even though utilizing class probabilities results in stronger attacks, due to the challenges of using them for sentence-level attacks, existing attacks use either no feedback or only the class labels. Overcoming the challenges, we develop a novel algorithm that uses class probabilities for black-box sentence-level attacks, investigate the effectiveness of using class probabilities on the attack’s success, and examine the question if it is worthy or practical to use class probabilities by black-box sentence-level attacks. We conduct extensive evaluations of the proposed attack comparing with the baselines across various classifiers and benchmark datasets.

In recent years, there has been a rapid proliferation of AI-generated text, primarily driven by the release of powerful pre-trained language models (PLMs). To address the issue of misuse associated with AI-generated text, various high-performing detectors have been developed, including the OpenAI detector and the Stanford DetectGPT. In our study, we ask how reliable these detectors are. We answer the question by designing a novel approach that can prompt any PLM to generate text that evades these high-performing detectors. The proposed approach suggests a universal evasive prompt, a novel type of soft prompt, which guides PLMs in producing “human-like” text that can mislead the detectors. The novel universal evasive prompt is achieved in two steps: First, we create an evasive soft prompt tailored to a specific PLM through prompt tuning; and then, we leverage the transferability of soft prompts to transfer the learned evasive soft prompt from one PLM to another. Employing multiple PLMs in various writing tasks, we conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the efficacy of the evasive soft prompts in their evasion of state-of-the-art detectors.