	Once more, the procedures used were almost identical to those in the previously mentioned experiments, but this time around after the completion of the first trial, the experimenter asked the 6- and 9-year-old participants whether they believed the postage stamp's alteration had been achieved via magical means (i.e. the experimenter's manipulation of an object).  This follow-up experiment revealed that child participants were more likely to attribute the event to a magical rather than ordinary physical cause when explicitly asked about the possibility of a magical influence being in effect.  Furthermore, Subbotsky contends that “this confirms the 'open nature' of the original phenomenalistic judgments that can later be developed either into a magical or a natural-physical explanation, depending on the circumstances”.  In essence, Subbotsky believes that phenomenalism is an open system that admits variation—e.g. toward magical or scientific reasoning—when specific conditions are met.
	In light of this evidence, it is illuminating to note the Woolley et al. study, in which both magical and scientifically-based causal reasoning in children are shown to be limited by at least two of the same basic principles.  Although children are aware that the world is governed by laws that prevent them from affecting their physical environments through sheer mental force, younger children still engage in the practice of wish-making with substantial belief in its efficacy.
	When most people conceive of cause and effect in ordinary events, three principles are considered inviolable: priority, in which the cause of an event occurs prior to the effect; consistency, in which the cause of an event is consistent with its outcome; and exclusivity, in which an effect can have only one cause.  The aim of the experiment was to determine if these inviolable properties of ordinary causality were also in force within the domain of wish-making.  Participants watched as an experimenter wished for specific items to appear within a box that had been contrived to dispense the wished-for items when manipulated by another experimenter.  Woolley et al. found in a sample of participants of ages 3-6 that during trials when children observed an experimenter violating either the principle of priority or exclusivity, they were significantly more likely to claim that the experimenter had not produced the object by wishing.  Further experiments that tested the responses of 3-6-year-old participants to violations of ordinary causality (e.g. a toy-chute contraption familiar to many of the participants that was rigged to dispense marbles into a cup) yielded similar results, showing that children did not believe the experimenter's actions to be the cause of a familiar, ordinary event when there was a clear disruption in priority, exclusivity, or consistency.  The overlap between two of the three constraints is apparent and suggestive of a common source from which ordinary and magical causality arise.  In fact, Woolley et al. connect the results of their experiments to Subbotsky's verbal and behavioral hypothesis, speculating that the fact that older children wished for desirable objects with nearly the same frequency as younger children, despite attesting to a disbelief or lesser belief in wish-making, may “reflect verbal-behavioral dissociations in which children's beliefs in magic disappear first in verbal responses and later in their behavior”.  To name another example, Subbotsky's study of 17 college students once again reveals that behavior often belies verbal expression: when the participants were presented with the choice of allowing a “witch” to hex their lives, not one of them gave their consent in spite of the fact that they all professed to disbelieve in magic.
