	Most animals lie; humans, however, are the only ones who do so in such varied ways when survival is not at stake. Nevertheless, the ability to detect deception can be a lifesaver in certain contests, like the criminal justice system where lives are literally at stake. Unfortunately, research in the field of deception detection repeatedly shows that human beings do not detect deception at a rate considerably higher than chance and that neither a singular verbal nor nonverbal cue indicative of deception exists.
	Unlike other species in the animal kingdom, humans have compiled a tome of psychological disorders that classify our fellow man into abnormalities, should the diagnosis fit. In more recent years, perceptions have changed from either having or not having a disorder to the abnormality existing on a continuum, where each person can exhibit certain traits and only those at the extremes are classified as abnormal. Psychopathy is one such abnormality. While psychopathy was once examined when polygraphs first appeared as the potential panacea to deception detection, this out-group was quickly put back behind the prison bars from whence it came.  Since the transition from psychological disorder to trait continuum, very little research has reexamined the deceptive aspects of psychopathy. The proposed project introduces a novel examination of the affect psychopathic traits play in an interrogation setting and how these traits may manifest as strategies capable of influencing deception detection abilities.
Classic deception detection studies manipulate veracity among college undergraduate students by randomly assigning the participants to lie or tell the truth. These statements are videotaped and are often coded for verbal and/or nonverbal cues to deception. Oftentimes, these taped interviews are used as stimuli in subsequent experiments to test the accuracy of veracity judgments made by other college undergraduates and, less frequently, “professional” lie detectors, such as members of law enforcement agencies.
	At this point in time, scholars have essentially concluded that there is no “Pinocchio’s nose”—an objective verbal or non-verbal cue known to be indicative of deception. In fact, a meta-analysis covering 120 studies with a total of 158 cues to deception showed that most behaviors are only weakly, if at all, related to deception, and that many commonly held beliefs of subjective cues are unrelated to deception. Another meta-analysis found that people average a 54% accuracy rate when attempting to detect deception, a level barely better than chance. Bond and DePaulo compared 206 documents and 24,483 lie catchers, including laypeople and law enforcement professionals. Overall, people correctly classified 47% of lies and 61% of truths as deceptive and non-deceptive, respectively. These findings suggest that people display a truth-bias; that is, people are more likely to believe someone is telling the truth than lying.
In a recent meta-analysis, the researchers found that the actual correlates of deception judgments are different from on what people report to rely. Instead, the authors found that people are judged as more deceptive when they are perceived as incompetent and ambivalent or when their statements lack plausibility and spontaneity. Since these cues are not commonly reported in deception detection studies, these results suggest that the behaviors people actually use to judge veracity are significantly different from the stereotypically conceived explicit influences (e.g., gaze aversion, peripheral movements, nervous behavior, etc.). Therefore, if these supposed explicit influences do not actually affect lie catchers’ decision-making to the degree to which they are thought, there must be some implicit processes exerting a significant influence on the veracity judgment process. These results are in line with other research showing that automatic, as opposed to controlled, processes are responsible for the processing of social information. Findings such as these support the hypothesis that people process truths and lies differently. 
