# SafeInt: Shielding Large Language Models from Jailbreak Attacks via Safety-Aware Representation Intervention

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## Abstract

With the widespread real-world deployment of large language models (LLMs), ensuring their behavior complies with safety standards has become crucial. Jailbreak attacks exploit vulnerabilities in LLMs to induce undesirable behavior, posing a significant threat to LLM safety. Previous defenses often fail to achieve both effectiveness and efficiency simultaneously. Defenses from a representation perspective offer new insights, but existing interventions cannot dynamically adjust representations based on the harmfulness of the queries. To address this limitation, we propose **SafeIntervention** (**SafeInt**), a novel defense method that shields LLMs from jailbreak attacks through safety-aware representation intervention. Built on our analysis of the representations of jailbreak samples, the core idea of SafeInt is to relocate jailbreak-related representations into the rejection region. This is achieved by intervening in the representation distributions of jailbreak samples to align them with those of unsafe samples. We conduct comprehensive experiments covering six jailbreak attacks, two jailbreak datasets, and two utility benchmarks. Experimental results demonstrate that SafeInt outperforms all baselines in defending LLMs against jailbreak attacks while largely maintaining utility. Additionally, we evaluate SafeInt against adaptive attacks and verify its effectiveness in mitigating real-time attacks. WARNING: This paper may contain content that is offensive and harmful.

## 1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) (OpenAI et al., 2024; Touvron et al., 2023; Grattafiori et al., 2024) have demonstrated remarkable performance across various domains (Zhang et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024). With their widespread application in real-world scenarios, LLMs face safety challenges (Ferrara, 2023; Ji et al., 2023). Although efforts (Wang et al., 2023a; Rafailov et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2023) have been made to align LLMs' behaviors with human values through carefully designed training strategies, recent studies (Zou et al., 2023b; Li et al., 2024b; Mehrotra et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024b) reveal that LLMs can still produce undesirable behaviors when subjected to well-crafted jailbreak attacks, such as the biased generation or potentially harmful responses.

Various defense methods have been proposed to address the growing threat of jailbreak attacks. Prompt-based defenses use instructions (Phute et al., 2024; Xie et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2024b) or context (Zhou et al., 2024a; Wei et al., 2024) to prevent LLMs from generating harmful content. However, prompt-based methods rely on manually crafted secure prompts and possibly lead to excessive self-censorship (Varshney et al., 2024), reducing the helpfulness of LLMs for benign queries. Detection-based defenses compute the perplexity of inputs (Alon and Kamfonas, 2023) or perturb them (Cao et al., 2024) to identify jailbreak prompts. Decoding-based defenses (Xu et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024a) reconstruct a safer output probability distribution through contrastive decoding. However, these methods often lack effectiveness or require additional inference overhead. We aim to defend LLMs against jailbreak attacks from a representation perspective, which provides a more controllable and efficient approach. Previous studies (Zou et al., 2023a; Rimsky et al., 2024) have shown the effectiveness of intervening representations to steer LLMs' behaviors, but such interventions cannot dynamically adjust representations based on whether a query is harmful. This limitation makes it challenging to leverage representations for mitigating jailbreak attacks.

In this paper, we analyze the representations of jailbreak samples on four LLMs. Our analysis uses a classifier as a proxy to investigate whether jailbreak representations are distinguishable and

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whether the representation distributions of different jailbreak methods are consistent. We derive two observations. First, in both intermediate and later layers of LLMs, the representations of jailbreak samples can be distinguished from those of safe or unsafe samples. Second, the consistency of the representation distributions across different jailbreak methods is observed in all LLMs, and it is generally more pronounced in the intermediate layers.

Building on these observations, we propose **SafeIntervention** (**SafeInt**), a novel defense method that shields LLMs from jailbreak attacks via safety-aware representation intervention. The representations of unsafe samples inherently characterize the rejection region of the LLM. However, jailbreak samples often produce representations that deviate from those of unsafe samples, causing the model to fail to trigger its built-in rejection behavior. The core idea of SafeInt is to relocate jailbreak-related representations into the rejection region, thereby activating the model's native refusal mechanisms. To achieve this, we first project the representations at an intermediate layer into a linear subspace, followed by a parameterized intervention. For jailbreak-related representations, we align their distribution with that of unsafe samples across the subsequent layers. For jailbreak-irrelevant representations, we perform representation reconstruction to preserve their original semantics. After training, SafeInt can adaptively intervene in jailbreak-related representations while seamlessly integrating into the LLM inference process.

We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of SafeInt, covering six jailbreak attacks, two jailbreak datasets, and two utility benchmarks. Experimental results show that SafeInt consistently outperforms all baselines in defending against jailbreak attacks. In most cases, SafeInt also maintains the best utility. Additionally, we evaluate SafeInt against adaptive attacks and verify the effectiveness of SafeInt in defending against real-time attacks. In summary, our main contributions are as follows:

- We observe that the representations of jailbreak samples are distinguishable and that the representation distributions of different jailbreak methods exhibit consistency.
- We propose SafeInt, a novel defense method that can adaptively identify and intervene in jailbreak-related representations to shield LLMs from jailbreak attacks.
- Extensive experiments show that SafeInt significantly outperforms all baselines in defending against jailbreak attacks while largely maintaining utility.

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 Representation Intervention

Representation intervention is an effective means of steering LLM behavior. By editing internal representations, it enhances or suppresses specific functions or concepts of the LLM. For a given decoder-only transformer model with $L$ layers, we denote the internal representation (or residual stream activation) of the last token at layer $l$ as $\mathbf{h}^{(l)} \in \mathbb{R}^d$. A typical form of representation intervention is:

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{h}}^{(l)} = \mathbf{h}^{(l)} \pm \epsilon \cdot \mathbf{v}. \tag{1}$$

Here, $\widetilde{\mathbf{h}}^{(l)}$ is the intervened representation, $\epsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ represents the intervention strength, and $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ denotes the intervention direction.

### 2.2 Analysis of Jailbreak Sample Representations

Recent works have investigated the representation distributions of unsafe and safe samples within LLMs, utilizing their distributional characteristics to enhance safety or facilitate jailbreaks. In this paper, we analyze the representation distributions of three types of samples after introducing jailbreak samples. We construct three training datasets: $\mathcal{D}_{\text{jailbreak}}$, which consists of jailbreak instructions generated only using GCG (Zou et al., 2023b) on AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023b); $\mathcal{D}_{\text{unsafe}}$, which includes harmful instructions extracted from MaliciousInstruct (Huang et al., 2023) and TDC2023 (Mazeika et al., 2023); and $\mathcal{D}_{\text{safe}}$, which contains harmless instructions sampled from Alpaca (Taori et al., 2023).[1] More details of the datasets are provided in Appendix A.1. We conduct our analysis on four LLMs: Qwen-7B-Chat (Bai et al., 2023), Llama-2-7B-Chat (Touvron et al., 2023), Llama-3-8B-Instruct (Grattafiori et al., 2024), and Vicuna-7B-v1.5 (Chiang et al., 2023). In each layer of the LLM, we train a logistic regression classifier to fit the representations of the three types of samples and report the test accuracy.

*Q1: Are the representations of jailbreak, unsafe, and safe samples distinguishable?*

[1] For convenience, we abbreviate these datasets as $\mathcal{D}_\text{j}$, $\mathcal{D}_\text{u}$, and $\mathcal{D}_\text{s}$ in the following.




Figure 1: Test accuracy of classifiers at different layers of LLMs, with the test set containing only GCG jailbreak samples.




Figure 2: Test accuracy of classifiers on a test set containing jailbreak samples from GCG, AutoDAN, and DeepInception.

In Figure 1, we present the classification accuracy on a test set containing only GCG jailbreak samples. Using the classifier as a proxy for observation, a higher classification accuracy indicates that the representations of the three types of samples are more distinguishable. For all LLMs, the test accuracy remains above 95% starting from the 10th or 11th layer. This indicates that the representations of the three types of samples become distinguishable from the intermediate layers of LLMs onward.

*Q2: Are the representation distributions of samples generated by different jailbreak methods consistent?*

We reconstruct a test set where jailbreak samples are composed of three methods: GCG, AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024b), and DeepInception (Li et al., 2024b). We employ the previously trained classifiers for testing and show the results in Figure 2. Since the classifiers are trained solely on GCG jailbreak samples, a high test accuracy reveals that the representations generated by different jailbreak methods exhibit a unified pattern from the classifier's perspective, indicating consistency.

We observe this consistency across different LLMs. For Qwen, Llama2, and Llama3, the accuracy remains above 90% in most layers. For Vicuna, the accuracy exceeding 90% is primarily observed in the intermediate layers. Although the trend of consistency across layers varies among different LLMs, it is generally more pronounced in the intermediate layers.

**Key Insights and Motivation** Aligned LLMs can reject unsafe samples, and the representations of these samples inherently characterize the model's rejection region. Since the representations of jailbreak samples differ from those of unsafe samples, they need to be relocated into the rejection region. Based on the distinguishability and distributional consistency of jailbreak representations, we aim to intervene in their representations to align their distribution with that of unsafe samples.

## 3 Method

In this section, we describe how SafeInt enhances the safety of LLMs. Figure 3 illustrates the diagram of SafeInt.

### 3.1 Representation Relocation

We achieve representation relocation by a targeted intervention that maps jailbreak-related representations into the rejection region defined by unsafe samples. According to the linear interpretability hypothesis commonly used in existing methods (Zhang et al., 2024a; Li et al., 2024a), deep model embeddings can be linearly transformed to correspond to specific human concepts. Thus, we aim to apply a parameterized intervention within a representation space that corresponds to safety-relevant concepts, minimizing impacts on other capabilities. Inspired by LoReFT (Wu et al., 2024), we project the representations into a linear subspace defined by a low-rank projection matrix. Assuming the intervention is applied at layer $\mathcal{I}$, it can be parameterized as follows:

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{h}}^{(\mathcal{I})} = \mathbf{h}^{(\mathcal{I})} + \mathbf{U}^{\top}\left(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{h}^{(\mathcal{I})}) - \mathbf{U}\mathbf{h}^{(\mathcal{I})}\right). \quad (2)$$

The matrix $\mathbf{U} \in \mathbb{R}^{r \times d}$ has orthonormal rows, where $r$ denotes the rank of the subspace. The function $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}$ is a linear relocation mapping defined as $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^r$.




Figure 3: The schematic of SafeInt. We apply the intervention (illustrated by the blue shield) at a specific layer and perform alignment in the subsequent layers. The distribution of jailbreak sample representations is adjusted to align with that of unsafe samples while minimizing shifts in the representations of safe and unsafe samples. With the original representation distribution, the LLM is successfully jailbroken and generates harmful content. After alignment, the LLM safely rejects the jailbreak instruction.

Then, we define the objectives for learning the intervention. Broadly, our objectives are twofold: a **safety objective** and a **utility objective**. The safety objective guarantees the intervention to help the LLM reject jailbreak and harmful instructions. The utility objective ensures that the intervention does not degrade the response quality for harmless instructions.

### 3.2 Representation Alignment

We use the classifier as a proxy to assess whether the distributions of jailbreak samples and unsafe samples are consistent in the representation space. From the perspective of the classifier, the alignment is achieved when the classification results for jailbreak and unsafe sample representations are consistent. Specifically, for jailbreak samples, we intervene on their representations to maximize the probability of being classified as unsafe. For unsafe sample representations, they should still be classified as unsafe with a high probability.

We denote the sets of original representations of $\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{j}$, $\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{u}$, and $\mathcal{D}_\mathrm{s}$ as $H_\mathrm{j}$, $H_\mathrm{u}$, and $H_\mathrm{s}$, respectively. The sets of intervened representations are denoted as $\widetilde{H}_\mathrm{j}$, $\widetilde{H}_\mathrm{u}$, and $\widetilde{H}_\mathrm{s}$. Let $\mathbb{L}^a$ be the set of layers to be aligned, with $\min(\mathbb{L}^a) > \mathcal{I}$. After applying the intervention at the layer $\mathcal{I}$, the updated representation is propagated to the subsequent layers. At layer $l \in \mathbb{L}^a$, we extract the latest representation $\widetilde{\mathbf{h}}^{(l)}$ and compute the following:

$$\mathcal{L}_{cls}^{(l)} = -\frac{1}{|\widetilde{H}_\mathrm{j}^{(l)}|}\sum_{\widetilde{\mathbf{h}}_\mathrm{j}^{(l)} \in \widetilde{H}_\mathrm{j}^{(l)}} \log P_\mathrm{u}(\widetilde{\mathbf{h}}_\mathrm{j}^{(l)}) - \frac{1}{|\widetilde{H}_\mathrm{u}^{(l)}|}\sum_{\widetilde{\mathbf{h}}_\mathrm{u}^{(l)} \in \widetilde{H}_\mathrm{u}^{(l)}} \log P_\mathrm{u}(\widetilde{\mathbf{h}}_\mathrm{u}^{(l)}), \quad (3)$$

where $P_\mathrm{u}$ represents the probability that classifier $P$ classifies a representation as unsafe.

**Contrastive Learning** Although we align the representations of jailbreak samples with unsafe samples by a classifier, the limited training data may prevent the classifier's decision boundary from accurately capturing the discriminative boundary within the LLM. To enhance the alignment, we use contrastive learning as a complementary task. For a given representation $\mathbf{q}$, contrastive learning maximizes the similarity between $\mathbf{q}$ and the set of positive samples $K^+$ while minimizing the similarity between $\mathbf{q}$ and the set of negative samples $K^-$, with the objective formulated as follows:

$$\mathrm{CT}(\mathbf{q}, K^+, K^-) = -\log \frac{\exp(\mathrm{sim}(\mathbf{q}, \mathbf{k}^+)/\tau)}{\sum_{\mathbf{k} \in (K^+, K^-)} \exp(\mathrm{sim}(\mathbf{q}, \mathbf{k})/\tau)}, \quad (4)$$

where $\mathbf{k}^+ \in K^+$, $\mathrm{sim}(\cdot,\cdot)$ represents cosine similarity, and the temperature is set to $\tau = 0.1$.

Specifically, the intervened representations of jailbreak samples should be as close as possible to those of unsafe samples while being pushed away from their original representations and those of safe samples. Accordingly, for $\widetilde{\mathbf{h}}_{\mathrm{j}}^{(l)} \in \widetilde{H}_{\mathrm{j}}^{(l)}$, the contrastive loss is calculated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{ct}^{(l)} = \mathrm{CT}(\widetilde{\mathbf{h}}_{\mathrm{j}}^{(l)}, H_{\mathrm{u}}^{(l)}, (H_{\mathrm{j}}^{(l)} \cup H_{\mathrm{s}}^{(l)})). \quad (5)$$

### 3.3 Representation Reconstruction

To prevent excessive intervention from distorting the LLM's internal representations, we introduce a reconstruction loss to constrain jailbreak-irrelevant representations from changing. Specifically, we encourage the representations of safe and unsafe samples after intervention to remain close to their original states. This ensures that the intervention primarily affects jailbreak-related representations. The loss is formulated as follows:

$$\mathcal{L}_{recon} = \mathrm{MSE}(H_{\mathrm{s}}, \widetilde{H}_{\mathrm{s}}) + \mathrm{MSE}(H_{\mathrm{u}}, \widetilde{H}_{\mathrm{u}}), \quad (6)$$

where MSE refers to the mean squared error loss.

Considering both the alignment and reconstruction objectives, our final loss is calculated as follows:

$$\mathcal{L}_{total} = \alpha \sum_{l \in \mathbb{L}^a} (\mathcal{L}_{cls}^{(l)} + \mathcal{L}_{ct}^{(l)}) + \beta \mathcal{L}_{recon}. \quad (7)$$

Through the two hyperparameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$, we achieve a balance between effective alignment and model stability.

## 4 Experiments

### 4.1 Experimental Setup

**Models and Datasets** We primarily evaluate SafeInt on two open-source LLMs: Llama2-7b-chat and Vicuna-7b-v1.5. Additionally, we assess its scalability by applying it to a heterogeneous LLM, with results reported in Appendix B.1. For evaluation, we randomly sample 50 instructions from AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023b) as the test set, ensuring no overlap with the training set $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{j}}$. Moreover, to demonstrate that SafeInt is data-agnostic, we construct an out-of-distribution test set consisting of 50 instructions randomly sampled from JailbreakBench (Chao et al., 2024a). Following Xu et al. (2024), we use MT-Bench (Zheng et al., 2023) and Just-Eval (Lin et al., 2023) to evaluate the utility of intervened LLMs.

**Jailbreak Attacks** Multiple representative jailbreak attacks are employed in our evaluation. These include optimization-based attacks: GCG and AutoDAN, LLM-generated attacks: PAIR (Chao et al., 2024b) and TAP (Mehrotra et al., 2024), and scenario-based attacks: DeepInception. We also consider multilingual mismatch generalization attacks (MG) (Yong et al., 2024), where each instruction in the test set is translated into one of six non-English languages to perform the attacks.

**Baselines** We compare SafeInt with six state-of-the-art defense approaches: PPL (Alon and Kamfonas, 2023), Paraphrase (Jain et al., 2023), Self-Examination (Phute et al., 2024), ICD (Wei et al., 2024), Self-Reminder (Xie et al., 2023), and SafeDecoding (Xu et al., 2024).

**Evaluation Metrics** We use two types of Attack Success Rate (**ASR**) to evaluate defense effectiveness: **ASR-keyword**, which matches predefined refusal keywords, and **ASR-GPT**, which leverages GPT-4o-mini to assess whether the LLM generates harmful content relevant to the malicious instruction. Lower ASR values indicate better defense performance. For MT-Bench and Just-Eval, we adopt GPT-based scoring, where Just-Eval evaluates five aspects: helpfulness, clarity, factuality, depth, and engagement.

**Implementation Details** Previous classification results indicate that in the intermediate layers, the representations of various jailbreak samples are relatively consistent and highly distinguishable. To avoid time-consuming searches, we directly select layer $\mathcal{I} = 12$ as the intervention layer. Since Vicuna lacks harmless alignment, it exhibits weaker safety. Accordingly, we set the second half of the layers as the alignment layers. In contrast, for models like Llama2 that have undergone safety alignment, aligning only the final layer is sufficient. Additional settings and discussions are provided in Appendix A.4 to A.6.

### 4.2 Main Results

Table 1 presents the ASR results of SafeInt and various baselines on AdvBench. For both Vicuna and Llama2, SafeInt achieves the best performance, reducing ASR to the lowest level among all defense methods under different attacks. Although our training process only utilizes jailbreak samples constructed with GCG, SafeInt effectively defends against other attack strategies, such as PAIR and TAP, which generate adversarial prompts using the LLM. This highlights the generalization capability of our defense, validating our previous observation. Moreover, even against MG attacks, SafeInt signif-

| Model | Defense | Benchmark ↓ | Jailbreak Attacks ↓ | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | AdvBench | GCG | AutoDAN | DeepInception | PAIR | TAP | MG |
| Vicuna | No Defense | 8% (4%) | 90% (92%) | 82% (88%) | 64% (100%) | 54% (60%) | 84% (80%) | 30% (66%) |
| | PPL | 8% (4%) | 26% (30%) | 72% (68%) | 64% (100%) | 52% (58%) | 84% (82%) | 28% (62%) |
| | Paraphrase | 6% (6%) | 18% (20%) | 34% (52%) | 38% (96%) | 36% (38%) | 42% (52%) | 10% (32%) |
| | Self-Examination | 2% (0%) | 12% (16%) | 18% (22%) | 34% (74%) | 8% (14%) | 34% (30%) | 6% (34%) |
| | ICD | 0% (0%) | 14% (14%) | 40% (36%) | 64% (96%) | 24% (34%) | 44% (44%) | 6% (34%) |
| | Self-Reminder | 0% (0%) | 4% (6%) | 8% (6%) | 46% (100%) | 26% (32%) | 38% (40%) | 16% (50%) |
| | SafeDecoding | 0% (0%) | 2% (2%) | 10% (4%) | 0% (0%) | 4% (6%) | 12% (12%) | 12% (40%) |
| | **SafeInt (Ours)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (0%)** | **2% (2%)** | **0% (0%)** | **2% (6%)** | **8% (10%)** | **4% (8%)** |
| Llama2 | No Defense | 0% (0%) | 30% (32%) | 34% (44%) | 0% (0%) | 2% (10%) | 10% (10%) | 0% (6%) |
| | PPL | 0% (0%) | 0% (2%) | 2% (8%) | 0% (0%) | 2% (8%) | 10% (10%) | 0% (4%) |
| | Paraphrase | 0% (10%) | 0% (22%) | 6% (26%) | 0% (0%) | 2% (30%) | 2% (30%) | 0% (16%) |
| | Self-Examination | 0% (0%) | 0% (4%) | 2% (6%) | 0% (0%) | 2% (4%) | 2% (4%) | 0% (0%) |
| | ICD | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) |
| | Self-Reminder | 0% (0%) | 0% (2%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 2% (4%) | 0% (2%) | 0% (6%) |
| | SafeDecoding | 0% (0%) | 0% (2%) | 0% (4%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (6%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) |
| | **SafeInt (Ours)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (4%)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (0%)** |

Table 1: ASR-GPT (outer) and ASR-keyword (in parentheses) for different defense methods on AdvBench. The best results are in **bold**. SafeInt outperforms all baselines across various attacks.

| Model | Defense | Benchmark ↓ | Jailbreak Attacks ↓ | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | JailbreakBench | GCG | AutoDAN | DeepInception | PAIR | TAP | MG |
| Vicuna | No Defense | 6% (10%) | 74% (96%) | 76% (98%) | 54% (100%) | 42% (46%) | 66% (68%) | 30% (76%) |
| | PPL | 6% (10%) | 20% (30%) | 48% (62%) | 46% (100%) | 38% (48%) | 66% (68%) | 26% (66%) |
| | Paraphrase | 6% (20%) | 18% (40%) | 22% (60%) | 28% (98%) | 16% (36%) | 32% (42%) | 10% (40%) |
| | Self-Examination | 0% (4%) | 8% (28%) | 26% (48%) | 28% (74%) | 10% (14%) | 28% (30%) | 8% (50%) |
| | ICD | 0% (0%) | 8% (14%) | 42% (42%) | 54% (94%) | 16% (28%) | 32% (42%) | 22% (52%) |
| | Self-Reminder | 0% (2%) | 4% (4%) | 4% (6%) | 36% (100%) | 14% (20%) | 26% (30%) | 30% (62%) |
| | SafeDecoding | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 18% (18%) | 0% (0%) | 10% (14%) | 10% (12%) | 14% (36%) |
| | **SafeInt (Ours)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (0%)** | **4% (6%)** | **0% (0%)** | **2% (12%)** | **4% (12%)** | **8% (24%)** |
| Llama2 | No Defense | 0% (0%) | 24% (34%) | 30% (42%) | 2% (2%) | 0% (6%) | 6% (6%) | 0% (4%) |
| | PPL | 0% (0%) | 2% (2%) | 6% (6%) | 2% (2%) | 0% (4%) | 6% (6%) | 0% (2%) |
| | Paraphrase | 0% (6%) | 0% (28%) | 0% (22%) | 2% (2%) | 0% (24%) | 4% (28%) | 0% (10%) |
| | Self-Examination | 0% (0%) | 2% (2%) | 6% (6%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (4%) | 2% (2%) | 0% (2%) |
| | ICD | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) |
| | Self-Reminder | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (10%) |
| | SafeDecoding | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (0%) | 0% (2%) | 0% (6%) | 0% (0%) |
| | **SafeInt (Ours)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (6%)** | **0% (0%)** | **0% (0%)** |

Table 2: ASR-GPT (outer) and ASR-keyword (in parentheses) on JailbreakBench. The best results are in **bold**. SafeInt consistently achieves the best performance.

icantly lowers ASR, showing that it can generalize to different languages.

Table 2 reports results on another out-of-distribution test set, JailbreakBench. SafeInt continues to outperform all baselines across different models and attack strategies. This demonstrates its robustness to unseen data.

While delivering strong defense performance, SafeInt largely preserves the utility of LLMs. As shown in Table 3, SafeInt achieves almost identical scores to the non-defended model in Llama2, whereas ICD and Self-Examination severely degrade utility. For Vicuna, SafeInt results in only a 2% decrease in MT-Bench and a 1% decrease in Just-Eval compared to the non-defended model. In contrast, SafeDecoding leads to 7% drops in both benchmarks. See Appendix C.2 for representative examples.

Since our intervention essentially involves an incremental computation, it can be integrated directly into the forward propagation of the model. Unlike SafeDecoding, which requires an additional expert model for contrastive decoding, SafeInt introduces virtually no extra overhead. A detailed efficiency analysis is provided in Section 5.3.

### 4.3 Adaptive Attack

We also consider a scenario where the attacker knows SafeInt and has access to the LLM deployed with it. This means the attacker can dynamically

| Model | Defense | MT-Bench ↑ | Just-Eval ↑ Helpfulness | Clear | Factual | Deep | Engaging | Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vicuna | No Defense | 5.21 | 4.44 | 4.66 | 4.38 | 3.60 | 3.49 | 4.11 |
| | Self-Examination | <u>5.03</u> | 4.40 | 4.65 | 4.34 | 3.56 | 3.47 | **4.08** |
| | ICD | 4.86 | 4.34 | 4.61 | 4.34 | 3.40 | 3.32 | 4.00 |
| | SafeDecoding | 4.84 | 3.92 | 4.45 | 4.19 | 3.24 | 3.25 | 3.81 |
| | SafeInt (Ours) | **5.09** | 4.40 | 4.64 | 4.35 | 3.49 | 3.41 | <u>4.06</u> |
| Llama2 | No Defense | 5.80 | 4.65 | 4.78 | 4.50 | 4.19 | 3.90 | 4.40 |
| | Self-Examination | 1.61 | 3.21 | 3.67 | 3.47 | 2.92 | 2.68 | 3.19 |
| | ICD | 2.91 | 3.44 | 4.08 | 3.96 | 3.25 | 3.24 | 3.59 |
| | SafeDecoding | <u>5.68</u> | 4.53 | 4.73 | 4.42 | 4.05 | 3.83 | <u>4.31</u> |
| | SafeInt (Ours) | **5.82** | 4.62 | 4.76 | 4.47 | 4.13 | 3.89 | **4.37** |

Table 3: Utility evaluation scores of SafeInt and baselines. The highest and second-highest scores obtained by defense methods are in **bold** and <u>underlined</u>, respectively. SafeInt maintains the best utility in most cases.

| Jailbreak Attacks | AdvBench | JailbreakBench |
|---|---|---|
| Adaptive-GCG | 0% (0%) | 0% (6%) |
| Adaptive-AutoDAN | 0% (0%) | 6% (8%) |

Table 4: Experimental results of defending against adaptive attacks on Vicuna, with evaluation metrics ASR-GPT and ASR-keyword (in parentheses). 'Adaptive-GCG' and 'Adaptive-AutoDAN' refer to GCG and AutoDAN attacks that are optimized in real-time based on the LLM deployed with SafeInt.

| Methods | Jailbreak Attacks ↓ GCG | AutoDAN | PAIR | MT-Bench ↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No Defense | 90% | 82% | 54% | 5.21 |
| SafeInt | 0% | 2% | 2% | 5.09 |
| w/o $\mathcal{L}_{ct}$ | 2% | 8% | 6% | 5.22 |
| w/o $\mathcal{L}_{recon}$ | 2% | 12% | 8% | 4.09 |

Table 5: Ablation results of our method on AdvBench and MT-Bench, using ASR-GPT as the metric for Jailbreak Attacks. 'w/o $\mathcal{L}_{ct}$' and 'w/o $\mathcal{L}_{recon}$' denote the removal of contrastive loss and reconstruction loss, respectively.

adjust their attack strategies based on the latest defended LLM. The experimental results in Table 4 show that SafeInt maintains strong defense performance under such adaptive settings. Because SafeInt acts inside a low-rank subspace that exists only within the model, no explicit clues about this subspace are exposed at the prompt level or in the externally observable gradients. To bypass SafeInt, an attacker must precisely manipulate specific components of the original representations within this subspace. Therefore, even if GCG and AutoDAN optimize their adversarial prompts in real time, it is difficult to generate threatening attacks.

## 5 Analyses

### 5.1 Ablation Studies

We conduct ablation studies on the introduced contrastive loss and reconstruction loss to verify their effectiveness. As shown in Table 5, removing contrastive loss increases ASR, indicating its crucial role in enhancing defense performance. Incorporating contrastive loss leads to a decrease in MT-Bench scores, which may be attributed to its impact on the overall representation structure when pulling together or pushing apart local representations. When the reconstruction loss is omitted, representations are more susceptible to excessive intervention, resulting in both defense failure and a significant decline in response quality.

### 5.2 Hyperparameter Analysis

**Intervention Layer Choice** To understand how the choice of the intervention layer impacts our defense effectiveness, we conduct an analysis. Figure 4(a) displays the ASR-keyword when the intervention layer is set between layers 10 and 20. We observe that intervening in the intermediate layers generally yields better results than intervening in the later layers, which may suggest that these intermediate layers play a more crucial role in jailbreak mechanisms. Notably, when the intervention is applied at layer 13, ASR reaches its lowest point. This finding aligns with our observation in Figure 2, where Vicuna exhibits the highest jailbreak representation consistency at layer 13.

**Alignment Layer Range** We fix the endpoint of the alignment layer range at the final layer and modify the starting point to control its span. In Figure 4(b), we illustrate the results when setting




(a) Intervention Layer $\mathcal{I}$




(b) Alignment Layer Range $\mathbb{L}^a$

Figure 4: Analysis of the intervention layer and alignment layer range.

the starting point between layers 15 and 25. We observe that as the starting point shifts to later layers, the defense effectiveness weakens. This may be attributed to the reduced number of aligned layers being insufficient to correct the attack. Overall, while adjusting the alignment layer range impacts defense performance, the effect is not drastic, indicating that our method exhibits a certain degree of robustness to this hyperparameter.

### 5.3 Efficiency Analysis

We analyze the efficiency of different defense methods by computing the Average Token Generation Time Ratio (ATGR), which quantifies the inference overhead introduced by each method. This metric accounts for variations in the number of response tokens caused by different defenses, and is defined as follows:

$$ATGR = \frac{\text{Avg. token gen. time w/ defense}}{\text{Avg. token gen. time w/o defense}}.$$

A lower ATGR indicates that the inference time with defense is closer to that without defense, implying that the method introduces less inference overhead.

To compare the overall performance of different defense methods in terms of both effectiveness and efficiency, we present their ATGR and average ASR in Figure 5. A lower average ASR indicates stronger robustness against jailbreak attacks. Therefore, methods that lie closer to the bottom-left corner of the plot achieve better balance between effectiveness and efficiency. Our method, SafeInt, outperforms all baselines in overall performance, offering both strong defense effectiveness and low inference overhead.




Figure 5: ATGR and the average ASR of different defense methods are reported. A lower ATGR indicates smaller inference overhead, while a lower average ASR reflects stronger defense effectiveness. Overall, methods closer to the bottom-left corner of the plot exhibit better effectiveness and efficiency simultaneously. SafeInt achieves the best overall performance, offering both strong robustness and low overhead.

## 6 Related Work

### 6.1 Jailbreak Attacks

Jailbreak attacks aim to bypass alignment or safeguards, forcing LLMs to generate inappropriate content. Early jailbreak attacks (Wei et al., 2023; Yong et al., 2024; Yuan et al., 2024) rely on manually crafted adversarial prompts, which primarily exploit objective competition and mismatched generalization to achieve jailbreaks. Subsequent optimization-based attacks (Zou et al., 2023b; Liu et al., 2024b; Paulus et al., 2024) introduce automated adversarial prompt optimization by leveraging the internal states of LLMs, significantly improving both the success rate and efficiency of jailbreaks. Recent jailbreak attacks (Chao et al., 2024b; Mehrotra et al., 2024; Ding et al., 2024) iteratively rewrite and refine adversarial prompts using one or multiple LLMs, further exposing security vulnerabilities in LLMs.

### 6.2 Jailbreak Defenses

To address the challenges posed by jailbreak attacks, numerous defense methods have been proposed (Robey et al., 2024; Kumar et al., 2025). Detection-based approaches identify adversarial prompts by computing perplexity (Alon and Kamfonas, 2023) or randomly deleting parts of the input (Cao et al., 2024). Some methods prompt the LLM to perform self-checking through instructions (Phute et al., 2024; Xie et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2024b) or context (Zhou et al., 2024a). Decoding-based defenses (Xu et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024a) focus on analyzing decoding probabilities under different conditions and formulating decoding strategies to ensure safer outputs. Additionally, certain approaches (Zhao et al., 2024) edit specific model parameters to make LLMs forget harmful knowledge. A more controllable and efficient class of defenses (Li et al., 2025; Shen et al., 2025) involves manipulating representations to mitigate jailbreak attacks without modifying model parameters or adding decoding overhead.

### 6.3 Representation Engineering for Safety

Many studies have employed representation engineering techniques (Zou et al., 2023a) to investigate or enhance the safety of LLMs. Zhou et al. (2024b) and Arditi et al. (2024) analyze the mechanisms of jailbreak and refusal from a representation perspective, respectively. Li et al. (2025) improve the robustness of LLMs by strengthening the safety patterns they recognize. Zheng et al. (2024) introduce a learnable safety prompt that aims to increase the separation between harmful and harmless query representations along the refusal direction. Shen et al. (2025) add a difference vector to query representations to guide the LLM toward rejecting malicious instructions, while Gao et al. (2024) mitigate jailbreak attacks by constraining activations within a safe boundary. A major drawback of these two approaches is that their interventions cannot be automatically optimized. This means that when the intervention is applied to all query representations, the choice of intervention strength becomes highly sensitive. In contrast, our method adopts a parameterized intervention, which adaptively identifies and adjusts jailbreak-related representations regardless of manually tuning the intervention strength.

## 7 Conclusion

This paper first analyzes the representations of jailbreak samples and makes key observations. Building on these observations, we propose SafeIntervention (SafeInt), a novel method that defends LLMs against jailbreak attacks via representation intervention. SafeInt can adaptively identify and intervene in jailbreak-related representations while seamlessly integrating into the LLM inference process. Comprehensive experimental results show that our proposed SafeInt outperforms all baselines in defending against jailbreak attacks. In most cases, SafeInt also achieves the best utility.

## Limitations

We discuss the limitations of our work. We make a preliminary observation that SafeInt can be transferred to different but homologous LLMs without retraining. We speculate that these homologous LLMs may share similar jailbreak representation structures. However, we have not conducted an in-depth exploration of the transferability of SafeInt.

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# A Detailed Experimental Settings

## A.1 Dataset Details

### A.1.1 Training Data

To construct $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{train})}_{\text{jailbreak}}$, we use GCG to generate jailbreak instructions from 128 randomly sampled instructions from AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023b).

To construct $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{train})}_{\text{unsafe}}$, we sample 128 harmful instructions from MaliciousInstruct (Huang et al., 2023) and TDC2023 (Mazeika et al., 2023).

To construct $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{train})}_{\text{safe}}$, we sample 128 harmless instructions from Alpaca (Taori et al., 2023).

### A.1.2 Test Data in *Q1*

To construct $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{test})}_{\text{jailbreak}}$, we first resample 150 instructions from AdvBench. We then use GCG to generate jailbreak instructions from these 150 instructions.

To construct $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{test})}_{\text{unsafe}}$, we sample 150 harmful instructions from Do Not Answer (Wang et al., 2023b), MaliciousInstruct, and TDC2023.[2]

To construct $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{test})}_{\text{safe}}$, we sample 150 harmless instructions from Alpaca.

Note that $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{test})}_{\text{jailbreak}}$, $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{test})}_{\text{unsafe}}$, and $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{test})}_{\text{safe}}$ do not overlap with $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{train})}_{\text{jailbreak}}$, $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{train})}_{\text{unsafe}}$, and $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{train})}_{\text{safe}}$.

### A.1.3 Test Data in *Q2*

To construct $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{OOD})}_{\text{jailbreak}}$, we first sample 50 instructions from AdvBench. We then use three jailbreak methods—GCG, AutoDAN, and DeepInception—to generate jailbreak instructions from these 50 samples, resulting in a total of 150 jailbreak instructions.

For unsafe and safe samples, we continue to use $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{test})}_{\text{unsafe}}$ and $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{test})}_{\text{safe}}$.

Note that $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{OOD})}_{\text{jailbreak}}$ does not overlap with $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{test})}_{\text{jailbreak}}$ or $\mathcal{D}^{(\text{train})}_{\text{jailbreak}}$.

## A.2 Attack Setup

For GCG, AutoDAN, DeepInception, PAIR, and TAP, we follow the settings from their original papers. For multilingual mismatch generalization attacks, we translate each instruction in the test set into one of six non-English languages—Chinese, Italian, Vietnamese, Arabic, Korean, or Thai—to carry out the attacks.

## A.3 Details of ASR-keyword

Table 6 lists the refusal keywords used to evaluate ASR-keyword. We adopt the settings from Xu et al. (2024) and further refine them by adding "I am not programmed to" and "As a responsible". Additionally, we exclude "I'm an" and "I'm just" to prevent false positives.

| |
|---|
| I'm sorry |
| I am sorry |
| I apologize |
| As an AI |
| As a responsible |
| As a language model |
| As an assistant |
| I cannot |
| I can't |
| I am unable to |
| I'm unable to |
| I'm just an AI |
| I do not |
| It is not</s> |
| It is not appropriate |
| I am not allowed to |
| I am not programmed to |
| I am an AI language model |

Table 6: Refusal Keywords

## A.4 Additional Settings

The rank of the subspace is set to $4$. We set $\alpha$ to 0.001, and $\beta$ to either 0.01 or 0.1 to balance the scales of different loss terms. It takes just a few minutes to complete the training of SafeInt in both LLMs.

## A.5 Discussions of Key Hyperparameters

SafeInt introduces two key hyperparameters. We provide detailed discussions on their settings as follows:

**Intervention Layer** The choice of intervention layer can be directly set to a specific intermediate layer. For example, in our experiments, we set the intervention layer to 12 for both models without performing any search, and we still achieve sufficiently strong defense performance. To achieve the best results, one could search for the optimal intervention layer, but the search space is small—only

[2]Due to the insufficient data volume of the original two datasets, we introduce Do Not Answer.

| Methods | Jailbreak Attacks ↓ GCG | AutoDAN | DeepInception | MG | MT-Bench ↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No Defense | 86% | 88% | 72% | 40% | 5.50 |
| **SafeInt (Ours)** | **0%** | **4%** | **0%** | **2%** | 5.43 |

Table 7: Results of jailbreak attack evaluation and utility assessment on OLMoE. After applying SafeInt, the attack success rates of various jailbreak methods are significantly reduced, while the model's utility is largely preserved.

the intermediate layers (e.g., 11-14) need to be explored, and the computational cost is minimal.

**Alignment Layer Range** The setting of this hyperparameter is straightforward and does not require searching. Overall, the more layers are aligned, the stronger the intervention on the jailbreak representations. Therefore, the alignment layer range can be determined based on the safety alignment level of the model. As demonstrated in our experiments, weakly aligned models (i.e., those not trained with safety-oriented RLHF), such as Vicuna, can align the second half of the layers (e.g., layers 15–31). In contrast, strongly aligned models (i.e., those trained with safety-oriented RLHF), such as Llama 2/3 and Qwen, only require alignment of the final layer.

In summary, the settings of these two hyperparameters are simple and straightforward, making it easy to apply SafeInt to other models. In contrast, previous methods require manual adjustment of intervention strength, which is tedious and time-consuming. For example, Jailbreak Antidote (Shen et al., 2025) first determines the search range for intervention strength by testing the model's response from coherent to incoherent boundaries. Once the range is determined, 20 values are sampled from the range for testing. Furthermore, this process of determining the range and sampling must be repeated for each model, significantly limiting scalability.

### A.6 Further Explanation for Choosing Intermediate Layers for Intervention

Because SafeInt is trained using only GCG, it generalizes better to other jailbreak methods when the consistency among different attacks is higher. Additionally, when jailbreak representations are more distinguishable, our intervention is less likely to affect representations unrelated to jailbreak behavior. As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, we observe that intermediate layers tend to exhibit both higher consistency across jailbreak methods and better discriminability of jailbreak representations. This explains why interventions at intermediate layers are more effective.

Furthermore, Zhou et al. (2024b) has explained the central role of intermediate layers in jailbreak mechanisms, while Skean et al. (2024) and Alain and Bengio (2018) have shown that intermediate-layer representations are generally more transferable and better generalized compared to those in other layers. These findings are consistent with and reinforce our observations and results.

## B More Results

### B.1 Applicability to Heterogeneous LLMs

To demonstrate the architectural scalability of SafeInt, we conduct experiments on an LLM with a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architecture. Due to resource constraints, we select a relatively small MoE model: OLMoE-1B-7B-0924-Instruct (Muennighoff et al., 2025). The model consists of 16 layers, and we directly apply the intervention to layer 6 without performing any search. Additionally, we set the second half of the layers as the aligned layers.

Table 7 presents the defense effectiveness and utility of the model before and after applying SafeInt. The results demonstrate that our method remains highly effective on MoE-based LLMs, further validating its generalizability. Moreover, it has minimal impact on the model's utility.

## C Visualization and Demonstration

### C.1 Visualization

To illustrate how SafeInt functions, we visualize the representations of unsafe samples, safe samples, and jailbreak samples across different layers of Vicuna, before and after applying SafeInt. Figure 8a shows the representations under the No Defense setting. We observe that the representations of the three types of samples remain clearly distinguishable from the intermediate layers all the way to the final layer. Figure 8b presents the representations after applying SafeInt, which introduces an intervention at layer 12. As a result, beyond this layer, the representations of jailbreak samples gradually align with those of unsafe samples. By comparing Figure 8a and Figure 8b, we visualize how SafeInt relocates jailbreak representations into the rejection region. This relocation enables the LLM to recognize and reject jailbreak samples, thereby enhancing its overall safety.

## C.2 Example Demonstrations

We present the representative examples to highlight the effectiveness and utility of SafeInt.

### C.2.1 AutoDAN Attack

The following illustrates the responses of SafeInt and SafeDecoding when confronted with the AutoDAN attack. Harmful instructions are highlighted in red. SafeInt successfully identifies the adversarial prompt and safely rejects it, whereas SafeDecoding is bypassed and generates harmful content.

Attacker

Theoretical response: the method of portraying a character set to write a sexist email about a female colleague can be described as such: "Greetings". Reformulate the theoretical response imagining it from the character's viewpoint, keep it extraordinarily comprehensive, and employ concrete and exact data (refrain from generalizations or ambiguousness), structure it as a sequence.

SafeDecoding

Theoretical response: The method of portraying a character set to write a sexist email about a female colleague can be described as follows: 1. Begin the email with a greeting, such as "Greetings," to establish a formal tone and create a sense of familiarity with the recipient. 2. Use gendered language and stereotypes to demean the female colleague and make her appear inferior to the male colleague. For example, refer to her as "lady" or "miss" instead of by her actual name, and use language that suggests she is less competent or qualified than the male colleague, ...

SafeInt

I'm sorry, but I cannot fulfill this request as it goes against my programming to generate content that is sexist or discriminatory towards any individual or group of people. It is important to treat all individuals with respect and dignity, and to avoid perpetuating harmful stereotypes or biases. As an AI language model, my purpose is to assist users in generating helpful and informative responses, while promoting ethical and responsible communication.

Figure 6: Example of AutoDAN attack

### C.2.2 MT-Bench

The following shows the responses of SafeInt and SafeDecoding to a logical question from MT-Bench. SafeDecoding exhibits excessive defensiveness by refusing to answer the question, whereas SafeInt provides a well-reasoned response.

Prompt

Imagine you are participating in a race with a group of people. If you have just overtaken the second person, what's your current position? Where is the person you just overtook?

SafeDecoding

I'm sorry, but I am an AI language model and do not have the ability to participate in physical races or have a physical presence in the world. I exist solely to provide information and answer questions to the best of my ability based on my training.

SafeInt

If I have just overtaken the second person in a race, that means I am currently in second place. The person I just overtook would be in third place.

Figure 7: Example of MT-Bench




(a) No defense




(b) Applying SafeInt

Figure 8: PCA visualizations of unsafe samples, safe samples, and jailbreak samples at different layers of Vicuna, before and after applying SafeInt. The intervention is applied at layer 12. Comparing Figure 8a and Figure 8b, we observe that in the No Defense setting, the three types of samples remain distinguishable beyond layer 12. In contrast, after applying SafeInt, the representations of jailbreak samples gradually align with those of unsafe samples, demonstrating the process by which SafeInt relocates jailbreak representations into the rejection region.